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 This volume ,  Proof and proving in mathematics education , is a Study Volume 
 sponsored by the International Commission on Mathematical Instruction (ICMI). 
ICMI Studies explore specifi c topics of interest to mathematics educators; they aim 
at identifying and analysing central issues in the teaching and learning of these 
 topics. To this end, the ICMI convenes a Study Conference on chosen topics: A group 
of scholars from the conference then prepares a Study Volume that reports on the 
outcomes of the conference. 
 The present Study Volume examines several theoretical and practical notions 
about why and how mathematics educators should approach the teaching and learning 
of proof and proving. The authors of the chapters here are presenting major themes 
and subthemes that arose from the presentations and discussions at the 19th ICMI 
Study Conference. 
 1  ICMI Study 19 
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serve on an International Program Committee (IPC). The Co-Chairs prepared a 
draft Discussion Document, circulated it to the entire IPC, and then revised it in 
light of the IPC members’ input. At its fi rst meeting (Essen, Germany, November 
2007), the IPC settled on the themes of the Study and fi nalised the Discussion 
Document, which was later published in the Bulletin of the International Commission 
on Mathematical Instruction as well as in a number of mathematics education jour-
nals (see  Appendix 1 ). 
 Clearly, we could not include in a single ICMI Study all the themes germane 
to the teaching of proof. Thus the IPC originally selected seven themes that it 
judged to be most relevant to mathematics education and within the IPC mem-
bers’ realm of expertise. The Discussion Document called for contributions that would 
address these themes and contained a list of criteria by which the contributions 
would be assessed. 
 At its second meeting (Sèvres, France, November 2008), the IPC selected the 
contributions that had been recommended by reviewers after a strict refereeing 
process and that were also most closely related to the conference themes. 
(Unfortunately a few excellent submissions had to be excluded because they treated 
themes beyond the conference’s scope.) The IPC then drew up an invitation list of 
about 120 contributors. 
 Taking into account the submissions that had been accepted, the IPC developed a 
programme that included only six of the original seven themes. Each of these themes 
was the focus of a Working Group (WG) that met throughout the Study Conference 
and whose major aim was to prepare one or more chapters for this book. 
 WG1: Cognitive Development of Proof , co-chaired by David Tall and Oleksiy 
Yevdokimov, focused on the characteristics of the cognitive development of proof 
at various school levels, with a view to building an overall picture of the cognitive 
development of proof. 
 WG2: Argumentation , chaired by Viviane Durand-Guerrier, focused on the relation-
ship between proof and argumentation from the perspective of opposing qualities 
such as formal vs. informal, form vs. content, syntax vs. semantics, truth vs. valid-
ity, mathematical logic vs. common sense, formal proof vs. heuristics, and continuity 
vs. discontinuity. 
 WG3: Dynamic Geometry Software/Experimentation , chaired by Ferdinando 
Arzarello, focused on the ways in which mathematical investigations using advanced 
technology and different semiotic resources relate to the formal aspects of mathe-
matical discourse and to the production of proofs. 
 WG4: Proof in the School Curriculum, Knowledge for Teaching Proof, and the 
Transition from Elementary to Secondary , chaired by Fou-Lai Lin, focused on the 
knowledge that teachers need to teach proof effectively and on how proving activities 
should be designed to best foster successful instruction about proof and proving. 
 WG5: The Nature of Proof for the Classroom , co-chaired by Tommy Dreyfus, Hans 
Niels Jahnke, and Wann-Sheng Horng, examined aspects of the teaching of proof 
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from the primary through the tertiary level. It addressed questions about the form, 
status, and role that proof must assume at each level to ensure success in generating 
mathematical understanding. 
 WG6: Proof at the Tertiary Level , chaired by Annie Selden, explored all aspects of 
the teaching and learning of proof and proving at the tertiary level, including the 
transition from secondary school to university and the transition from undergradu-
ate to graduate work in mathematics. 
 Complementary to the Working Groups, the IPC broadened the Study’s scope 
by inviting four distinguished scholars to deliver plenary talks on topics related 
to proof in mathematics, but not necessarily intimately connected to mathematics 
education. In their talks, Giuseppe Longo, Jonathan Borwein, Judith Grabiner 
and Frank Quinn examined proof from the four perspectives of epistemology, 
experimental mathematics, the history of mathematics, and mathematics itself. 
The IPC also invited a panel of eminent experts, Karine Chemla, Wann-Sheng 
Horng and Man Keung Siu to discuss proof as perceived in ancient Chinese 
mathematics writing. 
 The ICMI Study Conference itself took place at the National Taiwan Normal 
University in Taipei, Taiwan, from May 10 to May 15, 2009 (see  Appendix 2 ). 
 2  Contents of the Volume 
 A common view of mathematical proof sees it as no more than an unbroken sequence 
of steps that establish a necessary conclusion, in which every step is an application 
of truth-preserving rules of logic. In other words, proof is often seen as synonymous 
with formal derivation. This Study Volume treats proof in a broader sense, recognis-
ing that a narrow view of proof neither refl ects mathematical practice nor offers the 
greatest opportunities for promoting mathematical understanding. 
 In mathematical practice, in fact, a proof is often a series of ideas and insights 
rather a sequence of formal steps. Mathematicians routinely publish proofs that 
contain gaps, relying on the expert reader to fi ll them in. Many published proofs are 
informal arguments, in effect, but are still considered rigorous enough to be accepted 
by mathematicians. 
 This Volume examines aspects of proof that include, but are not limited to, explo-
rations, explanations, justifi cation of conjectures and defi nitions, empirical reasoning, 
diagrammatic reasoning, and heuristic devices. The chapter authors, whilst by and 
large accepting the common view of proof, do diverge on the importance they attach 
to various aspects of proof and particularly on the degree to which they judge formal 
derivation as necessary or useful in promoting an understanding of mathematics and 
mathematical reasoning. 
 The remainder of the Volume is divided into six parts. These are arranged 
according to major themes that arose from the conference as a whole, rather than 
by working groups. 
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 Part I: Proof and Cognition 
 In Chap.  2 , “Cognitive development of proof” David Tall, Oleksiy Yevdokimov, 
Boris Koichu, Walter Whiteley, Margo Kondratieva and Ying-Hao Cheng examine 
the development of proof from the child to the adult learner and on to the mature 
research mathematician. The authors fi rst consider various existing theories and 
viewpoints relating to proof and proving from education research, brain research, 
cognitive science, psychology, semiotics, and more, and then go on to offer their 
own theory of “the broad maturation of proof structures”. Their resulting framework 
for the broad maturation of proof structures consists of six developmental stages 
which they illustrate with an interesting array of well-chosen examples. They also 
appropriately elaborate on the novel notion of a “crystalline concept” which they 
defi ne as “a concept that has an internal structure of constrained relationships that 
cause it to have necessary properties as part of its context.” 
 In his plenary chapter “ Theorems as constructive visions ” Giuseppe Longo 
describes mathematics and proofs as conceptual constructions that, though sup-
ported by language and logic, originate in the real activities of humans in space 
and time. He points out in particular the crucial role of cognitive principles such 
as symmetry and order in attaining mathematical knowledge and understanding 
proof, citing several examples to show that in constructing a proof the notions of 
symmetry and order derived from actual experience are no less essential than logi-
cal inference. He concludes that “Mathematics is the result of an open-ended 
‘game’ between humans and the world in space and time; that is, it results from 
the inter-subjective construction of knowledge made in language and logic, along 
a passage through the world, which canalises our praxes as well as our endeavour 
towards knowledge.” 
 Part II: Experimentation: Challenges and Opportunities 
 M athematical researcher Jonathan Borwein, in his plenary chapter “ Exploratory 
experimentation: Digitally-assisted disc ov ery and proof ” argues that current com-
puting technologies offer revolutionary new scaffolding both to enhance mathemat-
ical reasoning and to restrain mathematical error. He shares Pólya’s view that 
intuition, enhanced by experimentation, mostly precedes deductive reasoning. He then 
gives and discusses some illustrative examples, which clearly show that the bound-
aries between mathematics and the natural sciences, and between inductive and 
deductive reasoning, are blurred and getting more blurred. 
 Borwein points out that the mathematical community faces a great challenge to 
re-evaluate the role of proof in light of the power of computer systems, the sophis-
tication of mathematical computing packages, and the growing capacity to data-
mine on the Internet. As the prospects for inductive mathematics blossom, the need 
to ensure that the role of proof is properly founded remains undiminished. 
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 The chapter “ Experimental approaches to theoretical thinking: Artefacts and 
proofs ” by Ferdinando Arzarello, Mariolina Bartolini Bussi, Andy Leung, Maria 
Alessandra Mariotti, and Ian Stevenson examines the dynamic tension between the 
empirical and the theoretical aspects of mathematics, especially in relation to the role 
of technological artefacts in both. It does so against the background of offering teach-
ers a comprehensive framework for pursuing the learning of proof in the classroom. 
 The authors discuss and analyse their subject from different linked perspectives: 
historical, epistemological, didactical and pedagogical. They fi rst present examples 
of the historical continuity of experimental mathematics from straight-edge and 
compass construction to the modern use of different dynamic mathematics soft-
ware. They draw these examples from a few different cultures and epochs in which 
instruments have played a crucial role in generating mathematical concepts, theo-
rems and proofs. 
 Second, the authors analyse some didactical episodes from the classroom, where 
the use of instruments in proving activities makes the aforementioned dynamic ten-
sion explicit. Specifi cally, they examine how this tension regulates students’ cogni-
tive processes in solving mathematical problems, fi rst making explorations with 
technological tools, then formulating suitable conjectures and fi nally proving them. 
 The chapter is followed by a commentary “Response to Experimental approaches 
to theoretical thinking: Artefacts and proofs” by Jonathan Borwein and Judy-
anne Osborn. 
 Part III: Historical and Educational Perceptions of Proof 
 In her plenary address “Why proof? A historian’s perspective,” historian of mathemat-
ics Judith Grabiner traces some of the main aspects of the history of mathematical 
proof in the Western tradition. She fi rst addresses the birth of logical proof in Greek 
geometry and why the Greeks moved beyond visualisation to purely logical proof. 
Then she looks at the use of visual demonstration in Western mathematics since the 
Greeks, and proceeds to discuss two characteristics of more modern mathematics, 
abstraction and symbolism, and their power. There follows a discussion of how and 
why standards of proof change, noting in particular the infl uence of ideas from phi-
losophy. Finally, the author discusses how proof in mathematics interacts with the 
‘real world’, arguing that proof did not develop in a cultural or intellectual vacuum. 
 In the chapter “ Conceptions of proof – In research and in teaching ”, Richard 
Cabassut, AnnaMarie Conner, Filyet Aslı İşçimen, Fulvia Furinghetti, Hans Niels 
Jahnke and Francesca Morselli describe mathematicians’ conceptualisations of 
proof and contrast them with those of mathematics educators. The authors argue 
that practising mathematicians do not rely on any specifi c formal defi nition of proof 
but they do seem to know what a proof is. On the other hand, mathematics educa-
tors’ conceptions of proof derive from the need to teach students to construct proper 
proofs and to recognise the subtle differences between argumentation and 
 mathematical proof. The authors then discuss the ideas of “genetic”, “pragmatic,” 
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and “conceptual” proofs. They next examine in detail some epistemological and 
pedagogical beliefs about the nature and role of proof in mathematics, about the role 
of proof in school mathematics, about diffi culties in proving, about how proof 
should be taught in school, and about the self as mathematical thinker in the context 
of proof. The authors conclude by discussing “metaknowledge about proof”, its 
importance and its role in the mathematics curriculum. 
 Tommy Dreyfus, Elena Nardi and Roza Leikin review diverse forms of proofs in 
their chapter “ Forms of proof and proving in the classroom ”. Relying on many 
empirical studies presented at the ICMI 19 Conference and on published empirical 
research papers, they describe a variety of proofs (e.g., by visual, verbal, and 
dynamic representations) and an array of mathematical arguments (from example-
based, deductive and inductive to generic and general). They discuss different 
degrees of rigour, where and how these are used, and the contexts in which they 
appear. The authors also report on students’ and teachers’ beliefs about various 
aspects of proof and proving. They discuss the pedagogical importance of multiple-
proof tasks and of taking into account the mathematical, pedagogical, and cognitive 
structures related to the effective teaching of proof and proving. They conclude with 
a plea for additional empirical research, longitudinal studies, and investigations on 
the long-term effects of the different approaches to proof. 
 In the chapter “ The need for proof and proving: mathematical and pedagogical 
perspectives ”, Orit Zaslavsky, Susan D. Nickerson, Andreas Stylianides, Ivy 
Kidron and Greisy Winicki-Landman explore three main questions: Why teach 
proof? What are (or may be) learners’ needs for proof? How can teachers facilitate 
the need for proof? 
 First, they discuss the connection between different functions of proof in math-
ematics and the needs those evoke for teaching proof. They briefl y explore the epis-
temology of proof in the history of mathematics in order to illuminate the needs that 
propelled the discipline’s development. Second, the authors take a learner’s per-
spective on the need to prove, and examine categories of intellectual need that may 
drive learners to prove (i.e., needs for certitude, for understanding, for quantifi ca-
tion, for communication, and for structure and connection). Finally, the authors 
address pedagogical issues involved in teachers’ attempts to facilitate learners’ need 
to prove; uncertainty, cognitive confl ict or the need for explanation or organised 
structure may help drive learners to prove. 
 In his plenary “Contemporary proofs for mathematics education”, Frank Quinn 
argues that the proofs encountered in mathematical practice provide a very high level 
of reliability, because the proof process creates a record suffi ciently detailed to allow 
easy detection and repair of errors. He therefore recommends the introduction of two 
key ideas, “potential proof” and “formal potential proof,” into school mathematics 
and undergraduate mathematics education. The fi rst entails asking students to show 
their work – that is, to provide a detailed record of their solution so that it can be 
checked for errors. The second means asking students to supply explicit explanations 
to justify their work. Citing several examples, Quinn argues that students should 
thereby learn that a train of reasoning leading to a correct conclusion does not count 
as a proof unless it is a potential proof that has been found to be error-free. 
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 Part IV: Proof in the School Curriculum 
 Keith Jones and Patricio Herbst, in their chapter “ Proof, proving, and teacher- 
student interaction: Theories and contexts ”, seek to identify theoretical frameworks 
that would help understand the teacher’s role in proof education. They focus on 
three theories that might shed light on teacher-student interaction in teaching of 
proof across diverse contexts. They fi rst discuss the theory of socio-mathematical 
norms, characterised by inquiry-based mathematics classrooms and the use of class-
room interactions to arrive at shared norms of mathematical practice. Second comes 
the theory of teaching with variation, in which the teacher uses two types of varia-
tions:  conceptual variation (highlighting a new concept by contrasting inadmissible 
examples), and  procedural variation (refocusing the learner’s attention from a con-
crete problem to its symbolic representation). Third, the authors examine the theory 
of instructional exchanges that, borrowing from Brousseau’s notion a “didactical 
contract” presumes that teacher and students are mutually responsible for whatever 
learning takes place in the classroom. 
 Feng-Jui Hsieh, Wang-Shian Horng and Haw-Yaw Shy, in “From exploration to 
proof production”, explain how exploration, especially hands-on exploration, is 
introduced and integrated into the teaching of proof in Taiwan. They describe a 
conceptual model for the relationship between exploration, problem solving, prov-
ing and proof, and illustrate it with two exploratory teaching experiments. 
 The authors distinguish two different positions in regard to “exploration” as a 
learning and conceptualising activity. The fi rst position views exploration as a men-
tal process, the second, as an activity that involves manipulating and interacting 
with external environments (e.g., hands-on or dynamic computer software environ-
ments). Exploration generally provides learners with valuable opportunities to con-
struct mathematics objects, transform fi gures, probe in multiple directions, perceive 
divergent visual information, and receive immediate feedback on their actions. The 
authors also give two extracts from a Taiwanese textbook, which demonstrate the 
integration of exploration in proving. Last, they provide a useful but tentative com-
parison of dynamic computer and hands-on explorations, and summarise some of 
the positive and negative issues raised by integrating exploration, as well as suggest-
ing areas for future research. 
 Fou-Lai Lin, Kyeong-Hwa Lee, Kai-Lin Yang, Michal Tabach and Gabriel 
Stylianides develop some principles for designing tasks that teach conjecturing and 
proving in the chapter “ Principles of task design for conjecturing and proving ”. 
They extract some fi rst principles from design research and the literature for design-
ing tasks for mathematics learning generally. They also briefl y refl ect on a few his-
torical examples, such as Fermat and Poincaré’s conjectures, within the context of 
Lakatos’ model. 
 They discuss the strategy of promoting ‘what-if-not’ questions, which encourage 
students to conjecture the consequence of some change in a statement’s premise or 
conclusion or to explore the transformation and application of algorithms and for-
mulae in other areas. They also explore students’ attainment of conviction and 
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 ability to refute statements as well as how to scaffold students’ progress from an 
inductive to a symbolic proof schema. They then adapt elements of all the above in 
order to develop specifi c principles for formulating a more general framework for 
conjecturing and proving. They illustrate this model by developing and analysing 
some practical tasks. 
 The chapter “ Teachers’ professional learning of teaching proof and proving ” 
by Fou-Lai Lin, Kai-Lin Yang, Jane-Jane Lo, Pessia Tsamir, Dina Tirosh and 
Gabriel Stylianides starts with a narrative on the Hanoi Towers activity. From it, 
the authors draw three essential factors for teachers’ competence in teaching 
proof: knowledge specifi c to proof content and proof methods; beliefs/values specifi c 
to the nature and didactics of proof; and practice specifi c to motivating, guiding, 
and evaluating students’ argumentation and proof. They then elaborate on these 
factors with examples related to specifi c content for the professional learning of 
primary and secondary mathematics teachers. They distinguish and discuss three 
further important dimensions from the research literature on mathematics teacher 
education: establishing conviction, the role of the teacher educator, and the notion 
of cognitive confl ict. 
 Last the authors discuss the importance of involving teachers in designing task 
sequences for teaching proof that motivate students’ engagement, challenge their 
mathematical thinking, create cognitive confl ict, and encourage argumentation and 
critical refl ection. To sequence such tasks, the teacher as designer needs to take 
 possible learning trajectories into consideration. Testing the instructional tasks with 
their students engages teachers in productive refl ection. 
 Part V: Argumentation and Transition to Tertiary Level 
 In their chapter “ Argumentation and proof in the mathematics classroom ”, Viviane 
Durand-Guerrier, Paolo Boero, Nadia Douek, Susanna Epp and Denis Tanguay 
adopt the position that the broad concept of argumentation encompasses mathematical 
proof as a special case. They describe and discuss the complex relationships between 
argumentation and proof in mathematical practice from various mathematical and 
educational perspectives. They conclude that students can benefi t from the openness 
of exploration and fl exible validation rules typical of argumentation as a prelude to 
the stricter uses of rules and symbols essential in constructing a mathematical proof. 
They describe many examples indicating that appropriate learning environments 
can facilitate both argumentation and proof in mathematics classes. 
 Next, in “Examining the role of logic in teaching proof”, the same authors 
examine the usefulness of teaching formal logic in school mathematics classes, 
since many high-school mathematics graduates arrive at the tertiary level defi cient 
in deductive reasoning skills. The authors initially examine the positions taken by 
cognitive scientists and mathematics educators about the role of formal logic in 
reasoning, argumentation and proof. This survey reinforces their view that ( pace 
some of those commentators) the principles of formal logic operate in all these 
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procedures, even if not explicitly stated. The authors next move to argue the 
importance of teaching logic along with mathematics, since logic operates in both 
 syntactic and semantic mathematical discourses. Hence, students’ constructing 
proofs requires both logical and mathematical knowledge. Finally, the authors 
give examples of contexts suitable for fostering students’ knowledge of logic and 
dispelling some of their misconceptions. Familiar contexts provide the best oppor-
tunities, they conclude. 
 Annie Selden’s chapter “ Transitions and proof and proving at tertiary level ” 
examines some of the changes students experience when moving from secondary 
school to undergraduate study, or further to graduate studies, in mathematics. For 
example, they face changes in the didactical contract and a cognitive transition from 
experiential and intuitive concepts to more abstract ones with formal defi nitions and 
properties reconstructed through logical deductions. 
 More important for Selden, at the tertiary level constructing proofs involves both 
understanding and using formal defi nitions and previously established theorems, as 
well as considerable creativity and insight. Reading and constructing such formal, 
more rigorous proofs entails a major transition for students, but one that is some-
times supported by relatively little explicit instruction. 
 In addition, tertiary proofs relate to more complex, abstract structures than those 
expected of students at primary or secondary level. Comparing typical secondary 
school geometry proofs with proofs in real analysis, linear algebra, abstract algebra 
or topology, Selden argues that the objects in geometry are idealisations of real 
things (points, lines, planes), whereas the objects in the latter subdisciplines (func-
tions, vector spaces, groups, topological spaces) are abstract reifi cations. 
 Part VI: Lessons from the Eastern Cultural Traditions 
 The last two chapters are devoted to a close look at traditional forms of proof in 
China. In her panel presentation “Using documents from ancient China to teach 
mathematical proof”, Karine Chemla discusses the proofs used in ancient China 
and shows how they can provide a rich source of ideas worth examining for their 
relevance to the classrooms of today. Her point of departure is the work of Liu Hui, 
who in 263 C.E completed a commentary on The Nine Chapters on Mathematical 
Procedures, the earliest known Chinese mathematical book. Chemla shows that 
Liu Hui, when investigating the algorithms embedded in this early book, took pains 
to elaborate how they were developed and how they could best be shown to be cor-
rect by way of systematic and detailed analysis. The examples she brings show 
how important it was for Liu Hui to keep track of the meaning of the operations 
within an algorithm and of providing evidence for the correctness of these opera-
tions. In Chemla’s opinion the teaching of algebraic proofs in today’s schools could 
benefi t from Liu Hui’s insistence, demonstrated in his commentary of The Nine 
Chapters, on the use of well-defi ned mathematical procedures and on the need for 
evidence at each step. 
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 In his panel presentation “Proof in the Western and Eastern traditions: Implications 
for mathematics education”, Man Keung Siu compares and contrasts the Western 
and Eastern traditions of doing mathematics, whilst maintaining that “there is some-
thing about mathematics that is universal, irrespective of race, culture or social con-
text”. He states that even if one accepts the over-simplifi ed notion that Western 
tradition is “dialectic”, whereas Eastern tradition is “algorithmic”, it can be shown 
that there are several parallels between these two mathematical traditions. Siu pres-
ents several examples of proofs and constructions in which these two approaches 
can clearly be seen as complementing each other. In Siu’s view the Western and 
Eastern traditions can both play an important role in the teaching of mathematics, 
because a procedural (algorithmic) approach can be used to help build up a concep-
tual (dialectic) understanding. 
 3  Conclusion 
 The aspects of mathematics proof investigated in this Volume are those that the IPC 
and ICMI executive representatives judged vital to a better understanding of teaching 
mathematics in general and teaching proof in particular. We hope they have deepened 
our understanding of these diffi cult issues in many ways. The Volume does not 
address all of the research areas and questions raised in the Discussion Document 
( Appendix 1 ) in equal depth and detail. Ideally, the Discussion Document will con-
tinue to stimulate new directions for research on proof, for example, the didactical 
use of the explanatory nature of proof to motivate students to learn proof. 
 Proof in mathematical research often allows further generalisation and/or spe-
cialisation to new results, since proving results usually promotes insight into why 
they are true. So another under-explored research area encompasses the identifi ca-
tion of good problems and the development of effective strategies to help students 
see and appreciate this ‘discovery’ function of proof. In addition, the mathematics 
education community needs to constantly and fundamentally rethink the role of 
experimentation and proof in the light of rapidly developing computer technologies, 
dynamic software environments and concurrent advances in cognitive science and 
in the emerging science of automated proof. 
 We hope that this book will convince readers that research on proof and proving is 
indispensable to serious discussions about the place of proof in mathematics education. 
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 1  Introduction 
 In this chapter our aim is to seek how individuals develop ideas of proof appropriate 
for their level of maturity at the time, and how these ideas change in sophistication 
over the long term, from the young child to the adult user of mathematics and on to 
the research mathematician. The exposition focuses on the ways in which the 
 developing individuals build from real world perceptions and actions to a mental 
world of sophisticated mathematical knowledge. 
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 This chapter is consonant with the four plenaries presented to the ICMI 
 conference on proof. Longo sees the formalism of modern mathematics growing 
out of the actions and perceptions of the biological human brain. Grabiner reports 
signifi cant examples of development in history as mathematical experts build on 
their experience to develop new mathematical constructs. Borwein observes the 
changing nature of mathematical thought now that we have computer technology 
to perform highly complex computations almost immediately and to represent 
information in dynamic visual ways. Quinn underlines the mathematical concern 
that proof at the highest level needs to be fundamentally based on the precision of 
the axiomatic method. 
 Mathematical proof develops in many different forms both in historical time and 
in the development of any individual. Various degrees of proof are suggested in 
school mathematics by terms such as ‘show’, ‘justify’, ‘explain’, ‘prove from fi rst 
principles’. Rather than begin by debating the difference between them, we will use 
the word ‘proof’ in its widest sense and analyse the changes in its meaning as the 
individual matures. 
 The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section  2 we consider how the nature 
of proof is envisioned by professional mathematicians and by novices in mathemat-
ics. This is followed, in Section  3 , by introducing a three-facet conceptual framework 
based on perceptions, operations and formal structures that enables us to adequately 
consider the cognitive journey from the child to the adult, and from the novice to 
professional mathematician. Section  4 deals with the development of proof from 
human experience. Section  5 considers the development of proof in the context of 
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry. Section  6 details the increasing sophistica-
tion of proofs in arithmetic and algebra from proof using specifi c calculations, generic 
arguments, algebraic manipulation and on to algebraic proof based on the rules of 
arithmetic. Section  7 addresses the development of proof in undergraduates and on to 
research mathematics, followed by a summary of the whole development. 
 2  Perceptions of Proof 
 2.1  What Is Proof for Mathematicians? 
 Mathematics is a diverse and complex activity, spanning a range of contexts from 
everyday practical activities, through more sophisticated applications and on to the 
frontiers of mathematical research. At the highest level of mathematical research, 
discovery and proof of new theorems may be considered to be the summit of 
 mathematical practice. In the words of three mathematicians:
 Proofs are to mathematics what spelling (or even calligraphy) is to poetry. Mathematical 
works do consist of proofs, just as poems do consist of characters (Arnold  2000 , p. 403). 
 ‘Ordinary mathematical proofs’—to be distinguished from formal derivations—are the 
locus of mathematical knowledge. Their epistemic content goes way beyond what is sum-
marised in the form of theorems (Rav  1999 , p. 5). 
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 The truth of a mathematical claim rests on the existence of a proof. Stated this way, such 
a criterion is absolute, abstract, and independent of human awareness. This criterion is 
conceptually important, but practically useless (Bass  2009 , p. 3 ) . 
 We chose these quotations because they suggest not only the importance of 
proofs in mathematics, but also reveal the debate on the role and nature of proofs 
within the mathematical community. We learn from the fi rst quotation that proofs 
are fundamental to the structure of mathematics. The second tells us that the usual 
(‘ordinary’) proofs produced by mathematicians have subtleties of meaning that go 
beyond the application of logic. The third implies that mathematical proof as an 
absolute argument is conceptually important but may not be what occurs, or even 
what is achievable, in practice. 
 A formal proof, in the sense of Hilbert  ( 1928 /1967), is a sequence of assertions, 
the last of which is the theorem that is proved and each of which is either an axiom 
or the result of applying a rule of inference to previous formulas in the sequence; the 
rules of inference are so evident that the verifi cation of the proof can be done by 
means of a mechanical procedure. Such a formal proof can be expressed in fi rst-order 
set-theoretical language (Rav  1999 ) . Dawson  ( 2006 , p. 271) observed that ‘formal 
proofs appear almost exclusively in works on computer science or mathematical 
logic, primarily as objects to study to which other, informal, arguments are applied.’ 
 An ordinary mathematical proof consists of an argument to convince an audience of 
peer experts that a certain mathematical claim is true and, ideally, to explain why it is 
true (cf. Dawson  2006 ) . Such ordinary proofs can be found in mathematics research 
journals as well as in school and university-level textbooks. They utilise second or 
higher-order logic (Shapiro  1991 ) , but often contain conceptual bridges between parts of 
the argument rather than explicit logical justifi cation (Rav  1999 ) . Sometimes a convinc-
ing argument for peer experts does not constitute a formal proof, only a justifi cation that 
a proof can be constructed, given suffi cient time, incentive, and resources (Bass  2009 ) . 
 From the epistemic point of view, a proof for mathematicians involves thinking 
about new situations, focusing on signifi cant aspects, using previous knowledge 
to put new ideas together in new ways, consider relationships, make conjectures, 
formulate defi nitions as necessary and to build a valid argument. 
 In summary, contemporary mathematicians’ perspectives on proof are sophisti-
cated yet build on the broad development to ‘convince yourself, convince a friend, 
convince an enemy,’ in mathematical thinking at all levels (Mason et al.  1982 ) . To 
this should be added Mason’s further insight that mathematicians are able to develop 
an ‘internal enemy’– a personally constructed view of mathematics that not only 
sets out to convince doubters, but shifts to a higher level attempting to make sense 
of the mathematics itself. 
 2.2  What Is Proof for Growing Individuals? 
 Children or novices do not initially think deductively. The young child begins by 
interacting with real-world situations, perceiving with the senses including vision, 
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hearing, touch, acting on objects in the world, pointing at them, picking them up, 
exploring their properties, developing language to describe them. 
 In parallel with the exploration of objects, the child explores various operations on 
those objects: sorting, counting, sharing, combining, ordering, adding, subtracting, 
multiplying, dividing, developing the operations of arithmetic and on to the generalised 
arithmetic of algebra. This involves observing regularities of the operations, such as 
addition being independent of order and various other properties that are collected 
together and named ‘the rules of arithmetic’. Properties that were seen as natural 
occurrences during physical operations with objects are subtly reworded to become 
rules that must be obeyed. Children may even establish their own rules which are not 
necessarily correct yet, nevertheless, help them to make initial steps towards deduc-
tive thinking. For instance, a 4-year old child attempting to persuade her parents that, 
‘I am older (than another child) because I am taller.’ (Yevdokimov,  in preparation .) 
 Over the longer term, the convincing power of the emerging rules for the child is 
often rooted not only in the observation that the rules ‘work’ in all available situa-
tions, but in the external role of authorities such as a parent, a teacher or a textbook 
(Harel and Sowder  1998 ) . 
 It is only much later – usually at college level – that axiomatic formal proof 
arises in terms of formal defi nitions and deductions. Unlike earlier forms of proof, 
the axioms formulated express only the properties required to make the necessary 
deduction, and are no longer restricted to a particular context, but to any situation 
where the only requirement is that the axioms are satisfi ed. 
 This yields a broad categorisation of three distinct forms of proof: using fi gures, 
diagrams, transformations and deduction in geometry, using established rules of 
arithmetic in algebra initially encountered in school, and in axiomatically defi ned 
structures met only by mathematics majors in university. Our task is to fi t the devel-
opment of proof in general and these three forms of proof in particular into a frame-
work of cognitive growth. 
 3  Theoretical Framework 
 We begin by considering a brief overview of theories of cognitive growth relevant to 
the development of proof. Then we focus on a single idea that acts as a template for 
the cognitive development of proof in a range of contexts: the notion of a crystalline 
concept. This will then be used as a foundation for the development of mathematical 
thinking over time, in which the cognitive development of proof plays a central role. 
 3.1  Theories of Cognitive Growth 
 There are many theories of cognitive growth offering different aspects of develop-
ment over the longer term. Piaget, the father of cognitive approaches to  development, 
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sees the child passing through various stages, from the sensorimotor, through 
 concrete operations, then on to formal operations. 
 Lakoff  ( 1987 ) and his co-workers (Lakoff and Johnson  1999 ; Lakoff and Núñez 
 2000 ) claim that all human thought is embodied through the sensorimotor functions 
of the human individual and builds linguistically through metaphors based on human 
perception and action. 
 Harel and Sowder  ( 1998,  2005 ) describe cognitive growth of proof in terms of 
the learner’s development of proof schemes – relatively stable cognitive/affec-
tive confi gurations responsible for what constitutes ascertaining and persuading 
an individual of the truth of a statement at a particular stage of mathematical 
maturation. A broadly based empirical study found a whole range of different 
proof schemes, some categorised as ‘external conviction’, some ‘empirical’ and 
some ‘analytical’. 
 Van Hiele  ( 1986 ) focuses specifi cally on the development of Euclidean geome-
try, proposing a sequence of stages from the recognition of fi gures, through their 
description and categorisation, the more precise use of defi nition and construction 
using ruler and compass and on to the development of a coherent framework of 
Euclidean deductive proof. 
 There are also theories of development of symbolism through the encapsulation 
of processes (such as counting) into concepts (such as number) that reveal a differ-
ent kind of development in arithmetic and the generalised arithmetic of algebra 
(Dubinsky and McDonald  2001 ; Gray and Tall  1994 ; Sfard  1991 ) . 
 Many theoretical frameworks speak of multiple representations (or registers) that 
operate in different ways (e.g., Duval  2006 ; Goldin  1998 ) . The two distinct forms of 
development through the global visual-spatial modes of operation on the one hand 
and the sequential symbolic modes of operation on the other can operate in tandem 
with each supporting the other (Paivio  1991 ) . Bruner’s three modes of communica-
tion – enactive, iconic, symbolic – also presume different ways of operating: the 
sensorimotor basis of enactive and iconic linking to the visual and spatial, and the 
symbolic forms including not only language but the sub-categories of number and 
logic (Bruner  1966 ) . 
 The hypothesis about distinct cognitive structures for language/symbolism and 
for visualisation has received empirical support by means of neuroscience. 
 For instance, Fig.  2.1 shows the areas of the brain stimulated when responding to 
the problem ‘5 × 7’, which coordinates an overall control in the right hemisphere 
and the language area in the left recalling a verbal number fact, and the response to 
the problem ‘Is 5 × 7 > 25?’ that uses the visual areas at the back to compare relative 
sizes (Dehaene  1997 ) . This reveals human thinking as a blend of global perceptual 
processes that enable us to ‘see’ concepts as a gestalt (Hoffmann  1998 ) , and sequen-
tial operations that we can learn to perform as mathematical procedures. 
 The brain operates by the passage of information between neurons where con-
nections are excited to a higher level when they are active. Repeated use strengthens 
the links chemically so that they are more likely to react in future and build up 
sophisticated knowledge structures. Meltzoff et al.  ( 2009 ) formulate the child’s 
learning in terms of the brain’s implicit recognition of statistical patterns:
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 Recent fi ndings show that infants and young children possess powerful computational skills 
that allow them automatically to infer structured models of their environment from the 
statistical patterns they experience. Infants use statistical patterns gleaned from experience 
to learn about both language and causation. Before they are three, children use frequency 
distributions to learn which phonetic units distinguish words in their native language, use 
the transitional probabilities between syllables to segment words, and use covariation to 
infer cause-effect relationships in the physical world (p. 284). 
 The facility for building sophisticated knowledge structure is based on a phe-
nomenal array of neuronal facilities for perception and action that are present in the 
new-born child and develop rapidly through experience in the early years. Tall 
 ( 2008 ) refers to these abilities as ‘set-befores’ (because they are set before birth as 
part of our genetic inheritance and develop through usage) as opposed to ‘met-
befores’ that arise as a result of previous experience and may be supportive or prob-
lematic when that experience is used in new contexts. He hypothesises that three 
major set-befores give rise to three distinct developments of mathematical thinking 
and proof through:
 recognition of similarities, differences and patterns through perception, • 
 repetition: the ability to learn complex sequences of operation through action, and • 
 the development of language to enable perception and action to be expressed and • 
conceived in increasingly subtle ways. 
 In the development of mathematical thinking, these three set-befores combine to 
give the three different ways of constructing mathematical concepts. Language 
enables the verbal categorisation of the perception of fi gures in geometry and other 
aspects of mathematics. It enables the encapsulation of processes as concepts to 
compress processes that occur in time into manipulable mental objects in arithmetic 
 Fig. 2.1  Areas of the brain recalling a fact and performing a comparison 
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and algebra. And it enables defi nition of concepts, both in terms of observed 
 properties of perception and action in school mathematics and also of the proposed 
set-theoretic properties of axiomatic systems. 
 As the authors of this chapter refl ected together on the total development of 
mathematical proof and the many cognitive theories available with various links and 
differences, we came to the view that there is a single broad developmental template 
that underlies them all, from early perceptions and actions, to the various forms of 
Euclidean, algebraic and axiomatic proof. 
 3.2  Crystalline Concepts 
 The foundational idea that underpins our framework can be introduced using a 
 single specifi c example that starts simply and becomes more general until it pro-
vides a template for the total development of mathematical proof, from the fi rst 
perceptions and actions of the child to the Platonic concepts of Euclidean geometry, 
algebraic proofs based on the rules of arithmetic, and formal proofs in axiomatic 
mathematics. 
 Our example is the notion of an isosceles triangle as seen by a maturing child. At 
fi rst the child perceives it as a single gestalt. It may have a shape that is broad at the 
bottom, narrowing to the top with two equal sides, two equal angles and an axis of 
symmetry about a line down the middle. If the triangle is cut out of paper, it can be 
folded over this central line to reveal a complete symmetry. The child can learn to 
recognise various isosceles triangles and describe some of their properties. However, 
at this early stage, all these properties occur simultaneously, they are not linked 
together by cause-effect relationship. 
 In order to be able to make sense of coherent relationships, the child needs to 
build a growing knowledge structure (or schema) of experiences involving percep-
tions and actions that relate to each other. As the child develops, some of the proper-
ties described may become privileged and used as a defi nition of a particular concept. 
For instance, one may describe an isosceles triangle to be ‘a triangle with two equal 
sides.’ Now the child may use this criterion to test whether new objects are isosceles 
triangles. For the child, the ‘proof’ that a particular triangle is isosceles is that anyone 
can see that it has two equal sides. 
 Subsequently, the child may be introduced to a more sophisticated knowledge 
structure, such as physically placing one triangle on top of another and verbalising 
this as the principle of congruence. As the child becomes aware of more and more 
properties of an isosceles triangle and his or her conceptions of relationships 
develop, it may become possible to see relationships between properties and to use 
appropriate principles based on constructions and transformations to deduce some 
properties from the others. The idea emerges that it is not necessary to include all 
known properties in a defi nition. An isosceles triangle defi ned only in terms of equal 
sides, with no mention of the angles, can now be proved by the principle of congruence 
to have equal angles. 
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 Other, more sophisticated, properties may be deduced using similar techniques. 
For instance, for an isosceles triangle, the perpendicular bisector of the base can be 
proved to pass through the vertex, or the bisector of the vertex angle can be proved 
to meet the base in the midpoint at right angles. Further proofs show that any of 
these deduced properties mentioned may be used as alternative defi nitions. At this 
point there may be several different possible defi nitions that are now seen to be 
equivalent. It is not that the triangle has a single defi nition with many consequences, 
but that it has many equivalent defi nitions any one of which can be used as a basis 
for the theory. One of these properties, usually the simplest one to formulate, is then 
taken as the primary defi nition and then all other properties are deduced from it. 
 Then something highly subtle happens: the notion of isosceles triangle – which 
originally was a single gestalt with many simultaneous properties, and was then 
defi ned using a single specifi c defi nition – now matures into a fully unifi ed concept, 
with many properties linked together by a network of relationships based on 
deductions. 
 We introduce the term crystalline concept for such a phenomenon. A crystalline 
concept may be given a working defi nition as ‘a concept that has an internal structure 
of constrained relationships that cause it to have necessary properties as part of its 
context.’ A typical crystalline concept is the notion of an idealised Platonic fi gure in 
Euclidean geometry. However, as we shall see, crystalline concepts are also natural 
products of development in other forms of proof such as those using symbol manip-
ulation or axiomatic defi nition and deduction. 
 The long-term formation of crystalline concepts matures through the construc-
tion of increasingly sophisticated knowledge structures, as follows:
 perceptual recognition of phenomena where objects have simultaneous • 
properties, 
 verbal description of properties, often related to visual or symbolic representa-• 
tions, to begin to think about specifi c properties and relationships, 
 definition and deduction, to define which concepts satisfy the definition and • 
to develop appropriate principles of proof to deduce that one property implies 
another, 
 realising that some properties are equivalent so that the concept now has a • 
structure of equivalent properties that are related by deductive proof, 
 and realising that these properties are different ways of expressing an underlying • 
crystalline concept whose properties are connected together by deductive proof. 
 Crystalline concepts are not isolated from each other. The deductive network of 
one crystalline concept may intersect with another. For instance, a child may begin 
to perceive an isosceles triangle as a representative of a broader class of objects – 
triangles in general – and compare the defi nitions and properties involved to fi nd 
new deductive journeys relating concepts that may not always be equivalent. This 
leads to the distinction between direct and converse deduction of properties and 
further developments of deductive relationships (Yevdokimov  2008 ) . 
 This development represents a broad trend in which successive stages are seen 
as developing and interrelating one with another, each correlated within the next 
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(Fig.  2.2 ). This is represented by the deepening shades of grey as increasingly 
sophisticated knowledge structures are connected together as each new stage devel-
ops and matures. On the right is a single vertical arrow whose shaft becomes more 
fi rmly defi ned as it is traced upwards. Such an arrow will be used subsequently to 
denote the long-term development from initial recognition of a phenomenon in a 
given mathematical context through increasing sophistication to deductive knowl-
edge structures. The development is a natural human growth and should not be 
seen as a rigid growth of discrete levels, rather as a long-term growth in maturity 
to construct a full range of mathematical thinking from perceptual recognition to 
deductive reasoning. 
 Such a framework is consistent with van Hiele’s theory of the teaching and 
 learning of geometry, but it goes further by making explicit the fi nal shift from 
equivalent fi gures drawn on the page or in sand to conceiving them as instances of 
crystalline concepts in the form of perfect platonic objects. 
 The framework is also consistent with the development of other forms of geo-
metry that arise in new contexts (projective geometry drawing a representation of a 
three-dimensional scene on a plane, spherical geometry on the surface of a sphere, 
elliptic and hyperbolic geometries in appropriate contexts, fi nite geometries, alge-
braic geometries and so on). 
 These new frameworks reveal that the ‘appropriate principles of deduction’ may 
differ in different forms of geometry. For instance, in spherical geometry, whilst 
there is a concept of congruence of spherical triangles, there are no parallel lines, 
and proof is a combination of embodied experience operating on the surface of a 
sphere coupled with symbolic computations using trigonometry. 
Perceptual Recognition 
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perceived relationships
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 Fig. 2.2  The broad maturation of proof structures 
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 In arithmetic and algebra the symbols have a crystalline structure that the child 
may begin to realise through experience of counting collections that are then put 
together or taken away. The sum 8 + 6 can be computed fi rst by counting, and in 
this context it may not yet be evident that 8 + 6 gives the same result as 6 + 8. As 
the child builds more sophisticated relationships, it may later be seen as part of a 
more comprehensive structure in which 8 + 2 makes 10 and, decomposing 6 into 2 
and 4, gives 8 + 6 is 10 + 4, which is 14. One might say that 8 + 6 or 6 + 8 or 10 + 4 
or various other arithmetic expressions equal to 14 are all equivalent, but it is 
cognitively more effi cient to say simply that they are the same. Gray and Tall 
 ( 1994 ) referred to such symbols as different ways of representing a procept, where 
the symbols can stand dually for a process and the concept output by the process. 
Here the various symbols, 8 + 6, 10 + 4, and so on, all represent the same underly-
ing procept that operates as the fl exible crystalline concept ‘14’. This crystalline 
structure is then used to derive more complex calculations from known facts in a 
deductive knowledge structure. 
 Algebra arises as generalised arithmetic, where operations having the same 
effect, such as ‘double the number and add six’ or ‘add three to the number and 
double the result’, are seen as being equivalent; these equivalences give new ways 
of seeing the same underlying procept written fl exibly in different ways as  2 6x´ +
 and  ( 3) 2x + ´  . These equivalences can be described using the rules that were 
observed and described as properties in arithmetic, now formulated as rules to 
defi ne the properties in algebra. Finally, a crystalline concept, ‘an algebraic expres-
sion’ arises in which equivalent operations are seen as representing the same 
underlying operation. 
 Procepts arise throughout the symbolism of mathematics where symbols such as 
 4 3+  ,  ¾  ,  2 6x +  ,  dy / dx ,  sin x dxò  ,  nuS  dually represent a process of computation 
and the result of that process. Such procepts, along with the networks of their 
deduced properties, form crystalline concepts, which allow the human brain to oper-
ate fl exibly and effi ciently in formulating models, solving problems through symbol 
manipulation and discovering new properties and connections. 
 Crystalline concepts also operate at the formal-axiomatic level. Mathematicians 
construct the successive systems    ,    ,    ,    ,    formally using equivalence 
relations, such as defi ning the integers    as equivalence classes of ordered pairs 
 ( , )m n  where  ,m n Î  and  ( , ) ~ ( , )m n p q  if  + = +m q p n  . The whole number  m 
corresponds to the equivalence class  +( , )m n n  . Successive constructions of    ,    , 
   and    formulate each as being isomorphic to a substructure of the next. 
Cognitively, however, it is more natural to see the successive number systems con-
tained one within another, with    ,    ,    ,    seen as points on the  x -axis and    
as points in the plane. This is not a simple cognitive process, however, as such 
extensions involve changes of meaning that need to be addressed, such as subtrac-
tion always giving a smaller result in    but not in    , and a (non-zero) square 
always being positive in    but not in    . 
 The various number systems may be conceived as a blend of the visual number 
line (or the plane) and its formal expression in terms of axioms. For example, the 
real numbers    have various equivalent defi nitions of completeness that the expert 
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recognises as equivalent ways of defi ning the same underlying property. The real 
numbers    now constitute a crystalline concept whose properties are constrained 
by the axioms for a complete ordered fi eld. 
 More generally, any axiomatic system, formulated as a list of specifi c axioms 
uses formal proof to develop a network of relationships that gives the axiomatic 
system the structure of a crystalline concept. Whilst some may be unique (as in the 
case of a complete ordered fi eld), others, such as the concept of group, have  different 
examples that may be classifi ed by deduction from the axioms. 
 3.3  A Global Framework for the Development 
of Mathematical Thinking 
 The full cognitive development of formal proof from initial perceptions of objects 
and actions to axiomatic mathematics can be formulated in terms of three distinct 
forms of development (Tall  2004,  2008 ) :
 a development of the conceptual embodiment of objects and their properties, • 
with increasing verbal underpinning appropriate for the maturation of Euclidean 
geometry; 
 a translation of operations into proceptual symbolism, where a symbol such as • 
 +2 3x  represents both a process of evaluation, ‘double the number and add 
three’, and a manipulable concept, an algebraic expression; 
 the development of axiomatic formalism, in which set-theoretic axioms and defi -• 
nitions are used as a basis of a knowledge structure built up through mathemati-
cal proof. 
 In each form of development, the idea of proof builds through a cycle pictured in 
Fig.  2.2 represented by a vertical arrow to give the overall framework in Fig.  2.3 as 
proof develops in the geometric embodiment, algebraic symbolism, and axiomatic 
formalism. The framework represents the child at the bottom left playing with phys-
ical objects, refl ecting on their shapes and relationships to build an increasingly 
sophisticated development of Euclidean geometry through constructions, verbalised 
defi nitions and Euclidean proof. 
 In the centre, as the child refl ects on his or her actions on objects, there is a blend 
of embodiment and symbolism in which properties such as addition are seen visibly 
to be independent of order (even though the counting procedures and visual repre-
sentations may be different) and are translated into verbal rules such as the com-
mutative law of addition. Specifi c pictures may also be seen as generic representations 
of similar cases, building up generalisations. The culmination of this central overlap 
includes any proof blending embodiment and symbolism. 
 On the right-hand side, the operation of counting is symbolised as the concept of 
number and, in proceptual symbolic terms, specifi c instances of arithmetic such as 
 + = +10 7 7 10  are generalised into an algebraic statement   + = +x y y x  , and such 
generalities are formulated as rules to be obeyed in algebra. 
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 As the child matures, he or she is introduced to the idea that conceptions based in 
perception and action can be transformed into proof by verbal defi nition – a  signifi cant 
cognitive change that leads to Euclidean proof in geometry and rule-based proof in 
algebra. The fi gure of Plato here represents a view of crystalline conceptions that are 
so perfect that they seem to be independent of the fi nite human brain. 
 There is a major cognitive change denoted by the horizontal dotted line from 
inferences based on perception and action to proof based on a defi nition (of fi gures 
in geometry and rules of arithmetic in algebra). For instance, in algebra, the power 
rule  m n m na a a +´ =  for whole numbers  m and  n can be embodied directly by count-
ing the factors, but when  m and  n are taken as fractions or negative numbers, then 
the idea of counting the factors no longer holds. Now the power rule is used as a 
defi nition from which the meanings of  ½a  and  -1a  are deduced. This requires a 
signifi cant shift of meaning from properties based on perception to properties 
deduced from rules. 
 The formal world includes all forms of proof based on an appropriate form of 































































 Fig. 2.3  Three strands of conceptual development: embodied, symbolic, formal 
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on geometric principles such as congruence, algebraic proof based on the rules of 
arithmetic, and axiomatic formal proof. In applications, applied proof builds on 
embodiment and symbolism, developing refi ned strategies of contextual reasoning 
appropriate to the context. 
 A major development in formal proof is the shift to the axiomatic method of 
Hilbert. Now mathematical objects are defi ned as lists of set-theoretic axioms and 
any other properties must be deduced from the axioms and subsequent defi nitions 
by formal mathematical proof. 
 This gives a second major cognitive change, from defi nitions based on familiar 
objects or mental entities – as in the thought experiments of Plato – to formal defi ni-
tions where proofs apply in any context where the required axioms hold – as in the 
formal theory of Hilbert. 
 At the level of axiomatic formalism, the top right arrow in the fi gure represents 
the desired development of the student maturing from a range of familiar ideas to 
their organisation as formal defi nitions and proof. The student learning the axiom-
atic method for the fi rst time is faced with a list of axioms from which she or he 
must make initial deductions, building up a knowledge structure of formally deduced 
relationships that leads to the proof of successive theorems. 
 Some theorems, called ‘structure theorems’ have special qualities that prove that 
the axiomatic structures have specifi c embodiments and related embodied opera-
tions. For instance the structure theorem that all fi nite dimensional vector spaces 
over  F are isomorphic to a coordinate space  nF  reveals that such a vector space can 
be represented symbolically using coordinates and operations on vectors that can be 
carried out symbolically using matrices. When  = F  , the formalism is then related 
to embodiments in two and three-dimensional space. 
 In this way, embodiment and symbolism arise once more, now based on an axi-
omatic foundation. Mathematicians with highly sophisticated knowledge structures 
then refl ect on new problems, think about possibilities, formulate conjectures and 
seek formal proofs of new theorems in a continuing cycle of mathematical research 
and development. At each stage, this may involve embodiment, symbolism and 
formalism as appropriate for the given stage of the cycle. 
 4  The Development of Proof from Embodiment 
 4.1  From Embodiment to Verbalisation 
 Young children have highly subtle ways of making sense of their observations. For 
instance, Yevdokimov  ( in preparation ) observed that young children playing with 
wooden patterns of different shapes sense symmetry even in quite complicated 
forms and may build their own conceptions of symmetry without any special empha-
sis and infl uence from adults. However, they experience enormous diffi culties when 
attempting to describe a symmetric construction verbally. 
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 The young child may develop ways to recognise and name different shapes in ways 
that may be quite different from an adult perspective. Two-year old Simon learned to 
recognise and say the name ‘triangle’ for a shape he recognised (Tall  2012 , under 
review). He learnt it through watching and listening to a television programme in which 
Mr. Triangle was one of several characters, including Mr. Square, Mr. Rectangle and Mr. 
Circle where each character had the named shape with a face on it and hands and feet 
attached. 
 When Simon saw a triangle, he named it, but then, when playing with some 
square table mats, he put together a 3 by 2 rectangle, a 2 by 2 square, and then reor-
ganised four squares into an upside down T-shape that he called a triangle (Fig.  2.4 ). 
Although the fi gure lacks three sides, it is fat at the bottom, thin at the top and sym-
metric about a vertical axis. It is the nearest word in his vocabulary to describe what 
he sees, being more like a triangle than any other shape that he can name. 
 4.2  From Embodiment and Verbalisation to Pictorial 
and Symbolic Representations 
 A case of interest is the 5-year long study of Maher and Martino  ( 1996 ) , which 
 followed the developing ideas of a single child, called Stephanie. This revealed 
the emergence of statements that are precursors of quantifi ers (such as ‘there is an 
 A such that  B occurs’ or ‘for all  A ,  B occurs’). During her third and fourth grade, 
Stephanie and her classmates were given variations of the following question, 
which will be termed the four-cube-tall Tower Problem:
 How many different four-cube-tall towers can be built from red and blue cubes? 
 When Stephanie and her partner approached this problem for the fi rst time, she 
started from the search for different four-cube-tall towers using a trial-and-error 
strategy. Namely, she built a tower, named it (e.g. ‘red in the middle’ or ‘ patchwork’), 
and compared it with all the towers that had been constructed so far to see whether it 
was new or a duplicate. In several minutes, Stephanie began to spontaneously notice 
 Fig. 2.4  Simon’s triangle 
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relationships between pairs of towers and put them together. She then called the 
 towers such as the left pair on Fig.  2.5 as ‘opposites’, and the right pair as ‘cousins’. 
Maher and Martino interpreted this as the beginning of Stephanie’s classifi cation of 
towers into sets by a local criterion. No global organisational criterion emerged at 
this stage, and Stephanie, who eventually constructed all 16 towers, did not know 
whether or not she found them all. When asked about it, she explained that she ‘con-
tinued to build towers until [she] couldn’t fi nd any that were different’ (p. 204). 
 Eighteen months later, in the fourth grade, Stephanie was presented with the 
problem concerning the number of fi ve-cube-tall towers that can be built from red 
and yellow cubes. This time she constructed 28 original combinations organised in 
the sets consisting of four elements: some tower, its ‘opposite’, its ‘cousin’ and ‘the 
opposite of the  cousin’ (see Fig.  2.5 ). Thus, though a global organisational principle 
still remained murky for Stephanie, she progressed from the pure trial-and-error 
strategy to trial-and-error strategy combined with the local classifi cation strategy. 
 A crucial event occurred when the teacher asked the class about the number of 
fi ve-cube-tall towers with exactly two red cubes. In response, Stephanie argued that 
all towers in this category can be accounted by the following organisational crite-
rion: there are towers in which two red cubes are separated by no yellow cube, one 
yellow cube, two yellow cubes or three yellow cubes (see Fig.  2.6 ). It is notable that 
at this stage Stephanie began to draw pictures of the towers she produced rather than 
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 In this episode Stephanie for the fi rst time arrived at an existential algebraic 
statement that required proving. She declared: ‘there exist exactly 10 fi ve-cube-tall 
towers with exactly two red cubes.’ Her justifi cation of this statement involved an 
indirect proof by contradiction as she explained: ‘it is not possible to have towers 
with four or more yellow cubes placed between the two red cubes without violating 
the requirement that a tower be only fi ve cubes tall’ (p. 205). 
 One can see here that, though still operating in her embodied mathematical 
world, Stephanie succeeds in substituting her previous local organisational cri-
terion (‘opposites’ and ‘cousins’) with a new, all-inclusive or global, one (the num-
ber of yellow cubes separating the red ones). This invention enabled Stephanie 
to construct – though only for a sub-problem of the fi ve-cube-tall Towers 
Problem – a mathematically valid argument. An important sign of the develop-
ment of the idea of proof in Stephanie is that she was able to mentally represent 
not only what is possible to do with the cubes, but also what is impossible. The 
spirit of a crystalline concept – a concept that has an internal structure of con-
strained relationships that cause it to have necessary properties as part of its 
context – enters here! 
 Two weeks later, two more cognitive advances emerged when Stephanie shared 
with the interviewers her thinking about the six-cube-tall Towers Problem that she 
assigned to herself. The fi rst advance occurred when she introduced a letter-grid 
notation for representing the towers, instead of drawing them or assembling from 
the plastic cubes that she used before. This is an important step on her way to the 
symbolic mathematical world. Interestingly, the authors mentioned that, when in 
fi rst grade, Stephanie had used a letter-grid notation for solving another combinato-
rial problem, and then, it seemed, she forgot about it. As Lawler  ( 1980 ) noted, it 
may seem that a child regresses in knowledge, whereas he or she may in fact be 
attempting to insert new knowledge into an existing knowledge structure. (See also 
Pirie and Kieren  1994 .) 
 Our point here is that the pictorial and later symbolic representations that she 
used were indeed rooted in Stephanie’s embodied world. The second advance was 
that Stephanie started to fl uently consider different organisational principles for 
producing the towers in a systematic way. In particular, she introduced a method 
of holding the position of one colour when varying positions for another. 
Apparently, the second advance is related to the fi rst one: convenient notation 
makes consideration of various patterns more accessible. These important 
advances eventually led Stephanie to construct a full proof for the four-cube-tall 
Tower Problem (by classifying the towers into fi ve categories: towers with no 
white cube, towers with exactly one cube, etc.). We interpret Stephanie’s last 
insight as a verbalisation of the embodied skill to infer cause-effect relationships 
from statistical patterns: Stephanie found that the answers for three-, four-, and 
fi ve-cube-tall towers were 8, 16, and 32, respectively, and just expressed her belief 
that this numerical pattern will work forever. Such a guess is statistically justifi ed 
for Stephanie, and is appropriate at her stage of development. In the fi fth grade 
she is only just beginning to transfer embodied proof concepts into a symbolic 
mathematical form. 
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 4.3  From Embodiment, Verbalisation and Symbolism 
to Deduction 
 The experiences just described offer an example of a learner building up increasingly 
sophisticated knowledge structures by physical experiment with objects, fi nding 
ways to formulate similarities and differences, then representing the data observed 
using drawings and symbols that have an increasingly meaningful personal inter-
pretation. In this section we discuss the general principles underpinning a learner’s 
path towards deductive reasoning from its sensorimotor beginnings, through the 
visual-spatial development of thought and on to the verbal formulation of proof, 
particularly in Euclidean geometry. 
 As the child matures, physical objects, experienced through the senses, become 
associated with pictorial images, and develop into more sophisticated knowledge 
structures that Fischbein  ( 1993 ) named fi gural concepts. These are
 mental entities […] which refl ect spatial properties (shape, position, magnitude) and, at the 
same time, possess conceptual qualities like ideality, abstractness, generality, perfection 
(Fischbein  1993 , p. 143). 
 Figural concepts refl ect the human embodiments that underlie our more abstract 
formal conceptions. 
 Cognitive science sees the human mental and physical activity underlying all our 
cognitive acts (Johnson  1987 ; Lakoff and Johnson  1999 ; Lakoff and Núñez  2000 ) . 
For example, the schema of ‘containment’ where one physical object contains 
another underlies the logical principle of transitivity  A BÌ  ,  ÌB C  implies 
 ÌA C  and operates mentally to infer that if  A is contained in  B and  B is contained 
in  C , then  A must be contained in  C . Even Hilbert – on the occasion declaring his 
famous 23 problems at the International Congress of 1900 – noted the underpin-
ning of formalism by visual representation, picturing transitivity as an ordering on 
a visual line:
 Who does not always use along with the double inequality  a >  b >  c the picture of three 
points following one another on a straight line as the geometrical picture of the idea 
‘between’? (Hilbert  1900 ). 
 Empirical evidence in support of this can be found throughout the literature. 
Byrne and Johnson-Laird  ( 1989 ) studied adults responding to tasks in which they 
were given verbal evidence of relative positions of objects placed on a table and 
found that the subjects used visual mental models rather than a pure logical approach 
to produce their deductions. 
 The other side of the coin suggests that a mismatch between images (schemata) 
and formal defi nitions of mathematical concepts can be a source of diffi culty in the 
study of mathematics and mathematical reasoning. For instance, Tall and Vinner 
 ( 1981 ) illustrated how students may interpret real analysis based on their concept 
imagery of earlier experiences rather than on formal defi nitions. Hershkowitz and 
Vinner  ( 1983 ) similarly revealed how particular attributes of pictures interfere with 
the general conceptualisation process in geometry. 
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 In a similar way, Núñez et al.  ( 1999 ) suggested that the epsilon-delta approach to 
continuity is problematic for students because it confl icts with natural embodied 
conceptions of continuity. The problem, however, is more subtle, because formal-
ism only captures specifi c explicit properties, such as the ‘closeness’ of natural 
continuity formulated in the epsilon-delta defi nition. Natural continuity also involves 
other relevant aspects such as the completeness of the real numbers and the con-
nectedness of the domain. 
 Sometimes, the practice of generalising from empirical fi ndings or building argu-
ment from intuitively appealing images leads to a possibility that happens to be 
wrong. As an example of a situation where valid deductive argument is applied to a 
plausible, but wrong image, we give a ‘proof’ that every triangle is isosceles. 
Kondratieva  ( 2009 ) used this example in order to illustrate the process of learning 
the art of deduction through the analysis of unexpected or contradictory results. 
 Consider an arbitrary triangle  ABC. Let the point of intersection of the bisector 
of the angle  B and the perpendicular bisector of the side  AC meet in the point  M . For 
simplicity, assume that  M lies inside of the triangle (Fig.  2.7 ). 
 Let points  K and  L be the feet of perpendiculars dropped from  M to the sides adjacent to 
vertex  A . In the triangles  BMK ,  BML , the side  BM is common; the angles  KBM and  LBM 
are equal, as are the right angles  BKM ,  BLM . Therefore, triangles  BMK ,  BLM are congruent, 
and  BK =  BL . The right-angled triangles AKM and CLM are also congruent because the legs 
 MK =  ML , and their hypotenuses are equal  AM =  CM by the property of the perpendicular 
bisector. Thus,  AK =  CL . Finally,  AB =  AK +  KB =  CL +  LB =  CB . Hence the triangle  ABC is 
isosceles. QED. 
 Students often perceive the fi gure to be legitimate and concentrate on looking for 
mistakes in the argument. The deductions concerning congruency in this proof are 
supported by reference to appropriate theorems and appear to be correct. It is often 
a surprise for a student to realise that the actual fallacy arises through drawing M 
inside the triangle when it should be outside, more precisely on the triangle’s 
circumcircle. 
 Such examples have the potential to prepare the learner for the need to doubt 
representations and arguments that seem intuitively valid. This can lead to several 
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 The fi rst is to realise that correct reasoning based on a misleading (incorrect) 
diagram can lead to false conclusions. Thus, in mathematical derivations we must 
attend to both the deduction and the assumption(s). 
 The second is to illustrate the idea of a proof by contradiction. For instance, con-
sider the statement: ‘The intersection point of an angular bisector and the right 
bisector of the opposite side in any triangle lies outside the triangle.’ Drawing a 
picture purporting to represent the contrary situation where the intersection lies 
inside the triangle, as in Fig.  2.7 , can then be seen as leading to the impossible 
statement that ‘all triangles are isosceles’. 
 The third possibility is to introduce the concept of a direct constructive proof by 
inviting the student to perform the construction using dynamic software and arguing 
why the point M must lie outside the triangle. 
 The need for a more reliable proof leads to the idea of deductive reasoning, 
which may be seen as the ability of an individual to produce new statements in the 
form of conclusions from given information, particularly in areas where the subject 
has no prior knowledge other than the information given. The new statements must 
be produced purely by reasoning with no simultaneous access to hand-on materials 
and experimentation. However, such methods require the individual to build a 
knowledge structure that enables the use of logical forms of deduction. As we anal-
yse Euclidean geometry, we fi nd that its deductive methods build on ways of work-
ing that are themselves rooted in human embodiment. 
 5  Euclidean and Non-Euclidean Proof 
 5.1  The Development of Euclidean Geometry 
 From a mathematician’s viewpoint, the study of Euclidean geometry in school has 
often been considered as providing a necessary basis for the formal notion of proof 
and, in particular, the building of a succession of theorems deductively from basic 
assumptions. From a cognitive viewpoint it is our fi rst example of the long-term 
development of crystalline concepts. Beginning from personal perceptions and 
actions, the learner may build personal knowledge structures relating to the proper-
ties of space and shape, then develop defi nitions and deductions to construct the 
crystalline platonic objects of Euclidean geometry. 
 Even though the books of Euclid produce a sequence of successively deduced 
propositions based on specifi ed common notions, defi nitions and postulates, a closer 
inspection reveals the use of principles based on human perception and action. For 
example, the notion of congruence involves the selection of certain minimal proper-
ties that enable triangles to be declared to have all their properties in common, in 
terms of requiring only three corresponding sides (SSS), two sides and included 
angle (SAS), or two angles and corresponding side (AAS). All are based on an 
embodied principle of superposition of one triangle upon another (perhaps turning 
it over). This concept of congruence of triangles is not endowed with a specifi c 
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name in the Books of Euclid. It is used as an established strategy to formulate 
 minimal conditions under which different triangles are equivalent and consequently 
have all the same properties. 
 Parallel lines are another special concept in Euclid, defi ned to be straight lines 
which, being in the same plane and being produced indefi nitely in both directions, 
do not meet one another in either direction (Euclid, Book I, Defi nition 23). Using 
this defi nition, Euclid establishes various (equivalent) properties of parallel lines, 
such as alternate angles being equal to one another, corresponding angles being 
equal, and the sum of the interior angles being equal to two right angles (Proposition 
27 et seq.). Once more the concept of parallel lines is a crystalline concept with a 
range of interlinked properties each of which can be used to furnish a Euclidean 
proof of the others. 
 The development of geometry, starting at Euclid Book I, has been declared inap-
propriate for young children:
 The deductive geometry of Euclid from which a few things have been omitted cannot pro-
duce an elementary geometry. In order to be elementary, one will have to start from a world 
as perceived and already partially globally known by the children. The objective should be 
to analyze these phenomena and to establish a logical relationship. Only through an 
approach modifi ed in this way can a geometry evolve that may be called elementary accord-
ing to psychological principles (van Hiele-Geldof  1984 , p. 16). 
 Some enlightened approaches to geometry have attempted to integrate it with 
broader ideas of general reasoning skills including the need for clear defi nitions and 
proof. For example, Harold Fawcett, the editor of the 1938 NCTM Yearbook on 
Proof, developed his own high school course that he taught at the University School 
in Ohio State entitled The Nature of Proof. His fundamental idea was to consider 
any statement, to focus on words and phrases, to ask that they be clearly defi ned, to 
distinguish between fact and assumption, and to evaluate the argument, accepting or 
rejecting its arguments and conclusion, whilst constantly re-examining the beliefs 
that guided the actions. Speaking about the course at an NCTM meeting in 2001, 
Frederick Flener observed:
 Throughout the year, the pupils discussed geometry, creating their own undefi ned terms, 
defi nitions, assumptions and theorems. In all he lists 23 undefi ned terms, 91 defi nitions, and 
109 assumptions/theorems. The difference between an assumption and a theorem is whether 
it was proved. Briefl y, let me tell you a few of the undefi ned terms which the pupils under-
stood, but were unable to defi ne. For example, as a class they couldn’t come up with ‘the 
union of two rays with a common endpoint’ as the defi nition of an angle, so they left it as 
undefi ned. Nor could they defi ne horizontal or vertical, or area or volume. Yet they went on 
to defi ne terms like dihedral angle, and the measure of a dihedral angle—which I assume 
involved having rays perpendicular to the common edge (Flener  2001 ) . 
 A detailed study of the students who attended this course revealed signifi cant 
long-term gains in reasoning skills over a lifetime (Flener  2006 ) . This suggests that 
making personal sense of geometry and geometric inferences can have long-term 
benefi ts in terms of clarity of thinking and reasoning skills. 
 Modern trends in teaching have led to encouraging young children to build a 
sense of shape and space by refi ning ideas through experience, exploring the 
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 properties of fi gures and patterns. They experiment with geometrical objects, seek 
to recognise the properties of card shapes, sketch the faces of a box when pulled out 
into a fl at fi gure, fold paper, measure the angles and sides of a triangle, and discuss 
their ideas with friends or teachers. 
 They may have experiences in constructing and predicting what occurs in geo-
metric software such as Logo in ways that give fi gural meanings to geometric ideas. 
For instance, a ‘turtle trip’ round a (convex) polygon may enable the child to sense 
that ‘If the turtle makes a trip back to its starting state without crossing its own path, 
the total turn is 360°’. According to Papert  ( 1996 ) , this is a theorem with several 
important attributes: fi rst, it is powerful; second, it is surprising; third, it has a proof. 
It is not a theorem in the formal mathematical sense, of course, but it is a meaningful 
product of human embodiment, sensing a journey round a circuit and ending up fac-
ing the same direction, thus turning through a full turn. 
 These experiences provide young children with preliminary background on 
which to develop ideas of proof in a variety of ways. For example, it is possible to 
experience many ways in which children may attempt to provide a proof for the 
statement that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180°. 
 In the studies of Lin et al.  ( 2003 ) , Healy and Hoyles  ( 1998 ) , and Reiss 
 ( 2005 ) , eight distinct proofs were collected from students before they had 
any formal introduction to Euclidean proof as a deductive sequence of 
propositions. 
 The fi rst two are pragmatic actions applied to specifi c cases: 
 Proof 1: by physical experiment (Fig.  2.8 ). 
 Take a triangle cut out of paper, tear off the 
corners and place them together to see that they 
form a straight line. Do this a few times for 
 different triangular shapes to confi rm it. 
 Proof 2: by practical measurement (Fig.  2.9 ). 
 Draw a triangle. Measure the angled to 
check that the sum is equal to 180°. Repeat the 
same process on other triangles. 
 A third proof is a dynamic embodiment, 
which arises in Logo: 
 Proof 3: the turtle-trip theorem: imagine 
walking round a triangle (Fig.  2.10 ). 
 Start at any point  P and walk all the way 
round. This turns through 360°. At each verti-
ces, the sum of exterior and interior angles is 
180° so the sum of the three exterior and inte-
rior angles is 540°. Subtract the total 360° turn 
to leave the sum of the interior angles as 
540°−360° = 180°. 
B CA
 Fig. 2.8  A proof by physical experiment 
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A









34 D. Tall et al.
 A fourth proof uses a known fact about  triangles 
to infer another fact. 
 Proof 4: Use the fact that the exterior angle equals 
the sum of the two interior opposite angles 
(Fig.  2.11 ). 
 Extend the segment  CA ; the exterior angle  Ð1  
is equal to the sum of the two interior opposite angles. 
Because the exterior angle and  ÐBAC  make a 
straight line, the sum of all three angles is 180°. 
 The fi fth and sixth proofs introduce additional 
parallel lines. 
 Proof 5: A proof using parallel lines (Fig.  2.12 ). 
 1.  Draw a line parallel to  AB through point  C . 
 2.  Ð = Ð1A  (alternate angles) and  Ð = Ð2B  
(corresponding angles). 
 3.  °Ð +Ð +Ð = Ð +Ð +Ð =1 2 180 .A B C C  
 Proof 6: A second proof using parallel lines 
(Fig.  2.13 ). 
 1.  Draw a line  L parallel to  BC through point  A . 
Then  Ð = Ð1B  and  Ð = Ð2C  (alternate angles). 
 2.  Hence
 
°Ð +Ð +Ð = Ð +Ð +Ð =1 2 180 .B BAC C BAC  
 The seventh uses a property of the circle. 
 Proof 7: Using a property of angles subtended by a 
chord (Fig.  2.14 ). 







A BOC B AOC
C AOB
Ð = Ð Ð = Ð
Ð = Ð    
 Adding these together:
 ½ 360 .A B C
° °Ð + Ð + Ð = = 180  
 Proof eight appeals to the more general 
form of the angle sum of an  n -sided poly-
gon, either as a consequence of the turtle 
trip theorem, or simply by substitution in 
the general formula. 
 Proof 8: An  n -sided (convex) polygon has 
angle sum  180 360n ° °´ -  (Fig.  2.15 ). 
 Put  = 3n  in the general formula to get 


















 Fig. 2.14  A proof using a property 






 Fig. 2.15  A proof using a formula for an 
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 These eight solutions reveal a broad  hierarchy. Proofs 1 and 2 are embodied 
approaches, the fi rst by a physical process of putting the angles together (in a manner 
that may have been suggested to them earlier), the second by measuring a few 
examples. Proof 1 contains within it the seeds of more sophisticated proofs 5 and 6 
using the Euclidean idea of parallel lines. Proof 3 (and its generalisation to a 
polygon used in proof 8) are dynamic proofs that do not arise in the static formal 
geometry of Euclid and yet provide a dynamic embodied sense of why the theorem 
is true. Proof 4, relating to the exterior angle property, nicely links two properties of 
a triangle and yet, an expert may know that these are given as equivalent results 
from a single theorem of Euclid (Book 1, proposition 32, as given in Joyce  1998 ) : 
 In any triangle, if one of the sides is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the two interior 
and opposite angles, and the three interior angles of the triangle are equal to two right 
angles (Joyce 1998). 
 Though some experts, looking at this proof from a formal viewpoint, may see it 
relating two equivalent properties in a circular manner, it is a natural connection for 
a student to make in the early stages of building a knowledge structure of relation-
ships in geometry (Housman and Porter  2003 ; Koichu  2009 ) . 
 Proofs 5 and 6 are in the spirit of Euclid, constructing a parallel line and using 
established propositions concerning parallel lines to establish the theorem. However, 
here they are more likely to involve an embodied sense of the properties of parallel 
lines than the specifi c formal sequence of deductions in Euclid Book I. 
 Proofs 7 and 8 both use more sophisticated results to prove simple consequences 
and have a greater sense of a general proof. And yet one must ask oneself, how 
does one establish the more general proof in the fi rst place? Whilst networks of 
theorems may have many different paths and possible different starting points, the 
deeper issues of sound foundations and appropriate sequences of deductions 
remain. 
 It has long been known that students have diffi culty reproducing Euclidean proof 
as a sequence of statements where each is justifi ed in an appropriate manner. Senk 
 ( 1985 ) showed that only 30% of students in a full-year geometry course reached a 
70% mastery on a set of six problems in Euclidean proof. 
 Given the perceived diffi culties in Euclidean geometry, the NCTM Standards 
 ( 2000 ) suggested that there should be decreased attention to the overall idea of 
geometry as an axiomatic system and increased attention on short sequences of 
theorems. These can in themselves relate to Papert’s notion that a theorem should be 
powerful, surprising, and have a proof. Two examples include the theorem that two 
parallelograms on the same base and between the same parallels have the same area, 
even though they may not look the same, and the theorem that the angles subtended 
by a chord in a circle are all equal (Fig.  2.16 ). 
 Here, short sequences of construction are possible. For instance, in the area of 
parallelograms, one may prove that the triangles  ADD ¢ and  BCC ¢ are congruent and 
that each parallelogram is given by taking one of these triangles from the whole 
polygon  ABC ¢ D . The equalities of the angles subtended by a chord is established by 
constructing the angle at the centre of the circle and proving that it is twice the angle 
at the circle. 
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 5.2  The Beginnings of Spherical and Non-Euclidean 
Geometries 
 The teaching of non-Euclidean geometries is not central in the current curriculum, 
but practical experience in such geometries is becoming part of the development of 
college mathematics in the USA.
 College-intending students also should gain an appreciation of Euclidean geometry as one 
of many axiomatic systems. This goal may be achieved by directing students to investigate 
properties of other geometries to see how the basic axioms and defi nitions lead to quite 
different – and often contrary – results (NCTM Standards  1989 , p. 160). 
 Although spherical geometry goes back to the time of Euclid, it does not share 
the axiomatic tradition developed in plane geometry. Spherical geometry may be 
approached as a combination of embodiment and trigonometric measurement. 
One may begin with the physical experience of operating on the surface of a 
sphere (say an orange, or a tennis ball with elastic bands to represent great circles). 
This produces surprising results quite different from the axiomatic geometry of 
Euclid. When exploring spherical triangles whose sides are great circles, the 
learner may fi nd a new geometry that shares properties predicting congruence 
(SAS, SSS, AAS), but is fundamentally different from plane Euclidean geometry, 
in that parallel lines do not occur and the angles of a triangle always add up to 
more than 180°. 
 This can be proved by a combination of embodiment and trigonometry. 
Figure  2.17 shows a spherical triangle  ABC produced by cutting the surface with 
three great circles. It has a corresponding triangle  A ¢ B ¢ C ¢ where the great circles 
meet on the opposite side of the sphere having exactly the same shape and area. 
 The total area of the shaded parts of the surface between the great circles through 
 AB and  AC can be seen by rotation about the diameter  AA ¢ to be  /a p  of the total 
area, where  a  denotes the size of the angle  A measured in radians. This area is 
 2 24 / 4r rp a p a´ =  . The same happens with the slices through  B and through  C 
with area  24 rb  and  24 rg  . These three areas cover the whole surface area of the 
A B
D CD C





 Fig. 2.16  Interesting theorems 
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sphere and all three overlap over the triangles  ABC and  A ¢ B ¢ C ¢ . Adding all three 
together, allowing for the double overlap gives the surface area of the sphere as
  
2 2 2 24 4 4 4 4r r r rp a b g= + + - D   
where  D  is the area of the spherical triangle  ABC . This gives the area  D  as 





a b g p
D
+ + = +
   
 The experience challenges learners to rethink the ‘deductive arguments’ given 
above that the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180° when the sum of the angles of 
a spherical triangle is always more by a quantity proportional to its area. 
 In long-term implementations with in-service teachers and university students, 
learners report that they could not have developed concepts and the arguments with-
out access to materials to handle and dynamic geometry sketches to explore the tasks. 
In short, this provides evidence for the continuing role for embodied experience in 
the cognitive development of proof in adults. Examples of such an approach arise in 
the book Experiencing Geometry ( Henderson and Taimina  2005 ) and the work of 
Lénárt  ( 2003 ) , encouraging comparison of concepts and reasoning in spherical 
geometry and plane geometry, through practical activities such as handling spheres 
or folding paper. These explorations give an emphasis to transformations and sym-
metry, matching the ‘modern’ defi nition of geometry of  Klein  ( 1872 ) and offer a 
setting for increasingly sophisticated refl ections on two distinct embodied geome-
tries. The similarities and contrasts between the two structures provoke a refl ective 
reworking of unexamined concepts such as ‘straight lines’ and ‘angles’ and also of 
principles related to ‘congruence of triangles’ and the properties of ‘parallel lines’. 
 Fig. 2.17  Area of a spherical triangle 
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 Other geometries may be studied, perhaps as axiomatic systems, but more often 
as a combination of embodiment and symbolism. For instance, projective geometry 
of the plane can be studied using embodied drawing or symbolic manipulation of 
homogeneous coordinates. Non-Euclidean geometries include the Poincaré model 
of hyperbolic geometry in the upper half plane where ‘points’ are of the form  ( , )x y  
for  y > 0 and ‘lines’ are semi-circles with centre on the  x -axis; two ‘lines’ are said to 
be ‘parallel’ if they do not meet. In this new context, students must refl ect on new 
meanings to make deductions dependent upon the defi nitions in the new context 
(Neto et al .  2009 ) . 
 6  Symbolic Proof in Arithmetic and Algebra 
 As the mathematics becomes more sophisticated, increasingly subtle forms of proof 
develop in arithmetic and algebra. They build from demonstrations or calculations 
for single examples, to considering a specifi c example to represent a generic proof 
that applies to all similar cases, and then to general proofs expressed algebraically. 
Induction proofs can operate at two distinct levels, one the potentially infi nite pro-
cess of proving a specifi c case and repeating a general step as often as is required, 
the second involving a three stage proof that compresses the potentially infi nite 
repetition of steps to a single use of the induction axiom in a more formal setting. 
 6.1  The Increasing Sophistication of Proof in Arithmetic 
and Algebra 
 An example of such successively sophisticated forms of proof is the Gauss Little 
Theorem that is reputed to have been produced by the schoolboy Gauss when his 
teacher requested the class to add up all the whole numbers from 1 to 100 (Fig .  2.18 ). 
 These successive proofs are not all as successful in giving meaning to students. 
Rodd  ( 2000 ) found that both the generic pictorial and algebraic proofs made more 
sense to the students because they gave a meaningful explanation as to why the 
proof is true, whilst the formal proof by induction is more obscure because it seems 
to use the result of the proof (assuming  P ( n ) for a specifi c  n to prove  P ( n + 1)) during 
the proof itself. In addition, the fi nite proof by induction (Proof 6) may cause further 
problems because, although it has only three steps, the set defi ned by the Peano 
axioms must itself be infi nite. 
 6.2  Proof by Contradiction and the Development 
of Aesthetic Criteria 
 On the one hand, it is well established that proving by contradiction is problematic 
for many students (e.g. Antonini  2001 ; Epp  1998 ; Leron  1985 ; Reid and Dobbin 
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 Fig. 2.18  Proofs of the formula for the sum of the fi rst  n whole numbers 
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 1998 ; Tall  1979 ) . On the other hand, Freudenthal  ( 1973 , p. 629) notes that indirect 
proof arises spontaneously in young children in statements such as ‘Peter is at home 
since otherwise the door would not be locked’. Such a phenomenon occurred with 
Stephanie (see Sect.  4.2 ) where she observed that it is not possible to have a tower 
of fi ve cubes to have four or more yellow cubes placed between two red cubes. 
 The full notion of proof by contradiction (to prove P, assume P is false and deduce 
that this leads to a contradiction) is an altogether more problematic mode of proving 
as the prover must simultaneously hold a falsehood to be true and attempt to argue 
why it is false whilst in a state of stress. Leron  ( 1985 ) suggests that it is preferable 
to reorganise a contradiction proof so that it initially involves a positive construction 
and the contradiction is postponed to the end. For instance, in order to prove there 
are an infi nite number of primes, start by proving positively that given any fi nite 
number of primes one can always construct another one, then – and only then – 
deduce that, if there are only a fi nite number of primes, then this would lead to a 
contradiction. 
 A similar technique is to use a generic proof. For instance, rather than prove that 
√2 is irrational by contradiction, fi rst prove that if one squares a rational number 
where denominator and numerator are factorised into different primes, then its 
square has an even number of each prime factor in the numerator or denominator. 
Then, and only then, deduce that √2 cannot be a rational because its square is 2, 
which only has an odd number of occurrences of the prime 2. (At a formal level, we 
note that this proof is dependent on the uniqueness of factorisation into primes, but 
this is not a concern that occurs to students on fi rst acquaintance with the proof.) 
 Tall  ( 1979 ) presented a choice of two proofs: the contradiction proof that √2 is 
irrational and the generic proof that √(5/8) is irrational because 5/8 contains an odd 
number of 5s and also an odd number of 2s in its prime factorisation. The generic 
proof has explanatory power that generalises easily whilst the contradiction proof is 
both problematic and not easily generalised. Students signifi cantly preferred the 
generic proof over the contradiction proof and even amongst students who were 
already familiar with the contradiction proof, their preference for the generic proof 
increased over a period of days. 
 The process of turning all contradiction proofs to more direct proofs with a later 
contradiction, however, may not be profi table in the long-term as proofs by contra-
diction are central to mathematical analysis. This suggests that direct proofs will be 
helpful in the early stages, but there is a need to shift to the use of contradiction 
proofs to enable the student to build more powerful knowledge structures that are 
suffi ciently robust for more advanced mathematical analysis. 
 Dreyfus and Eisenberg  ( 1986 ) found that mathematicians comparing different 
proofs of the irrationality of √2 ranked the proofs by contradiction that lack the need 
for prerequisite knowledge as elegant and appropriate for their teaching. They also 
found that college students had not yet developed the sense of aesthetics of a proof 
and proposed that such a sense should be encouraged. 
 Koichu and Berman  ( 2005 ) found that gifted high school students, who were 
asked to prove the Steiner-Lehmus theorem (‘If the bisectors of two angles of a tri-
angle are equal, then it is an isosceles triangle’), could fl uently operate in the mode 
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of proving by contradiction. In addition, they manifested the developed aesthetic 
sense, by their incentive to fi nd the most parsimonious proof. For instance, they 
realised that it was possible to build a concise proof that used the minimum of pre-
requisite knowledge. However, in the pressure of a contest, they found that the brute 
force of using well-rehearsed procedures could prove to be more effi cient if less 
aesthetic. 
 The development of more sophisticated insight into proof reveals the fact that the 
use of contradiction requires the propositions involved to be either true or false with 
no alternative. More general forms of logic are possible, for instance allowing an 
extra alternative that a theorem might be undecideable (it could be true, but the truth 
cannot be established in a fi nite number of steps), or there may be different grada-
tions between absolute truth and absolute falsehood. This might occur in multi-
valent logic allowing in-between possibilities between 0 (false) and 1 (true). It also 
occurs when a conjecture is formulated, which may be considered ‘almost certain’, 
‘highly probable’, ‘fairly likely’ or some other level of possibility prior to the estab-
lishment of a formal proof. 
 7  Axiomatic Formal Proof 
 Formal proof, as introduced earlier in Sect.  2.1 , refers either to a precise logical 
form as specifi ed by Hilbert or to forms of proof used by mathematicians to com-
municate to each other in conversation and in journal articles. We begin by consid-
ering the undergraduate development in formal proof as part of the long-term 
cognitive growth of proof concepts from child to adult. 
 7.1  Student Development of Formal Proof 
 Initial student encounters with formal proof can occur in a number of ways. At one 
end of the spectrum is the Moore method in which students are given basic defi ni-
tions and theorems and encouraged to seek proofs for themselves. R. L. Moore 
reckoned that ‘That student is taught the best who is told the least’ (Parker  2005 ) . 
He produced a rich legacy of graduates in mathematics who advanced the frontiers 
of research, producing a phenomenon consistent with the long-term success of 
Fawcett’s open-ended approach to geometry in school. 
 When students are introduced to formal proof in a university pure mathematics 
course, the objective is for them to make sense of formal defi nitions in a way that 
can be used for deduction of theorems. Pinto  ( 1998 ) found that there was a spectrum 
of approaches in an analysis course, which she classifi ed in two main groups: those 
who gave meaning to the defi nition from their current concept imagery, and those 
who extracted meaning from the defi nition by learning to reproduce it fl uently and 
studying its use in proofs presented in class. She found that both approaches could 
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lead to the building of successful formal knowledge structures but that either could 
break down as a result of confl ict between previous experience and the theory, or 
through the sheer complexity of the defi nitions that could involve three or more 
nested quantifi ers. 
 These observations are consistent with the work of Duffi n and Simpson  ( 1993, 
 1995 ) who distinguished between ‘natural’ approaches to describe a new experi-
ence that fi ts a learner’s current mental structures, ‘alien’ approaches when the 
learner fi nds no connection with any of his or her internal structures, and ‘confl icting’ 
when the learner realises the experience is inconsistent with them. 
 Pinto and Tall  ( 1999 ) used the terms ‘natural’ to describe the process of extract-
ing meaning and ‘formal’ for the process of giving meaning by working with the 
formal deductions. To the categories ‘natural’ and ‘formal’, Weber  ( 2004 ) added 
the notion of ‘procedural’ learning for those students who simply attempted to 
cope with formal defi nitions and proof by learning them by rote. 
 Alcock and Weber  ( 2004 ) later classifi ed the responses of students into ‘semantic’ 
and ‘syntactic’, using terms from linguistics that essentially refer to the meaning of 
language (its semantic content) and the structure of the language (its syntax). They 
described a syntactic approach as one in which ‘the prover works from a literal read-
ing of the involved defi nitions’ and a semantic approach ‘in which the prover also 
makes use of his or her intuitive understanding of the concepts.’ These are broadly 
consistent (though not identical) with the extracting and giving of meaning and the 
related categories of ‘formal’ and ‘natural’. 
 This reveals the complexity that students face in attempting to make sense of 
formal mathematical theory. Overall, it may be seen as a journey making sense of 
axiomatic systems by natural or formal means, beginning with specifi c axioms and 
seeking to construct a more fl exible knowledge structure. For instance, one may 
begin with the defi nition of completeness in terms, say, of an increasing sequence 
bounded above having a limit, and then deduce other properties such as the conver-
gence of Cauchy sequences or the existence of a least upper bound for a non-empty 
subset bounded above. All of these properties may then be seen to be equivalent 
ways of defi ning completeness, with the ultimate goal being the conception of a 
complete ordered fi eld as a crystalline concept having a tight coherent structure 
with the various forms of completeness being used fl exibly as appropriate in a 
given situation. 
 In this way, expertise develops as hypothesised in Fig.  2.3 , from the students’ 
previous growing experience, shifting from description to formal defi nition, construct-
ing links through formal proof, establishing the equivalence of various defi nitions, and 
then building increasingly fl exible links to construct crystalline concepts that can be 
mentally manipulated in fl exible ways. 
 Evidence for this further development was given by Weber  ( 2001 ) who investi-
gated how four undergraduates and four research students responded to formal 
problems, such as the question of whether there is an isomorphism between the 
group of integers    under addition and the group    of rational numbers under 
addition. None of the four undergraduates could provide a formal response but all 
four graduates were able to do so. Whilst the undergraduates attempted to deal with 
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the proof in terms of defi nition to fi nd a bijection that preserved the operation, the 
graduates used their more fl exible knowledge structures to consider whether an iso-
morphism was even possible. 
 Some undergraduates focused on their memory that    and     have the same 
cardinal number and so already had a bijective correspondence between them. They 
had part of the idea – a bijection – but not a bijection that respected the operation. 
Meanwhile the graduates used their wider knowledge structures, including a wider 
repertoire of proving strategies, to suggest possible ways of thinking about the prob-
lem. For instance, one immediately declared that    and    could not be isomor-
phic, fi rst by speculating that    is dense but    is not, then that ‘   is cyclic, but 
   s not’ (meaning that the element 1 generates the whole of     under addition but 
no element in    does so). 
 7.2  Structure Theorems and New Forms of Embodiment 
and Symbolism in Research Mathematics 
 In the process of building formal knowledge structures, certain central theorems 
play an essential role. These are structure theorems. They state that an axiomatic 
structure has certain essential properties which can often involve enriched visual 
and symbolic modes of operation that are now based not on naïve intuition but on 
formal proof. Typical examples are:
 An equivalence relation on  • S corresponds to a partition of  S . 
 A fi nite group is isomorphic to a subgroup of a group of permutations. • 
 A fi nite dimensional vector space over a fi eld  • F is isomorphic to  nF  . 
 A fi eld contains a subfi eld isomorphic to  •   or to   n  . 
 An ordered fi eld contains a subfi eld isomorphic to  •   . 
 An ordered fi eld extension  • K of    contains fi nite and infi nite elements and any 
fi nite element is of the form  ε+c  where  c Î and  ε ÎK  is infi nitesimal. 
 Such theorems enable research mathematicians to develop personal knowledge 
structures that operate in highly fl exible ways. Some build formally, others naturally, 
as observed by the algebraist Saunders MacLane  ( 1994 ) speaking of a conversation 
with the geometer Michael Atiyah:
 For MacLane it meant getting and understanding the needed defi nitions, working with them 
to see what could be calculated and what might be true, to fi nally come up with new ‘struc-
ture’ theorems. For Atiyah, it meant thinking hard about a somewhat vague and uncertain 
situation, trying to guess what might be found out, and only then fi nally reaching defi nitions 
and the defi nitive theorems and  proofs (pp. 190–191). 
 This division between those ‘preoccupied with logic’ and those ‘guided by intu-
ition’ was noted long ago by Poincaré  ( 1913 ) , citing Hermite as a logical thinker 
who ‘never evoked a sensuous image’ in mathematical conversation and Riemann 
as an intuitive thinker who ‘calls geometry to his aid’ (p. 212). 
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 Such ‘intuition’ used by mathematicians relates to deeply embedded subtle linkages 
in their own personal knowledge structures that suggest likely relationships before 
they may be amenable to formal proof. Formal proof is the fi nal stage of research in 
which the argument is refi ned and given in a deductive manner based on precise 
defi nitions and appropriate mathematical deductions. Making sense of mathematics 
requires more:
 Only professional mathematicians learn anything from proofs. Other people learn from 
explanations. A great deal can be accomplished with arguments that fall short of proofs 
(Boas  1981 , p. 729). 
 If mathematics were formally true but in no way enlightening this mathematics would 
be a curious game played by weird people (Rota  1997 , p. 132) . 
 Burton  ( 2002 ) interviewed 70 research mathematicians (with equal numbers of 
males and females) to study a range of aspects under headings such as thinking 
styles, socio-cultural relatedness, aesthetics, intuition and connectivities. She ini-
tially hypothesised that she would fi nd evidence of the two styles of thinking formu-
lated above (which she described as visual and analytic) and that mathematicians 
would move fl exibly between the two. However, her analysis of the data showed a 
more complex situation that she organised into three categories – visual (thinking in 
pictures, often dynamic), analytic (thinking symbolically, formalistically) and con-
ceptual (thinking in ideas, classifying). The majority of those interviewed (42/70) 
embraced two styles, a small number (3/70) used all three and the rest referred only 
to one (15 visual, 3 analytic and 7 conceptual). Rather than a simple dualism, this 
suggests a range of thinking styles used in various combinations. 
 This fi ner analysis remains consistent with the broad framework of embodiment, 
symbolism and formalism, whilst revealing subtle distinctions. The research cycle 
of development builds on the experiences of the researchers and involves explora-
tion in addition to formal proof. The visual category is concerned with embodiment 
in terms of ‘thinking in pictures, often dynamic’. The analytic category specifi cally 
describes ‘thinking symbolically, formalistically’. The conceptual category refers to 
‘thinking in ideas’, which occurs at an exploratory phase of a cycle of research, 
whilst ‘classifying’ relates to classifying structures that satisfy an appropriate defi -
nition. These defi nitions may vary in their origins, as verbally defi ned embodiments, 
symbolic concepts related to rules of operation, or formally defi ned concepts that 
may then be proved to have a given structure. For instance simple groups are defi ned 
formally but their classifi cation may be performed using structural properties such 
as generators and relations rather than formal proof as a sequence of quantifi ed 
statements. 
 Applied mathematicians develop contextually based inference in their area of 
expertise, often based on embodiment of situations, translated into some kind of 
symbolism (such as systems of algebraic or differential equations) to manipulate 
and predict a solution. 
 Research mathematicians have a variety of ways of thinking creatively to develop 
new theorems. Byers  ( 2007 ) observed that true creativity arises out of paradoxes, 
ambiguities and confl icts that occur when ideas from different contexts come into 
contact. This encourages mathematicians to attempt to make sense of the problem, 
452 Cognitive Development of Proof
thinking about possibilities, suggesting possible hypotheses, making new defi nitions, 
and seeking mathematical proofs. 
 In creating new mathematical theorems, mathematicians will work not only 
according to their personal preferences, but also with respect to the particular math-
ematical context. The possible combinations of embodiment, symbolism and for-
malism lead to a variety of techniques in which a particular activity may lean towards 
one or more modes of operation appropriate to the situation. 
 Mathematical proof at the highest level is an essential part of the story of devel-
opment, with differently oriented mathematicians having different ways of thought 
but sharing common standards as to the need for proof to establish a desired result. 
However, a mathematical proof is not the end of the story, it is the full stop at the 
end of a paragraph, a place to pause and celebrate the proof of a new theorem which, 
in turn, becomes the launching pad for a new cycle of research and development. 
 8  Summary 
 In considering the development of proof from the child to the adult and the mathe-
matical researcher, we have embraced a wide range of viewpoints that relate directly 
to the ideas of proof and proving. Overall, however, we see the cognitive develop-
ment beginning with the perceptions, actions and refl ections of the child, develop-
ing out of the sensorimotor foundation of human thought, as the child observes 
regularities, builds mental concepts and makes links between them. 
 Different developments of proof occur in the visuospatial development of geom-
etry and the symbolic development of arithmetic and algebra. In geometry, percep-
tions are described and knowledge structures are developed that construct 
relationships, develop defi nitions of fi gures, deduce equivalent properties and build 
up a coherent structure of Euclidean geometry. In arithmetic, general properties of 
operations are observed, described, then later formulated as rules that should be 
obeyed in algebra, enabling a form of proof based on algebraic manipulation subject 
to the rules of arithmetic. 
 The general population builds mainly on the physical, spatial and symbolic 
aspects of mathematics. Pure mathematicians in addition develop formally defi ned 
set-theoretic entities and formal proof. This leads to structure theorems that give the 
entities a rich combination of embodiment and symbolism, now supported by for-
mal deduction. Applied mathematicians, develop contextual ways of using struc-
tures to model embodied situations as symbolic representations, solved by symbolic 
operations. 
 In each case the strand of development begins from human perception and action, 
through experience of objects and properties, that are described, with meanings that 
are refi ned and defi ned, then built into more sophisticated thinkable concepts that 
have a rich knowledge structure. These are connected together through relation-
ships constructed by appropriate forms of deduction and proof to lead to sophisti-
cated crystalline concepts whose properties are constrained by the given context. 
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In Euclidean geometry the crystalline concepts are platonic fi gures that represent 
the essentials underlying the physical examples, in arithmetic and algebra they are 
fl exible procepts that enable fl uent calculation and manipulation of symbols, and in 
formal mathematics they are the total entities arising through deduction from axioms 
and defi nitions, with their essential structure revealed by structure theorems. 
 Proof involves a lifetime of cognitive development of the individual that is shared 
within societies and is further developed in sophistication by successive generations 
of mathematicians. Mathematical proof is designed to furnish theorems that can be 
used in a given context as both the culmination of a process of seeking certainty and 
explanation and also as a foundation for future developments in mathematical 
research. 
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 1  The Constructive Content of Euclid’s Axioms 
 From the time of Euclid to the age of super-computers, Western mathematicians 
have continually tried to develop and refi ne the foundations of proof and proving. 
Many of these attempts have been based on analyses logically and historically 
linked to the prevailing philosophical notions of the day. However, they have all 
exhibited, more or less explicitly, some basic cognitive principles – for example, the 
notions of symmetry and order. Here I trace some of the major steps in the evolution 
of notion of proof, linking them to these cognitive basics. 
 I take as a starting point Euclid’s  Aithemata (Requests), the  minimal construc-
tions required to do geometry:
 1.  To draw a straight line from any point to any point. 
 2.  To extend a fi nite straight line continuously in a straight line. 
 3.  To draw a circle with any centre and distance. 
 4.  That all right angles are equal to one another. 
 5.  That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on 
the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefi -
nitely, meet on that side on which the angles are less than the two right angles. 
(Heath  1908 ; pp. 190–200). 
 These “Requests” are  constructions performed by ruler and compass : an abstract 
ruler and compass, of course, not the carpenter’s tools but tools for a dialogue with 
the Gods. They provide the minimal “construction principles” the geometer should 
be able to apply. 
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 Note that these Requests follow a “maximal symmetry principle”. Drawing a 
straight line between two points, one obtains the most symmetric possible struc-
ture: any other line, different from this one, would introduce asymmetries by 
breaking at least the axial symmetry of the straight line. The same can be said for 
the second axiom, where any other extension of a fi nite line would yield fewer 
symmetries. Similarly, the third, a complete  rotation symmetry , generates the 
most symmetric fi gure for a line enclosing a point. In the fourth, equality is defi ned 
by congruence; that is, by a  translation symmetry . Finally, the fi fth construction 
again is a matter of drawing, intersecting and then extending. The most symmetric 
construction occurs when the two given lines do  not intersect: then the two inner 
angles are right angles on both sides of the line intersecting the two given lines. 
The other two cases, as negations of this one (once the theorem in Book I n. 29 in 
Euclid’s Elements has been shown), would reduce the number of symmetries. 
Their equivalent formulations (more than one parallel in one point to a line, no 
parallel at all) both yield fewer symmetries,  on a Euclidian plane , than having 
exactly one parallel line. 
 Euclid’s Requests found geometry by actions on fi gures, implicitly  governed by 
symmetries . Now, “symmetries” are at the core of Greek culture, art and science. 
They refer to “balanced” situations or, more precisely, “measurable” entities or 
forms. But the meaning we give to symmetries today underlies Greek “aesthetics” 
(in the Greek sense of the word) and their sensitivity, knowledge and art, from 
sculpture to myth and tragedy. Moreover, loss of symmetry (symmetry-breaking) 
originated the world as well as human tragedy; as a breaking of equilibrium between 
the Gods, it underlies the very sense of human life. As tools for mathematical con-
struction, symmetry-breakings participate in the “original formation of sense”, as 
Husserl would say (see below and Weyl  1952 ) . 
 Concerning the axioms of geometry, the formalist universal-existential version 
(“For  any two points on a plane, there  exists one and only one segment between 
these points” etc.) misses the constructive sense and misleads the foundational anal-
ysis into the anguishing quest for formal, thus fi nitistic, consistency proofs. 1 We 
know how this quest ended: by Gödel’s theorem, there is no such proof for the para-
digm of fi nitism in mathematics, formal arithmetic. 
 2  From Axioms to Theorems 
 “Theorem” derives from “ theoria ” in Greek; it means “vision”, as in “theatre”: a 
theorem  shows , by constructing. So, the fi rst theorem of Euclid’s fi rst book shows 
how to take a segment and trace the (semi-)circles centred on the extremes of the 
segment, with the segment as radius. These intersect in one point. Draw straight lines 
from the extremes of the segment to that point: this produces an equilateral triangle. 
 1  In my interpretation, existence, in the fi rst axiom, is by  construction and unicity by  symmetry . 
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 For a century critics have told us that this is not a proof (in Hilbert’s sense!): One 
must formally prove the existence of the point of intersection. These detractors could 
use more of the Greeks’ dialogue with their Gods. 2 Both points and continuous lines 
are founding notions, but the conceptual path relating them is the inverse of the point-
wise constructions that have dominated mathematics since Cantor. Lines are ideal 
objects, they are  a cohesive continuum with no thickness . Points, in Euclid, are 
obtained as a  result of an intersection of lines: two  thickless (one-dimensional) lines, 
suitably intersecting, produce a point,  with no parts (no dimension) The immense 
step towards abstraction in Greek geometry is the invention of continuous lines with 
no thickness, as abstract as a divine construction. As a matter of fact, how else can 
one propose a general  Measure Theory of surfaces, the aim of “geo-metry”? If a 
plane fi gure has thick borders, which is the surface of the fi gure? 
 Thus came this amazing conceptual (and metaphysical) invention, done within 
the Greek dialogue with the Gods: the continuous line with no thickness. Points – 
with no dimension, but nameable, as Euclid defi nes them 3 – are then produced by 
intersecting lines or sit at the extremes of a line or segment (defi nition  g ). But lines 
are not composed of signs-points. A line, either continuous or discrete, is a  gestalt , 
not a set of points. 
 Greek geometric fi gures and their theatrical properties derive by constructions 
from these fundamental gestalts, signs-points and lines, in a game of rotations and 
translations, of constructing and breaking symmetries. These gestalts inherently 
penetrate proofs even now. 
 3  On Intuition 
 Mathematical intuition is the result of an historical praxis; it is a constituted frame 
for active constructions, grounded on action in space, stabilised by language and 
writing in inter-subjectivity. 
 A pure intuition refers to  what can be done , instead of to  what is . It is the seeing 
of a mental construction; it is the appreciation of an active experience, of an active 
(re-) construction of the world. We can intuit, because we  actively construct (math-
ematical) knowledge on the phenomenal screen between us and the world. 
 As for that early and fundamental gestalt, the continuous line, our evolutionary 
and historical brain sets contours that are not in the world, beginning with the 
activity of the primary cortex. There is a big gap – actually, an abyss – between the 
 biological-evolutionary path and the historical-conceptual construction; yet, I’ll try 
to bridge it in a few lines. 
 2  Schrödinger stresses that a fundamental feature of Greek philosophy is the absence of ‘the 
 unbearable division, which affected us for centuries… : the division between science and religion’ 
(quoted in Fraisopi  2009 ) . 
 3  Actually “signs” ( s h m e i a , defi nition  a ): Boetius fi rst used the word and the meaning of “point”. 
Note that a sign-point ( s h m e i o n ) in Euclid is  identifi ed with the letter that names it (see Toth  2002 ) . 
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 The neurons of the primary cortex activate by  contiguity and  connectivity along 
non-existent lines and “project” non-existing continuous contours on objects (at most, 
contours are singularities). More precisely, recent analyses of the primary cortex 
(see Petitot  2003 ) highlight the role of intra-cortical synaptic linkages in the percep-
tual construction of edges and of trajectories. In the primary cortex, neurons are 
sensitive to “directions”: they activate when oriented along the tangent of a detected 
direction or contour. More precisely, the neurons which activate for  almost parallel 
directions, possibly along a straight line, are more connected than the others. In 
other words, neurons whose receptive fi eld,  approximately and  locally , is upon a 
straight line (or along parallel lines) have a larger amount of synaptic connections 
amongst themselves. Thus, the activation of a neuron stimulates or prepares for 
activation neurons that are  almost aligned with it or that are  almost parallel – like 
tangents along a continuous virtual line in the primary cortex. We detect the conti-
nuity of an edge by a global “gluing” of these tangents, in the precise geometrical 
(differential) sense of gluing. More exactly, our brain “imposes” by continuity the 
unity of an edge by relating neurons which are structured and linked together in a 
continuous way and locally  almost in parallel. Their “integral” gives the line 
(Petitot  2003 ) . 
 The humans who fi rst drew the  contours of a bison on the walls of a cavern 
(as in Lascaux) instead of painting a brown or black body, communicated to other 
humans with the same brain cortex and life experience. A real bison is not made 
just of thick contours as in some drawings on those walls. Yet, those images evoke 
the animal by a reconstruction of it on that phenomenal screen which is the con-
structed interface between us and the world. The structures of mathematics origi-
nate also from such drawings, through their abstract lines. The Greek “limit” 
defi nition and construction of the ideal line with no thickness is the last plank of 
our long bridge: a constructed but “critical” transition to the pure concept (see 
Bailly and Longo  2006 ) , far from the world of senses and action, well beyond all 
we can say by just looking at the brain, but grounded on and made possible by our 
brain and its action in this world. 
 Consider now the other main origin of our mathematical activities: the counting 
and ordering of small quantities, a talent that we share with many animals (see 
Dehaene  1997 ) . By language we learn to iterate further; we stabilise the resulting 
sequence with names; we propose numbers for these  actions . These numbers were 
fi rst associated, by common names, with parts of the human body, beginning with 
the fi ngers. With writing, their notation departed from just iterating fi ngers or 
strokes; yet, in all historical notations, we still write with strokes up to 3, which is 
given by three parallel segments interconnected by continuous drawing, like 2, 
which is given by two connected segments. However, conceptual iteration has no 
reason to stop: it may be “ apeiron ” – “without limit”, in Greek. Thus, since that 
early conceptual practice of potential infi nity, we started seeing the endless number 
line, a discrete gestalt, because we iterate an action-schema in space (counting, 
ordering …) and we  well order it by this very conceptual gesture. For example, we 
look at that discrete endless line, which goes from left to right (in our Western 
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 culture, but opposite for Arabs; Dehaene  1997 ) , and observe “a generic non-empty 
subset has a least element.” (A suffi ciently mathematically minded reader should 
pause here and envision this.) This is the principle of  well-ordering as used every 
day by mathematicians. It is a consequence of the discrete spatial construction, a 
geometric invariant resulting from different practices of discrete ordering and 
counting into mental spaces. It originates in the simple, small counting and order-
ing that we share with many animals (Dehaene  1997 ; Longo and Viarouge  2010 ) 
Further on, in a long path, via language, arithmetical (logico-formal) induction fol-
lows from those early active forms of ordering and counting objects rather than 
founding them – contrary to Frege’s and Hilbert’s views (see below). The mathe-
matical construction, induction, is the result of these ancient practices, by action 
and language; then it organises the world and allows proofs. Yet, it is grounded on 
a “gestalt”, the discrete well-ordering where individual points make no sense with-
out their ordered context. 
 4  Little Gauss’ Proof 
 At the age of 7 or 8, Gauss was asked by his school teacher to produce the result of 
the sum of the fi rst n integers (or, perhaps, the question was slightly less general…), 
 Gauss (1801) . 4 He then proved a theorem, by the following method. He wrote on the 
fi rst line the increasing sequence 1,… ,  n , then, below it and inverted, the same 
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 Then the result is obvious:  
1
( 1) / 2
n
i n n= +∑  
 This proof is  not by induction. Given  n , it proposes a uniform argument which 
works for  any integer  n . Following Herbrand (Longo  2002 ) , we may call this kind 
of proof a  prototype : it provides a (geometric) prototype or schema for any intended 
parameter of the proof. Of course, once the formula  
1
( 1) / 2
n
i n n= +∑  is given, we 
can very easily prove it by induction as well. But one must know the formula or, 
more generally, the “induction load”. Little Gauss did not know the formula; he had 
to construct it as a result of the proof. On the contrary, we have the belief induced 
by the formalist myth: that proving a theorem is proving an  already given formula ! 
We learn, more or less implicitly, from the formal approach, that mathematics is 
 4  This section is partly borrowed from the introduction to Longo  ( 2002 ) . 
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“the use of the axioms to prove a given formula” – an incomplete foundation and a 
parody of mathematical theorem proving. 
 Except in a few easy cases, even when the formula to be proved is already 
given (best known example: Fermat’s last theorem), the proof requires the inven-
tion of an induction load and of a novel deductive path which may be very far 
from the formula. In Fermat’s example, the detour requires the invention of an 
extraordinary amount of new mathematics. The same is true also in Automatic 
Theorem Proving, where human intervention is required even in inductive proofs 
because, except in a few trivial cases, the assumption required in the inductive 
step (the induction load) may be much stronger than the thesis or have no trivial 
relation to it. Clearly,  a posteriori the induction load may be generally described 
within the formalism, but its “choice”, out of infi nitely many possibilities, may 
require some external heuristics (typically: analogies, symmetries, symmetry-
breaking, etc.). 
 More generally,  proving a theorem is answering a question , like Gauss’ teacher’s 
question, about a property of a mathematical structure or about relating different 
structures;  it is not proving an already given formula . 
 Consider a possible way to Gauss’ proof. Little Gauss “saw” the discrete number 
line, as we all do, well ordered from left to right. But then he had a typical hit of 
mathematical genius: He dared to invert it, to force it to go backwards in his mind, 
an amazing step. This is a paradigmatic mathematical invention: constructing a new 
symmetry, in this case by an audacious space rotation or order inversion. That 
reverse-refl ection (or mirror) symmetry gives the equality of the vertical sums. The 
rest is obvious. 
 In this case, order and symmetries both  produce and  found Gauss’ proof. Even  a 
posteriori , the proof cannot be founded on formal induction, as this would assume 
the knowledge of the formula. 
 4.1  Arithmetic Induction and the Foundation 
of Mathematical Proof 
 Above, I hinted at an understanding of the ordering of numbers with reference to 
a mental construction in space (or time). Frege would have called this approach 
“psychologism” – Herbart’s style, according to Frege  ( 1884 ) . Poincaré  ( 1908 ) 
instead could be a reference for this view on the certainty and meaning of induc-
tion as grounded on intuition in space. In Brouwer’s  ( 1948 ) foundational pro-
posal, the mathematician’s intuition of the sequence of natural numbers, which 
founds mathematics, relies on another phenomenal experience: It should be 
grounded on the “discrete falling apart of time”, as “twoness” (“the falling apart 
of a life moment into two distinct things, one which gives way to the other, but is 
retained by memory”; Brouwer  1948 ) . Thus, “Brouwer’s number line” originates 
from (a discrete form of) phenomenal time and induction derives meaning and 
certainty from it. 
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 Intuition of the (discrete and increasing) ordering in space and time  contributes 
to establishing the well-ordered number line as an  invariant of these different 
active phenomenal experiences: Formal induction follows from and is  founded 
on this intuition in Poincaré’s and Brouwer’s philosophy. Recent scientifi c evidence 
(see Longo and Viarouge  2010 ) suggests that we use extensively, in reasoning 
and computations, the “intuitive” number line as an order in space; those remark-
able neuropsychological investigations take us beyond the “introspection” that 
the founding fathers used as the only way to ground mathematics on intuition. 
We are probably in the process of transforming the analysis of intuition from 
naive introspection to a scientifi c investigation of our cognitive performances, in 
which the “Origin of Geometry” and the intuition of numbers blend in an indis-
soluble whole. 
 I return now to the sum of the fi rst  n integers and induction. About 80 years later, 
 Peano (1889) and  Dedekind (1888) , by their work on Arithmetic, (implicitly) sug-
gested that little Gauss’ proof was certainly a remarkable achievement (in particular 
for a child), but that adults had to prove theorems in Number Theory by a “formal 
and uniform method”, defi ned as a “potentially mechanisable” one by  Peano (1889) 
and  Padua (1900) . Then Peano defi nitely specifi ed “formal induction” as  the proof 
principle for arithmetic, thus defi ning Peano Arithmetic, or PA (Kennedy  2006 ) . 
 Frege set induction at the basis of his logical approach to mathematics; he con-
sidered it a founding (and absolute) logical principle, and thus gave PA the founda-
tional status that it still has. Of course, Frege thought that logical induction (or PA) 
was “categorical” (in modern terms); that is, that induction exactly captured the 
“theory of numbers” or that everything was said within PA: This logical theory 
simply coincided, in his view, with the structure and properties of numbers. (Frege 
didn’t even make the distinction “theory vs. model” and never accepted it; the logic 
was exactly the mathematics, for him.) 
 In  The Foundation of Geometry (1899), Hilbert set the formal foundation for 
geometry, as a solution for the incredible situation where many claimed that rigid 
bodies could be not so rigid and that light rays could go along curved geodetics. 
Riemann’s  ( 1854 ) work (under Gauss’ supervision) had started this “delirium”, as 
Frege called the intuitive-spatial meaning of the new geometry  ( 1884 , p. 20). Later, 
Helmholtz, Poincaré and Enriques (see Boi  1995 ; Bottazzini and Tazzioli  1995 ) 
developed both the geometry and Riemann’s epistemological approach to mathe-
matics as a “genealogy of concepts”, partly grounded on action in space. 
 For these mathematicians,  meaning , as a reference to phenomenal space and 
its mathematical structuring, preceded rigour and provided “foundation”. Thus, 
through mathematics, geometry in particular, Poincaré and Enriques wanted to 
make the physical world intelligible (see Boi  1995 ) . For them, proving theorems 
by rigorous tools and conceptual constructions did not coincide with a formal/
mechanical game of symbols. Hilbert  ( 1899 ) had a very different foundational 
attitude: For the purposes of foundations (but only for these purposes), one has 
to forget the meaning in the physical space of the axioms of non-Euclidean 
geometries and interpret their purely formal presentation in PA. In his  1899 book, 
Hilbert fully formalised a  unifi ed approach to geometry and “interpreted” it in 
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PA. Formal rigour and proof principles as effective-fi nitistic reduction lie at the 
core of his analysis. 5 
 On the one hand, that geometrisation of physics, from Riemann  ( 1854 ) to 
Einstein  ( 1915 ) and Weyl  ( 1949 ) (via Helmholtz, Clifford and Poincaré; see Boi 
 1995 ) , brought a revolution in that discipline, originating in breathtaking physico-
mathematical theories (and theorems). On the other hand, the attention to 
formal,  potentially mechanisable rigour, independent of meaning and intuition, 
provided the strength of the modern axiomatic approach and fantastic logico-
formal  machines , from Peano and Hilbert to Turing and digital computers 
(Longo  2009 ) . 
 At the 1900 Paris conference, Hilbert contributed to giving PA (and formal 
induction) its central status in foundation by suggesting one could prove (formally) 
the consistency of PA. In his analytic interpretation, the consistency of the geomet-
ric axiomatisations would have followed from that of formal Number Theory, with 
no need of reference to meaning. 
 Moreover, a few years later, Hilbert proposed a further conjecture, the “ultimate 
solution”, to all foundational problems, a jump into perfect rigour: Once shown the 
formal consistency of PA by fi nitistic tools, prove the completeness of the formal 
axioms for arithmetic. Independent of its heuristics, a proof’s certainty had to ulti-
mately be given by formal induction. 
 However, the thought of many mathematicians at the time (and even now) 
proposed more than that. That is, in addition to its role as a foundation for “ a 
posteriori formalisation”, they dreamed the “potential mechanisation” of math-
ematics was not only a locus for certainty but also a “complete” method for 
proving theorems. The Italian logical school firmly insisted on this with their 
“pasigraphy”: a universal formal language that was a mechanisable algebra for 
all aspects of human reasoning. Now the “sausage machine” for mathematics 
(and thought), as Poincaré ironically called it (Bottazzini  2000 ) , could be put 
to work: Provide pigs (or axioms) as input and produce theorems (or sausages) 
as output. (Traces of this mechanisation may still be found in applications of 
AI or in teaching.) The story of complete  a posteriori formalisation and,  a for-
tiori , of potential mechanisation of deduction ended badly. Hilbert’s conjec-
tures on the formally provable consistency, decidability and completeness of 
PA turned out to be all wrong, as  Gödel (1931) proved. Gödel’s proof gave rise 
to (incomplete but) fantastic formal machines by the rigorous definition of 
“computable function”. More precisely, Gödel’s negative result initiated a 
major expansion of logic: Recursion Theory (in order to prove undecidability, 
Gödel had to define precisely what decidable/computable means), Model 
Theory (the fact that not all models of PA are elementarily equivalent strongly 
motivates further investigations) and Proof Theory (Gentzen) all got a new 
start. (Negative results matter immensely in science, see Longo  2006 .) The  latter 
 5  For more on the connections between “proof principles” and “construction principles” in 
 mathematics and physics, see Bailly and Longo  ( 2006 ) . 
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led to the results, amongst others, of Girard and Friedman (see Longo  2002 ) . 
For Number Theory, the main consequence is that formal induction is incom-
plete and that one cannot avoid infinitary machinery in proofs (e.g., in the rig-
orous sense of Friedman  1997 ) . 
 4.2  Prototype Proofs 
 In some cases, the incompleteness of formal induction can be described in terms of 
the structure of “prototype proofs” or of “geometric judgements” with no explicit 
reference to infi nity. As Herbrand proposed, “…when we say that a theorem is true 
for all x, we mean that for each x individually it is possible to iterate its proof, which 
may just be considered a  prototype of each individual proof” (see Goldfarb and 
Dreben  1987 ) . Little Gauss’ theorem is an example of such a prototype proof. But 
any proof of a universally quantifi ed statement over a structure that does not realise 
induction constitutes a “prototype”. 
 For example, consider Pythagoras’ theorem: one  needs to draw, possibly on the 
sand of a Greek beach, a right triangle, with a specifi c ratio amongst the sides. Yet, 
at the end of the proof, one makes a fundamental remark, the true beginning of 
mathematics: Look at the proof; it does not depend on the specifi c drawing, but only 
on the existence of a right angle. The right triangle is  generic (it is an invariant of 
the proof) and the proof is a  prototype . There is no need to scan all right triangles. 
By a similar structure of the proof, one has to prove a property to hold for any ele-
ment of (a sub-set of) real or complex numbers; that is, for elements of non-well 
ordered sets. However, in number theory, one has an extra and very strong proof 
principle: induction. 
 In a prototype proof, one must provide a reasoning which uniformly holds for 
all arguments; this uniformity allows (and is guaranteed by) the use of a generic 
argument. Induction provides an extra tool: The intended property doesn’t need 
to hold for the same reasons for all arguments. Actually, it may hold for different 
reasons for each argument. One only has to give a proof for 0, and then provide 
a uniform proof from  x to  x + 1. That is, uniformity of reasoning is required only 
in the inductive step. This is where the prototype proof steps in again: the argu-
ment from  x to  x + 1. Yet, the situation may be more complicated: In the case of 
nested induction, the universally quantifi ed formula of this inductive step may be 
given by induction on  x . However, after a fi nite number of nestings, one has to 
get to a prototype proof going from  x to  x + 1 (i.e., the rule of induction is logically 
well-founded). 
 Thus, induction provides a rigorous proof principle, which, over well-orderings, 
holds in addition to uniform (prototype) proofs, though sooner or later a prototype 
proof steps in. However, the prototype/uniform argument in an inductive proof 
allows one to derive, from the assumption of the thesis for  x , its validity for  x + 1, in 
any possible model. On the other hand, by induction one may inherit properties 
from  x to  x + 1 (e.g., totality of a function of  x ; see Longo  2002 ) . 
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 As we already observed, in an inductive proof, one must know in advance the 
formula (the statement) to be proved: little Gauss did not know it. Indeed, (straight) 
induction (i.e., induction with no problem in the choice of the inductive statement 
or load) is closer to proof-checking than to “mathematical theorem proving”; if one 
already has the formal proof, a computer can check it. 
 5  Induction  vs. Well-Ordering in Concrete 
Incompleteness Theorems 
 Since the 1970s several examples of “concrete incompleteness results” have been 
proved. 6 That is, some interesting properties of number theory can be shown to be 
true, but their proofs cannot be given within number theory’s formal counterpart, 
PA. A particularly relevant case is Friedman’s Finite Form (FFF) of Kruskal’s 
Theorem (KT), a well-known theorem on sequences of “fi nite trees” in infi nite com-
binatorics (and with many applications). 7 The diffi cult part is the proof of unprov-
ability of FFF in PA. Here, I am interested only in the proof that FFF holds over the 
structure of natural numbers (the standard model of PA). FFF is easily derived from 
KT, so the problem of its formal unprovability lies somewhere in the proof of KT. 
Without entering into the details even of the statements of FFF or KT (see Gallier 
 1991 ; Harrington and Simpson  1985 ; Longo  2002 ) , I shall skip to where “meaning,” 
or the geometric structure of integer numbers in space or time (the gestalt of well-
ordering) steps into the proof. 
 The set-theoretic proof of KT (Gallier  1991 ; Harrington and Simpson  1985 ) goes 
by a strong non-effective argument. It is non-effective for several reasons. First, one 
argues “ ad absurdum ”; that is, one shows that a certain set of possibly infi nite 
sequences of trees is empty by deriving an absurd if it were not so (“not empty 
implies a contradiction; thus it is empty”). More precisely, one fi rst assumes that a 
certain set of “bad sequences” (sequences without ordered pairs of trees, as required 
in the statement of KT) is not empty and then defi nes a minimal bad sequence from 
this assumption. Then one shows that  that minimal sequence cannot exist, as a 
smaller one can be easily defi ned from it. This minimal sequence is obtained by 
using a quantifi cation on a set that is going to be proved to be empty, a rather non-
effective procedure. Moreover, the to-be-empty set is defi ned by a  ∑11  predicate, 
well outside PA (a proper, impredicative second-order quantifi cation over sets). For 
a non-intuitionist who accepts a defi nition  ad absurdum of a mathematical object 
(a sequence in this case), as well as an impredicatively defi ned set, the proof poses 
 6  Concerning “concrete” incompleteness: An analysis of the nonprovability of normalisation for 
non-predicative Type Theory, Girard’s system F, in terms of prototype proofs is proposed in 
Longo  ( 2002 ) . 
 7  For a close proof-theoretic investigation of KT, see Harrington and Simpson  ( 1985 ) , Gallier 
 ( 1991 ) . I borrow here a few remarks from Longo  ( 2002 ) , which proposes a further analysis. 
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no problem. It is abstract, but very convincing (and relatively easy). The key 
non-arithmetisable steps are in the  ∑11  defi nition of a set and in the defi nition of 
a new sequence by taking, iteratively, the least element of this set. 
 Yet, the mathematically minded readers (and the graduate students to whom I 
lecture) have no problem in applying their shared mental experience of the “number 
line” to accept this formally non-constructive proof: From the assumption that the 
intended set is non-empty, one understands (“sees”) that it has a least element, with-
out caring about its formal (infi nitary,  ∑11  ) defi nition. If the set is assumed to 
contain an element, then the way the rest of the set “goes to infi nity” doesn’t really 
matter; the element supposed to exist (by the non-emptiness of the set) must be 
somewhere in the fi nite, and the least element will be amongst the fi nitely many 
preceding elements, even if there is no way to present it explicitly. This is well-
ordering. Finally, the sequence defi ned  ad absurdum , in this highly non-constructive 
way, will never be used; it would be absurd for it to exist. So its actual “construction” 
is irrelevant. Of course, this is far from PA, but it is convincing to anyone accepting 
the “geometric judgement” of well-ordering: “A  generic non-empty subset of the 
number line has a least element”. This vision of a property, a fundamental judge-
ment, is grounded in the gestalt discussed above. 
 An intuitionistically acceptable proof of KT was later given by Rathjen and 
Weierman  ( 1993 ) . This proof of KT is still not formalisable in PA, of course, but it 
is “constructive”, at least in the broad sense of “infi nitary inductive defi nitions” as 
widely used in the contemporary intuitionist community. It is highly infi nitary, 
because it uses induction beyond the fi rst impredicative ordinal Г 
0
 . Though another 
remarkable contribution to the ordinal classifi cation of theorems and theories, this 
proof is in no way “more evident” than the one using well-ordering given above. In 
no way does it “found” arithmetic more than that geometric judgement, as the issue 
of consistency is postponed to the next ordinal on which induction would allow one 
to derive the consistency of induction up to Г 
0
 . 
 6  The Origin of Logic 
 Just as for geometry or arithmetic, mathematicians have to pose the epistemological 
problem of logic itself. That is, we have to stop viewing formal properties and 
logical laws as meaningless games of signs or absolute laws preceding human 
activities. They are not a linguistic description of an independent reality; we have 
to move towards understanding them as a result of a  praxis in analogy to our 
 praxes in and of space and time, which create their geometric intelligibility by 
their own  construction . 
 The logical rules or proof principles have constituted the invariants of our practice 
of discourse and reasoning since the days of the Greek Agora; they are organised also, 
but not only, by language. Besides the geometry of fi gures with their borders with no 
thickness, which forced symmetries and order in space (our bodily symmetries, our 
need for order), the Greeks extracted the regularities of discourse. In the novelty of 
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democracy, political power in the Agora was achieved by arguing and convincing. 
Some patterns of that common discourse were then stabilised and later theoretised, by 
Aristotle in particular, as rules of reasoning (Toth  2002 ) . These became established as 
invariants, transferable from one discourse to another (even in different areas: politics 
and philosophy, say). The Sophistic tradition dared to argue  per absurdum , by insist-
ing on contradictions, and, later, this tool for reasoning became, in Euclid, a method 
of proof. All these codifi ed rules made existing arguments justifi able and provided a 
standard of acceptability for any new argument, while nevertheless being themselves 
the  a posteriori result of a shared activity in history. 
 Much later, the same type of social evolution of argument produced the practice 
of actual infi nity, a diffi cult achievement which had required centuries of religious 
disputes in Europe over metaphysics (see Zellini  2005 ) . Actual infi nity became rig-
orous mathematics (geometry) after developing fi rst as perspective in Italian 
Renaissance painting. Masaccio fi rst used the convergence point at the horizon in 
several (lost) Annunciations (see Vasari  1998 ) ; Piero della Francesca followed his 
master and theoretised this practice in a book on painting, the fi rst text on projective 
geometry. 8 The advance of discourse helped to restore infi nity, initially conceived as 
a metaphysical commitment, in space as a projective limit, a very effective tool to 
represent three-dimensional fi nite spaces in (two-dimensional) painting. 
Mathematicians later dared to manipulate the linguistic-algebraic representations of 
such inventions, abstracted from the world that originated them but simultaneously 
making that same world more intelligible. The conception of actual infi nity enabled 
mathematics to  better organise the fi nite . For example, infi nity became an analytic 
tool which Newton and Leibniz used for understanding fi nite speed and acceleration 
through an asymptotic construction. In the nineteenth century, Cantor made the 
extremely audacious step (see Cantor  1955 ) and turned infi nity into an algebraic and 
logically sound notion: He objectivised infi nity in a sign and dared to compute on it. 
A new praxis, the arithmetic of infi nity (both on ordinal and cardinal numbers) 
started a new branch of mathematics. Of course, this enrichment of discourse would 
have been diffi cult without the rigorous handling of quantifi cation proposed in 
Frege’s foundation of logic and arithmetic (Frege  1884 ) . 
 That fruitful resonance between linguistic constructions and the intelligibility of 
space contributed to the geometrisation of physics. Klein’s and Clifford’s algebraic 
treatment of non-Euclidean geometries (see Boi  1995 ) was crucial for the birth of 
Relativity Theory. 9 Since his 1899 work, Hilbert’s axiomatic approach was also funda-
mental in this, despite his erroneous belief in the completeness and (auto-)consistency 
 8  Masaccio and Piero invented the modern perspective, in Annunciations fi rst (1400–1450), by the 
explicit use of points of converging parallel lines. As a matter of fact, the Annunciation is the locus 
of the encounter of the Infi nity of God with the Madonna, a (fi nite) woman (see Panovsky  1991 ) . 
Later, “infi nity in painting”, by the work of Piero himself, became a general technique to describe 
fi nite spaces better. 
 9  Klein and Clifford also stressed the role of symmetries in Euclidean Geometry: It is the only 
geometry which is closed under homotheties. That is, its group of automorphisms, and only its 
group, contains this form of symmetry. 
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of the formal approach. In addition, physicists, like Boltzmann,  conceived limit 
 constructions, such as the thermodynamic integral, which asymptotically unifi ed 
Newton’s trajectories of gas particles and thermodynamics (Cercignani  1998 ) . 
Statistical physics, or re-normalisation methods, play an important role in today’s 
physics of criticality, where infi nity is crucial (Binney et al.  1992 ) . Logicians contin-
ued to propose purely linguistic infi nitary proofs of fi nitary statements. 
 The development of infi nity is but one part of the never-ending dialogue between 
geometric construction principles and logical proof principles. It started with pro-
jective geometry, as a mathematisation of the Italian invention of perspective in 
painting, fi rst a  praxis , a technique, in art. It is a subset of the ongoing historical 
interaction between invariants of action in space and time and their linguistic expres-
sions, extended also by metaphysical discussions (on infi nity), originating in human 
inter-subjectivity, including the invariants of historical, dialogical reasoning (logic). 
These interactions produce the constitutive history and the evolving, cognitive and 
historical foundations of mathematics. 
 7  Conclusion 
 In my approach, I ground mathematics and its proofs, as conceptual  constructions, 
in humans’ “phenomenal lives” (Weyl  1949 ) : Concepts and structures are the result 
of a cognitive/historical knowledge process. They originate from our actions in 
space (and time) and are further extended by language and logic. Mathematics, for 
example, moved from Euclid’s implicit use of connectivity to homotopy theory or 
to the topological analysis of dimensions. Symmetries lead from plane geometry to 
dualities and adjunctions in categories, some very abstract concepts. Likewise, the 
ordering of numbers is formally extended into transfi nite ordinals and cardinals. 
 In this short essay, I have tried to spell-out the role of prototype proofs and of well-
ordering vs. induction. I insisted on the role of symmetries both in our understanding 
of Euclid’s axioms and in proofs; I stressed the creativity of the proof, which often 
requires the invention of new concepts and structures. These may be, in most cases, 
formalised, but  a posteriori and each in some  ad hoc way. However, there is no 
Newtonian absolute Universe; nor a Zermelo-Fraenkel unique, absolute and complete 
set theory; nor any ultimate foundations: This is a consequence of incompleteness (see 
Longo  2011 ) . More deeply, evidence and foundation are not completely captured by 
formalisation, beginning with the axioms: “The primary evidence should not be inter-
changed with the evidence of the ‘axioms’; as the axioms are mostly the result already 
of an original formation of meaning and they already have this formation itself always 
behind them,” (Husserl  1933 ) . This is the perspective applied in my initial sketchy 
analysis of the symmetries “lying behind” Euclid’s axioms. 
 Moreover, recent concrete incompleteness results show that the reference to this 
underlying and constitutive meaning cannot be avoided in proofs or in foundational 
analyses. The consistency issue is crucial in any formal derivation and cannot be 
solved within formalisms. 
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 After the early references to geometry, I focused on arithmetic as foundational 
analyses have mostly done since Frege. Arithmetic has produced fantastic logico-
arithmetical machines – and major incompleteness results. I have shown how 
geometric judgements penetrate proofs even in number theory; I argue,  a fortiori , 
their relevance for general mathematical proofs. We need to ground mathematical 
proofs also on geometric judgements which are no less solid than logical ones: 
“Symmetry”, for example, is at least as fundamental as the logical “ modus ponens ”; 
it features heavily in mathematical constructions and proofs. Physicists have long 
argued “by symmetry”. More generally, modern physics extended its analysis from 
the Newtonian “causal laws” – the analogue to the logico-formal and absolute “laws 
of thought” since Boole  ( 1854 ) and Frege  ( 1884 ) – to understanding the phenome-
nal world through an active geometric structuring. Take as examples the conserva-
tion laws as symmetries (Noether’s theorem) and the geodetics of Relativity 
Theory. 10 The normative nature of geometric structures is currently providing a 
further understanding even of recent advances in microphysics (Connes  1994 ) . 
Similarly, mathematicians’ foundational analyses and their applications should also 
be enriched by this broadening of the paradigm in scientifi c explanation: from  laws 
to  geometric intelligibility . (I discussed symmetries, in particular, but also the geo-
metric judgement of “well-ordering”.) Mathematics is the result of an open-ended 
“game” between humans and the world in space and time; that is, it results from the 
inter-subjective construction of knowledge made in language and logic, along a 
passage through the world, which canalises our praxes as well as our endeavour 
towards knowledge. It is effective and objective exactly because it is constituted by 
human action in the world, while by its own actions transforming that same world. 
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 1  Digitally-Assisted Discovery and Proof 
 [I]ntuition comes to us much earlier and with much less outside infl uence than formal 
arguments which we cannot really understand unless we have reached a relatively high 
level of logical experience and sophistication. 
 Therefore, I think that in teaching high school age youngsters we should emphasise 
intuitive insight more than, and long before, deductive reasoning.—George Pólya (1887–1985) 
 ( 1981 , (2) p. 128) 
 1.1  Exploratory Experimentation 
 I share Pólya’s view that intuition precedes deductive reasoning. Nonetheless, Pólya 
also goes on to say, proof should certainly be taught in school. I begin with some 
observations many of which have been fl eshed out in  The Computer as Crucible 
(Borwein and Devlin  2009 ) ,  Mathematics by Experiment (Borwein and Bailey  2008 ) , 
and  Experimental Mathematics in Action (Bailey et al.  2007 ) . My musings here 
focus on the changing nature of mathematical knowledge and in consequence ask 
the questions such as “How do we come to believe and trust pieces of mathematics?”, 
“Why do we wish to prove things?” and “How do we teach what and why to 
students?” 
 J. M.  Borwein (*)
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 While I have described myself in Bailey et al.  ( 2007 ) and elsewhere as a 
“computationally assisted fallibilist”, I am far from a social-constructivist. Like 
Richard Brown, I believe that Science “at least attempts to faithfully represent reality” 
 ( 2008 , p. 7). I am, though, persuaded by various notions of embodied cognition. 
As Smail writes: 
 [T]he large human brain evolved over the past 1.7 million years to allow individuals to 
negotiate the growing complexities posed by human social living. (Smail  2008 , p. 113) 
 In consequence, humans fi nd various modes of argument more palatable than 
others, and are prone to make certain kinds of errors more than others. Likewise, 
Steve Pinker’s observation about language as founded on 
 …the ethereal notions of space, time, causation, possession, and goals that appear to make 
up a language of thought (Pinker  2007 , p. 83) 
 remains equally potent within mathematics. The computer offers to provide scaf-
folding both to enhance mathematical reasoning and to restrain mathematical error. 
 To begin with let me briefl y reprise what I mean by discovery and by proof in 
mathematics. The following attractive defi nition of  discovery has the satisfactory 
consequence that a student can certainly discover results whether those results are 
known to the teacher or not. 
 In short, discovering a truth is coming to believe it in an independent, reliable, and rational 
way. (Giaquinto  2007 , p. 50) 
 Nor is it necessary to demand that each dissertation be original (only indepen-
dently discovered). 
 A standard defi nition 1 of  proof follows. 
 PROOF , n. a sequence of statements, each of which is either validly derived from those 
preceding it or is an axiom or assumption, and the fi nal member of which, the conclusion, 
is the statement of which the truth is thereby established. 
 As a working defi nition of mathematics itself, I offer the following, in which the word 
“proof” does not enter. Nor should it; mathematics is much more than proof alone: 
 MATHEMATICS , n. a group of subjects, including algebra, geometry, trigonometry and 
calculus, concerned with number, quantity, shape, and space, and their inter-relationships, 
applications, generalisations and abstractions. 
 DEDUCTION , n. 1. the process of reasoning typical of mathematics and logic, in which a 
conclusion follows necessarily from given premises so that it cannot be false when the 
premises are true. 
 INDUCTION , n. 3. ( Logic) a process of reasoning in which a general conclusion is drawn 
from a set of particular premises, often drawn from experience or from experimental evi-
dence. The conclusion goes beyond the information contained in the premises and does not 
follow necessarily from them. Thus an inductive argument may be highly probable yet lead 
 1  All defi nitions below are taken from the  Collin’s Dictionary of Mathematics which I co-authored. 
It is available as software—with a version of Student  Maple embedded in it—at  http://www.math-
resources.com/products/mathresource/index.html . 
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to a false conclusion; for example, large numbers of sightings at widely varying times and 
places provide very strong grounds for the falsehood that all swans are white. 
 It awaited the discovery of Australia to confound the seemingly compelling 
inductive conclusion that all swans are white. Typically, mathematicians take for 
granted the distinction between  induction and  deduction and rarely discuss their 
roles with either colleagues or students. Despite the conventional identifi cation of 
Mathematics with deductive reasoning, in his 1951 Gibbs Lecture Kurt Gödel 
(1906–1978) said: 
 If mathematics describes an objective world just like physics, there is no reason why induc-
tive methods should not be applied in mathematics just the same as in physics. 
 He held this view until the end of his life, despite the epochal deductive achieve-
ment of his incompleteness results. And this opinion has been echoed or amplifi ed 
by logicians as different as Willard Quine and Greg Chaitin. More generally, one 
discovers a substantial number of great mathematicians from Archimedes and 
Galileo—who apparently said “All truths are easy to understand once they are dis-
covered; the point is to discover them.”—to Poincaré and Carleson who have 
emphasised how much it helps to “know” the answer. Over two millennia ago 
Archimedes wrote to Eratosthenes in the introduction to his long-lost and recently 
re-constituted  Method of Mechanical Theorems : 
 I thought it might be appropriate to write down and set forth for you in this same book a 
certain special method, by means of which you will be enabled to recognise certain math-
ematical questions with the aid of mechanics. I am convinced that this is no less useful for 
fi nding proofs of these same theorems. 
 For some things, which fi rst became clear to me by the mechanical method, were after-
wards proved geometrically, because their investigation by the said method does not furnish 
an actual demonstration.  For it is easier to supply the proof when we have previously 
acquired, by the method, some knowledge of the questions than it is to fi nd it without any 
previous knowledge. [My emphasis] (Livio  2009 ) 
 Think of the  Method as an ur-precursor to today’s interactive geometry software—
with the caveat that, for example,  Cinderella actually does provide certifi cates for 
much Euclidean geometry. As 2006 Abel Prize winner Leonard Carleson described 
in his 1966 ICM speech on his positive resolution of Luzin’s 1913 conjecture, about 
the pointwise convergence of Fourier series for square-summable functions, after 
many years of seeking a counter-example he decided none could exist. The impor-
tance of this confi dence he expressed as follows: 
 The most important aspect in solving a mathematical problem is the conviction of what is 
the true result. Then it took 2 or 3 years using the techniques that had been developed during 
the past 20 years or so. 
 1.2  Digitally Mediated Mathematics 
 I shall now assume that all proofs discussed are “non-trivial” in some fashion appro-
priate to the level of the material since the issue of using inductive methods is really 
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only of interest with this caveat. Armed with these terms, it remains to say that by 
 digital assistance I intend the use of such  artefacts as 
 • Modern Mathematical Computer Packages —be they Symbolic, Numeric, 
Geometric, or Graphical. I would capture all as “modern hybrid workspaces”. 
One should also envisage much more use of stereo visualisation,  haptics , 2 and 
auditory devices. 
 • More Specialist Packages or  General Purpose Languages , such as Fortran, C++, 
CPLEX, GAP, PARI, SnapPea, Graffi ti, and MAGMA. The story of the  SIAM 
100-Digits Challenge (Borwein  2005 ) illustrates the degree to which mathe-
maticians now start computational work within a hybrid platform such as  Maple , 
 Mathematica or  matlab and make only sparing recourse to more specialist 
packages when the hybrid work spaces prove too limited. 
 • Web Applications , such as Sloane’s Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences, 
the Inverse Symbolic Calculator, Fractal Explorer, Jeff Weeks’ Topological 
Games, or Euclid in Java. 3 
 • Web Databases , including Google, MathSciNet, ArXiv, JSTOR, Wikipedia, 
MathWorld, Planet Math, Digital Library of Mathematical Functions (DLMF), 
MacTutor, Amazon, and many more sources that are not always viewed as part 
of the palette. Nor is necessary that one approve unreservedly, say of the histori-
cal reliability of MacTutor, to acknowledge that with appropriate discrimination 
in its use it is a very fi ne resource. 
 All the above entail  data-mining in various forms Franklin  ( 2005 ) argues that what 
Steinle has termed “exploratory experimentation” facilitated by “widening technol-
ogy” as in pharmacology, astrophysics, and biotechnology, is leading to a reassess-
ment of what is viewed as a legitimate experiment, in that a “local model” is not a 
prerequisite for a legitimate experiment. Henrik Sørensen  ( 2010 ) cogently makes 
the case that  experimental mathematics —as “defi ned” below—is following similar 
tracks: 
 These aspects of exploratory experimentation and wide instrumentation originate from the 
philosophy of (natural) science and have not been much developed in the context of experi-
mental mathematics. However, I claim that e.g. the importance of wide instrumentation for 
an exploratory approach to experiments that includes concept formation also pertain to 
mathematics. 
 Danny Hillis is quoted as saying recently that: 
 Knowing things is very 20th century. You just need to be able to fi nd things. 4 
 about how  Google has already changed how we think. This is clearly not yet true 
and will never be, yet it catches something of the changing nature of cognitive style 
 2  With the growing realisation of the importance of gesture in mathematics “as the very texture of 
thinking,” (Sfard  2009 , p. 92) it is time to seriously explore tactile devices. 
 3  A cross-section of such resources is available through  http://ddrive.cs.dal.ca/~isc/portal/ . 
 4  In Achenblog  http://blog.washingtonpost.com/achenblog/ of July 1 2008. 
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in the twenty-fi rst century. Likewise, in a provocative article  ( 2008 ) , Chris Anderson, 
the Editor-in-Chief of  Wired , recently wrote 
 There’s no reason to cling to our old ways. It’s time to ask: What can science learn from 
Google? 
 In consequence, the boundaries between mathematics and the natural sciences 
and between inductive and deductive reasoning are blurred and getting blurrier. This 
is discussed at some length by Jeremy Avigad  ( 2008 ) . A very useful discussion of 
similar issues from a more explicitly pedagogical perspective is given by de Villiers 
 ( 2004 ) who also provides a quite extensive bibliography. 
 1.3  Experimental Mathodology 
 We started  The Computer as Crucible (Borwein and Devlin  2009 ) with then United 
States Supreme court Justice Potter Stewart’s famous, if somewhat dangerous, 1964 
Supreme Court judgement on pornography: 
 I know it when I see it. (Borwein and Devlin  2009 , p. 1) 
 I complete this subsection by reprising from Borwein and Bailey  ( 2008 ) what 
somewhat less informally we mean by  experimental mathematics . I say ‘somewhat’, 
since I do not take up the perhaps vexing philosophical question of whether a true 
 experiment in mathematics is even possible—without adopting a fully realist phi-
losophy of mathematics—or if we should rather refer to ‘quasi-experiments’? Some 
of this is discussed in Bailey et al.  (2007 , Chap. 1) and Borwein and Bailey  ( 2008 , 
Chaps. 1,2, and 8), wherein we further limn the various ways in which the term 
‘experiment’ is used and underline the need for mathematical experiments with 
predictive power. 
 1.3.1  What Is Experimental Mathematics? 
 1.  Gaining insight and  intuition . 
 Despite my agreement with Pólya, I fi rmly believe that—in most important 
senses—intuition, far from being “knowledge or belief obtained neither by rea-
son nor by perception,” as the Collin’s English Dictionary and Kant would have 
it, is acquired not innate. This is well captured by Lewis Wolpert’s 2000 title  The 
Unnatural Nature of Science , see also Gregory and Miller  ( 1998 ) . 
 2.  Discovering new relationships 
 I use “discover” in Giaquinto’s terms as quoted above. 
 3.  Visualising math principles. 
 I intend the fourth Random House sense of “to make perceptible to the mind or 
imagination” not just Giaquinto’s more direct meaning. 
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 4.  Testing and especially  falsifying conjectures. 
 Karl Popper’s “critical rationalism” asserts that induction can never lead to truth 
and hence that one can only falsify theories (Brown  2008 ) . Whether one believes 
this is the slippery slope to  Post modernist interpretations of science (Brown’s 
term abbreviated  PIS ) or not is open to debate, but Mathematics, being based 
largely on deductive science, has little to fear and much to gain from more 
aggressive use of falsifi cation. 
 5.  Exploring a possible result to see if it  merits formal proof. 
 “Merit” is context dependent. It may mean one thing in a classroom and quite 
another for a research mathematician. 
 6.  Suggesting approaches for  formal proof . 
 I refer to computer-assisted or computer-directed proof which is quite far from 
completely  Formal Proof —the topic of a special issue of the  Notices of the AMS 
in December 2008. 
 7.  Computing replacing lengthy hand derivations. 
 Hales’ recent solution of the  Kepler problem , described in the 2008  Notices article, 
pushes the boundary on when “replacement” becomes qualitatively different 
from, say, factoring a very large prime. In the case of factorisation, we may well 
feel we understand the entire sequence of steps undertaken by the computer. 
 8.  Confi rming analytically derived results. 
 The  a posteriori value of confi rmation is huge, whether this be in checking 
answers while preparing a calculus class, or in confi rming one’s apprehension of 
a newly acquired fact. 
 Of these, the fi rst fi ve play a central role in the current context, and the sixth 
plays a signifi cant one. 
 1.4  Cognitive Challenges 
 Let me touch upon the  Stroop effect 5 illustrating  directed attention or  interference . 
This classic cognitive psychology test, discovered by John Ridley Stroop in 1935, is 
as follows. 
 Consider the picture in Fig.  4.1 , in which various coloured words are coloured in 
one of the colours mentioned, but not necessarily in the same one to which the word 
refers. First, say the  colour which the given  word mentions . 
 Second, say the  colour in which the  word is written . 
 Most people fi nd the second task harder. You may fi nd yourself taking more time 
for each word, and may frequently say the word, rather than the colour in which the 
word appears. Profi cient (young) multitaskers fi nd it easy to suppress information and 
so perform the second task faster than traditionally. Indeed, Cliff Nass’ work in the 
CHIME lab at Stanford suggests that neurological changes are taking place amongst 
 5  http://www.snre.umich.edu/eplab/demos/st0/stroopdesc.html has a fi ne overview. 
754 Exploratory Experimentation: Digitally-Assisted Discovery and Proof
the ‘born-digital.’ 6 If such cognitive changes are taking place there is even more 
reason to ensure that epistemology, pedagogy, and cognitive science are in concert. 
 1.5  Paradigm Shifts 
 Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract logical forms and categories. 
They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. 
Moreover, the conviction persists-though history shows it to be a hallucination that all the 
questions that the human mind has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the 
alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress usually 
occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they 
assume an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent 
interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. 
 Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding 
to the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest 
dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new meth-
ods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientifi c revolution that found 
its climax in the “Origin of Species”.—John Dewey (1859–1952) 7 
 Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) has noted that a true  paradigm shift —as opposed to 
the cliché—is “a conversion experience.” 8 You (and enough others) either have one 
or you don’t. Oliver Heaviside (1850–1925) said in defending his operator calculus 
before it could be properly justifi ed:“Why should I refuse a good dinner simply 
because I don’t understand the digestive processes involved?” 
 Fig. 4.1  An illustration of 
the Stroop test 
 6  See  http://www.snre.umich.edu/eplab/demos/st0/stroop_program/stroopgraphicnonshockwave.gif . 
 7  In Dewey’s introduction to his book  ( 1910 ) . Dewey, a leading pragmatist (or instrumentalist) 
philosopher and educational thinker of his period, is also largely responsible for the Trotsky 
archives being at Harvard, through his activities on the  Dewey Commission . 
 8  This was said in an interview in Regis  ( 1986 ) , not only in Kuhn’s 1962  The Structure of Scientifi c 
Revolutions , which Brown notes is “the single most infl uential work in the history of science in the 
twentieth century.” In Brown’s accounting  ( 2008 ) Kuhn bears more responsibility for the slide into 
PIS than either Dewey or Popper. An unpremeditated example of digitally assisted research is that—
as I type—I am listening to  The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions , having last read it 35 years ago. 
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 But please always remember as Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener wrote: 
“The price of metaphor is eternal vigilance.” 9 I may not convince you to reevaluate 
your view of Mathematics as an entirely deductive science—if so indeed you view 
it—but in the next section I will give it my best shot. 
 2  Mathematical Examples 
 I continue with various explicit examples. I leave it to the reader to decide how 
much or how frequently he or she wishes to exploit the processes I advertise. 
Nonetheless they all controvert Picasso’s “Computers are useless they can only give 
answers.” 10 and confi rm Hamming’s “The purpose of computing is insight not num-
bers.” 11 As a warm-up illustration, consider Fig.  4.2 . The lower function in both 
graphs is  − 2 logx x x x  . The left-hand graph compares  − 2x x x  while the 
right-hand graph compares  2 4x x x−  each on 0  ≤ ≤0 1.x  . 
 Before the advent of plotting calculators if asked a question like  “Is − x 2 log  x 
less than x − x 2 on the open interval between zero and one?” one immediately had 
recourse to the calculus. Now that would be silly, clearly they cross. In the other 
case, if there is a problem it is at the right-hand end point. ‘Zooming’ will probably 
persuade you that  − ≤ −2 2 4logx x x x  on 0  £  x  £ 1 and may even guide a calculus 
proof if a proof is needed. 
 The examples below contain material on sequences, generating functions, spe-
cial functions, continued fractions, partial fractions, defi nite and indefi nite integrals, 
fi nite and infi nite sums, combinatorics and algebra, matrix theory, dynamic geometry 
and recursions, differential equations, and mathematical physics, among other 
things. So they capture the three main divisions of pure mathematical thinking: 
algebraic-symbolic, analytic, and topologic-geometric, while making contact with 
more applied issues in computation, numerical analysis and the like. 
   Example I: What Did the Computer Do? 
 This computer, although assigned to me, was being used on board the International Space 
Station. I was informed that it was tossed overboard to be burned up in the atmosphere 
when it failed.—anonymous NASA employee 12 
 In my own work, computer experimentation and digitally-mediated research now 
invariably play a crucial part. Even in many seemingly non-computational areas of 
 9  Quoted by R. C. Leowontin, in  Science p. 1264, Feb 16, 2001 (the  Human Genome Issue ). 
 10  Michael Moncur’s (Cynical) Quotations #255  http://www.quotationspage.com/collections.html 
 11  Richard Hamming’s philosophy of scientifi c computing appears as preface to his infl uential 1962 
book  ( 1962 ) . 
 12  Science , August 3, 2007, p. 579: “documenting equipment losses of more than $94 million over 
the past 10 years by the agency.” 
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functional analysis and the like, there is frequently a computable consequence 
whose verifi cation provides confi dence in the result under development. Moreover, 
the process of specifying my questions enough to program with them invariably 
enhances my understanding and sometimes renders the actual computer nearly 
superfl uous. For example, in a recent study of expectation or “box integrals” (Bailey 
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 Along the way to the evaluation above, after exploiting some insightful work by 
George Lamb, there were several stages of symbolic computation, at times involv-
ing an expression for  1K  with over 28, 000 characters (perhaps 25 standard book 
pages). It may well be that the closed form in ( 1 ) can be further simplifi ed. In any 
event, the very satisfying process of distilling the computer’s 28, 000 character dis-
covery, required a mixture of art and technology and I would be hard pressed to 
assert categorically whether it constituted a conventional proof. Nonetheless, it is 
 Fig. 4.2  Try visualisation or 
calculus fi rst? 
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correct and has been checked numerically to over a thousand-digit decimal 
precision.  
 I turn next to a mathematical example which I hope will reinforce my assertion 
that there is already an enormous amount to be mined mathematically on the inter-
net. And this is before any mathematical character recognition tools have been made 
generally available and when it is still very hard to search mathematics on the web. 
 Example II: What Is That Number? 
 The dictum that everything that people do is ‘cultural’  … licenses the idea that every cul-
tural critic can meaningfully analyze even the most intricate accomplishments of art and 
science.  … It is distinctly weird to listen to pronouncements on the nature of mathematics 
from the lips of someone who cannot tell you what a complex number is!—Norman 
Levitt 13 
 In 1995 or so Andrew Granville emailed me the number 
  : 1.4331274267223a = …    (2) 
and challenged me to identify it; I think this was a test I could have failed. I asked 
 Maple for its continued fraction. In the conventional concise notation I was rewarded 
with 
  [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,...].a =    (3) 
Even if you are unfamiliar with continued fractions, you will agree that the changed 
representation in ( 3 ) has exposed structure not apparent from ( 2 )! I reached for a 
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1
 are  Bessel functions of the fi rst kind. Actually I remembered that all 
arithmetic continued fractions arise in such fashion, but as we shall see one now 
does not need to. 
 In 2009 there are at least three “zero-knowledge” strategies:
 1.  Given ( 3 ), type “arithmetic progression”, “continued fraction” into  Google . 
 2.  Type “1, 4, 3, 3, 1, 2, 7, 4, 2” into  Sloane’s Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences . 14 
 3.  Type the decimal digits of  a into the  Inverse Symbolic Calculator . 15 
 13  In  The fl ight From Science and Reason. See  Science , Oct. 11, 1996, p. 183. 
 14  See  http://www.research.att.com/~njas/sequences/ . 
 15  The online  Inverse Symbolic Calculator  http://isc.carma.newcastle.edu.au/ was newly web-
accessible in the same year, 1995. 
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 I illustrate the results of each strategy. 
 1.  On October 15, 2008, on typing “arithmetic progression”, “continued fraction” 
into  Google , the fi rst three hits were those shown in Fig.  4.3 . Moreover, the 
MathWorld entry tells us that any arithmetic continued fraction is of a ratio of 
Bessel functions, as shown in the inset to Fig.  4.3 , which also refers to the second 
hit in Fig.  4.3 . The reader may wish to see what other natural search terms 
uncover ( 4 )—perhaps in the newly unveiled  Wolfram Alpha .  
 2.  Typing the fi rst few digits into Sloane’s interface results in the response shown in 
Fig.  4.4 . In this case we are even told what the series representations of the req-
uisite Bessel functions are, we are given sample code (in this case in  Mathematica ), 
and we are lead to many links and references. Moreover, the site is carefully 
moderated and continues to grow. Note also that this strategy only became viable 
after May 14th 2001 when the sequence was added to the database which now 
contains in excess of 158, 000 entries. 
 3.  If one types the decimal representation of  a into the Inverse Symbolic Calculator 
(ISC) it returns 
 Best guess: BesI(0,2)/BesI(1,2) 
 Most of the functionality of the ISC is built into the “identify” function in versions 
of  Maple starting with version 9.5. For example,  “<identify(4.45033263602792)>” 
returns  +3 e  . As always, the experienced user will be able to extract more from 
this tool than the novice for whom the ISC will often produce more.   
 Fig. 4.3  What Google and MathWorld offer 
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 Example III: From Discovery to Proof 
 Besides it is an error to believe that rigour in the proof is the enemy of simplicity.—David 
Hilbert 16 












+∫    
(5) 
as described in Borwein and Bailey  ( 2008 ) . As the integrand is positive on (0, 1) the 
integral yields an area and hence  p < 22 ⁄ 7. This problem was set on a 1960 Sydney 
 Fig. 4.4  What  Sloane’s Encyclopedia offers 
 16  In his  23 Mathematische Probleme lecture to the Paris International Congress, 1900 
(Yandell  2002 ) . 
 17  Eureka was an undergraduate Cambridge University journal. 
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honours mathematics fi nal exam ( 5 ) and perhaps originated in 1941 with the author 
of the 1971 article—Dalzeil who chose not reference his earlier self! Why should 
we trust this discovery? Well  Maple and  Mathematica both ‘do it’. But this is  proof 
by appeal to authority less imposing than, say, von Neumann (Inglis and Mejia-













+∫   
The computer algebra system (CAS) will return 
  




6 51 1 2 4d 4 4arcta  n ,
7 3 31
t x x
x t t t t t t
x
−
= − + − + −
+∫    
(6)
 
and now differentiation and the  Fundamental theorem of calculus proves the 
result. 
 This is probably not the proof one would fi nd by hand, but it is a totally rigorous 
one, and represents an “instrumental use” of the computer. The fact that a CAS will 
quite possibly be able to evaluate an indefi nite integral or a fi nite sum whenever it 
can evaluate the corresponding defi nite integral or infi nite sum frequently allows 
one to provide a certifi cate for such a discovery. In the case of a sum, the certifi cate 
often takes the form of a mathematical induction (deductive version). Another inter-
esting feature of this example is that it appears to be quite irrelevant that 22 ⁄ 7 is an 
early, and the most famous, continued-fraction approximation to  p (Lucas  2009 ) . 
Not every discovery is part of a hoped-for pattern.   
 Example IV: From Concrete to Abstract 
 The plural of ‘anecdote’ is not ‘evidence’.—Alan L. Leshner 18 
 We take heed of Leshner’s caution but still celebrate accidental discovery. 
 1.  In April 1993, Enrico Au-Yeung, then an undergraduate at the University of 














π⎛ ⎞+ + + = … ≈ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ 
  
He had spotted from six place accuracy that  … =0.047222 17 / 360  . I was very 
skeptical, but Parseval’s identity computations affi rmed this to high precision. 
This is effectively a special case of the following class 
 18  Leshner, the publisher of  Science , was speaking at the Canadian Federal Science & Technology 
Forum, October 2, 2002. 
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where  s 
 j 
 are integers and  s 
 j 
 = signum s 
 j 
 . These can be rapidly computed as 
implemented at  http://www.cecm.sfu.ca/projects/ezface+ (Borwein et al.  2004 ) . 
In the past 20 years they have become of more and more interest in number 
theory, combinatorics, knot theory and mathematical physics. A marvellous 
example is Zagier’s conjecture, found experimentally and now proven in 








⎛ ⎞ π⎜ ⎟ =
⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠


   
(7)
 
Along the way to fi nding the proof we convinced ourselves that ( 7 ) held for 
many values including  n = 163 which required summing a slowly convergent 
326-dimensional sum to 1, 000 places with our fast summation method. Equation 
 7 is a remarkable non-commutative counterpart of the classical formula for 
 z (2 n ) (Borwein et al.  2004 ,  Chap. 3 ). 
 2.  In the course of proving empirically-discovered conjectures about such multiple 
zeta values (Borwein and Bailey  2008 ) we needed to obtain the coeffi cients in 
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(8)
 







+ − −⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠   
with a symmetric expression for  b 
 j 
  s ,  t  . This was known to Euler and once known 
is fairly easily proved by induction. But it can certainly be discovered in a CAS 
by considering various rows or diagonals in the matrix of coeffi cients—and 
either spotting the pattern or failing that by asking Sloane’s Encyclopedia. Partial 
fractions like continued fractions and Gaussian elimination are the sort of task 
that  once mastered are much better performed by computer while one focusses 
on the more conceptual issues they expose. 
 3.  We also needed to show that  = + −:M A B C  was invertible where the  n × n 
matrices  A ,  B ,  C respectively had entries 
  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 12 2 11 , 1 , 1 .
2 1 1
k k kn j n j j
n k k k




⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠    
(9)
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Thus,  A and  C are triangular while  B is full. For example, in nine dimensions  M 
is displayed below 
  
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
−
1 34 272 1360 4760 12376 24752 38896 48620
0 16 136 680 2380 6188 12376 19448 24310
0 13 105 470 1470 3458 6370 9438 11440
0 11 88 364 1015 2093 3367 4433 5005
0 9 72 282 715 1300 1794 2002 2002







































− − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
0 145 315 456 462 341 220
0 3 24 85 175 231 203 120 55
0 1 8 28 56 70 56 28 9
  
After messing around futilely with lots of cases in an attempt to spot a pattern, it 
occurred to me to ask  Maple for the  minimal polynomial of  M . 
 >  linalg[minpoly](M(12),t); 
 returns  − + + 22 t t  . Emboldened I tried 
 >  linalg[minpoly](B(20),t); 
>  linalg[minpoly](A(20),t); 
>  linalg[minpoly](C(20),t); 
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 and was rewarded with  − + − + − +3 2 21 , 1 , 1 .t t t  Since a typical matrix has a full 
degree minimal polynomial, we are quite assured that  A ,  B ,  C really are roots of 
unity. Armed with this discovery we are lead to try to prove 
  = = = =
2 2 2, , ,A I BC A C I CA B    (10) 
which is a nice combinatorial exercise (by hand or computer). Clearly then we 
obtain also 
  = = = = =
3 2 2· ( ) ( )B B B B CA BC A A I    (11) 











M AA AB AC BA BB BC CA CB CC
I C B A I
I M
= + − + + − − − +
= + − − +
= −    
 It is also worth confi rming that we have discovered an amusing presentation of 
the symmetric group  S 
3
 .   
 Characteristic or minimal polynomials, entirely abstract for me as a student, now 
become members of a rapidly growing box of concrete symbolic tools, as do many 
matrix decomposition results, the use of Groebner bases, Robert Risch’s 1968 decision 
algorithm for when an elementary function has an elementary indefi nite integral, 
and so on. 
 Example V: A Dynamic Discovery and Partial Proof 
 Considerable obstacles generally present themselves to the beginner, in studying the ele-
ments of Solid Geometry, from the practice which has hitherto uniformly prevailed in this 
country, of never submitting to the eye of the student, the fi gures on whose properties he is 
reasoning, but of drawing perspective representations of them upon a plane.  … I hope that 
I shall never be obliged to have recourse to a perspective drawing of any fi gure whose parts 
are not in the same plane.—Augustus De Morgan (1806–1871) (Rice  1999 , p. 540) 
 In a wide variety of problems (protein folding, 3SAT, spin glasses, giant Sudoku, 
etc.) we wish to fi nd a point in the intersection of two sets  A and  B where  B is non-
convex but “divide and concur” works better than theory can explain. Let  P 
 A 
 ( x ) and 
 ( ): 2 ( )A AR x P x x= −  denote respectively the  projector and  refl ector on a set  A , as 
shown in Fig.  4.5 , where  A is the boundary of the shaded ellipse. Then “divide and 







n A B n
n




   
(12) 
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 Consider the simplest case of a line  A of height  a (all lines may be assumed 
horizontal) and the unit circle  B . With  z 
 n 
 : = ( x 
 n 
 ,  y 
 n 
 ) we obtain the explicit iteration 
  1 1: cos , : sin , ( : arg ).n n n n n n nx y y zq a q q+ += = + − =    (13) 
 For the infeasible case with  a > 1 it is easy to see the iterates go to infi nity verti-
cally. For the tangent  a = 1 we provably converge to an infeasible point. For 0 <  a < 1 
the pictures are lovely but proofs escape me and my collaborators. Spiraling is ubiq-
uitous in this case. The iteration is illustrated in Fig.  4.6 starting at (4. 2, − 0. 51) with 
 a = 0. 94. Two representative  Maple pictures follow in Fig.  4.7 . 
 For  a = 0 we can prove convergence to one of the two points in  A ∩  B if and only 
if we do not start on the vertical axis, where we provably have  chaos . 
 Fig. 4.5  Refl ector ( interior ) 
and projector ( boundary ) of a 
point external to an ellipse 




 Let me sketch how the interactive geometry  Cinderella 19 leads one both to 
discovery and a proof in this equatorial case. Interactive applets are easily made and 
the next two fi gures come from ones that are stored on line at
 A1.  http://users.cs.dal.ca/~jborwein/refl ection.html ; and 
 A2.  http://users.cs.dal.ca/~jborwein/expansion.html respectively. 
 Figure  4.8 illustrates the applet  A1 . at work: by dragging the trajectory (with 
 N = 28) one quickly discovers that
 1.  as long as the iterate is outside the unit circle the next point is  always closer to 
the origin; 
 2.  once inside the circle the iterate  never leaves; 
 3.  the angle now  oscillates to zero and the trajectory hence converges to (1, 0). 
 All of this is quite easily made algebraic in the language of ( 13 ). 
 Figure  4.9 illustrates the applet  A2 . which takes up to 10, 000 starting points in 
the rectangle  |{( , ) : 0 1,| 1}≤ ≤ − ≤x y x y a  coloured by distance from the vertical 
axis with red on the axis and violet at  x = 1, and produces the fi rst 100 iterations in 
gestalt. Thus, we see clearly but I cannot yet prove, that all points not on the  y -axis 
are swept into the feasible point  2( 1 , )a a−  . It also shows that to accurately record 
the behaviour  Cinderella ’s double precision is inadequate and hence provides a fi ne 
if unexpected starting point for a discussion of numerical analysis and instability. 
 Here we have a fi ne counter-example to an old mathematical bugaboo:
 A heavy warning used to be given [by lecturers] that pictures are not rigorous; this has never 
had its bluff called and has permanently frightened its victims into playing for safety. Some 
pictures, of course, are not rigorous, but I should say most are (and I use them whenever 
possible myself).—J. E. Littlewood, (1885–1977) 20 
 Fig. 4.7  The behaviour of ( 13 ) for  a = 0. 95 (L) and  a = 1 (R) 
 19  Available at  http://www.cinderella.de . 
 20  From p. 53 of the 1953 edition of Littlewood’s  Miscellany and so said long before the current fi ne 
graphic, geometric, and other visualisation tools were available; also quoted in Inglis and Mejia-
Ramos  ( 2009 ) . 
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 Fig. 4.8  Discovery of the proof with  a = 0 




 Á la Littlewood, I fi nd it hard to persuade myself that the applet  A2. does not 
constitute a  generic proof of what it displays in Fig.  4.10 .  Cinderella ’s numerical 
instability is washed away in this profusion of accurate data. For all intents and 
purposes, we have now run the algorithm from all relevant starting points. 
 We have also considered the analogous differential equation since asymptotic 
techniques for such differential equations are better developed. We decided 
  














= − = +
= −
   
(14)
 
was a reasonable counterpart to the Cartesian formulation of ( 13 )—we have replaced 
the difference  + −1n nx x  by  x  ¢  ( t ), etc.—as shown in Fig.  4.11 . Now we have a whole 
other class of discoveries without proofs. For example, the differential equation 
solution clearly performs like the discrete iteration solution. 
 This is also an ideal problem to introduce early under-graduates to research as it 
involves only school geometry notions and has many accessible extensions in two 
or three dimensions. Much can be discovered and most of it will be both original 
 Fig. 4.10  Snapshots of 10, 000 points after 0, 2, 7, 13, 16, 21, and 27 steps in  Cinderella 
 
894 Exploratory Experimentation: Digitally-Assisted Discovery and Proof
and unproven. Consider what happens when  B is a line segment or a fi nite set rather 
than a line or when  A is a more general conic section. 
 Corresponding algorithms, like “project-project-average”, are representative of 
what was used to correct the Hubble telescope’s early optical abberation problems.  
 Example VI: Knowledge Without Proof 
 All physicists and a good many quite respectable mathematicians are contemptuous about 
proof.—G. H. Hardy (1877–1947) 21 
 A few years ago Guillera found various Ramanujan-like identities for  p , including 
















⎛ ⎞= − + + ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
   
(15)
 
 Fig. 4.11  ODE solution and vector fi eld for ( 14 ) with  a = 0. 97 in  Cinderella 
 21  In his famous  Mathematician’s Apology of 1940. I can not resist noting that modern digital assis-
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As far as we can tell there are no analogous formulae for 1 ⁄  p  N  with  N  ³ 4. There are, 
however, many variants based on other Pochhammer symbols. 
 Guillera proved ( 15 ) and ( 16 ) in tandem, by using very ingeniously the  Wilf–
Zeilberger algorithm for formally proving hypergeometric-like identities (Borwein 
and Bailey  2008 ; Bailey et al.  2007 ) . He ascribed the third to Gourevich, who found 
it using  integer relation methods (Borwein and Bailey  2008 ; Bailey et al.  2007 ) . 
Formula ( 17 ) has been checked to extreme precision. It is certainly true but has no 
proof, nor does anyone have an inkling of how to prove it, especially as experiment 
suggests that it has no mate, unlike ( 15 ) and ( 16 ). 
 My by-now-sophisticated intuition on the matter tells me that if a proof exists it 
is most probably more a verifi cation than an explication and so I for one have 
stopped looking. I am happy just to know the beautiful identity is true. It may be so 
for no good reason. It might conceivably have no proof and be a very concrete 
Gödel statement.   
 Example VII. A Mathematical Physics Limit 
 Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood a single word.—Niels 
Bohr 22 
 The following  N -dimensional integrals arise independently in mathematical 
physics, indirectly in statistical mechanics of the  Ising Model and as we discovered 

























   
(18)
 
 22  As quoted in Barad  ( 2007 , p. 54) with a footnote citing  The Philosophical Writings of Niels Bohr 
(1998). (1885–1962). 
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We fi rst showed that  C 
 N 









NC tK t dtN
∞
= ∫
   
(19)
 
where  K 
0
 is a  modifi ed Bessel function —Bessel functions which we met in Example 
I are pervasive in analysis. 
 We then computed 400-digit numerical values. This is impossible for  n  ³ 4 from 
( 18 ) but accessible from ( 19 ) and a good algorithm for  K 
0
 . Thence, we found the 
following, now proven, results (Bailey et al.  2008 ) : 
  

















We also observed that 
  = …1024 0.630473503374386796122040192710878904354587C   
and that the limit as  N →  ∞ was the same to many digits. We then used the Inverse 
Symbolic Calculator, the aforementioned online numerical constant recognition 
facility, at  http://isc.carma.newcastle.edu.au/ which returned 
 Output: Mixed constants, 2 with elementary trans-
forms..6304735033743867 = sr(2)^2/exp(gamma)^2 








Here  g = 0. 57721566490153 … is  Euler’s constant and is perhaps the most basic 
constant which is not yet proven irrational (Havel  2003 ) . The limit discovery showed 






= ∑  
the value of the Riemann zeta-function at 3, also called Apéry’s constant, was only 
proven irrational in 1978 and the irrationality of  z (5) remains unproven. 
 The discovery of the limit value, and its appearance in the literature of Bessel 
functions, persuaded us the Bessel function representation ( 19 ) was fundamental—
not just technically useful—and indeed this is the form in which  C 
 N 
 , for odd  N 
appears in quantum fi eld theory (Bailey et al.  2008 ) .  
 Example VIII: Apéry’s Formula 
 Another thing I must point out is that you cannot prove a vague theory wrong.  … Also, if 
the process of computing the consequences is indefi nite, then with a little skill any experi-
mental result can be made to look like the expected consequences.—Richard Feynman 
(1918–1988) 
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 Margo Kondratieva found the following identity in the 1890 papers of Markov 
(Bailey et al.  2007 ) : 
  ( )













n a n an
nn a a k
∞ ∞
= = =




   
(20)
 
Apéry’s 1978 formula 













   
(21)
 
which played a key role in his celebrated proof of the irrationality of  z (3), is the case 
with  a = 0. 
 Luckily, by adopting Giaquinto’s accounting of discovery we are still entitled to 
say that Apéry discovered the formula ( 21 ) which now bears his name. 
 We observe that  Maple ‘establishes’ identity ( 20 ) in the hypergeometric 
formula 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) 4 3 3
2
1 1 5 1,1,1,1 1
2, 2, 3 ,
2 2 4 2,2, 4
a a FY Y z− = − − + −
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
that is, it has reduced it to a form of ( 21 ).  
 Like much of mathematics, this last example leads to something whose compu-
tational consequences are very far from indefi nite. Indeed, it is the rigidity of much 
algorithmic mathematics that makes it so frequently the way hardware or software 
errors, such as the ‘Pentium Bug’, are fi rst uncovered. 
 Example IX: When Is Easy Bad? 
 Many algorithmic components of CAS are today extraordinarily effective when two 
decades ago they were more like ‘toys’. This is equally true of extreme-precision 
calculation—a prerequisite for much of my own work (Baillie et al.  2008 ; Bailey 
et al.  2009 ) and others (Borwein  2005 ) —or in combinatorics. 
 Consider the  generating function of the number of  additive partitions ,  p ( n ) of a 
natural number where we ignore order and zeroes. Thus, 
  = + = + = + + = + + = + + + = + + + +5 4 1 3 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   

















   
(22) 
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This is easily obtained by using the geometric formula for each  −1 / (1 )kq  and 
observing how many powers of  q  n  are obtained. The famous and laborious com-
putation by MacMahon of  p (200) = 3972999029388 early last century, if done 
 symbolically and entirely naively from ( 22 ) on a reasonable laptop took 20 min in 
1991, and about 0.17 sec today, while 
  =(2000) 4720819175619413888601432406799959512200344166p   
took about 2 min in 2009. 
 Moreover, Richard Crandall was able, in December 2008, to calculate  p (10 9 ) in 
3 s on his laptop, using Hardy-Ramanujan and Rademacher’s ‘fi nite’ series along 
with FFT methods. The current ease of computation of  p (500) directly from ( 22 ) 
raises the question of what interesting mathematical discoveries does easy computa-
tion obviate? 
 Likewise, the record for computation of  p has gone from under 30 million deci-
mal digits in 1986 to over 5 trillion places this year (Borwein and Bailey  2008 ) . 
 3  Concluding Remarks 
 We [Kaplansky and Halmos] share a philosophy about linear algebra: we think basis-free, 
we write basis-free, but when the chips are down we close the offi ce door and compute with 
matrices like fury.—Paul Halmos (1916–2006) (Ewing and Gehring  1991 ) 
 Theory and practice should be better comported! 
 The students of today live, as we do, in an information-rich, judgement-poor 
world in which the explosion of information, and of tools, is not going to diminish. 
So we have to teach judgement (not just concern with plagiarism) when it comes to 
using what is already possible digitally. This means mastering the sorts of tools I 
have illustrated. Additionally, it seems to me critical that we mesh our software 
design—and our teaching style more generally—with our growing understanding of 
our cognitive strengths and limitations as a species (as touched upon in Sect.  1 ). 
Judith Grabiner, in her contribution to this volume, has noted that a large impetus 
for the development of modern rigour in mathematics came with the Napoleonic 
introduction of regular courses: Lectures and text books force a precision and a 
codifi cation that apprenticeship obviates. 
 As Dave Bailey noted to me recently in email: 
 Moreover, there is a growing consensus that human minds are fundamentally not very good 
at mathematics, and must be trained as Ifrah points out (Ifrah  2000 ) . Given this fact, the 
computer can be seen as a perfect complement to humans—we can intuit but not reliably 
calculate or manipulate; computers are not yet very good at intuition, but are great at calcu-
lations and manipulations. 
 We also have to acknowledge that most of our classes will contain students with a 
very broad variety of skills and interests (and relatively few future mathematicians). 
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Properly balanced, discovery and proof, assisted by good software, can live side-by-side 
and allow for the ordinary and the talented to fl ourish in their own fashion. 
Impediments to the assimilation of the tools I have illustrated are myriad as I am only 
too aware from my own recent teaching experiences. These impediments include our 
own inertia and organisational and technical bottlenecks (this is often from poor IT 
design—not so much from too few dollars). The impediments certainly include 
under-prepared or mis-prepared colleagues and the dearth of good material from 
which to teach a modern syllabus. 
 Finally, it will never be the case that quasi-inductive mathematics supplants 
proof. We need to fi nd a new equilibrium. Consider the following empirically- 
discovered identity
  
sinc( )sinc( / 3)sinc( / 5) sinc( / 23)sinc( / 29)
sinc( )sinc( / 3)sinc( / 5) sinc( / 23)sinc( / 29)
n
n n n n n










   
(23) 
where the denumerators range over the primes. 
 Provably, the following is true: The analogous “sum equals integral” identity 
remains valid for more than the fi rst 10, 176 primes but stops holding after some 
larger prime, and thereafter the “sum minus integral” is positive but  much less than 
one part in a googolplex (Baillie et al.  2008 ) . It is hard to imagine that inductive 
mathematics alone will ever be able to handle such behaviour. Nor, for that matter, 
is it clear to me what it means psychologically to digest equations which are false 
by a near infi nitesimal amount. 
 That said, we are only beginning to scratch the surface of a very exciting set of 
tools for the enrichment of mathematics, not to mention the growing power of for-
mal proof engines. I conclude with one of my favourite quotes from George Pólya 
and Jacques Hadamard: 
 This “quasi-experimental” approach to proof can help to de-emphasise a focus on rigor and 
formality for its own sake, and to instead support the view expressed by Hadamard when he 
stated “The object of mathematical rigor is to sanction and legitimise the conquests of intu-
ition, and there was never any other object for it.” (Pólya  1981 , (2) p. 127) 
 Unlike Frank Quinn (Jaffe and Quinn  1991 ) perhaps, I believe that in the most 
complex modern cases certainty, in any reasonable sense, is unattainable through 
proof. I do believe that even then quasi-inductive methods and experimentation can 
help us improve our level of certainty. Like Reuben Hersh  ( 1997 ) , I am happy to at 
least entertain some “non-traditional forms of proof.” Never before have we had 
such a cornucopia of fi ne tools to help us develop and improve our intuition. The 
challenge is to learn how to harness them, how to develop and how to transmit the 
necessary theory and practice. 
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 1  Introduction 
 From straight-edge and compass to a variety of computational and drawing tools, 
throughout history instruments have been deeply intertwined with the genesis and 
development of abstract concepts and ideas in mathematics. Their use introduces an 
“experimental” dimension into mathematics, as well as a dynamic tension between 
the  empirical nature of activities with them, which encompasses perceptual and 
operational components– and the  deductive nature of the discipline, which entails 
rigorous and sophisticated formalisation. As Pierce writes of this peculiarity:
 (It) has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is purely deductive 
in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the other hand, it presents as rich 
and apparently unending a series of surprising discoveries as any observational science. 
 (Peirce, C.P., 3.363: quoted in Dörfl er  2005 , p. 57) 
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 The main goal of our chapter centres on the dynamic tension between the  empirical 
and the theoretical nature of mathematics. Our purpose is to underline the elements of 
historical continuity in the stream of thought today called experimental mathematics, 
and show the concrete possibilities it offers to today’s teachers for pursuing the learning 
of proof in the classroom, especially through the use of their computer tools. 
 Specifi cally, we examine how this dynamic tension regulates the actions of students 
who are asked to solve mathematical problems by fi rst making explorations with 
technological tools, then formulating suitable conjectures and fi nally proving them. 
 The latest developments in computer and video technology have provided a 
multiplicity of computational and symbolic tools that have rejuvenated mathematics 
and mathematics education. Two important examples of this revitalisation are 
 experimental mathematics and  visual theorems :
 Experimental mathematics is the use of a computer to run computations – sometimes no 
more than trial-and-error tests – to look for patterns, to identify particular numbers and 
sequences, to gather evidence in support of specifi c mathematical assertions that may them-
selves arise by computational means, including search. Like contemporary chemists – and 
before them the alchemists of old – who mix various substances together in a crucible and heat 
them to a high temperature to see what happens, today’s experimental mathematicians put 
a hopefully potent mix of numbers, formulas, and algorithms into a computer in the hope 
that something of interest emerges. 
( Borwein and Devlin  2009 , p. 1) 
 Briefl y, a visual theorem is the graphical or visual output from a computer program – usually 
one of a family of such outputs – which the eye organizes into a coherent, identifi able whole and 
which is able to inspire mathematical questions of a traditional nature or which contributes in 
some way to our understanding or enrichment of some mathematical or real world situation. 
(Davis  1993 , p. 333) 
 Such developments throw a fresh light on mathematical epistemology and on the 
processes of mathematical discovery; consequently, we must also rethink the nature of 
mathematical learning processes. In particular, the new epistemological and cognitive 
viewpoints have challenged and reconsidered the phenomenology of learning proof 
(cf. Balacheff  1988,  1999 ; Boero  2007 ; de Villiers  2010 ;  Chap. 3 ). These recent 
writers have scrutinised and revealed not only  deductive but also  abductive and 
 inductive pro cesses crucial in all mathematical activities, emphasising the importance 
of experimental components in teaching proofs. The related didactical phenomena 
become particularly interesting when instructors plan proving activities in a technolo-
gical environment ( Arzarello and Paola  2007 ; Jones et al.  2000 ) , where they can 
carefully design their interventions. By “technological environment”, we do not 
mean just digital technologies but any environment where instruments are used to 
learn mathematics (for a non-computer technology, see Bartolini Bussi  2010 ) . 
We discuss this issue from different linked perspectives: historical, epistemological, 
didactical and pedagogical. 
 In Part 1, we consider some emblematic events from the history of Western 
mathematics where instruments have played a crucial role in generating mathemati-
cal concepts. 
 Next, Part 2 analyses some didactical episodes from classroom life, where 
the use of instruments in proving activities makes the dynamic tension palpable. 
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We carefully analyse students’ procedures whilst using tools and derive some 
 theoretical frameworks that explain how that tension can be used to design suitable 
didactical situations. Within these, students can learn practices with the tools that 
help them pass from the empirical to the theoretical side of mathematics. In particular, 
we discuss the complex interactions between inductive, abductive and deductive 
modalities in that transition. By analysing the roles for technologies within our 
framework, we show that instructors can and should make the history and cultural 
aspects of experimental mathematics visible to students. 
 Last, in Part 3 we show how a general pedagogical framework (Activity Theory) 
makes sense of the previous microanalyses within a general, unitary educational 
standpoint. 
 2  Part 1: From Straight-Edge and Compass to Dynamic 
Geometry Software 
 2.1  Classical European Geometry 
 Since antiquity, geometrical constructions have had a fundamental theoretical 
importance in the Greek and later Western traditions (Heath  1956 , p. 124); indeed, 
construction problems were central to Euclid’s work. This centrality is clearly 
illustrated by the later history of the classic ‘impossible’ problems, which so puzzled 
Euclid and other Greek geometers (Henry  1993 ) . Despite their apparent practical 
objective, geometrical constructions (like drawings produced on papyrus or 
parchment) do have a theoretical meaning. In Euclid’s masterpiece, the  Elements , 
no real, material tools are envisaged; rather their use is objectifi ed into the geo-
metrical objects defi ned by defi nitions and axioms. However, Arsac  ( 1987 ) shows 
that the observational, empirical component was also present in the  Elements . 
Euclid was aware of the dialectic between the decontextualised aspects of pure 
geometry and the phenomenology of our perception of objects in space and our 
representations of them in the plane. In his  Optics (Euclide  1996 ) masterpiece, he 
gives a rationale for this tension. Giusti writes: “the mathematical objects are not 
generated through abstraction from real objects […] but they formalize human 
operations” 1 (Giusti  1999 ) . In addition, they are shaped by the tools with which 
people perform such operations. 
 Consequently, the tools and the rules for their use have a counterpart in the axi-
oms and theorems of a theoretical system, so that we may conceive of any construc-
tion as a theoretical problem stated inside a specifi c theoretical system. The solution 
of a problem is correct; therefore, insofar as we can validate it within such a 
 1 ‘gli oggetti matematici provengono non dall’astrazione da oggetti reali […] ma formalizzano 
l’operare umano’. 
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 theoretical system, any successful construction corresponds to a specifi c theorem, 
and  validates the specifi c relationships between the properties of the geometrical 
fi gure represented by the drawing, obtained after the construction. 
 From the perspective of classical geometry, drawing tools, despite their empirical 
manifestation, may also be conceived as theoretical tools defi ning a particular 
geometry. Hence, the tradition of calling classic Euclidean geometry “straight-edge 
and compass geometry” refers to both the origins and limitations of its objects. 
 2.2  The Modern Age in Europe 
 In the Western Euclidean tradition, interesting European developments about the 
theoretical status of drawing tools and geometric objects have accumulated since 
the seventeenth century. For example, in the ‘ Géométrie ’, Descartes clearly states 
two methods of representing curves: (a) by a continuous motion and (b) by an equa-
tion (Bos  1981 ) . Descartes invented a tool, his compass (Fig.  5.1 ), to make evident 
what he meant: moving the different t-squares YBC, DCE, EDF, … moves a point 
like H and generates a curve with the features described under (a) and (b). 
 In contrast, in the Hippias trisectrix (Fig.  5.2 ), the points of the curve APQT are 
generated through a continuous synchronous motion of the ray DP (which rotates 
uniformly around D like the hand of a clock) and of the horizontal ray MP (which 
moves uniformly downwards, so that whilst the ray rotates from DA to DC the ray 
MP moves from AB to DC). In fact, it is impossible to empirically obtain the posi-
tion of all the points of the curve APQT since one can only imagine them through 
the description of the movement, not concretely depict them as in the case of a 
fi gure drawn using straight-edge and compass. 
 Fig. 5.1  Descartes compass 
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 As Lebesgue  ( 1950 ) claims, a curve traced pointwise is obtained by  approximation; 
it is only a graphic solution. However, if one designs a tracing instrument, the 
graphic solution becomes a mechanical solution. The seventeenth century mathe-
maticians found the mechanical solution acceptable because it refers to one of the 
basic intuitions about the continuum: namely, the movement of an object. Descartes 
did not confront the question of whether the two given criteria – the mechanical and 
the algebraic – are equivalent or not. This problem requires more advanced alge-
braic tools and, more important, changing the status of the new drawing instruments 
from tools for solving geometric problems to objects of a theory. 
 In the classical age and in the seventeenth century, changing the drawing tools 
would clearly have changed the set of solvable problems. So, if one accepts only the 
straight-edge and compass (i.e., only straight lines and circles), one cannot rigor-
ously solve the problems of cube duplication and angle trisection. If, on the contrary, 
other tools are admitted (e.g., the Nicomedes compass that draws a conchoid; see 
Heath  1956 ) , these problems can be solved rigorously. 
 The previous examples highlighted a crucial dialectical relationship between 
practical and theoretical problems. The core of this relationship resides in the notion 
of  construction as related to the specifi c tools available. Therefore, the practical 
realisation of any graphical element has a counterpart in a theoretical element, in 
either an axiom that states how to use a tool or a theorem that validates the construc-
tion procedure according to the stated axioms. In these terms, we can consider a 
geometrical construction archetypal for a theoretical approach to geometry. 
 However, in spite of their long tradition, geometrical constructions have recently 
lost their centrality and almost disappeared from the Geometry curriculum, at least 
in the Western world. One can rarely fi nd any reference to ‘drawing tools’ when 
geometrical axioms are stated, and geometrical constructions no longer belong to 
the set of problems commonly proposed in the textbooks. This disappearance 
began as nineteenth century mathematicians from Pasch to Peano to Hilbert tried 
to eliminate the observational “intuitive” hidden hypotheses from Geometry. 
 Fig. 5.2  Hippias trisectrix 
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Similarly, the school of Weierstrass eliminated any reference to space or motion in 
the geometric defi nition of limits through the epsilon-delta machinery (Lakoff 
and Núñez  2000 ) : in fact, the new defi nition entails only purely logical relation-
ships (“for all epsilon, there is a delta…”) and any reference to motion and time 
(e.g. “whilst  x approaches  x 
0
 ,  f ( x ) approaches  l ”) is eliminated. Until recently, 
observational components had apparently been completely banished from the 
geometric scene. However, philosophical criticisms by many recent scholars (for a 
survey, cf. Tymoczko  1998 ) and the development of computational techniques 
have produced a fresh approach to mathematical learning and discovery. They have 
revived epistemological stances which underlie the observational, experimental 
and empirical aspects of mathematical inquiry, including the use of geometric con-
structions (see Lovasz  2006 ) . 
 Indeed, geometric constructions are rich in meaning and perfectly suitable for 
implementation in today’s classrooms, even though the relationship between a 
geometrical construction and the theorem which validates it is very complex and 
certainly not immediate for students, as Schoenfeld  ( 1985 ) discussed. As he 
explained, “many of the counterproductive behaviors we see in students are learned 
as unintended by-products of their mathematics instruction” (p. 374). Apparently, 
the very nature of the construction problem may make it diffi cult to take a theoretical 
perspective (cf. Mariotti  1996 ) . 
 Nevertheless, the analysis above allows us to state a specifi c hypothesis, namely, 
that  geometrical construction can serve as a  key to accessing the meaning of proof. 
Different research groups have undertaken to test or apply this hypothesis, in different 
directions with different tools and different mathematical theories. 
 2.3  Constructions with Straight-Edge and Compass 
in the Mathematics Classroom 
 A recent teaching experiment in Italy has shown the potential of straight-edge and 
compass for developing an experimental approach with theoretical aims (Bartolini 
Bussi et al.  in print ) . The project involved a group of 80 mathematics teachers (only 
six from primary school, the others equally divided between junior secondary and 
high school; see Martignone  2010 ) and nearly 2,000 students (scattered all over a 
large region of Northern Italy). Straight-edge and compass problems were set in the 
larger context of mathematical “machines” (Bartolini Bussi  2000 , p. 343), tools that 
force a point to follow a trajectory or to be transformed according to a given law. 
A common theoretical framework (see below; also Bartolini Bussi and Mariotti 
 2008 ) structured the exploration of the tools and of the functions they served in 
the solution of geometrical problems by construction. Similar learning processes 
were implemented with the participants. First, the teachers received an in-service 
course of six meetings; then they instructed their students. A total of 79 teaching 
experiments, with detailed documentations, were collected; 25% of them concerned 
straight-edge and compass. 
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 The general structure of the approach comprised:
 A.  Exploration and analysis of the tool (shorter for teachers; longer for students, in 
order to make them aware of the relationship between the physical structure of 
the compass and Euclid’s defi nition of a circle). 
 B.  Production of very simple constructions of geometrical fi gures (e.g., “draw an 
equilateral triangle with a given side”) in open form, in order to allow a variety 
of constructions based on different known properties. 
 C.  Comparison of the different constructions in large group discussions, to show 
that the “same” drawing may be based on very different processes, each drawing 
on either implicit or explicit assumptions and on the technical features of the 
tool. 
 D.  Production of proofs of the constructions exploiting each times the underlying 
assumptions. 
 These stages were structured around three key questions concerning the compass 
as a tool:
 1.  How is it made? 
 2.  What does it do? 
 3.  Why does it do that? 
 The third question, dependent on the others, aimed at connecting the tool’s 
practical use to the theoretical content. In fact, the justifi cation of a construction 
draws on the geometrical properties of the compass, as is clearly shown in the proof 
of Proposition 1, Book 1 of Euclid’s  Elements (Heath  1956 , p. 241), with the 
construction of an equilateral triangle. 
 2.4  Constructions in a DGS 
 The interest in constructions has been renewed in particular by the appearance of 
Dynamic Geometry Systems (DGS), where the basic role played by construction 
has been reinforced by the use of graphic tools available in a dynamic system, like 
 Cabri-géomètre ,  Sketchpad ,  Geogebra , etc. Any DGS fi gure is the result of a con-
struction process, since it is obtained after the repeated use of tools chosen from 
those available in the “tool bar”. However, what makes DGS so interesting com-
pared to the classic world of paper and pencil fi gures is not only the construction 
facility but also the direct manipulation of its fi gures, conceived in terms of the 
embedded logic system (Laborde and Straesser  1990 ; Straesser  2001 ) of Euclidean 
geometry. DGS fi gures possess an intrinsic logic, as a result of their construction, 
placing the elements of a fi gure in a hierarchy of relationships that corresponds to 
the procedure of construction according to the chosen tools and in a hierarchy of 
properties, and this hierarchy corresponds to a relationship of logical conditionality. 
This relationship is made evident in the “dragging” mode, where what cannot be 
dragged by varying the basic points (elements) of a built fi gure constitutes the results 
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of the construction. The dynamics of the DGS fi gures preserves its intrinsic logic; 
that is, the logic of its construction. The DGS fi gure is the complex of these elements, 
incorporating various relationships which can be differently referred to the defi nitions 
and theorems of geometry. 
 The presence of the dragging mode introduces in the DGS environment a specifi c 
criterion of validation for the solution of the construction problems: A solution is 
valid if and only if the fi gure on the screen is stable under the dragging test. However, 
the system of DGS fi gures embodies a system of relationships consistent with the 
broad system of geometrical theory. Thus, solving construction problems in DGS 
means not only accepting all the facilities of the software but also accepting a logic 
system within which to make sense of them. 
 The DGS’s intrinsic relation to Euclidean geometry makes it possible to interpret 
the control ‘by dragging’ as corresponding to theoretical control ‘by proof and defi -
nition’ within the system of Euclidean Geometry, or of another geometry that allows 
recourse to a larger set of tools. In other words, there is a correspondence between 
the world of DGS constructions and the theoretical world of Euclidean Geometry. 
 2.5  DGS Constructions in the Classroom 
 Mariotti  ( 2000,  2001 ) carried out teaching experiments with grade 10 students 
attending fi rst year in a science-oriented school (Liceo Scientifi co). The design of 
the teaching sequence was based on the development of the fi eld of experience 
(Boero et al.  1995 ) of geometrical constructions in a DGS ( Cabri-Géomètre ). 
The educational aim was to introduce students to a theoretical perspective; its 
achievement relied on the potential correspondence between DGS constructions 
and geometric theorems. 
 The activity started by revisiting drawings and concrete artefacts which the pupils 
had already experienced: for example, the compass. The students were more or less 
familiar with the artefacts’ constraints, which determine possible actions and expected 
results; for instance, a compass’s intrinsic properties directly affect the properties of 
the graphic trace it produces. Revisitation involved transferring the drawing activity 
into the  Cabri environment, thus moving the external context from the physical world 
of straight-edge and compass to the virtual world of DGS fi gures and commands. 
 In a DGS environment, the new ‘objects’ available are Evocative Computational 
Objects (Hoyles  1993 ; Hoyles and Noss  1996 , p. 68), characterised by their com-
putational nature and their power to evoke geometrical knowledge. For  Cabri , 
they comprise:
 1.  The  Cabri -fi gures realising geometrical fi gures; 
 2.  The  Cabri -commands (primitives and macros), realising the geometrical rela-
tionships which characterise geometrical fi gures ; 
 3.  The dragging function, which provides a perceptual control of the construction’s 
correctness, corresponding to a theoretical control consistent with geometric 
theory. 
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 The development of the fi eld of experience occurred through activities in  Cabri ’s 
world, such as construction tasks, interpretation and prediction tasks and mathematical 
discussions. However, that development also involved making straight-edge and 
compass constructions, which became both concrete referents and signs of the  Cabri 
fi gures. Relating the drawings on paper and the  Cabri fi gures gave the students a 
unique experience with a ‘double face’, one physical and the other virtual. 
 In the DGS environment, a construction activity, such as drawing fi gures through 
the commands on the menu, is integrated with the dragging function. Thus, a con-
struction task is accomplished if the fi gure on the screen passes the dragging test. 
 In Mariotti’s  ( 2000,  2001 ) research, the necessity of justifying the solution came 
from the need to validate one’s own construction, in order to explain why it worked 
and/or to foresee that it would work. Although dragging the fi gure might suffi ce to 
display the correctness of the solution, the second component of the teaching/learn-
ing activities came into play at this point. Namely, construction problems become 
part of a social interchange, where the students reported and compared their differ-
ent solutions. This represented a crucial element of the experience. 
 2.6  Experiments and Proofs with the Computer 
 Typically, current experimental mathematics involves making computations with a 
computer. Crucially, validating numerical solutions, which may have already been 
found, requires producing suitable proofs (cf. Borwein and Devlin  2009 , for exam-
ple). We illustrate with an example precisely how a so called CAS (Computer 
Algebra System: it processes not only numerical values but also algebraic expres-
sions with letters and infi nite-precision rational numbers) can be used as a tool for 
promoting the production of proofs for found numerical solutions. 
 Arzarello  ( 2009 ) researched Grade 9 students, attending fi rst year in a science-
oriented higher secondary school (Liceo Scientifi co), who were studying functions 
through tables of differences. The students had already learnt that for fi rst-degree 
functions, the fi rst differences are constant. The teacher asked them to make conjec-
tures on which functions have the fi rst differences that change linearly and to arrange 
a spreadsheet as in Fig.  5.3a , where they utilise: 
 1.  Columns A, B, C, D to indicate respectively the values of the variable  x , of the 
function  f(x) (in B 
i
 there is the value of  f (A 
i
 )) and of its related fi rst and second 
differences (namely in C 
i
 there is the value  f (A 
i+1
 ) −  f (A 
i
 ) and D 
j
 there is the value 
C 
j+1
 − C 
j
 ); 
 2.  Variable numbers in cells E2, F2, …,I2 to indicate respectively: the values  x 
0
 (the 
fi rst value for the variable  x to put in A2);  a ,  b ,  c for the coeffi cients of the second 
degree function  ax 2 +  bx +  c ; the step  h of which the variable in column A is incre-
mented each time for passing to A 
i
 to A 
i+1
 . 
 By modifying the values of E2, F2, …, I2, the students could easily do their 
explorations. This practice gradually became shared in the classroom, through 
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the intervention of the teacher. In fact the class teacher stressed its value as an 
 instrumented action (Rabardel  2002 ) , to support explorations in the numerical envi-
ronment. Students realised that:
 1.  If they changed only the value of  c , column B changed, whilst columns C and D 
of the fi rst and second differences did not change; hence, they argued, the way in 
which a function increased/decreased did not depend on the coeffi cient  c ; 
 2.  If they changed the coeffi cient  b , then columns B and C changed but column D 
did not; many students conjectured that the coeffi cient  b determines whether a 
function increases or decreases, but not its concavity; 
 3.  If they changed the coeffi cient  a , then columns B, C and D changed; hence the 
coeffi cient  a was responsible for the concavity of the function. 
 Here, it is diffi cult to understand why such relationships hold and to produce at 
least an argument or even a proof of such conjectures. The tables of numbers do not 
suggest any justifi cation. Now, the symbolic power of the spreadsheet became use-
ful. 2 The students’ very interesting instrumented actions consisted in substituting 
letters for the numbers (Fig.  5.3b ); in most cases, the teacher had suggested this 
practice, but a couple of students used it autonomously. The resulting spreadsheet 
shows clearly that the value of the second difference is 2 ah 2 . The letters condense 
the symbolic meaning of the numerical explorations, so proofs can be produced 
(with teacher’s help) because of the spreadsheet’s symbolic support. In the subse-
quent lesson, the teacher stressed the power of the symbolic spreadsheet; a fresh 
practice had entered the classroom. 
 Finally, a typical algebraic proof, where the main steps are computations – like 
the proof produced through use of the spreadsheet – apparently differs from the 
more discursive proofs produced in elementary geometry. Such algebraic proofs 
 Fig. 5.3  ( a ) Numerical fi nite differences. ( b ) Algebraic fi nite differences 
 2  They were using the TI-Nspire software of Texas Instruments. 
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result from the “algebraisation” of geometry, which started with Descartes and 
improved further in the succeeding development of mathematics (e.g., the Erlangen 
programme by F. Klein  1872 ; see also Baez  2011 ) . Consequently, so-called syn-
thetic proofs have been surrogated by computations developed in linear algebra 
environments. Though students fi nd big obstacles in learning algebra as a meaning-
ful topic (e.g. Dorier  2000 ) , CAS environments can support students in conceiving 
and producing such computational proofs, which are typically not so easy to reach 
in paper and pencil environments. 
 2.7  Implementation in Mathematics Classrooms 
 In all the cases above (straight-edge and compass as well as DGS or CAS), the 
teacher’s role is crucial. The teacher not only selects suitable tasks to be solved 
through constructions and visual, numerical or symbolic explorations, but also 
orchestrates the complex transition from practical actions to theoretical argumenta-
tions. Students’ argumentations rest on their experimental experiences (drawing, 
dragging, computing, etc.), so the transition to a validation within a theoretical system 
requires delicate mediation by an expert (see diagram, Fig.  5.4 ). 
 The upper part of Fig.  5.4 represents the student’s space. The students are given 
a task (left upper vertex) to be solved with an artefact or set of artefacts. The pres-
ence of the artefact(s) calls into play experimental activities: for example, drawing 
with straight-edge and compass; creating DGS-fi gures with DGS-tools; or using 
 Fig. 5.4  Relationships between teachers, students, mathematics and artefacts in didactical 
activities 
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numbers and letters in the symbolic spreadsheet. An observer, the teacher for 
instance, may monitor the process: students gesticulate, point, and tell themselves 
or their fellows something about their actions; from this observable behaviour one 
may gain insight into their cognitive processes. If the task requires giving a fi nal 
report (either oral or written), traces of the experience are likely to remain in the text 
produced. Such reports may thus differ from the decontextualised texts typical of 
mathematics; nevertheless, they can evoke specifi c mathematical meanings. 
 The lower part of Fig.  5.4 represents the mathematical counterpart of the students’ 
experience. There is the activity of mathematics in general as a cultural product, and 
there is the mathematical knowledge to be taught according to curricula. The link 
between the students’ productions and the mathematics to be taught is the respon-
sibility of the teacher, who has to construct a suitable process that connects the 
students’ personal productions with the statements and proofs expected in the math-
ematics to be taught. 
 Hence, Fig.  5.4 highlights two important responsibilities for the teacher:
 1.  Choosing suitable tasks (left side); 
 2.  Monitoring and managing of the process from students’ productions to mathe-
matical statements and proofs (right side) 
 The second point constitutes the core of the semiotic mediation process, in which 
the teacher is expected to foster and guide the students’ evolution towards recognisable 
mathematics. The teacher acts both at the cognitive and the metacognitive levels, by 
fostering the evolution of meanings and guiding the pupils to awareness of their 
mathematical status (see the idea of mathematical norms, Cobb et al.  1993 ; see also 
chapter 5 in this volume). From a sociocultural perspective, one may interpret these 
actions as the process of relating students’ “personal senses” (Leont’ev  1964/1976 , 
pp. 244 ff.) to mathematical meanings, or of relating “spontaneous” to “scientifi c” 
concepts ( Vygotsky  1978 /1990, p. 286 ff.). The teacher, as an expert representative 
of mathematical culture, participates in the classroom discourse to help it proceed 
towards sense-making within mathematics. 
 Within this perspective, several investigations have focused on the teacher’s contri-
bution to the development of a mathematical discourse in the classroom, specifi cally in 
the case of classroom activities centred on using an artefact (Bartolini Bussi et al.  2005 ; 
Mariotti  2001 ; Mariotti and Bartolini Bussi  1998 ) . The researchers aimed at identifying 
specifi c “semiotic games” (Arzarello and Paola  2007 ; Mariotti and Bartolini Bussi 
 1998 ) played by the teacher, when intervening in the discourse, in order to make the 
students’ personal senses emerge from their common experience with the artefact and 
develop towards shared meanings consistent with the target mathematical meanings. 
Analysis of the data highlighted a recurrent pattern of interventions encompassing 
a sequence of different types of operations (Bartolini Bussi and Mariotti  2008 ; for 
further discussion, see Mariotti  2009 ; Mariotti and Maracci  2010 ) . 
 Thus, artefacts have historically been fruitful in generating the idea of proof and 
consequently can provide strong didactical support for teaching proofs, specifi cally, 
if the teacher acts as a semiotic mediator. In the next section, we illustrate this issue 
from the point of view of students. 
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 3  Part 2: A Student-Centred Analysis 
 Suitably designed technology can help students to face and possibly to overcome 
the obstacles between their empirical mathematical tasks and the discipline’s theo-
retical nature. When integrated in the teaching of proofs, artefacts trigger a network 
of interactive activities amongst different components categorisable at two different 
epistemological levels:
 1.  The convincing linguistic logical arguments that explain WHY according to the 
specifi c theory of reference; 
 2.  The artefact-dependent convincing arguments that explain WHY according to 
the mathematical experimentation facilitated by an artefact. 
 Approaching proof in school consists in promoting a  network of interactive 
activities in order to connect these different components. For example, as we dis-
cuss below, abductive processes can support interactions between (1) and (2) above. 
Other interactive activities concern students’ multimodal behaviour 3 whilst interact-
ing within technological environments. Such activities feature in the transition to 
proof within experimental mathematics, a transition with novel and specifi c features 
compared to the transition to proof within more traditional approaches. Here, we 
scrutinise when and how the distance between arguments and formal proofs 
(Balacheff  1999 ; Pedemonte  2007 ) produced by students can diminish because of 
the use of technologies within a precise pedagogical design. 
 To focus the didactical and epistemological aspects of this claim, we recall four 
theoretical constructs taken from the current literature:
 1.  Almost-empiricism and experimental mathematics; 
 2.  Abductive vs.  deductive activities in mathematics learning; 
 3.  Cognitive unity between arguments and proofs; 
 4.  Negation from a mathematical and cognitive point of view. 
 Using these theoretical constructs, we scrutinise some studies of students 
asked to explore different mathematical situations with different artefacts and 
 3  The notion of  multimodality has evolved within the paradigm of  embodiment , which has been 
developed in recent years (Wilson  2002 ) . Embodiment is a movement in cognitive science that 
grants the body a central role in shaping the mind. It concerns different disciplines, e.g. cognitive 
science and neuroscience, interested with how the body is involved in thinking and learning. It 
emphasises sensory and motor functions, as well as their importance for successful interaction 
with the environment, particularly palpable in human-computer interactions. A major consequence 
is that the boundaries among perception, action and cognition become  porous (Seitz  2000 ) . 
Concepts are so analysed not on the basis of ‘formal abstract models, totally unrelated to the life 
of the body, and of the brain regions governing the body’s functioning in the world’ (Gallese and 
Lakoff,  2005 , p.455), but considering the  multimodality of our cognitive performances. We shall 
give an example of multimodal behaviours of students when discussing the multivariate language 
of students who work in DGE. For a more elaborate discussion, see Arzarello and Robutti  ( 2008 ) . 
110 F. Arzarello et al.
within  different pedagogical designs. Specifi cally, we show that a suitable use of 
 technologies may improve the  almost-empirical aspects in students’ mathematical 
activities through a specifi c production of  abductive arguments , which generate a 
 cognitive unity in the transition from arguments to proofs. We also focus on some 
reasons why such a unity may not be achieved, particularly in the case of arguments 
and proofs by contradiction, where the  logic of negation typically presents a major 
diffi culty for students. 
 3.1  Almost-Empiricism and Experimental Mathematics 
 The notion of  almost-empirical actions , introduced by Arzarello  ( 2009 ) , describes 
some instrumented actions 4 within DGS and CAS environments. It refi nes the usual 
epistemic/pragmatic dyadic structure of the instrumental approach. We provide a 
brief emblematic example. 
 In Arzarello’s  ( 2009 ) study, students of the 10th grade faced a simple problem, 
originated by the PISA test:
 The students A and B attend the same school, which is 3 Km far from A’s home and 6 Km 
far from B’s home. What are the possible distances between the two houses? 
 They produced a solution by using TI-Nspire software as illustrated in Fig.  5.5 . 
They drew two circles, whose centre is the school and which represent the 
 Fig. 5.5  ( a ) Solving a problem with data capture in TI-nspire. ( b ) Graph of the solution 
 4  The so called  instrumentation approach has been described by Vérillon & Rabardel  ( 1995 ) and 
others (Rabardel  2002 ; Rabardel and Samurçay  2001 ; Trouche  2005 ) . In our case particular ways 
of using an artefact, e.g. specifi c dragging practices in DGS or data capture in TI-Nspire, may be 
considered an  artefact that is used to solve a particular  task (e.g. for formulating a conjecture). 
When the user has developed particular  utilisation schemes for the artefact, we say that it has 
become an  instrument for the user. 
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possible positions of the two houses with respect to the school. They then created 
two points, say  a and  b , moving on each circle, constructed the segment  ab and 
measured it using a software command. Successively they created a sequence of 
the natural numbers in column A of the spreadsheet (Fig.  5.5a ) and through two 
animations (moving  a and  b respectively) they collected the corresponding lengths 
of  ab in columns B and C. In the end, they built the “scattered plot” A vs. B and 
A vs. C (Fig.  5.5b ), and drew their conclusions about the possible distances of A’s 
and B’s houses by considering the regularities of the scatter graph and discussing 
why it is so. 
 The variable points and the ways they are manipulated in the example are typical 
of the software, which allows a collection of data similar to those accomplished in 
empirical sciences. One fi rst picks out the variables involved, then through sequence 
A one gets a device to reckon the time in the animation conventionally; namely, the 
time variable is made explicit. The instrumented actions of TI-Nspire software natu-
rally induce students to do so. The scattered plot thus combines the time variable A 
versus the length variable B or C, because the TI-Nspire software enables making 
the time variable explicit within mathematics itself. 5 
 Given a mathematical problem like that above, one can “do an experiment” very 
similar to those made in empirical sciences. One picks out the important variables 
and makes a concrete experiment using them (e.g., collecting the data in a spread-
sheet through the data-capture command). On can study mutual inter-relationships 
between variables (e.g., using the scatter plot) and conjecture and validate a math-
ematical model, possibly by new experiments. In the end, one can investigate why 
such a model is obtained and produce a proof of a mathematical statement. All these 
steps follow a precise protocol: pick out variables, design the experiment, collect 
data, produce the mathematical model, and validate it. The protocol is made palpa-
ble by different specifi c commands in the (TI-Nspire) software, such as naming 
variables, animation or dragging, data capture, and producing a scatter plot. 
 Such practices within TI-Nspire are as crucial as the dragging practices within 
DGS. Both incorporate almost-empirical features that can support the transition 
from the empirical to the deductive side of mathematics. Baccaglini-Frank  ( in print ) 
has suggested how this can happen when the students are able to internalise such 
practices and to use them as  psychological tools (Kozulin  1998 ; Vygotsky  1978 , 
p. 52 ff) for solving conjecture-generation problems. 
 In this sense, the practices with the software introduce new methods in mathe-
matics. Of course, the teacher must be aware of these potentialities of the software 
and integrated them into a careful didactical design. Such practices consist not only 
in the possibility of making explorations but also in the precise protocols that stu-
dents learn to follow according to the teacher’s design. Similarly, external data con-
cerning certain quantities are passed to a computer through the use of probes. In our 
 5  This procedure is very similar to the way Newton introduced his idea of scientifi c time as a 
 quantitative variable, distinguishing it from the fuzzy idea of time about which hundreds of phi-
losophers had (and would have) speculated (Newton, CW, III, p. 72). 
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case, the measures are collected through the “data capture” from the “internal 
experiment” made in the TI-Nspire mathematical world by connecting the three 
environments illustrated in Fig.  5.5a, b (Geometrical, Numerical, Cartesian) through 
suitable software commands. From one side, these methods are empirical, but from 
the other side they concern mathematical objects and computations or simulations 
with the computer, not physical quantities and experiments. Hence, the term  almost-
empirical (Arzarello  2009 ) , which recalls the vocabulary used by some earlier 
scholars; for example, Lakatos  ( 1976 ) and Putnam  ( 1998 ) claimed that mathematics 
has a  quasi - empirical status (cf. Tymoczko  1998 ) . However, “almost-empirical” 
stresses a different meaning: The main feature of almost-empirical methods is the 
precise protocol that the users follow to make their experiments, in the same way 
that experimental scientists follow their own precise protocols in using machines. 
 Almost-empirical methods also apply within DGS environments; in fact, there 
are strong similarities between instrumented actions produced in TI-Ns and DGS 
environments. In addition, almost-empirical actions made by students in either envi-
ronment are not exclusively pragmatic but also have an epistemic nature. As we 
discuss below, they can support the production of abductions and, hence, the transi-
tion from an inductive, empirical modality to a deductive, more formal one. 
 3.2  Abductions in Mathematics Learning 
 Abduction is a way of reasoning pointed out by Peirce, who observed that abductive 
reasoning is essential for every human inquiry, because it is intertwined both with 
perception and with the general process of invention: “It [abduction] is the only 
logical operation which introduces any new ideas” (C.P. 5.171). 6 In short, abduction 
becomes part of the  process of inquiry along with induction and deduction. 
 Peirce gave different defi nitions of abduction, two of which are particularly fruit-
ful for mathematical education (Antonini and Mariotti  2009 ; Arzarello  1998 ; 
Arzarello and Sabena  in print ; Baccaglini-Frank  2010a ) , particularly when techno-
logical tools are considered:
 1.  The so-called  syllogistic abduction (C.P. 2.623), according to which a  Case is 
drawn from a  Rule and a  Result . There is a well-known Peirce example about 
beans:
 Rule: All the beans  from this bag are white 
 Result: These beans are white 
 Case: These beans are from this bag 
 Such an abduction is different from a  Deduction that would have the form: the 
 Result is drawn from the  Rule and the  Case , and it is obviously different from an 
 Induction , which has the form: from a  Case and many  Results a  Rule is drawn. 
 6  Peirce’s work is usually referred to in the form C.P. n.m., with the following meaning. C.P. = 
Collected Papers; n = number of volume; m = number of paragraph. 
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Of course the conclusion of an abduction holds only with a certain probability. 
(In fact Pólya  1968 , called this abductive argument an  heuristic syllogism .) 
 2.  Abduction as “the process of forming an  explanatory hypothesis ” (Peirce, CP 
5.171; our emphasis). 
 Along this stream of thought, Magnani  ( 2001 , pp. 17–18) proposed the following 
conception of abduction: the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws and 
hypotheses that render some sentences plausible, that explain or discover some 
(eventually new) phenomenon or observation. As such it is the process of reasoning 
in which explanatory hypotheses are formed and evaluated. A typical example is 
when a logical or causal dependence of two observed properties is captured during 
the exploration of a situation. The dependence is by all means an “explanatory 
hypothesis” developed to explain a situation as a whole. 
 As pointed out by Baccaglini-Frank  ( 2010a , pp. 46–50), the two types of abduction 
correspond to two different logics of producing a hypothesis: the logic of  selecting a 
hypothesis from amongst many possible ones (fi rst type) versus the logic of  constructing 
a hypothesis (second type). According to Peirce (C.P. 5.14-212), an abduction in either 
form should be  explanatory ,  testable , and  economic . It is an  explanation if it accounts 
for the facts, but remains a suggestion until it is verifi ed, which explains the need for 
 testability . The motivation for the  economic criterion is twofold: it is a response to the 
practical problem of having innumerable explanatory hypotheses to test, and it satisfi es 
the need for a criterion to select the best explanation amongst the testable ones. 
 Abductions can be produced within DGS environments, and can bridge the gap 
between perceptual facts and their theoretical transposition through supporting a 
 structural cognitive unity (see below) between the explorative and the proving 
phase, provided there is a suitable didactic design. 
 For example, Arzarello  ( 2000 ) gave the following problem to students of ages 
17–18 (Grade 11–12) who knew Cabri-géomètre very well and had already had a 
course in Euclidean geometry. Moreover, the students knew how to explore situa-
tions when presented with open problems (see Arsac et al.  1992 ) and could con-
struct the main geometrical fi gures. The students were already beyond the third van 
Hiele level and were entering the fourth or fi fth one. (For the use of van Hiele levels 
in DGS environments, see Govender and de Villiers  2002 .) The problem read:
 Let ABCD be a quadrangle. Consider the perpendicular bisectors of its sides and their 
intersection points H, K, L, M of pairwise consecutive bisectors. Drag ABCD, considering 
all its different confi gurations: What happens to the quadrangle HKLM? What kind of fi g-
ure does it become? 
 Many pairs of expert 7 students typically solved the problem in fi ve “phases”:
 1.  The students start to shape ABCD into standard fi gures (parallelogram, rectan-
gle, trapezium) and check what kind of fi gures they get for HKLM. In some 
cases they see that all the bisectors pass through the same point. 
 7  Students who have acquired a suffi cient instrumented knowledge of dragging practices according 
to a precise didactical design. The word is taken from Baccaglini-Frank  ( 2010a ) . 
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 2.  As soon as they see that HKLM becomes a point when ABCD is a square, they 
consider this interesting; therefore they drag a vertex of ABCD (starting from 
ABCD as a square) so that H, K, L, M keep on being coincident. 
 3.  They realise that this kind of confi guration is also true with quadrilaterals that 
apparently have no special property. Using the trace command, they fi nd that 
whilst dragging a vertex along a curve that resembles a circle they can keep the 
four points together (Fig.  5.6 ). Hence they formulate the conjecture:  If the quad-
rilateral ABCD can be inscribed in a circle, then its perpendicular bisectors 
meet in one point, centre of the circle . 
 4.  They validate their conjecture by constructing a circle, a quadrilateral inscribed 
in this circle and its perpendicular bisectors, and observing that all of them meet 
in the same point (Fig.  5.7 ). 
 Fig. 5.7  Checking the conjecture with a construction 
 Fig. 5.6  Dragging with trace: generating a conjecture 
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 5.  They write a proof of the conjecture. This process mainly consists in  transforming 
(or eliminating) parts of the discussion held in the previous phases into a linear 
discourse, which is essentially developed according to the formal rules of proof. 
 Two major phenomena characterise the development above and are emblematic 
of these types of open tasks:
 1.  The production of an abduction: it typically marks a crucial understanding point 
in the process of solution; 
 2.  The structural continuity between the conjecturing phases 1–4 and the 
transforming-eliminating activities of the last phase. 
 In producing an abduction, students fi rst see a perceptual invariant, namely the 
coincidence of the four points in some cases (phases 1 & 2). So they start an explo-
ration in order to see what conditions make the four points H, K, L, M coincide 
(phases 2 & 3). A particular kind of dragging ( maintaining dragging : Baccaglini-
Frank  2010b ) supports this exploration: Using the trace command they carefully 
move the vertexes of ABCD so that the other four points remain together; fi nally, 
they realise they have thus produced a curve that resembles a circle (phase 3), 
namely a second invariant. At this point, they conjecture a link between the two 
invariants and see the second as a possible “cause” of the fi rst; namely they produce 
an abduction in the form of an “explanatory hypothesis” (phase 4). 
 In producing a proof, (phase 5) the students write a proof that exhibits a strong 
continuity with their discussion during their previous explorations; more precisely, 
they write it through linguistic eliminations and transformations of those aforemen-
tioned utterances. 
 3.3  Maintaining Dragging as an Acquired Instrumented Action 
 The results discussed above were acquired through suitably designed teaching inter-
ventions, carefully considering the instrumented practices with the software, aimed 
at students’ interiorising those practices as psychological tools (cf. Vygotsky  1978 ) 
they can use to solve mathematical problems. One approach to the instrumentation 
of dragging in DGS accords with this aim: the confi guration of the ‘ Maintaining 
Dragging Conjecturing Model’ for describing a specifi c process of conjecture-gen-
eration, as developed by A. Baccaglini-Frank ( Baccaglini-Frank  2010a ) and by 
Baccaglini-Frank and Mariotti  ( 2010 ) . Enhancing Arzarello et al.’s  ( 2002 ) analysis 
of dragging modalities (and of the consequent abductive processes), Baccaglini-
Frank developed a fi ner analysis of dragging. She has also advanced hypotheses on 
the potential of dragging practices, introduced in the classroom, becoming a psy-
chological tool, not only a list of automatic practices learnt by rote. 
 According to the literature (Olivero  2002 ) , spontaneous use of some typologies 
of dragging does not seem to occur frequently. Consequently, Baccaglini-Frank fi rst 
explicitly introduced the students to some dragging modalities, elaborated from 
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Arzarello et al.’s  ( 2002 ) classifi cation, 8 then asked the students to solve open tasks 
like the problem on quadrilaterals in the previous section. In such problem-solving 
activities, a specifi c modality of dragging appeared particularly useful to students: 
 maintaining dragging (MD). Maintaining dragging consists of trying to drag a base 
point whilst also maintaining some interesting property observed. In the example 
above, the solvers noticed that the quadrilateral HKLM, part of the  Cabri -fi gure, 
could “become” a single point; thus, they could attempt to drag a base point whilst 
trying to keep the four points together. In other words, MD involves both the recog-
nition of a particular confi guration as interesting and the attempt to induce the par-
ticular property to remain invariant during dragging. Healy’s  ( 2000 ) terminology 
would denote such an invariant as a soft invariant as opposed to a robust invariant, 
which derives directly from the construction steps. Maintaining dragging is an elab-
oration of  dummy locus dragging but differs slightly: dummy locus dragging can be 
described as “wandering dragging that has found its path,” a dummy locus that is 
not yet visible to the subject (Arzarello et al.  2002 , p. 68), whilst MD is “the mode 
in which a base point is dragged, not necessarily along a pre-conceived path, with 
the specifi c intention of the user to maintain a particular property.” ( Baccaglini-
Frank and Mariotti  2010 ) . 
 In the example above, MD happened in phases 2 and 3, when the students dragged 
the vertices of the quadrilateral in order to keep together the four points H, K, L, M. 
As in phases 3–4 of the example, when MD is possible, the invariant observed dur-
ing dragging may automatically become “the regular movement of the dragged-
base-point along the curve” recognised through the trace mark; this can be interpreted 
geometrically as the property “dragged-base-point belongs to the curve” (Baccaglini-
Frank  in print ) . As pointed out by Baccaglini-Frank  ( 2010b ) , the  expert solvers 
proceed smoothly through the perception of the invariants and immediately inter-
pret them appropriately as conclusion and premise in the fi nal conjecture. However, 
becoming expert is not immediate, since it requires a careful didactical design that 
pushes the students towards a suitable instrumented use of the MD-artefact. In fact, 
“from the perspective of the instrumental approach, MD practices may be consid-
ered a utilization scheme for expert users of the  MD- artefact thus making MD an 
 instrument (the  MD-instrument ) for the solver with respect to the task for producing 
a conjecture” (Baccaglini-Frank,  ibid. ). 
 8  Arzarello and his collaborators distinguish between the following typologies of dragging: 
 – Wandering dragging : moving the basic points on the screen randomly, without a plan, in order to 
discover interesting confi gurations or regularities in the fi gures. 
 – Dummy locus dragging : moving a basic point so that the fi gure keeps a discovered property; that 
means you are following a hidden path even without being aware of it. 
 – Line dragging : moving a basic point along a fi xed line (e.g. a geometrical curve seen during the 
dummy locus dragging). 
 – Dragging test : moving draggable or semi-draggable points in order to see whether the fi gure 
keeps the initial properties. If so, then the fi gure passes the test; if not, then the fi gure was not 
constructed according to the desired geometric properties. 
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 Baccaglini-Frank has organised this development of instrumented maintaining 
dragging (MD) in a Model (Baccaglini-Frank  2010a ) that serves as a precise proto-
col for students, who follow it in order to produce suitable conjectures when asked 
to tackle open problems (Arsac  1999 ) . This protocol structurally resembles that 
illustrated above for data-capture with TI-Nspire software. It is divided into three 
main parts:
 1.  Determine a confi guration to be explored by inducing it as a (soft) invariant. 
Through wandering dragging the solver can look for interesting confi gurations 
and conceive them as potential invariants to be intentionally induced. (See phases 
1–2 in our DGS example). 
 2.  Searching for a Condition through MD: students look for a condition that makes 
the intentionally induced invariant be visually verifi ed through maintaining drag-
ging from path to the geometric interpretation of the path. Genesis of a Conditional 
Link through the production of an abduction. (See phases 2–3). 
 3.  Checking the Conditional Link between the Invariants and verifying it through 
the dragging test. (See phases 3–4). 
 After a conjecture has been generated through this process, the students (try to) 
prove their conjecture (see phase 5). 
 The MD-conjecturing Model relates dragging and the perception of invariants 
with the developing a conjecture, especially with the emergence of the premise 
and the conclusion. This apparently common process is well-illustrated by the 
MD-conjecturing protocol as a sequence of tasks a solver can engage in. 
Baccaglini-Frank’s model allows us to “unravel” the abductive process that sup-
ports both the formulation of a conjecture and the transition from an explorative 
phase to one in which the conjecture is checked. 9 The  path (in our DGS example 
the circle created by the students in phase 4, Fig.  5.7 ) plays a central role by 
incorporating an answer to the solver’s “search for a cause” for the intentionally 
induced invariant (phase 3, Fig.  5.6 ), and thus leading to the premise of a poten-
tial conjecture. Its fi gure-specifi c component (the actual curve that can be repre-
sented on the screen) contains geometrical properties that may be used as a 
bridge to proof. 
 9  Arzarello et al.  ( 1998a ,b, 2000,  2002 ) showed that the transition from the inductive to the 
 deductive level is generally marked by an  abduction , accompanied by a cognitive shift from 
 ascending to descending epistemological modalities (see Saada-Robert  1989 ) , according to which 
the fi gures on the screen are looked at. The modality is ascending (from the environment to the 
subject) when the user explores the situation, e.g., a graph on the screen, with an open mind and to 
see if the situation itself can show her/him something interesting (like in phases 1, 2, 3 of our 
example); the situation is descending (from the subject to the environment) when the user explores 
the situation with a conjecture in mind (as in phase 4 of our example). In the fi rst case the instru-
mented actions have an explorative nature (to see if something happen); in the second case they 
have a checking nature (to see if the conjecture is corroborated or refuted). Epistemologically, the 
cognitive shift is marked by the production of an  abduction , which also determines the transition 
from an inductive to a deductive approach. 
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 When MD is used expertly, abduction seems to reside at a meta-level with respect 
to the dynamic exploration. However, abduction at the level of the dynamic explora-
tions only seems to occur when MD is used as a psychological tool (Kozulin  1998 ; 
Vygotsky  1978 , p. 52 ff). According to Baccaglini-Frank analysis, it seems that:
 if solvers who have appropriated the MD- instrument  also internalize it transforming it into 
a psychological tool, or a fruitful “mathematical habit of mind” (Cuoco  2008 ) that may be 
exploited in various mathematical explorations leading to the generation of conjectures, a 
greater cognitive unity (Pedemonte  2007 ) might be fostered. In other words, it may be the 
case that when the MD instrument is used as a psychological tool the conjecturing phase is 
characterized by the emergence of arguments that the solver can set in chain in a deductive 
way when constructing a proof (Boero et al.  1996 ) . 
(Baccaglini-Frank  in print ) 
 Something similar pertains to the protocol of data-capture with TI-Nspire 
software, which also involves almost-empirical actions (discussed above). Such 
almost-empirical methods seem fruitful for supporting the transition to the theo-
retical side of mathematics, provided their instrumentation can produce their 
internalisation as psychological tools and foster cognitive unity. On the con-
trary, when such protocols are merely used “automatically” they tend to lead to 
conjectures with no theoretical elements to bridge the gap between the premise 
and the conclusion of the conditional link; in other words, they do not encourage 
cognitive unity. 
 Since it is crucial in the transition from arguments to proofs, from the empirical 
to the theoretical, in the next section we discuss cognitive unity as the latest research 
has elaborated it. 
 3.4  Cognitive Unity 
 Boero has defi ned  cognitive unity as the continuity that may exist between the argu-
mentation of producing a conjecture and the construction of its proof (Boero et al. 
 1996 ) . He hypothesises that, in some cases, “this argumentation can be exploited by 
the student in the construction of a proof by organizing some of the previously pro-
duced arguments into a logical chain” (Boero et al.  2010 , p. 183). Pedemonte  ( 2007 ) 
has further refi ned this concept, introducing the notion of  structural continuity 
between argumentation and proof; that is, when inferences in argumentation and 
proof are connected through the same structure (abduction, induction, or deduc-
tion). For example, there is structural continuity between argumentation and proof 
if some abductive steps used in the argumentation are also present in the proof, as 
was the case in the problem of the distances of the houses from the school (see 
Fig.  5.5 and Boero et al.  2010 ) . 
 Recently, Boero and his collaborators (Boero et al.  2010 ,) have integrated their 
analysis of  cognitive unity with Habermas’ elaboration (Habermas  2003 ) of  rational 
behaviour in discursive practices . They have adapted Habermas’ three components 
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of rational behaviour (teleologic, epistemic, communicative) to the discursive 
 practice of proving and have identifi ed:
 (A)  An  epistemic aspect , consisting in the conscious validation of statements 
according to shared premises and legitimate ways of reasoning…; 
 (B)  A  teleological aspect , inherent in the problem-solving character of proving, 
and the conscious choices to be made in order to obtain the desired product; 
 (C)  A  communicative aspect , consisting in the conscious adhering to rules that 
ensure both the possibility of communicating steps of reasoning and the confor-
mity of the products (proofs) to standards in a given mathematical culture. 
 (Boero et al.  2010 , pp. 188) 
 In this model, the expert’s behaviour in proving processes can be described in 
terms of (more or less) conscious constraints upon the three components of rational-
ity: “constraints of epistemic validity, effi ciency related to the goal to achieve, and 
communication according to shared rules” ( ibid. , p. 192). As the authors point out, 
such constraints result in  two levels of argumentation :
 a level (that we call   – ground level ) inherent in the specifi c nature of the three com-
ponents of rational behaviour in proving; 
 a   – meta-level , “inherent in the awareness of the constraints on the three 
components” 
 ( ibid. , p. 192). 
 The two notions – cognitive unity and levels of argumentations – are important 
for analysing students’ thought processes in the transition from argumentations to 
proofs within technological environments (especially DGS) and in particular very 
useful for analysing indirect proofs. 
 3.5  Indirect Proofs 
 Antonini and Mariotti ( 2008 ) have developed a careful analysis of indirect proofs 
and related argumentations from both a mathematical and a cognitive point of view, 
and have elaborated a model appropriate for interpreting students’ diffi culties with 
such proofs. Essentially, the model splits any indirect proof of a sentence S (principal 
statement) into a pair ( s,m ), where  s is a direct proof (within a theory T, for example 
Euclidean Geometry) of a secondary statement S* and  m is a meta-proof (within a 
meta-theory MT, generally coinciding with classical logic) of the statement S* → S. 
However, this meta-proof  m does  not coincide with Boero et al.’s  ( 2010 ) meta-level 
considered above; rather, it is at the meta-mathematical level. As an example, they 
consider the (principal) statement S: “Let  a and  b be two real numbers. If ab = 0 then 
a = 0 or b = 0” and the following indirect proof: “Assume that ab = 0, a  ¹ 0, and b  ¹ 0. 
Since a  ¹ 0 and b  ¹ 0 one can divide both sides of the equality ab = 0 by a and by b, 
obtaining 1 = 0”. In this proof, the secondary statement S* is: “let a and b be two real 
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numbers; if ab = 0, a  ¹ 0, and b  ¹ 0 then 1 = 0”. A direct proof is given. The  hypothesis 
of this new statement is the negation of the original statement and the thesis is a 
false proposition (“1 = 0”). 
 Antonini and Mariotti ( 2008 ) use their model to point out that the main diffi -
culty for students facing indirect proof consists in switching from  s to  m . Yet the 
diffi culty seems less strong for statements that require a proof by contrapositive; 
that is, to prove B' → A' (secondary statement) in order to prove A → B (principal 
statement). Integrating the two models, we can say that switching from  s to  m 
requires a well-established epistemic and teleological rationality in the students 
and in this respect does need the activation of Boero et al.’s  ( 2010 ) meta-level of 
argumentation. 
 The distinction between this meta-level and the ground level in Boero et al.’s 
 ( 2010 ) model may be very useful in investigating the argumentation and proving 
processes related to indirect proof. Based on this distinction, we introduce the notion 
of  meta-cognitive unity : a cognitive unity between the two levels of argumentation 
described above, specifi cally between the  teleological component at the  meta-level 
and the  epistemic component at the  ground level . 
 Different from structural and referential cognitive unity (Garuti et al.  1996 ; 
Pedemonte  2007 ) , meta-cognitive unity is not concerned with two diachronic stages 
in students’ discursive activities (namely argumentation and proving, which are pro-
duced sequentially), rather it refers to a synchronic integration between the two 
levels of argumentation. We hypothesise that the existence of such a meta-cognitive 
unity is an important condition for producing indirect proofs. In other words, lack-
ing the integration between the two levels of argumentation can block students’ 
proving processes or produce cognitive breaks like those described in the literature 
on indirect proofs. Meta-cognitive unity may also entail structural cognitive unity at 
the ground level and may develop through what we call ‘ the logic of not ’ (see 
Arzarello and Sabena,  in print ) . 
 3.6  The Logic of Not 
 The  ‘logic of not ’ is an interesting epistemological and cognitive aspect of argumen-
tation that sometimes is produced by students who tackle a problem where a direct 
argument is revealed as not viable. 
 Their strategy is similar to that of a chemist, who in the laboratory has to detect 
the nature of some substance. For example, knowing that the substance must belong 
to one of three different categories (a, b, c), the chemist uses suitable reagents to 
test: if the substance reacts in a certain way to a certain reagent it may be of type a 
or b but  not c, and so on. In such practices, abductive processes are usually used: if, 
as a  Rule , the substance S makes blue the reagent r and if the  Result of the experi-
ment shows that the unknown substance X makes blue the reagent r, then the chem-
ist reasons that X = S ( Case of the abduction). 
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 For example, we summarise the case of a student comprehensively discussed in 
Arzarello and Sabena  ( in print ) . The student S (grade 9 in a science-oriented school) 
is solving the following task:
 The drawing (Fig.  5.8 )  shows the graphs of: a function f , its derivative, one of its anti-
derivatives .  Identify the graph of each function, and justify your answer. 
 The functions are differently coloured: the parabola red (indicated with R); the 
cubic (with a maximum point in the origin) is blue (B); the last (a quartic with an 
infl ection point in the origin) is green (G). S does not know the analytic representa-
tions of the functions but has only their graphs. As such, he refers to the functions 
only by their colours. 
 In the fi rst part of his protocol S checks which of the three functions can be  f . He 
does this by looking for possible abductions, which involve the features of the given 
graphs. 
 For example, he starts supposing that  f is the red function, probably because it is 
the simplest graph, and wonders whether he can apply an abductive argument with 
the following form to conclude that its derivative possibly is the green function:
 1.  Rule: “any derivative of a  decreasing function is negative” 
 2.  Result: “the green function is negative”; (ARG. 1) 
 3.  Case: “the green function is the derivative of  f ” 
 Like the metaphorical chemist, S is able fi rst to fi nd a ‘reagent’ that discriminates 
between the substances (functions) he is analysing and then to validate his hypoth-
esis with a further discriminating experiment, using his learnt practices with the 
graphs of functions. Arzarello and Sabena  ( in print ) argue that some of S’s argu-
mentations are  teleological and at the  meta - level : they address S’s own successive 
actions and his control of what is happening. The teleological component at the 
meta-level intertwines with the epistemological component at the ground level in a 




122 F. Arzarello et al.
deep unity. This complex unity allows S to produce a proof by contraposition (the 
reasoning that logicians call “ modus tollens ”: from “A implies B” to “not B implies 
not A”). Through this transition to a new epistemological status for his statements, 
S can lighten the cognitive load of the task using Arzarello and Sabena’s ‘logic of 
not’, as written in part of S’s protocol:
 Then I compared the “red” with the “green” function: but, the “green” function cannot be a 
derivative of the “red” one, because in the fi rst part, when the “red” function is decreasing, 
its derivative should have a negative sign, but the “green” function has a positive sign. 
 Here the structure of the sentence is more complex than before: S is thinking 
towards a possible argument in the following form:
 1.  “any derivative of  a decreasing function is negative” 
 4.  “the “green” function has a positive sign”  (ARG. 2) 
 5.  “the “green” function cannot be a derivative of an
 increasing function” 
 Unlike the possible abduction ARG. 1 above, ARG. 2 has the form: (1) and not 
(2); hence not (3). Crucially, the refutation of the usual Deduction (Rule, Case; 
hence Result) has the same structure, because of the converse of an implication 
(“A implies B” is equivalent to “not B implies not A”) . In other words, the refutation 
of an argument by abduction coincides with the refutation of an argument by deduc-
tion. Whilst abductions and deductions are structurally and cognitively different, 
their refutations are identical formally. So S can produce a form of deductive argument 
“naturally” within an abductive modality – though remarkably from an epistemo-
logical and cognitive point of view, because the apparently “natural” abductive 
approach of students in the conjecturing phases (Arzarello et al.  1998 ) often does 
not lead to the deductive approach of the proving phase (Pedemonte  2007 ) . The 
transition from an abductive to a deductive modality requires a sort of “somersault”, 
an inversion in the functions and structure of the argument (the Case and Result 
functions are exchanged) which may cognitively load the students. However, this 
inversion is not necessary in either the refutation of an abduction or the refutation of 
a deduction. An “impossible” abductive argument already has the structure of a 
deduction; namely, it is an argument by contraposition. Of course greater cognitive 
effort is required to manage the refutation of an abduction than to develop a simple 
direct abduction. But the coincidence between abduction and deduction in cases of 
refutation allows avoiding the “somersault”. 
 De Villiers (who does not use this terminology) has pointed out another possible 
use of the ‘logic of not’. He observes that in DGS environments it is important:
 …to sensitize students to the fact that although  Sketchpad is very accurate and extremely use-
ful for exploring the validity of conjectures, one could still make false conjectures with it if 
one is not very careful. Generally, even if one is measuring and calculating to 3 decimal accu-
racy, which is the maximum capacity of  Sketchpad 3 , one cannot have absolute certainty that 
there are no changes to the fourth, fi fth or sixth decimals (or the 100th decimal!) that are just 
not displayed when rounding off to three decimals. This is why a logical explanation/proof, 
even in such a convincing environment as  Sketchpad , is necessary for absolute certainty. 
 (de Villiers  2002 , p. 9) 
1235 Experimental Approaches to Theoretical Thinking: Artefacts and Proofs
 One way of promoting students’ sensibility is to create some cognitive confl ict to 
counteract students’ natural inclination to just accept the empirical evidence that the 
software provides. For example, one can use an activity where students are led to 
make a false conjecture; though they are convinced it is true, it turns out false: In 
such cases the logic of not can drive them to produce a proof. 
 Thus, DGS has the potential of introducing students to indirect arguments and 
proofs; specifi cally, the use of “maintaining dragging” (MD) supports producing 
abductions. This can be fruitfully analysed in terms of the “logic of not”. 
 3.7  Indirect Proof Within DGS 
 Theorem acquisition and justifi cation in a DGS environment is a  “ cognitive-visual 
dual process potent with structured conjecture-forming activities, in which dynamic 
visual explorations through different dragging modalities are applied on geometri-
cal entities” (Leung and Lopez-Real,  2002 , p. 149). In this duality, visualisation 
plays a pivotal role in the development of epistemic behaviour like the Maintaining 
Dragging Model (Baccaglini-Frank and Mariotti  2010 ) . On the cognitive side, DGS 
facilitates experimental identifi cation of geometrical invariants through functions of 
variation induced by dragging modalities which serve as cognitive-visual tools to 
conceptualise conjectures and DGS-situated argumentative discourse (Leung  2008 ) . 
With respect to indirect proof within DGS, Leung proposed a visualisation scheme 
to “see a proof by contradiction” in a DGS environment (Leung and Lopez-Real 
 2002 ) . The scheme’s key elements were the DGS constructs of pseudo-object and 
locus of validity; together, they serve as the main cognitive-visual bridge to connect 
the semiotic controls and the theoretical controls in the argumentation process. This 
scheme developed out of a  Cabri problem-solving workshop conducted for a group 
of Grade 9 and Grade 10 students in Hong Kong. The researcher gave the following 
problem to students to explore in the  Cabri environment:
 Let ABCD be a quadrilateral such that each pair of interior opposite angles adds up to 
180◦. Find a way to prove that ABCD must be a cyclic quadrilateral. 
 3.7.1  The Proof 
 After exploration, a pair of students wrote down the following “ Cabri- proof” (Fig.  5.9 ). 
 The labelling of the angles in their diagram was not part of the actual  Cabri fi g-
ure. The key idea in the proof was the construction of an impossible quadrilateral 
EBFD. However, the written proof did not refl ect the dynamic variation of the 
impossible quadrilateral in the  Cabri environment that promoted the argumentation. 
An in-depth interview with the two students on how they used  Cabri to arrive at the 
proof led to the construction of the cognitive-visual scheme. 
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 3.7.2  The Argumentation 
 The impossible quadrilateral EBFD, henceforth called a  pseudo-quadrilateral , in 
Fig.  5.9 plays a critical role in organising the cognitive-visual process that leads to 
the construction and justifi cation of a theorem. EBFD is a visual object that mea-
sures the degree of anomaly of a biased  Cabri world with respect to the different 
positions of the vertices A, B, C and D. There are positions where the pseudo-
quadrilateral EBFD vanishes when a vertex of ABCD is being dragged. Figure  5.10 
depicts a sequence of snapshots in a dragging episode when C is being dragged until 
EBFD vanishes. 
 The last picture in the sequence shows that when C lies on the circumcircle 
C1 of the quadrilateral ABCD, E and F coincide, and at this instance, 
∠DEB + ∠DFB = 360◦ (a contradiction arising from the pseudo-quadrilateral 
EBFD). Furthermore, this condition holds only when C lies on C1; that is, when A, 
B, C and D are concyclic. The pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD and the circumcircle 
C1 play a dual role in an argumentation process. First, they restrict the quadrilateral 
ABCD to a special  confi guration that leads to the discovery that ABCD possesses 
 Fig. 5.10  Dragging the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD 
 Fig. 5.9  The proof of the students 
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certain properties (through abductive inference). Second, they generate a  convincing 
argument that collapses onto a Reductio ad Absurdum proof (Fig.  5.9 ) acceptable in 
Euclidean Geometry. 
 3.7.3  The Scheme 
 Suppose A is a fi gure (quadrilateral ABCD in the  Cabri -proof) in a DGS environ-
ment. Assume that A satisfi es a certain condition C(A) (interior opposite angles are 
supplementary) and impose it on all fi gures of type A in the DGS environment. This 
 forced presupposition evokes a ‘mental labelling’ (the arbitrary labelling of 
∠DAB = 2 a and ∠DCB = 180-2 a in the  Cabri -proof) which leads one to  act cogni-
tively on the DGS environment. Thus C(A) makes an object of type A biased with 
extra meaning that might not necessarily be true in the actual DGS environment. 
This  biased DGS environment exists as a kind of hybrid state between the  visual-true 
DGS (a virtual representation of the Euclidean world) and a  pseudo-true interpreta-
tion, C(A), insisted on by the user. In this pseudo world, the user can construct an 
object associated with A which inherits a local property that is not necessarily con-
sistent with the Euclidean world because of C(A) (e.g., the impossible quadrilateral 
EBFD in the  Cabri -proof): We call such an object associated a  pseudo object and 
denote it by O(A).When part of A (the point C) is being dragged to different posi-
tions, O(A) might vanish (or degenerate; i.e., a plane fi gure to a line, a line to a 
point). The path or locus on which this happens gives a constraint (both semiotic 
and theoretical) under which the forced presupposition C(A) is “Euclidean valid”; 
that is, where the biased microworld is being realised in the Euclidean world. This 
path is called the  locus of validity of C(A) associated with O(A) (the circle C1). 
 In the Indirect Proof context (Antonini and Mariotti,  2008 ), one can interpret this 
scheme as follows: S is the principle statement “If the interior opposite angles of a 
quadrilateral add up to 180 ° , then it is a cyclic quadrilateral”; S * is the secondary 
statement “If the interior opposite angles of a quadrilateral add up to 180 ° and its 
vertices can lie on two circles, then there exists a quadrilateral with the property that 
a pair of interior opposite angles add up to 360°.” (Fig.  5.11 ) 
 In this scheme, T is Euclidean Geometry; s is a direct Euclidean proof. In a DGS 
environment, the meta-proof m could be a kind of dragging-based visual logic. In 
the case discussed above, when a pseudo object and a locus of validity arise, m 
could be a drag-to-vanish MD visual logic. Thus the  composite proof 
 is an indirect proof that is both theoretical and DGS-mediated. 
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 In relation to the Boero-Habermas model (Boero et al.  2010 ) , the theoretical part 
(s) is the epistemological component (theoretical control) at the ground level where 
the existence of the pseudo-quadrilateral EBFD was deduced. The DGS-mediated 
part (m) is the teleological component (semiotic control) at the meta-level where the 
dragging-based argumentation took place. Hence the intertwined composite proof 
(m o s) can be seen as a meta-cognitive unity in which argumentation crystallises 
into a Reductio ad Absurdum proof. 
 Within the “logic of not”, the DGS-mediated part (m) allows a link from the 
abductive modality to the deductive modality. In the previous example of S, the 
distance between the two modalities was annihilated because of the coincidence 
between the negations of the abduction and of the deduction; here the distance is 
shortened through m: in both cases, the cognitive effort required is reduced. 
 Lopez-Real and Leung  ( 2006 ) suggested that Formal Axiomatic Euclidean 
Geometry (FAEG) and Dynamic Geometry Environment (DGE) are ‘parallel’ sys-
tems that are “situated in different semiotic phenomena” instead of two systems 
having a hierarchical relationship (Fig.  5.12 ). 
 The vertical two-way arrow denotes the connection (networking) that enables an exchange 
of meaning between the systems. The horizontal arrow stands for a concurrent mediation 
process that signifi es some kind of mathematical reality. This perspective embraces the 
idea that dragging in DGE is a semiotic tool (or a conceptual tool) that helps learners to 
form mathematical concepts, rather than just a tool for experimentation and conjecture 
making that doesn’t seem to match the ‘logical rigour’ in FAEG.  (Lopez-Real and Leung 
 2006 , p.667) 
 In this connection, the MD dragging scheme – together with the construct of 
pseudo-object and locus of validity, and with the associated reasoning carried out, 
on the one hand, in the context of the DGS and, on the other hand, in T by the 
solver – may serve as channels to enable an exchange of meaning between the two 
systems (Fig.  5.13 ). 
 The idea of composite proof in DGS environment could possibly be expanded to 
a wider scope where there is a hybrid of Euclidean and DGS registers. Leung  ( 2009 ) 
presented such a case where a student produced a written proof that intertwined 
Euclidean and DGS registers. The fi rst results of Leung’s analysis are promising, 
opening new perspectives of investigation. 
Formal Axiomatic Euclidean 
Geometry
Geometry realized (reified) in DGE
 Fig. 5.12  From Lopez-Real  and Leung  ( 2006 ) 
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 4  Part 3: Towards a Framework for Understanding 
the Role of Technologies in Geometrical Proof 
 As discussed in Part 1, geometry may be split into what Einstein  ( 1921 ) called 
“practical geometry”, obtained from physical experiment and experience, and 
“purely axiomatic geometry” containing its logical structure. Central to learning 
geometry is an understanding of the relationship between the technologies of geom-
etry and its epistemology. Technology in this context is the range of artefacts (objects 
created by humans) and the associated techniques which together are needed to 
achieve a desired outcome. Part 2 has set out in detail how the process of coordinat-
ing technologies with the development of geometric reasoning combines artefactual 
“know-how” with cognitive issues. In Part 3, we fi rst provide a model, using Activity 
Theory, that highlights the role of technology in the process. Second, this part dis-
cusses the mediational role of digital technology in learning geometry, and the 
implications for developing proofs. 
 4.1  Modelling Proof in a Technological Context 
 To analyse proof in a technological context, it is useful to consider a framework 
derived from Activity Theory, shown in Fig.  5.14 (Stevenson  2008 ) . The framework 
provides a way of describing the use of artefacts, (e.g., digital devices, straight-
edges, etc.) in processes of proving. Activity Theory, a framework for analysing 
artefact-based social activity, is a “theory” in the sense that it claims that such activ-
ity can be described as a system using the categories shown in Fig.  5.14 . In this 
section, we “fl esh out” the epistemological, cultural and psychological dimensions 
of the system in relation to technology and proof. 
 In Fig.  5.14 , the “object” of the system is the formulation of a problem which 
motivates and drives the proof process, with the “outcome” being the proof created 
from this system. “Artefacts” are any material objects used in the process, which in 








Arguments that explain WHY?
DGS-dependent Convincing
Arguments that explain WHY?
Composite ProofMD Dragging Scheme
 Fig. 5.13  The two semiotic systems: FAEG and DGE 
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is part of a “community” in which the activity is set; the community is “managed” 
through power structures that assign roles and status within a given context (e.g. class-
room, professional mathematics community). “Rules” comprise the relationships 
that defi ne different aspects of the system. 
 A “technology” in this system consists of the artefacts used, objects to which 
they can be applied, persons permitted to use the artefacts, and the sets of rules 
appropriate to each of the relationships which make up the system. Figure  5.14 
identifi es fi ve aspects of the interactions with technology useful for the analysis. 
‘Function’ covers the set of techniques applicable with the artefacts to a specifi c 
object, within a particular setting and social grouping. ‘Use’ relates to the ways in 
which individuals or groups actually behave with the artefacts within the social 
context, governed by the norms of community organisation. ‘Roles’ indicates the 
types of linguistic interactions adopted by the participants, and ‘Organisation’ refers 
to the groupings of those participating in the technology-based activities. Finally, 
‘Feasibility’ relates to the practical constraints placed on an activity by the physical 
and temporal location. 
 Figure  5.4 (Part 1) and its associated description highlight the cultural dimension 
of a mathematics classroom engaging in proof activities with technology (straight-
edge and compass or DGS) by linking together the fi ve aspects of the model in 
Fig.  5.14 (Use, Function, Roles, Feasibility and Organisation, cf. Stevenson  2008 ) . 
The model brings together both the selection of tasks related to the objectives and 
outcomes of activities and the teacher’s use of artefacts. In particular, it expresses 
how teachers tailor their use of artefacts to their specifi c classrooms in order to medi-
ate ideas about proof and its forms to their students. As a result, the model expresses 
how specifi c forms of activity and styles of linguistic interaction between pupils and 
teacher in a given physical location provide the context for studying proof. 
 Epistemologically, the system is defi ned by the rules governing the formal 
object of mathematical knowledge that is the context for the proof process (e.g., 
geometry). For “standard” proof, the technology consists of the artefacts needed 










 Fig. 5.14  Proving in a technological context: a framework from activity theory 
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how statements are organised. Their rules of inference describe the syntactical 
dimension of the process. A major claim for using proof as a method for obtaining 
knowledge is that, if “applied correctly”, the rules of inference preserve the 
semantic integrity of the argument forming the proof. Semantics deals with the 
meanings given to geometric statements and is concerned with the truth and 
knowledge claims that a proof contains. Technology, therefore, plays a key role in 
the relationship between the semantics and syntactical structures of a proof, rais-
ing the issue of whether syntax and semantics are separable or inextricably inter-
twined with the technology. 
 As the section “Abductions in mathematics learning” (Part 2) proposes, conjec-
tures become proofs by applying the technology of logical inference. Abduction is, 
epistemologically, a non-linear process which develops over a period of time and 
involves iterations between facts and the conjectured rules that gradually come to 
explain those facts. Constructing a proof involves restructuring a conjecture to suit 
the linear form of logical inference so that the technique can be applied to organise 
the argument “on the page”. Such linearisation re-interprets (or removes) the dia-
chronic aspect of abduction as an epistemological structure. In the process of trans-
lating conjecture into a proof, constructions, false starts, and strings of informal 
calculations are removed. References to sensorimotor processes in geometry are 
suppressed by talking about “ideal” points and lines, with the paper surface acting 
as a kind of window on the “real” geometry. (Livingstone  2006 ) . In terms of the 
model in Fig.  5.14 , the role of the teacher is crucial in helping learners make this 
linguistic transition. The extracts of dialogue related to this process of linearisation 
in Part 2 indicate how the cues and leads given by the teacher aid the learner in 
fi ltering the conjecture so that the techniques of inference can be used to organise 
it appropriately. 
 Adding DGS to this situation does not change the essential dynamic tensions 
resulting from the need to translate from one technological setting (straight-edge 
and compass or DGS) to another (rules of inference). The discussions in Part 2 of 
the “logic of not” and “indirect proof” (the ‘Use’ aspects of the model in Fig.  5.14 ) 
imply that abduction arises as a strategy to deal with those dynamic tensions. 
 4.2  Digital Technology as a Mediational Artefact 
 Learning how to use geometrical equipment, whether physical or digital, is part of 
the instrumentation of geometry (Verillion and Rabardel  1995 ) , the interplay 
between facility with artefacts and the development of psychological concepts. 
Physically, one has the experience of using a straight edge to draw a “straight line” 
and compasses to make a “curve”. In Lakoff’s  ( 1988 ) framework, such actions 
can be interpreted as developing a “prototype”. The motor-sensory action of 
using a straight-edge and pencil, combined with the word “straight” and the 
Gestalt perception of the resulting mark on a surface, embodies the concept of 
“straightness”. 
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 This account raises the question of how far technology, in general, mediates the 
understanding of geometrical concepts, and how that mediation relates to proof in 
the formal sense. For example, rather than simply motivating proofs of results, does/
can/should DGS play an integral part in forming the conceptual structures that con-
stitute geometry? Much of the interest in DGSs lies in the representation of Euclidean 
geometry, but as Part 2 implies, DGSs provide a different kind of geometry from 
that obtained by paper and pencil construction, or by the axiomatic version of 
Euclidean geometry. Consequently, different versions of geometry emerge with 
these different technologies: “pencil geometry”, “digital geometry”, and “axiomatic 
geometry”. The question is not whether technology mediates knowledge, but how 
different technologies mediate different kinds of knowledge. Proof, as a means of 
establishing knowledge claims, should therefore take account of the mediational 
role that artefacts play in epistemology. 
 Learning non-Euclidean geometry, for example, has a number of complexities 
when compared to the Euclidean case. On the one hand, spherical geometry is rela-
tively straightforward, since learners may have everyday opportunities to develop 
visual intuitions. Being “smaller” than Euclidean space, spherical surfaces are both 
closed and bounded, and allow both physical and digital manipulation. On the other 
hand, hyperbolic space poses a different problem; it is “larger” than Euclidean 
space, so learners have diffi culty defi ning a complete physical surface to manipulate 
(Coxeter  1969 ) . The learning process also lacks opportunities for visual intuition and 
suffers from diffi culties in fi nding appropriate artefacts to support instrumentation. 
However, digital technologies offer possibilities for engaging with hyperbolic 
geometries that cannot be found otherwise (Jones et al.  2010 ) . Figure  5.15 shows 
how a two-dimensional Euclidean model can be obtained by projecting a hyperbolic 
surface, and illustrates the geometry associated with the projection. 
 Imagine that an Escher tessellation is spread isometrically across the hyperbo-
loid on the left-hand side of Fig.  5.15 . Viewing it as a projection onto a fl at disc 
gives the image in the centre of Fig.  5.15 . The grid for the tessellation is shown on 
the right of Fig.  5.15 , together with the basic hyperbolic triangle OAB used to tes-
sellate the disc. Triangle OAB shows one of the key differences between hyperbolic 
geometry and Euclidean: the angle sum of the hyperbolic triangles is less than 180°. 
The edge of the circle represents infi nity (it is called the “horizon”), which can be 
 Fig. 5.15  A genesis of the Poincaré disc for hyperbolic geometry 
 
1315 Experimental Approaches to Theoretical Thinking: Artefacts and Proofs
approached but never reached, as indicated by the “bunching” of the tessellations at 
the circumference of the central image and of the grid lines on the right. Further, 
“straight” lines in the hyperbolic world can be either Euclidean straight lines (in fact 
diameters of the horizon) or circular arcs (orthogonal to the horizon). 
 Using Turtle geometry, it is possible to animate the two-dimensional projective 
model of the hyperbolic surface to provide an artefact for exploring the geometry 
(Jones et al.,  ibid ). Taken from Stevenson  ( 2000 ) , the following snippet shows the 
work of two adults (S and P) using the non-Euclidean Turtle microworld to illustrate 
the role of artefacts in mediating understanding of the geometry. In Fig.  5.16 , S and 
P fi rst draw the lines OA and OB; then they attempt to fi nd the line (AB) to close the 
triangle. Starting with the Turtle at B, pointing to the right of the screen, they turn it 
left through 135°, and use a built-in procedure called “Path” which indicates how 
the Turtle would travel if moved along that heading. They see that line does not 
close the triangle, so they turn the Turtle by a further 5° to the left. This time the path 
goes through A, and they refl ect on the screen results (Fig.  5.16 ). 
 S picks up a hyperbolic surface provided for them and reminds himself about 
the projection process (the left-hand side of Fig.  5.15 ). S comments on the diagram 
in Fig.  5.16 :
 S: We haven’t got 180, but it’s walking a straight-line path (refl ectively). 
  (S here refers to the metaphor that, in order to trace a straight line on a curved surface 
– in this case the hyperboloid, the Turtle must take equal strides, hence “walking a 
straight-line path”.) 
 P:  Yeah, you’ve probably got to turn. 
  (Instinctively, P thinks that a Turtle walking on the curved surface must turn to compen-
sate for the curvature. S is clear that this is not happening.) 
 S:  No, you don’t have to turn. It’s actually drawing a triangle on the surface. 
  (Looking at the hyperboloid, S imagines the Turtle marking out the triangle on the 
surface.) 
 S:  The projection defi es Pythagoras. No! Hang on, walking on the surface is defying it, isn’t it! 
Because we walk straight lines on the surface; we just see them as curves on the projection. 
 Fig. 5.16  The turtle within the hyperbolic world 
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 For S, the projection clearly preserves the geometric properties of the Turtle’s 
path on the surface. S believes that what they see is a fact about the geometry, not a 
result of the software or the projection. Two points are signifi cant: First, S’s insight 
would be impossible without both the material artefacts (physical surface and digi-
tal application) and the metaphor that turtles walk straight lines on curved surfaces 
by taking “equal-strides without turning” (Abelson and diSessa  1980 , p. 204). 
Second, S is convinced by what he sees, and provides an explanation about why the 
image preserves something about the geometry of the hyperbolic surface. 
 There remains the problem of what might constitute a proof that the angle sum 
of any hyperbolic triangle is always less than 180°. Given that the artefacts mediate 
the object of study (hyperbolic geometry), one can convert S’s insight into the tech-
nology of logical inference with its associated linearisation and the re-interpretation 
of the diachronic aspect. Proofs of the angle sum do exist, but they rely on the 
axiomatic approach described by Einstein and on the technology of inference 
(e.g. Coxeter  1969 , p. 296 ff.). However, the proofs are abstract and lack visual 
intuition; the digital and physical artefacts described here offer learners a more con-
crete and visual situation. 
 In the not too distant future, learners may use electronic media, rather than paper, 
to develop their work, which would enable them to embed digital applications. 
Effectively, this process will separate the technology of inference from the need to 
lay out arguments on paper as some kind of fi nal statement. As for the model pre-
sented in Fig.  5.15 , its value lies in being able to provide the cultural and pedagogic 
context for these activities; it embeds technologies in social relationships and human 
motivation. It also shows how dynamic tensions arise in reasoning due to confl icts 
between technologies. Coupled with Balacheff’s analysis of proof types  ( 2008 ) , the 
model identifi es how the assumptions and expectations of those engaging in proof 
generate contradictions in their practices (Stevenson  2011 ) . 
 In closing, in this chapter we have discussed some strands of experimental 
mathematics from both an epistemological and a didactical point of view. We have 
intro duced some past and recent historical examples in Western culture in order to 
illustrate how the use of tools has driven the genesis of many abstract mathematical 
concepts. 
 The intertwining between concrete tools and abstract ideas introduces both an 
“experimental” dimension in mathematics and a dynamic tension between the 
 empirical nature of the activities with the tools –which encompass perceptual 
and operational components– and the  deductive nature of the discipline –which 
entails a rigorous and sophisticated formalisation. This  almost empirical aspect 
of mathematics was hidden in the second half of the nineteenth and the fi rst half of 
the twentieth century because of a prevailing formalistic attitude. More recently, the 
perceptual and empirical aspects of the discipline have come again on the scene. 
This is mainly due to the heavy use of the new technology, which is deeply and 
quickly changing both research and teaching in mathematics (Lovasz  2006 ) . 
 We have illustrated the roles both perception and empiricism now play in 
proving activities within the classroom and have introduced some theoretical 
frameworks which highlight the dynamics of students’ cognitive processes 
whilst working in CAS and DGS environments. The learners use those 
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 technologies to explore  problematic situations, to formulate conjectures and 
fi nally to produce proofs. We have pointed out the complex interplay between 
inductive, abductive, and deductive modalities in the delicate transition from the 
empirical to the theoretical side in the production of proofs. This dynamic can 
be strongly supported by a suitable use of technologies, provided the students 
learn some practices in their use, for example the  maintaining dragging scheme 
in DGS. We have also shown how the induced instrumental genesis can help 
learners in producing indirect proofs. 
 Finally, we have used Activity Theory to model the dynamic tension between 
empiricism and deduction as a consequence of  translating between different tech-
nologies , understood in the broadest sense as something that can mediate between 
different ontologies and epistemologies. 
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 5  Response to “Experimental  Approaches to Theoretical 
Thinking: Artefacts and Proofs” 
 Jonathan M. Borwein, and Judy-anne Osborn 
 An overview of the chapter. The material we review focuses on the teaching of 
proof, in the light of the empirical and deductive aspects of mathematics. There is 
emphasis on the role of technology, not just as a pragmatic tool but also as a shaper 
of concepts. Technology is taken to include ancient as well as modern tools with 
their uses and users. Examples, both from teaching studies and historical, are pre-
sented and analysed. Language is introduced enabling elucidation of mutual rela-
tions between tool-use, human reasoning and formal proof. The article concludes by 
attempting to situate the material in a more general psychological theory. 
 We particularly enjoyed instances of the ‘student voice’ coming through, and 
would have welcomed the addition of the ‘teacher’s voice’ as this would have fur-
ther contextualised the many descriptions the authors give of the importance of the 
role of the teacher. We are impressed by the accessibility of the low-tech examples, 
which include uses of straight-edge and compass technology, and commonly avail-
able software such as spreadsheets. Other more high-tech examples of computer 
geometry systems were instanced and it would of interest to know how widely avail-
able these technologies are to schools in various countries (examples in the text 
were primarily Italian with one school from Hong Kong) and how much time-
investment is called upon by teachers to learn the tool before teaching with it. The 
general principles explicated by the authors apply equally to their low-tech and 
high-tech examples, and are thus applicable to a broad range of environments 
including both low and high-resourced schools. 
 The main theoretical content of the chapter is in the discussion of why and how 
tool-use can lighten cognitive load, making the transition from exploring to proving 
easier. On the one hand tool-use is discussed as it relates to the discovery of con-
cepts, both in the practical sense of students coming to a personal understanding, 
and in the historical sense of how concepts make sense in the context of the existence 
of a given tool. On the other hand the kinds of reasoning used in the practice of math-
ematics are made explicit – deduction, induction and a third called ‘abduction’ – with 
their roles in the stages of mathematical discovery, as well as how tool-use can 
facilitate these kinds of reasoning and translation between them. 
 Frequent use of the term ‘artefact’ is made in the writing, thus it is pertinent to 
note that the word has different and opposing meanings in the educational and the 
science-research literature. In the educational context the word means a useful 
 purposely human-created tool, so that a straight-edge with compass or computer-
software is an artefact in the sense used within the article. In the science-research 
literature, an artefact is an accidental consequence of experimental design which is 
misleading until identifi ed, so for instance a part of a graph which a computer gets 
wrong due to some internal rounding-error is an artefact in this opposite sense. 
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 The structure of the chapter. There is an introduction: essentially a reminder that 
mathematics has its empirical side as well as the deductive face which we see in 
formal proofs. Then there are three parts. Part 1 begins with a discussion of the his-
tory of mathematics, with reference to the sometimes less-acknowledged aspect of 
empiricism. In its second half, Part 1 segues from history into modern teaching 
examples. Part 2 is the heart of the article. It deals with the kind of reasoning natural 
to conjecture-forming, ‘abduction’, the concept of ‘instrumentation’ and cognitive 
issues relating to ‘indirect proofs’; all through detailed examples and theory. Part 3 
reads as though the authors are trying to express a large and fl edgling theory in a 
small space. A general psychological paradigm called ‘Activity Theory’, is intro-
duced, which deals with human activities and artefacts. An indication of digital 
technology as a means of translating between different ways of thinking is given in 
this context. We now discuss each Part in more detail. 
 Part 1. The historical half of Part 1 deals with geometric construction as a paradigmatic 
example, with the authors showing that since Euclid, tools have shaped concepts. 
For example, the straight-edge and compass is not just a practical technology, but 
helps defi ne what a solution to a construction problem means. For instance cube 
duplication and angle trisection are impossible with straight-edge and compass (i.e. 
straight lines and circles) alone, but become solvable if the Nicomedes compass 
which draws a conchoid are admitted. A merely approximate graphic solution 
becomes a mechanical solution with the new tool. The moral is that changing the set 
of drawing tools changes the set of theoretically solvable problems, so that practical 
tools become theoretical tools. Another theme is the ambiguity noted in Descartes’ 
two methods of representing a curve, by either a continuous motion or an equation; 
and subsequent historical developments coming with Pasch, Peano, Hilbert and 
Weierstrass, in which the intuition of continuous motion is suppressed in favour of 
purely logical relations. The authors perceive that historical suppression as having a 
 cost which is only beginning to be counted, and rejoice that the increased use of 
computers is accompanying a revived intuitive geometric perspective. 
 This revival also offers the prospect of teachers who better understand mathe-
matics in its historical context. Ideally, their students will gain a better appreciation 
of the lustrous history of mathematics. It is not unreasonable that students fi nd hard 
concepts which took the best minds in Europe decades or centuries to understand 
and capture. 
 Part 1 is completed by examples from three educational studies followed by a 
discussion of the importance of the role of the teacher. Each example uses a tool to 
explore some mathematical phenomenon, with the teaching aim being that students 
develop a theoretical perspective. The fi rst study involved over 2,000 students in 
various year-groups and 80 teachers, setting straight-edge and compass in the wider 
context of mathematical “machines”. The second study, of Year 10 students, sits in 
the context of a particular DGS (Dynamical Geometry System), specifi cally the 
software called  ‘Cabri’ . Students fi rst revised physical straight-edge and compass 
work, then worked in the virtual  Cabri world, in which their drawings become what 
are termed ‘Evocative Computational Objects’ | no longer just shapes but shapes 
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with associated  Cabri commands and the capacity to be ‘dragged’ in interesting 
ways whose stability relates to the in-built hierarchical structure of the object. 
Interesting assertions made by the authors are that drag-ability relates to prove-
ability, and that the original pencil drawings become signs for the richer  Cabri 
objects. As in the previous study, a central aspect was student group discussion and 
comparison of solutions. The third study was of the use Year 9 students made of a 
CAS (Computer Algebra System) to explore the behaviour of functions. The 
 students initially made numerical explorations, from which they formulated conjec-
tures. Then, largely guided by a suggestion from their teacher, they substituted let-
ters for numbers, at which point the path to a proof became evident. 
 The way in which the role of the teacher is crucial, in all three studies, is 
described with reference to a model expressed in Fig.  5.4 . On the left of the dia-
gram, activities and tasks chosen by the teacher sit above and relate to mathematics 
as a general entity within human culture. On the right side of the diagram, student’s 
productions and discoveries from carrying out the tasks sit above and relate to 
the mathematical knowledge required by the school curriculum. The artefact 
(purpose-created tool) sits in the middle. Reading the picture clockwise in an arc 
from bottom left to bottom right neatly captures that teachers need to choose 
suitable tasks, students carry them out, and teachers help the students turn their 
discovered personal meanings into commonly understood mathematics. It is pointed 
out that as students discuss their use of artefacts, teachers get an insight into students’ 
thought-processes. 
 Part 2. In Part 2, we get to the core of the article’s discussion of proving as the 
mental process of transitioning between the exploratory phase of understanding a 
mathematical problem to the formal stage of writing down a deductive proof. The 
central claim is that this transition is assisted by tools such as Dynamic Geometry 
System (DGS) softwares and Computer Assisted Algebra (CAS) softwares, pro-
vided these tools are used within a careful educational design. The concept of 
abduction is central to the authors’ conceptual framework. The term is used many 
times before it is defi ned – a forward reference to the defi nition in about the tenth 
paragraph of Part 2 would have been useful to us. It is worth quoting the defi nition 
(due to Peirce) verbatim:
 The so-called syllogistic abduction (C.P.2.623), according to which a Case is drawn from a 
Rule and a Result. There is a well-known Peirce example about beans: 
 Rule: All beans from this bag are white 
 Result: These beans are white Case: 
 These beans are from this bag 
 Clearly this kind of reasoning is not deduction. The conclusion doesn’t necessarily 
hold. But it might hold. It acts as a potentially useful conjecture. Nor, as the authors 
note, is this kind of reasoning induction, which requires one case and many results 
from which to suppose a rule. 
 The authors’ naming and valuing of abduction sits within their broader recogni-
tion and valuing of the exploratory and conjecture-making aspects of mathematics 
1415 Experimental Approaches to Theoretical Thinking: Artefacts and Proofs
which can be hidden in fi nal-form deductive proofs. Their purpose is to show how 
appropriate abductive thinking arises in experimentation and leads to deductive 
proofs, when the process is appropriately supported. 
 The role of abductive reasoning in problem solving strikes these reviewers as a 
very useful thing to bring to educator’s conscious attention. One of us personally 
recalls observing an academic chastise a student for reasoning which the academic 
saw as incorrect use of deduction, but which we now see as correct use of abduction 
in the early part of attempting to fi nd a proof. 
 An example of 10th grade students faced with a problem about distances between 
houses and armed with a software called TI-Nspire is presented in detail in this sec-
tion. The empirical aspect of mathematical discovery is described in an analogy 
with a protocol for an experiment in the natural sciences. We note that this example 
could be usefully adapted to a non-computerised environment. A point which the 
authors make, specifi c to the use of the computer in this context, is that the software 
encourages/requires useful behaviour such as variable-naming; which can then 
assist students in internalising these fundamental mathematical practices as psycho-
logical tools. 
 A teaching/learning example regarding a problem of fi nding and proving an 
observation about quadrangles, presented to 11th and 12th grade students is given. 
The authors give a summary of the steps most students used to solve the problem, 
and then interpret the steps in terms of the production of an abduction followed by 
a proof. The authors write
 In producing a proof, (Phase 5) the students write a proof that exhibits a strong continuity 
with their discussion during their previous explorations; more precisely, they write it 
through linguistic eliminations and transformations of those aforementioned utterances. 
 This statement is in the spirit of a claim at the start of Part 2 that empirical behav-
iour using software appropriately in mathematics leads to abductive arguments 
which supports cognitive unity in the transition to proofs. 
 The next main idea in Part 2 after ‘abduction’ is that of ‘instrumentation’. The 
special kind of ‘dragging’ which has been referred to during discussions of DGS 
softwares is recognised as maintaining dragging (MD), where what is being main-
tained during the dragging is some kind of visible mathematical invariant. 
Furthermore the curve that is traced out during dragging is key to conjecture-forma-
tion and potentially proof. 
 The third main concept dealt with in Part 2 is that of ‘indirect proof’ and the dif-
fi culties that students often have with it. The authors usefully describe how soft-
ware-mediated abductive reasoning may help, which they support with two plausible 
arguments. First, the authors note that indirect proofs can be broken up into direct 
proofs of a related claim (they use the term ‘ground level’) together with a proof of 
the relationship between the two claims (they use the term ‘meta level’). Thus an 
argument for software-mediated reasoning says that use of software helps students 
keep track of the two levels of argument. 
 Second, the authors argue that abduction is useful to students partly because of 
what happens to formal (mathematical) claims when they are negated. The authors 
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state that in some sense the cognitive distance between the conjecture and the proof 
is decreased in the negation step. They give two examples. The fi rst is a study of a 
Year 9 student presented with a delightful problem about functions and their deriva-
tives and anti-derivatives. In this case, refutation of an argument by abduction turns 
out to coincide with refutation of an argument by deduction. The second example is 
of a study of two students from Years 9 and 10 in Hong Kong given a problem about 
cyclic quadrilaterals in a  Cabri environment. In this case, ‘dragging’ behaviour led 
the students to an argument which collapsed to a formal ‘reductio ad absurdum’. 
 To summarise one stream of thought from Part 2 relating to the practice of learn-
ing and teaching: (a) tool-use facilitates exploration, especially visual exploration; 
(b) exploration (in a well-designed context) leads to conjecture-making; (c) practi-
cal tool-use forces certain helpful behaviours such as variable-naming; (d) this 
‘instrumentation’ can lead to internalising tools psychologically; (e) for indirect 
proofs, the way negation works helps bridge the distance between kinds of reason-
ing used in conjecture-making and proof. 
 In the closing section of Part 2, the authors go beyond the claim that abduction 
supports proof and become more speculative. They quote Lopez-Real and Leung to 
claim that deduction and abduction are parallel processes in a pair of ‘parallel systems’, 
Formal Axiomatic Euclidean Geometry on the one hand, and Geometry realised in 
a Dynamic Geometry Environment (DGE) on the other hand, and that interaction 
between the two ways of knowing and storing information could be productive in 
ways not yet fully elucidated. It would be fascinating to see these ideas fl eshed out. 
 Part 3. Part 3 introduces ‘Activity Theory’, a general framework concerned with the 
know-how that relates to artefacts, and attempts to situate the discussions of Parts 1 
and 2 in this context, however as readers we found it diffi cult to gain insight from 
this formulation lacking as we do previous detailed knowledge of Activity Theory. 
The attempted translation between languages is scanty, although there are some 
illuminating examples, for instance an interesting use of ‘turtle geometry’ to explore 
hyperbolic geometry is presented in this section, where the turtle geometry is 
regarded as an artefact within Activity Theory. This part also expands upon the idea 
of instrumentation, linking ideas about concept-development, Gestalt perception 
and embodiment. There is much here which could be further developed; and which 
assuredly will be. 
 Conclusions. We fi rst highlight a notion which is implicit throughout the chapter, 
which is the valuing of the teaching of proof in schools. Proof is a central compo-
nent of mathematics however the valuing of the teaching of proof is not always 
taken for granted. For instance in the Australian context we know of instances of 
stark contrast, where the current state-based curricula does not emphasise proof (it 
is mentioned in the context of upper level advanced classes only), although we 
know of cases in which teacher-training does emphasise it. In short, we believe that 
there is often not enough teaching of proof in schools and that the chapter under 
review may help by providing a conceptual and practical bridge for students and 
their teachers between the activities of exploring mathematics and of creating and 
understanding proofs. 
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 We also highlight the authors’ own advisements about implementation in 
practice of the theory they have articulated. The authors emphasise that the role of 
the teacher is crucial both in lesson design and classroom interaction; as is neatly 
captured by Fig.  5.4 near the end of Part 1. They observe, for instance in their dis-
cussion of “maintaining dragging” in Part 2, that desired student understandings and 
behaviours often do not arise spontaneously. Further, they warn early in Part 1 
(quoting Schoenfeld) that counterproductive student behaviour can arise as unin-
tended by-products of teaching. At the end of Part 1 the authors give references to 
studies in which the kinds of  useful interventions that teachers repeatedly make are 
analysed. It is helpful to have the centrality of the mathematics teacher made so 
clear. The importance of design and interaction are emphasised in quotations such 
as “The teacher not only  selects suitable tasks to be solved through constructions 
and visual, numerical or symbolic explorations, but also  orchestrates the complex 
transition from practical actions to theoretic arguments”; and “The teacher, as an 
expert representative of mathematical culture,  participates in the classroom dis-
course to help it proceed towards sense-making in mathematics” (our emphasis). 
 In summary, this work repays the effort to read it. The historical perspective at 
the beginning brings the duality between empiricism and deductive reasoning use-
fully to mind. The examples, language and theory developed in Part 2 are likely to 
be clarifying and inspiring to both educators and theorists. The more speculative 
aspects at the end of Part 2 and in Part 3 call for further elucidation and development 
to which we look forward. 
 Part III 
 Historical and Educational 
Perspectives of Proof 
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 1  Introduction 
 If you ask a  mathematician “why?” the mathematician will give you a proof. But 
when you ask a historian “why?” the historian will tell you a story. I’m a historian, 
and the title of this article asks why: “Why proof?” So I want to tell a story, or rather 
a series of stories, that address some questions about proof in the history of mathe-
matics. These are: Why was logically based proof developed in the fi rst place? Why 
were new types of proofs developed? And fi nally, what happens when standards of 
proof change? 
 These questions are important because every time we teach proof, we recapitulate 
a little of its history in the classroom. Reviewing the history of a topic lets us “remem-
ber” what it was like  not to know about it. History, unlike logic or philosophy, shows 
what the effects of various ideas actually have been. In the classroom, if we can rec-
reate the motivation, we can recreate the effect. Furthermore, proof did not develop 
in either a cultural or intellectual vacuum; we can recreate some of its historical con-
text in the classroom. Finally, we can recreate the excitement that creating proof in 
mathematics historically has had. We need that excitement in the classroom too! 
 This essay traces the history of mathematical proof in the western tradition. It 
fi rst addresses the birth of logical proof in Greek geometry and why the Greeks 
moved beyond visualisation to purely logical proof. Next, I look at the use of 
visual demonstration in Western mathematics after the Greeks. I then address two 
characteristics of more modern mathematics, abstraction and symbolism, and 
their power. Then follows a discussion of how and why standards of proof change, 
in particular the role of ideas imported from philosophy. Finally, I discuss how 
proof in  mathematics interacts with the ‘real world.’ 
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 2  The Birth of Logical Proof in Greek Geometry 
 Demonstration at fi rst was visualisation, the response to the question, “Is that so? 
 Show me.” In fact, the root of the Greek word “theorem” is a verb meaning “to look 
at”. We see visual proofs in the mathematics of many cultures, including the Greek. 
Figure  6.1 , from Plato’s dialogue the  Meno , shows how to prove, by counting 
 triangles, that, given the square with area four in the lower-left-hand corner, the 
square with twice its area is the square on the diagonal (Fauvel and Gray  1987 , 
pp. 61–67; Plato  2004 , 81e–86c). 
 Even arithmetic uses visual proofs. Whether we use a tally system, Egyptian 
hieroglyphic numbers, an abacus, or add small numbers by counting on our fi ngers, 
the elementary truths of arithmetic are made visually apparent. The Greeks knew 
this too. There were visual proofs in Pythagorean number theory, where a dot repre-
sented a unit. For example, Fig.  6.2 presents the Pythagorean visual demonstration 
that the sum of the successive odd numbers is always a square. 
 Eventually, though, visual demonstration did not suffi ce for the Greeks. We know 
this because they made logical proof essential to their geometry. In the simplest 
sense, a logical proof deduces that something is a logical consequence of something 
else already believed to be true. Such proofs are necessary when what is being 
proved is not apparent. The Greeks felt that they needed to give an argument in such 
cases. But they did not limit proving to just a few statements; they built the entire 
subject so that it had a logical structure, assuming as its basis the smallest possible 
number of “already believed” results. 
 Scholars have suggested a wealth of historical explanations for why this  particular 
culture, that of the ancient Greeks, was the one to give geometry this kind of logical 
structure and why the Greeks thought that doing this was so signifi cant. 
 Fig. 6.1  The double square 
is the square on the diagonal 
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 First, they argue, the Greek achievement did not come out of nowhere. Greek 
culture was heir to two previous mathematical traditions, the Egyptian and the 
Babylonian, each of which included a wealth of results (Imhausen  2007 ; Robson 
 2007 ) . But these two traditions did not always agree. For instance, in fi nding the 
areas of circles, the Babylonians approximated the areas in ways equivalent to set-
ting what we now call  p fi rst as 3, and later as 3 1/8, 1 in modern decimal notation 
3.125 (Boyer and Merzbach  1989 , p. 44). The best Egyptian area computations are 
equivalent to a value for  p of 256/81, which is about 3.16 (Imhausen  2007 , p. 31). 
Both values cannot be correct; the Greeks must have noticed this and asked what the 
true value is. Perhaps they reasoned that the way to avoid having multiple answers 
to the same question is to make only those assumptions about which nobody could 
disagree, like “all right angles are equal,” and then deduce other things from those 
undoubtable assumptions to see how far they could get. As it turned out, they got 
pretty far. 2 
 Fig. 6.2  The sum of the successive odd numbers is always a square 
 1  Since the Babylonians used fractions with a base of 60, a practice which, incidentally, is the origin 
of our base-60 divisions of time into minutes and seconds, it would be more accurate to say that 
the area calculation given is equivalent to approximating  p as  3 + 7/60 + 30/60  2  . 
 2  None of the present discussion is meant to rule out the possibility that there were already steps 
towards forming axioms and logical proofs in Egyptian and Babylonian mathematics. No evidence 
of this is known to me at the present time, but scholarship on ancient mathematics continues, and 
one should keep an open mind. Even should such evidence be found, though, we would still need 
to explain why the Greeks chose to make logical proofs, using the smallest possible set of axioms, 
so central to their mathematics. 
 
150 J.V. Grabiner
 A second explanation for the origin of axiom-based logical proof in Greece 
comes from the nature of Greek science. The earliest Greek philosophers of 
nature tried to fi nd a single explanatory principle that could make sense out of the 
entire universe. Thales (c. 624 – c. 547 BCE), for instance, said that “everything is 
water.” Anaximenes (c. 585 – c. 528 BCE) said that “everything is air.” The 
Pythagoreans (Sixth century BCE) said that “all is number.” Democritus (c. 460– c. 
370 BCE) said that “all is made of atoms.” Empedocles (c. 492–432 BCE) said that 
everything is made up of the “four elements” fi re, water, earth, and air. So, as in 
nature, so in mathematics: The Greeks would strive to reduce everything to simple 
fi rst principles, to its “elements.” 
 Another possible explanation comes from mathematical practice. Greek mathe-
maticians wanted to solve problems (Knorr  1993 ) . One effective way to solve a 
problem is to reduce it to a simpler problem whose solution is already known. A 
classic example is the way Hippocrates of Chios (470–410 BCE) reduced the famous 
Greek problem of duplicating the cube to the problem of fi nding two mean propor-
tionals between two numbers, which in turn reduces to fi nding the intersection of a 
hyperbola and a parabola. How this reduction worked is clear if we look at the problem 
in modern notation. To fi nd  x such that  x  3   = 2a  3  , it suffi ces to fi nd  x and  y such that 
 a/x = x/y = y/2a. Equating the fi rst two terms yields the equation  x  2   = y , a parabola, 
and equating the fi rst and third yields the equation  xy = 2a  2  , a hyperbola. The inter-
section of these two curves gives the required value for  x (Katz  2009 , pp. 40–41). 
Hippocrates also reduced fi nding the area of some “lunes” – areas bounded by two 
circular arcs – to fi nding the area of triangles. 
 When they reduced hard problems to simpler problems, and then reduced these 
to yet simpler problems, the Greek mathematicians were creating sets of linked 
ideas, from the complex to the simple. Now, suppose we run such a set of linked 
ideas in reverse order. This gives us a proof structure: simple things on which rest 
more complex things on which rest yet more complex things. The simplest things at 
the beginning are the “elements,” and the intermediate ones are the fruitful, but not 
fi nal, results we now call “lemmas.” In fact, Hippocrates of Chios himself is cred-
ited with being the fi rst to distinguish between those theorems interesting just for 
themselves and those theorems which lead to something else. And this explanation 
of the origin of proof – running reductions backwards – is supported by the fact that 
it was Hippocrates of Chios who wrote the best logically structured  Elements of 
Geometry until Euclid wrote his own  Elements 150 years afterwards. Much later, 
Pappus of Alexandria (Fourth century CE) gave the classic description of the rela-
tionship between these two processes. He called working backwards to fi nd the 
simple things from which a problem can be solved “analysis,” and subsequently 
proving that the solution follows from those simple things “synthesis” (Fauvel and 
Gray  1987 , pp. 208–209). 
 A fourth, cultural explanation for logical proof in Greece is based on the nature 
of classical Greek society (Katz  2009 , pp. 33, 39–40, 43; Lloyd  1996 ) . In the sixth 
and fi fth centuries BCE, Greece was made up of small city-states run by their citizens. 
Especially in Athens, the give and take of argument between disputing parties, from 
the law courts to the public assemblies, required, and therefore helped advance, 
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logical skills. A good way to persuade people is to fi nd their premises and then 
construct one’s own argument by reasoning from their premises, and a good way to 
disprove other people’s views is to fi nd some logical consequence of their views that 
appears absurd. An ideal place to see these techniques illustrated in the Greek social 
context is in the dialogues of Plato. So the cultural emphasis on logical thinking 
would easily be incorporated into mathematics. 
 Finally, yet another explanation for “why logical proof in Greece?” comes from 
the infl uence that Greek philosophy had on mathematics. Greek philosophy was 
deeply argumentative. Contemporary thinkers disagreed; later thinkers began by 
trying to logically refute their predecessors. Zeno, for instance, presented his para-
doxical arguments not to prove that motion is impossible but to use logic to chal-
lenge others’ intuition and common-sense assumptions. The very fact that Plato 
presents his philosophy in dialogue form both illustrates and demonstrates that 
Greek philosophy was about logical argument as much as about conclusions. In this 
respect, Greek mathematics is like Greek philosophy, and not by accident. Greek 
philosophy was intimately linked to mathematics – not just for Plato, who made it 
the centre of his prescription for the education of the rulers of his ideal Republic, but 
also for his great rival and successor Aristotle. Aristotle wanted every science to 
start, like geometry, with explicitly stated elementary fi rst principles, and then to 
logically deduce the rest of the subject (Fauvel and Gray  1987 , pp. 93–94; Katz 
 2009 , p. 44; McKirahan  1992 ) . So Greek philosophy issued marching orders to 
mathematicians, and Euclid followed these orders. 
 All those factors worked together to promote the Greek invention of logical 
proof in mathematics. Now, though, let us focus on one particular type of proof: 
indirect proof, or proof by contradiction. The argument form, “If you accept that, 
why, then, you must also accept so-and-so,…but this contradicts such-and-such,” 
was part and parcel of the educated Greek’s weapons of refutation. But proof by 
contradiction is not merely destructive. It also allows us to rigorously test conjec-
tures that cannot be tested directly and, if they are true, to demonstrate them. Take, 
for example, two supremely important historical instances of this process from 
ancient Greek mathematics. 
 First, Euclid defi ned parallel lines as lines that never meet. But we can never 
show directly that two lines never meet. One can only propose that the two lines  do 
in fact meet and then prove that this leads to a contradiction. That exact move made 
Euclid’s theory of parallels possible (Euclid  1956 ,  e.g ., Book I, prop. 27). 
 For the second example, consider the nature of Ö2. There must be a square root 
of 2, because of the Pythagorean theorem for isosceles right triangles. One literally 
sees this in the diagram from Plato’s  Meno (Fig.  6.1 ). But is the square root of 2 the 
ratio of two whole numbers? Because there are infi nitely many rational numbers, 
one cannot prove the irrationality of the square root of 2 by squaring every possible 
rational number to see if the square equals 2. Furthermore, no picture of an isosce-
les right triangle, no matter how carefully drawn, can possibly distinguish a ratio-
nal length from an irrational length. However, if we assume that there is a rational 
number whose square is two, logic then leads us to a contradiction and so forces us 
to conclude that there can be no such rational number. The Pythagoreans thus 
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proved that Ö2 was irrational. By these means, the Greeks created a whole new 
set of  mathematical objects: magnitudes that they could prove were not rational 
numbers. 
 To sum up what the Greeks had now introduced into mathematics: Logic lets us 
reason about things that are beyond experience and intuition, about things that abso-
lutely cannot be observed. The Greek proofs by contradiction changed the way later 
mathematicians thought about the subject-matter of mathematics. 3 Mathematics 
now had come to include objects whose existence cannot be visualised and which 
cannot be physically realised. Mathematics had become the study of objects neither 
visible nor tangible, objects transcending material reality, objects visible only to the 
eye of the intellect. Logical proof created these new objects, and these develop-
ments reinforced the role of proof as the heart of Western mathematics. 
 Thus, many factors contributed to the central role played by proof in Greek math-
ematics: disagreement between older results, the desire to establish elementary fi rst 
principles, the logical structure produced when problems are solved by reduction to 
simpler problems, the role of argument in Greek society, the central importance of 
philosophical argument in Greek thought, and the major contributions to mathematics 
resulting from using proof by contradiction. For present purposes, one can use all of 
these ideas in the classroom to motivate the teaching of proof. 
 Once the Greeks had established this ideal of logical proof in mathematics, the 
ideal took on a life of its own. Even before Euclid, Aristotle was advocating the 
ideal of a science based on demonstration. Since mathematicians apparently had 
achieved truth by means of proof, practitioners of other areas of Western thought 
wanted to do the same. So thinkers, in theology, politics, philosophy, and science 
tried to imitate the mathematicians’ method. Here, I discuss three of many impor-
tant historical examples. 
 In 1675, the rationalist philosopher Baruch Spinoza wrote  Ethics Demonstrated 
in Geometrical Order (Spinoza  1953 ) . In that book, he fi rst defi ned his terms – terms 
like “God” and “eternity.” He then laid down axioms about things like existence and 
causality. On the basis of these defi nitions and axioms, he proved his philosophical 
conclusions. In particular, he gave an proof – an indirect proof – for the existence of 
God, demonstrating that “God, or substance consisting of infi nite attributes, each 
one of which expresses eternal and infi nite essence, necessarily exists” (Spinoza 
 1953 , Prop. XI). 
 Even more important in the seventeenth century, Isaac Newton wrote his great 
work the  Principia , not like a modern physics book but with the same defi nition-
axiom-theorem structure as Euclid’s  Elements . In fact, Newton called his famous 
three laws “ Axioms , or Laws of Motion” (Fauvel and Gray  1987 , pp. 389–390; 
 3  I have used the phrase ‘Greek proofs by contradiction’. In philosophy, proof by contradiction 
exists in cultures independent of the Greek, notably in China (Leslie  1964 ; Siu  2009 ) . But as far as 
I know, only the Greeks and their mathematical heirs used it within mathematics; Professor Siu 
 ( 2009 ) says that he does not know of an example from China before the coming of the Jesuits in 
the seventeenth century. 
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Newton  1995 , emphasis added). From these axioms, Newton deduced many 
 propositions, such as: If a body moves in an ellipse, the force directed towards a focus 
of the ellipse varies inversely as the square of the distance between the body and that 
focus (Newton  1995 , Book I, Proposition XI). Newton even deduced his law of gravity in 
the form of two theorems (Newton  1995 , Book III, Propositions VII and VIII). 
 Third, the American Declaration of Independence also pays homage to the 
Euclidean proof method. The principal author, Thomas Jefferson, was well versed 
in contemporary mathematics (Cohen  1995 ) . Jefferson began with postulates, say-
ing “We hold these truths to be self-evident”, including “that all men are created 
equal…” and, that if a government does not protect human rights, “it is the right of 
the people to alter or abolish it, and set up new government.” The Declaration then 
says that it will “prove” – Jefferson’s word – that King George’s government does 
not protect human rights. Once Jefferson has proved this to his satisfaction, the 
Declaration of Independence concludes: “We  therefore … publish and declare that 
these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be free and independent states” 
(Jefferson  1776 , emphasis added). Indeed, Jefferson could have ended his argu-
ment, as had Spinoza and Newton, with the geometer’s “QED.” 
 All these examples suggest how important it is for all of liberal education, not 
just for mathematics, that students understand logical proofs. I am not repeating the 
general and often quoted statement that “mathematics trains the mind to think.” I 
mean something more specifi c and more important. In the systems of secondary 
education in most countries, if mathematics teachers do not teach logic, logic doesn’t 
get taught. Now, just as in ancient Athens, citizens of democracies need to be able 
to reason, to tell good arguments from bad. In the words of the American cultural 
historian Jacques Barzun, “The ability to feel the force of an argument apart from 
the substance it deals with is the strongest possible weapon against prejudice” 
(Barzun  1945 , p. 121). The historical function of proof in geometry has been not 
just to prove theorems in geometry, though of course it did that, but also to exem-
plify and teach logical argument in every fi eld from philosophy to politics to reli-
gion. We should be proud to be the guardians of this tradition and to pass it on to our 
students. 
 3  Visual Demonstration Revisited 
 However, logical proof, deduction from self-evident fi rst principles, is not the only 
kind of proof in mathematics. The visual proof remains, and the visual frequently 
not only is more convincing psychologically but also is a means of further discov-
ery. So some successors of Greek geometry creatively linked visual arguments to 
logical proof. 
 Figure  6.3 presents a well-known visual argument, found in Babylonian, 
Chinese, and Indian mathematics (Dauben  2007 , pp. 222–226; Pfl oker  2007 , p. 392; 
Robson  2007 , pp. 102–110), that can convince the modern student of algebra that 
( a + b )  2   = a  2   + 2ab + b  2  . 
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 If the teacher is lucky, the student says, “Great! Now I understand, I see why it’s 
not  a  2   + b  2  but  a  2   + 2ab + b  2  .” So the ancient visualisation helps explain algebraic 
computation. 
 However, Euclid brought the Greek logical attitude to testing this “obvious” visual 
result. He logically proved it in Book II, Proposition IV of his  Elements of Geometry 
(Euclid  1956 , vol. I, pp. 379–380; Fauvel and Gray  1987 , pp. 118–119). His proof 
required seven different theorems from Book I of the  Elements : theorems about par-
allel lines and angles, about parallelograms, and about the construction of squares. 
 Later, mathematicians in the medieval Islamic world combined visual demon-
strations with the proof tradition from the Greeks and with computational traditions 
from the Eastern mathematical sources. This produced something new. For exam-
ple, take a famous problem from the ninth-century  Algebra of Muhammad ibn Musa 
al-Khwarizmi (Fauvel and Gray  1987 , pp. 228–231; Struik  1969 , pp. 58–60). 
 Al-Khwarizmi (and many later writers in the Islamic world) used the example 
which we would write  x  2   + 10 x = 39 . Al-Khwarizmi stated it as a computational 
problem to be solved: The root multiplied by itself, added to ten times the root, 
gives 39; but he could also represent the equation geometrically. (Figure  6.4 shows 
the equation and al-Khwarizmi’s geometric solution.) 
 There is no obvious way to solve the diagrammed problem in the original form 
“L-shaped thing equals a number.” However, it is easy to solve a problem with the 
form “a square equals a number.” So al-Khwarizmi added something to the L-shaped 
fi gure to turn it into a square; that is, he completed the square. He fi lled the ‘gap’ in 
the L with a square with sides of 5. 
 He now had a larger square with sides of  x + 5 . But adding the square, with area 
25, to the L-shaped left-hand side of the equation requires adding 25 to the right side 
of the equation as well. The right-hand side now becomes a square with area 64 
(39 + 25). The side of that square must be 8 (Ö64), so  x + 5 is 8 (he considered posi-
tive roots only); therefore  x is 3. 
 How did al-Khwarizmi and his successors know that their method worked correctly 
in general, not just for that easily checked example? They knew because the geometri-
cal representation of the method is guaranteed by Euclid’s theorem II, 4 (Euclid  1956 , 
vol. I, pp. 379–380). So al-Khwarizmi had both a discovery and a proof. 
 Fig. 6.3  (a+b) 2  = a 2  + 2ab + b 2 
visually 
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 This example and many more show that algebra in the Islamic world brought 
together the activities of numerical problem-solving and logically based proof (Katz 
 2009 , Chapter 9, Berggren  2007 ). This linkage was both fruitful and infl uential. In 
addition, this episode exemplifi es how different people, and different cultures, may 
prefer one way of thinking about mathematical proof over another. Synthesising 
such diverse perspectives on what constitutes a proof has, historically, helped drive 
mathematical progress. 
 4  Abstraction, Symbolism, and Their Power 
 Historic changes in the style of proof also took place in Europe in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. The ruling proof paradigm changed from the geometric to 
the algebraic. 
 This shift began when François Viète (Franciscus Vieta) fi rst introduced general 
symbolism in algebra in 1591 (Struik  1969 , pp. 74–81; Viète  1968 ) . Elementary 
school children learn that for every unequal pair of numbers like 9 and 7, not only 
does 9 + 7 = 16, so does 7 + 9. There are infi nitely many such pairs of numbers. But 
Vieta’s general symbolism lets us write down the infi nite number of such facts all at 
once:
  B C C B.+ = +    
 So Vieta, by inventing general algebraic symbolism, began the transformation of 
algebra from a set of ways to solve individual problems to the general study of 
mathematical structures. A century after Vieta, Isaac Newton summed up the power 
x2 + 10 x = 39
From the square, (x+5)2 = 64
x + 5 = 8
x = 3
 Fig. 6.4  How al-Khwarizmi completes the square 
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and generality of this symbolic revolution by calling algebra “a universal  arithmetic” 
(Newton  1967 , title of the work) Newton meant that we could prove many facts if 
we just took for granted the universal validity of those symbolic manipulations that 
obey the laws of ordinary arithmetic. 
 For example, there are many different ways to arrange the square, linear, and 
constant terms to make up a quadratic. We have seen how earlier algebraists solved 
equations like  x  2   + 10 x = 39. But solving equations with forms like  x  2   + 21 = 10x 
required a somewhat different approach (Berggren  1986 , p. 104). Since Vieta intro-
duced the idea of general notation for constants, though, there has been really only 
one quadratic equation. In notation slightly more modern than Vieta’s, 4 one can 
write  ax  2   + bx + c = 0 for  every quadratic equation and then derive the general solu-
tion for every quadratic by completing the square. 
 The notation has even more power than this. Saying that “3” solves al-Khwarizmi’s 
equation gives no information about how that answer was obtained. But here, as 
Vieta’s English follower William Oughtred put it in 1647, the operations we have 
performed to get the answer leave their footsteps behind (Fauvel and Gray  1987 , 
p. 302). We know exactly how the answer was obtained from the coeffi cients in the 
equation. Furthermore, we have proved that this is the answer, because the truth of 
the generalised rules of arithmetical manipulation demonstrates it. 
 Another historically important seventeenth-century example shows symbolism 
itself discovering and proving results. Following Vieta, in the 1630s René Descartes 
(Struik  1969 , pp. 89–93) and Thomas Harriott (Stedall  2003 ) , independently, proved 
many results in what we now call the elementary theory of equations. For instance, 
they would consider an equation with two roots,  a and  b . Since  x = a and  x = b , it 
follows that x − a = 0, x − b = 0, and therefore that ( x −  a )( x −  b )  = 0 . Multiplying this 
product out yields:
  ( )
2 0.x a b x ab- + + =
   
 By this means, Descartes and Harriott demonstrated the root-coeffi cient relations 
of every quadratic equation. This process shows that a quadratic can have no more 
than two roots and makes clear why this is so. It shows also that the constant term 
has to be the product of the roots, and that the coeffi cient of the linear term must be 
the sum of the roots with the sign changed. This same approach let Descartes and 
Harriott discover and demonstrate similar relations for polynomial equations of any 
degree. For instance, for the fi rst time, mathematicians knew for sure that an  nth 
degree equation can have no more than  n roots. 
 The power of symbolism and abstraction led to even greater progress. In 1799, 
Joseph-Louis Lagrange argued that the idea of algebra as universal arithmetic was 
 4  Vieta, and many mathematicians in the century following him, thought of expressions like  x  3  as 
volumes,  x  2  as areas, and  x as lines, and so they would not write an expression like  ax  2   + bx + c. 
Vieta also designated his unknowns by upper-case vowels and his constants by upper-case conso-
nants; the use of the lower-case letters  x and  y for the principal unknowns was introduced later by 
Descartes. But these details do not affect the main point here. 
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not suffi ciently general. Algebra, he said, is more than a universal arithmetic; it is 
the general study of systems of operations (Lagrange  1808 ; compare Fauvel and 
Gray  1987 , pp. 562–563). This further abstraction, the idea of studying systems of 
operations, helped lead Lagrange to study the permutations of the roots of alge-
braic equations, work that led eventually to the theory of groups as well as to the 
proof that there is no general solution in radicals of algebraic equations of degrees 
higher than four. 
 Furthermore, in the eighteenth century mathematicians turned away from the 
visual almost entirely, giving primacy to algebraic symbolism. One reason was that 
algebraists like Lagrange thought that algebra was “pure” and that intuition, espe-
cially geometric intuition, could lead us astray. This belief led mathematicians to 
seek algebraic proofs even for things that seemed obvious from pictures, like the 
intermediate-value theorem for continuous functions. In fact Lagrange was the fi rst 
to try to prove the intermediate-value theorem (Grabiner  1981 , p. 73). His proof was 
defi cient, but the theorem was proved successfully in the early nineteenth century 
by Cauchy and by Bolzano (modulo implicitly assuming the completeness of the 
real numbers; Bolzano  1817 ; Cauchy  1821 , pp. 378–380, reprinted by Fauvel and 
Gray  1987 , pp. 570–571, excerpted in Fauvel and Gray  1987 , pp. 564–566). So this 
new algebraic paradigm advanced many fi elds of mathematics considerably. 
 In the nineteenth century, mathematicians, beginning with William Rowan 
Hamilton, even deliberately investigated systems of operations that disobey the laws 
of arithmetic, non-commutative (Hankins  1976 ) or even non-associative systems. 
As a result, people began to think of mathematics itself in a new way, as the study 
of formal systems. 
 But there was a cost in the classroom – not in rigour, to be sure, but in losing 
geometric intuition. For example, there are algebraic proofs of the quadratic for-
mula in textbooks. But when I ask my university students if they have ever seen the 
geometric diagrams for completing the square, they say they have not. The history 
of al-Khwarizmi’s proof is therefore well worth recapturing. Seeing his proof helps 
understand why the quadratic formula, and its symbolic derivation, are true. 
 Furthermore, the cost of downgrading the visual was not only in the classroom. 
Over-reliance on formal reasoning could also lead mathematicians astray. Eighteenth-
century mathematicians often manipulated formal symbols and paid little attention 
to what they stood for. For instance, Euler happily used the root-coeffi cient relations 
between polynomials and their factors to go back and forth between infi nite series 
and infi nite products. Often this led to valid new results (Dunham  1999 ; Euler  1748 ; 
Katz  2009 , pp. 617–625), but sometimes it did not. 
 Consider this eighteenth-century example of algebra extended to the infi nite that 
raises more problems than it solves. Algebraic long division gives us this formal 
relationship:
  ( )
2 3 41 / 1 1 .r r r r r+ = - + - + -¼
   
 Is this equation true in general? How about if  r = 1 ? In 1703, Guido Grandi said 
that if  r = 1 , yielding ½ for the left-hand side, then the infi nite sum on the right-hand 
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side was also ½ (Boyer and Merzbach  1989 , p. 487–8). Leibniz agreed with him. It 
took until 1821 to rein in such excesses, when Augustin-Louis Cauchy, who both 
introduced and proved the standard tests for convergence of series, warned against 
the common assumption that algebra was completely general. “Most algebraic for-
mulas,” Cauchy wrote, “hold true only under certain conditions, and for certain 
values of the quantities they contain” (Cauchy  1821 , p. iii), and that quotation from 
Cauchy is a good lead-in to our next topic: changing standards of proof. 
 5  When Standards of Proof Change 
 Not just styles of proof, but standards of proof, change. For example, consider the 
history of the calculus. In the late seventeenth century, Newton and Leibniz 
independently invented the algorithms and basic concepts of the calculus. The problem-
solving power of this new subject was tremendous, and the calculus was applied to 
Newtonian physics with amazing success. Eighteenth-century mathematicians 
therefore did not worry too much about the logical basis of the calculus. The calculus 
was advanced by means of plausible arguments and heuristic derivations without 
what modern mathematicians would consider adequate justifi cation. There was, in 
particular, a great deal of questionable reasoning about infi nites and infi nitesi-
mals, like arguing that a curve is made up of infi nitely many infi nitesimal straight 
lines. And Newtonians used the idea of velocity, which some eighteenth-century 
critics said was part of physics, to justify mathematical conclusions about deriva-
tives and integrals. 
 People noticed these logical defects. In 1734, George Berkeley, Bishop of 
Cloyne, attacked the logical rigour of eighteenth-century calculus. (Berkeley  1951 ; 
Fauvel and Gray  1987 , pp. 556–558; Struik  1969 , pp. 333–338). Berkeley had 
theological motives for attacking eighteenth-century science, but that didn’t make 
his arguments wrong. Berkeley said that all his contemporaries’ computations of 
what we now call “derivatives” were logically inconsistent. For example, consider 
fi nding the instantaneous rate of change of  x  2  . A typical solution began: Let  x 
become  x + h . Then the ratio of the differences of  x  2  and  x is [( x + h )  2   − x  2  ]  / h. 
After multiplying this out and simplifying it, the ratio becomes  2x + h. Then, the 
practitioners of the calculus said, as  h vanishes, this expression becomes  2x , and 
that  equals the instantaneous rate of change. 
 Berkeley’s criticism of such arguments pointed out that either  h is zero or it is 
not. If  h were zero, the top and bottom of the original ratio would both be zero, so 
there would be no ratio to set up. So  h cannot be zero. But if  h is not zero, what justi-
fi es fi nally discarding it? Even good students in modern calculus courses have trou-
ble refuting this attack. 
 Several of Berkeley’s mathematical contemporaries were disturbed by his argu-
ments. Some of them tried to repair the foundations of the calculus. For instance, 
Colin Maclaurin used indirect proofs, based on inequalities between constant and 
varying velocities. (Grabiner  1997 ; Maclaurin  1742 ; Sageng  2005 ) . Lagrange used 
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symbolic reasoning about infi nite series (Grabiner  1990 ; Lagrange  1797 ) . However, 
these attempted rigorisations suffered from their own logical problems, and, unsat-
isfactorily, they did not really embody the intuitions that underlie the calculus. 
 This history demonstrates how diffi cult the rigorisation of the calculus was: too 
hard even for Newton, Maclaurin, Leibniz, and Lagrange. The eventual rigorisation 
of analysis in the nineteenth century came about by using delta-epsilon defi nitions 
and proofs. It began with Cauchy 150 years after the invention of the calculus, and 
was only concluded, later yet, by Weierstrass and his school in Berlin in the 1860s 
and beyond (Katz  2009 , pp. 766–7). That it took over a century and a half is a good 
sign that the rigorous basis for the calculus is hard. 
 This diffi culty deserves closer examination. What Cauchy and Weierstrass did 
to the limit concept was counterintuitive. In a common example of the intuitive idea 
of limit, the circle was said to be the limit of the inscribed regular polygons 
(d’Alembert and de la Chapelle  1789 ) . One can see that, and that the polygons can 
be drawn as close as one likes to the circle. The intuition is that one eventually 
reaches the limit, so polygonal approximations actually give the area of the circle. 
More precisely: if a variable approaches a fi xed value so that it eventually differs 
from that fi xed value by less than any given quantity, the variable and that fi xed 
value become, in Newton’s words, “ultimately equal” (Newton  1995 , Book I, Section 
I, Lemma I; Fauvel and Gray  1987 , p. 391). Similarly, the slope of the secant ulti-
mately becomes equal to the slope of the tangent. For Newton, the calculus produces 
precise, exact results, for example that the rate of change of  x  2  is equal to  2x . 
 But the nineteenth-century delta-epsilon defi nition of limit changed the meaning 
of “equal” when dealing with limits. Thus, logically, when one says that a fi xed 
value is equal to the limit of the value of a variable, one is describing an infi nite set 
of  inequalities . That is, given every possible positive number epsilon, one can fi nd 
a corresponding number delta such that if the absolute value of  h is less than delta, 
the absolute value of the difference between, say, the ratio of the fi nite differences 
and the derivative is less than epsilon. That is what it means to say that something is 
equal to the limit of some process. That infi nite set of inequalities – given any epsilon, 
one can fi nd the appropriate delta – is suffi cient to prove theorems about the value 
of limits. So now mathematicians can construct rigorous proofs about the concepts 
of the calculus. But to support rigorous proofs, the new defi nition has reinterpreted 
the intuitive idea of limit to defi ne precise equality in terms of inequalities. That 
reinterpretation is part of what made rigorisation hard and makes the calculus a 
much deeper subject than it sometimes appears. 
 In fact, Berkeley’s logical criticism that a secant can never become a tangent, that 
there is always a difference, never got an intuitive answer. “You can get as close as 
you like, and that’s all you need for proofs,” may be true, but it is not wholly satisfying. 
Such diffi culties, which not only troubled Maclaurin and Lagrange but which trouble 
our students, are profound and have no simple answer. 
 I want to draw three more insights from this episode in the history of the calculus. 
First, there have been times in history when demanding proof, rather than plausibility 
arguments, was premature. After all, the great progress of the calculus in the 
eighteenth century did not require the full delta-epsilon machinery to justify the true 
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results and to rule out the false ones. Things other than rigorous proof can keep 
mathematics honest. In the eighteenth century, intuition, numerical checking, and 
successful applications to the natural world kept mathematics honest. There are 
times, the eighteenth century being one of them, when settling for less than com-
plete rigour may be the correct way. Another such time may be in introductory 
calculus courses. 
 Second, the fi rst incentive for the new rigour was not, as one might think, the 
correction of errors; instead, it was the need to teach (Grabiner  1981 , p. 25). For 
instance, Lagrange’s foundations of calculus were delivered in 1797 as a series of 
lectures at the  Ecole polytechnique in Paris, and Lagrange said that he had fi rst 
thought about the foundations of the calculus when lecturing at the military school 
in Turin (Lagrange  1759 ) . Cauchy’s “foundations” were part of his great  Cours 
d’analyse (Cauchy  1821 ) at the  Ecole polytechnique and of his subsequent lectures 
there on the calculus (Cauchy  1823 ) . Weierstrass’s work on foundations of analysis 
came from his lectures at Berlin (Birkhoff  1973 , pp. 71–92; Katz  2009 , pp. 786–787). 
Dedekind said that he began thinking about the nature of the natural numbers as a 
result of lecturing in Zurich in 1858 (Dedekind  1963 , p. 1; Fauvel and Gray  1987 , 
p. 573). The need to teach fi rst became urgent at the end of the eighteenth century, 
because, earlier in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mathematicians often 
had been attached to royal courts or on the payroll of noblemen. But starting with 
the  Ecole polytechnique , founded in the wake of the French Revolution, profes-
sional mathematicians by and large became teachers. And the need to teach a 
class – to present a subject systematically to people not already working with the 
concepts – focused mathematicians’ attention on the nature of the basic concepts 
and their most essential properties. It still does. 
 Third, although they were long not really needed for the progress of the calculus, 
eventually delta-epsilon proofs became absolutely crucial. There comes a point, 
even in the applications of the calculus, where failure to make the key distinctions, 
to have unexceptionable defi nitions, does produce mistakes. For instance, in the 
nineteenth century, Cauchy found distinct functions that had the same Taylor series 
expansions (Cauchy  1823 , pp. 230). Abel gave counterexamples to Cauchy’s 
supposed theorem that an infi nite series of continuous functions is itself continuous 
(Birkhoff  1973 , p. 70). Riemann showed that a function need not be continuous in 
order to have a defi nite integral (Birkhoff  1973 , pp. 16–23). Bolzano and others 
found functions that are everywhere continuous and nowhere differentiable (Boyer 
 1959 , p. 282). 
 The distinctions made as a result of these discoveries – for example, the distinc-
tion between pointwise and uniform convergence – gave rise, as had the Greek dis-
covery of irrationals, to a whole new set of mathematical objects, which lie even 
farther beyond intuition than do the concepts of the calculus. For example, Cantor’s 
theory of the infi nite arose out of trying to specify the structure of the sets of real 
numbers on which Fourier series converge (Dauben  1978 , Chapter 2). Cantor’s 
problem could not even have been formulated in eighteenth-century mathematical 
language, but it produced the whole theory of transfi nite numbers. There are times 
when informal arguments may suffi ce, but there are also times when stronger proofs 
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are absolutely necessary for any further progress in a subject. This holds true in the 
classroom as well as in the history of mathematics; it is an important pedagogical 
task to appreciate the difference. 
 6  How Ideas from Philosophy Shape Proofs 
 I return now to the history of proof to investigate what factors outside of  mathematics 
have driven changes in proof. I would argue that philosophy has played a causal role 
in the evolution of proofs. The most important philosophical principle involved is 
what Leibniz called “the principle of suffi cient reason”: “Nothing happens unless 
there is a reason why it happens that way and not otherwise” (Russell  1937 , p. 31). 
This has also been called the “principle of symmetry” and the “principle of indiffer-
ence.” Only by its use can one prove that a lever with equal weights at equal dis-
tances from the fulcrum must balance, or justify the fact that a geometric proof 
works equally well with a mirror image of its original diagram. This principle also 
operates in elementary probability theory, my fi rst example. 
 In elementary probability theory, the probability of an event  E is defi ned as the ratio 
 P ( E )  = n/N, where  n is the number of equally likely outcomes that make up the event  E 
and  N is the total number of equally likely outcomes. For instance, this defi nition tells us 
that the probability of getting an even number when we throw a single fair die is  3/6 . 
 But we have defi ned probability by using the term “equally likely outcomes,” 
which can only mean “outcomes with the same probability.” That would apparently 
make the defi nition of probability circular. 
 In fact, though, the notion of “equally probable” is simpler than that of probabil-
ity in general, because of the philosophical principle of indifference. When speak-
ing of a fair die, a seventeenth-century probability theorist was assuming that every 
one of the six sides is symmetrically placed and otherwise identical. In that case, 
there is no reason that the die should come up one way rather than another; each of 
the six possible outcomes is equally probable, equally likely. So Pascal and Fermat 
were able to invent probability theory in the 1650s (Katz  2009 , pp. 490–495). Given 
the defi nition of probability in terms of equally likely outcomes, they could use 
simple combinatorics to prove all the basic properties of probability. 
 Being able to prove things about probabilities, historically, was no minor matter. 
Aristotle had said it couldn’t be done. More precisely, he said, “There is no knowl-
edge by demonstration of chance conjunctions; for chance conjunctions exist nei-
ther by necessity or as general connections” (Aristotle  1994 , I.30.87b19); so a 
theory of probability could not meet the criteria of generality and necessity he had 
laid down for mathematical proofs. 
 What Aristotle said sounds compelling. It is one reason that it took 2,000 years 
after Aristotle before Pascal and Fermat invented probability theory. The explicit 
recognition of the philosophical principle of indifference in the seventeenth century 
was necessary for proofs about probability to meet Aristotle’s criteria – really, the 
criteria for all mathematical proofs – of generality and necessity. 
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 My second example concerns eighteenth-century ideas about space. The  principle 
of indifference justifi ed the eighteenth-century view that ‘real’ space had to be the 
same in all directions, and the principle of symmetry justifi ed the view that it had to 
be fl at. Similarly, real space had to be infi nite because there would be no reason for 
space to stop at any given point (Grabiner  2009 , pp. 6–7; Koyré  1957 ) . Such explicit 
philosophical arguments helped shape the eighteenth-century consensus that space 
not only is, but must necessarily be, Euclidean. 
 Thus, the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry had to overcome powerful 
philosophical forces embedded in eighteenth-century thinking about space by phys-
icists, philosophers, and geometers. Nevertheless, the discovery occurred, and did 
not even require imaginative or crazy people, hostile to mathematics, speculating 
about alternative realities. It was another triumph of human reason and logic over 
intuition and experience. Like the discovery of irrational numbers, the invention of 
non-Euclidean geometry came from indirect proof. 
 Non-Euclidean geometry ultimately grew out of attempts to prove Euclid’s Fifth 
Postulate, the so-called parallel postulate. Such proofs were undertaken because the 
postulate, as stated by Euclid, 5 seemed considerably less self-evident than his 
others. From antiquity onwards, people felt that it ought to be a theorem rather than 
an assumption; so many eminent mathematicians tried to prove Euclid’s fi fth postu-
late from his others. 
 However, in the eighteenth century, mathematicians tried something new. People 
like Gerolamo Saccheri, Johann Heinrich Lambert, and Lagrange all tried to prove 
the fi fth postulate indirectly; that is, they assumed it to be false, and deduced what 
appeared to be absurd consequences from that assumption. In fact, they were prov-
ing theorems in an alternative geometry, but what they thought was that some of the 
conclusions were contradictory or absurd. The ‘absurdity’ of many of the logical 
implications of denying Euclid’s Fifth Postulate – for instance, parallel lines are not 
everywhere equidistant, a quadrilateral with three right angles need not have a fourth 
right angle, parallels are not unique – stems from their contradicting our deep intui-
tive sense of symmetry (Grabiner  2009 , pp. 6–14). But in the nineteenth century, 
Gauss, Bolyai, and Lobachevsky, each independently, realised that these conclu-
sions were not absurd at all, but were perfectly valid theorems in an alternative 
geometry (Gray  1989 , Chapter 10; for excerpts from many of the original sources, 
see Fauvel and Gray  1987 , Chapter 16). 
 These innovators described this alternative geometry in different terms. 
Lobachevsky, by analogy with imaginary numbers, called the subject “imaginary 
geometry” (Gray  1989 , p. 118). Bolyai more theologically called it “a new world 
created out of nothing” (Gray  1989 , p. 107). But Gauss, acknowledging the logical 
move that made this new subject possible, called it non-Euclidean geometry (Letter 
to Schumacher, 1831, quoted by Bonola  1955 , p. 67). 
 5  ‘If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two 
right angles, then the two straight lines, if produced indefi nitely, meet on that side where the angles 
are less than two right angles’ (Euclid  1956 , Postulate 5, p. 155; Fauvel and Gray  1987 , p. 101). 
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 Geometry needed its historical commitment to logical proof for mathematicians 
to be able to overcome their intuitive and psychological and philosophical commit-
ment to Euclidean symmetry. Again, in order to understand the properties of the 
non-visible, the non-intuitive, or the counterintuitive, mathematicians need logic; 
we need proof. Indeed, non-Euclidean geometry is the ultimate triumph of the 
Euclidean method of proof. 
 Learning that there is such a thing as non-Euclidean geometry, an alternative 
system just as internally consistent as Euclid’s geometry, is a great way to enable 
students to learn easily what nineteenth-century philosophers laboured to conclude: 
that the essence of mathematics (as opposed to physics) is its freedom – a freedom 
to choose any consistent set of axioms that meets our sense of what is important, 
beautiful, and fruitful, as long as we get the logic right. And then, as eventually hap-
pened in the case of non-Euclidean geometry and general relativity, such a freely 
chosen system can apply to the real world after all (Gray  1989 , Chapter 20). 
 7  How Proof in Mathematics Interacts with the Real World 
 As to the ‘real world’: Many philosophers have addressed the relationship between 
proof in mathematics and our understanding of the world of nature and society. 
Aristotle and Spinoza, for instance, argued that the relationship between premises 
and conclusions is like the relationship between cause and effect. The “if” part 
explains the “then” part. What makes the base angles equal? The fact that it’s an 
isosceles triangle. 
 Figure  6.5 presents a more sophisticated geometric example: the parallel lines 
marking parking spaces. 
 Fig. 6.5  What causes these lines to be parallel? 
 
164 J.V. Grabiner
 How do the painters make the lines between the parking spaces parallel? Not by 
extending the lines for a mile or so to make sure they do not intersect. They have a 
device that paints the same angle (to the curb) over and over again. They are using 
a theorem in Euclid (Euclid  1956 , Book I, Proposition 28): If two lines are cut by a 
third so that the corresponding angles formed are equal, then the two lines are paral-
lel. Hence for the painters of parking spaces, making the corresponding angles equal 
causes the lines to be parallel. Premises are to conclusions as causes are to effects. 
 Thus logical proofs escape from the hermetically sealed world of pure thought 
into the real world. The logical structure of mathematics, imported into the natural 
and social sciences, produces explanations in all fi elds. A law or observation is 
explained by being deduced from an accepted general principle. Reasoning in sci-
entifi c fi elds, from antiquity to the nineteenth century, has historically followed the 
Euclidean/Aristotelian model. (Hence, statistical mechanics and, later, quantum 
mechanics challenged the prevailing philosophies of science, because their “expla-
nations” were not causal.) 
 8  Conclusion 
 My colleagues at this study conference (ICMI-19) have catalogued a number of 
functions for proof in the classroom: explanation, verifi cation, discovery, systemati-
sation, and intellectual challenge. All these functions are exemplifi ed in the historical 
record discussed above. 
 To start with, proofs provide explanations by convincing us that various results 
make sense, for example, the visual demonstration of the value of the algebraic 
product ( a + b )  2  . Proofs also perform the act of verifi cation when they help us dis-
tinguish between the true and the merely plausible. For instance, only a proof can 
defi nitively tell us whether Ö2 or  p are rational or irrational. Proofs accomplish dis-
covery where, for example, algebraic symbolism shows that an  nth degree equation 
can have no more than  n roots. As for proofs creating systematisation, one good 
example is the way Cauchy’s delta-epsilon foundation of analysis determined which 
arguments about infi nite series and limits are true and which are not. The historical 
record, of course, provides many more examples. 
 Finally, intellectual challenges abound in proofs. We learn from mathematical 
proof how to reason logically, and then we can apply the methods of logical demon-
stration to other subjects, as the examples of Newton, Spinoza, and Jefferson make 
clear. We learn to see the limitations of the mathematical models used in other sub-
jects, as when we realise that physical space need not be Euclidean. We learn that 
we can study and understand things that are beyond intuition and experience, rang-
ing from irrational numbers to infi nite sets. We should learn also not always to rank 
perfect logic above imperfect but real progress; Berkeley may have been logically 
correct, but the practitioners of calculus still had the last laugh. 
 I chose the examples of proof in this paper because of their historical importance. 
What happens historically must of course be psychologically possible, but what 
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happens historically is not necessarily psychologically or pedagogically optimal. 
Nevertheless, when what happens historically does coincide with what educational 
research says works best in the classroom, it means something. It does not mean that 
we should simply replicate the history in the classroom. But it does mean that the 
history of mathematics is a source of instructive examples and of inspiration, wor-
thy of study. 6 
 This paper has also illustrated another pair of generalisations: First, proof takes 
place always in historical, philosophical, cultural and social context. Second, proofs 
require ideas, not just going through the motions. Recapturing the ideas, the context, 
and the effects can help us, as well as help our students, recapture the original 
excitement. History, then, not only answers the question, “Why do we have proof?” 
History also helps us do a better job of teaching proof and proving. 
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 1  Conceptualisations of Proof 
 1.1  Conceptions by Mathematicians 
 The education of professional mathematicians very successfully transmits a 
practically precise conception of proof. Mathematically educated persons who spe-
cialise in and know a certain domain of mathematics will generally agree that a 
given piece of mathematical text is an adequate proof of a given statement. 
Nevertheless, no explicit general defi nition of a proof is shared by the entire 
mathematical community. Consequently, in attempting such a conceptualisation it 
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is wise to resort fi rst to mathematical logic for a defi nition of proof and to look 
afterwards at how working mathematicians comment on such a defi nition. 
 According to Rav  ( 1999 , p. 11), in a formalised theory  T a linear derivation is a 
fi nite sequence of formulas in the language of  T , each member of which is a logical 
axiom, or an axiom of  T , or the result of applying one of the fi nitely many explicitly 
stated rules of inference to previous formulas in the sequence. A tree derivation can 
be similarly defi ned. A formula of  T is said to be derivable if it is the end-formula 
of a linear or tree derivation. 
 Obviously, the structure characterised in this formal defi nition echoes the axiom-
atic method of Euclid’s  Elements (c. 300 B.C.). Hence, we can consider the notion 
of proof as some combination of the axiomatic method and formalism, the latter 
called ‘rigour’ since the time of Cauchy. 
 That defi nition may be considered as a ‘projection’ of the real practice of math-
ematical proof onto the skeleton of formal logic. A projection inherits some properties 
of the original, but is as a rule, poorer. Consequently, Rav distinguishes the formal 
idea of proof from that of a ‘conceptual proof’, by which he means an informal 
proof “of customary mathematical discourse, having an irreducible semantic content” 
(Rav  1999 , p. 11; see also Hanna and Barbeau  2009 , p. 86). As a rule, working 
mathematicians insist on the informal and semantic components of proof. As Rav 
stresses, beyond establishing the truth of a statement, proof contributes to getting 
new mathematical insights and to establishing new contextual links and new 
methods for solving problems. (Functions of proof beyond that of verifi cation are 
also discussed by Bell  ( 1976 ) , de Villiers  ( 1990 ) , and many others.) 
 Working mathematicians also stress the  social process of checking the validity of 
a proof. As Manin put it: “A proof only becomes a proof after the social act of 
‘accepting it as a proof’. This is true for mathematics as it is for physics, linguistics, 
and biology” (Manin  1977 , p. 48). By studying the comments of working mathema-
ticians Hanna came to the conclusion that the public process of accepting a proof 
not only involves a check of deductive validity, but is also determined by factors like 
‘fi t to the existing knowledge’, ‘signifi cance of the theorem’, the ‘reputation of the 
author’ and ‘existence of a convincing argument’ (Hanna  1983 , p. 70; see also 
Neubrand  1989 ) . Bell  ( 1976 ) also stressed the essentially public character of proof. 
 All in all, formal defi nitions of proof cover the meaning of the notion only incom-
pletely, whereas mathematicians are convinced that, in practice, they know precisely 
what a proof is. This situation is diffi cult to handle in the teaching of mathematics 
at schools, since there exist no easy explanations of what proof and proving are that 
teachers could provide to their pupils. Proof is not a “stand-alone concept”, as 
Balacheff nicely puts it  ( 2009 , p. 118), and is aligned to the concept of a “theory” 
(see also Jahnke  2009b , p. 30). 
 1.2  Conceptions by Mathematics Educators 
 Genuinely  didactical conceptions of proof are determined by two clearly distin-
guishable sets of motives. One line of thought tries to devise genetic ideas of proof. 
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These ideas are pedagogically motivated in that they try to devise a learning path 
from a cognitive state in which an individual learner is able to construct argumenta-
tions with some deductive components to a state in which the learner manages to 
understand and develop mathematical proofs in their proper sense. The other line of 
thought builds conceptions of proof with the intention of doing empirical research. 
Both lines of thought defi ne categories that allow one to classify individuals’ 
argumentative behaviours and strategies observed in classrooms or in interview 
situations. In both, it is essential to distinguish between arguments which are not yet 
proofs from mathematical proofs proper. No wonder different researchers come to 
different conclusions about the demarcation between the two modes of reasoning. 
Balacheff  ( 1988 ) and Duval  ( 1991 ) , for example, draw a sharp line of demarcation, 
whereas other authors stress the continuity between argumentation and proof – thereby 
embedding proof in a general theory of argumentation. In mathematics education, 
in recent years it has become customary to use the term ‘argumentation’ for reasoning 
which is ‘not yet’ proof and the term ‘proof’ for mathematical proof proper. 
 1.2.1  Genetic Ideas of Proof 
 Genetic conceptions distinguish between different stages in the development of 
proof essentially along three lines. First, the  type of warrant for a general statement 
is at stake. Pupils might infer from some special cases a general rule or statement. 
In such cases problems of proof and generalisation are intermingled. Generalisation 
is an important scientifi c activity but, of course, different from proof. Consequently, 
it is an important step in these pupils’ cognitive development to understand that a 
general statement can only be derived from other general statements. Second, if 
pupils argue on the level of general statements the  type of principle they refer to 
differs according to their proximity to established mathematical principles and 
norms. For example, in comparing the lengths of different paths between two points, 
pupils might apply a physical argument like the stretching of an elastic band as a 
warrant. Whether this is accepted as a valid argument is, in principle, a matter of 
classroom convention. Nevertheless, some authors would not classify this as a math-
ematical proof, because the principle does not belong to the accepted principles of 
mathematics proper. Third, the  mode of representing an argument might also be a 
distinguishing feature between different stages in the acquisition of proof. Though, 
in principle, it is extrinsic to the very heart of proof whether it is displayed in verbal 
or symbolic form, growth in the ability to handle the symbolic language of mathe-
matics is an indispensable condition for growth of a learner’s ability to understand 
and develop mathematical proofs; the complexity of most mathematical relations is 
such that they can hardly be expressed without recourse to symbolic representation. 
 A famous paper by van Dormolen  ( 1977 ) exemplifi es genetic conceptions of 
proof. In regard to different proof situations, van Dormolen gives possible solutions 
which refl ect different stages in the development of argumentative skills. One task 
asks for a proof of the statement that the diagonals in an isosceles trapezium are 
equal (Fig.  7.1 ). A beginning pupil might react by measuring the diagonals and 
fi nding them equal. On a second level, the pupil might mentally cut out the trapezium, 
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turn it about and put it back into its hole, with the result that each diagonal is now in 
the position of the other. On a third level, a pupil might formally argue from the 
symmetry of the fi gure and apply a refl ection, so that one diagonal is mapped on the 
other. 
 Van Dormolen considers these three stages in the framework of van Hiele’s the-
ory of levels of thinking. On a fi rst level the student is bound to special objects. On 
a second level the student can think about properties of classes of objects, and on the 
third level the student is able to logically organise an argument. 
 As a further example of such a pedagogically motivated genetic conception, 
Kirsch  ( 1979 ) distinguished between ‘pre-mathematical’ and ‘mathematical’ proofs, 
referring to the earlier paper  ( Semadeni n.d. ) . Later, Kirsch changed his terminol-
ogy and spoke about ‘pre-formal’ versus ‘formal’ proofs (Blum and Kirsch  1991 ) . 
 1.2.2  Conceptions from Empirical Research 
 In discussing conceptions of proof motivated by empirical research, Balacheff 
 ( 1988 ) states explicitly that his view rests on an experimental approach and that he 
is interested in studying pupils’ practices. For this purpose, he distinguishes between 
‘pragmatic’ and ‘conceptual’ proofs. Pragmatic proofs have recourse to real actions, 
whereas conceptual proofs deal with properties and the relations between them and, 
consequently, do not involve actions. However, there can and should be bridges 
between the two types, insofar as pragmatic proofs might have a generic quality and 
be a step towards conceptual proofs. Though Balacheff’s primary interest lies in the 
classifi cation of pupils’ practices, these distinctions interfere with genetic ideas, 
since pragmatic proofs operate on a lower, earlier level than conceptual proofs. 
Balacheff explicitly says that his categories “form a hierarchy … Where a particular 
type of proof falls in this hierarchy depends on how much the demands of generality 
 Fig. 7.1  Van Dormolen’s 
trapezium problem 
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and the conceptualisation of knowledge are involved,” (Balacheff  1988 , p. 218). It 
is also plausible to see in the distinction between pragmatic and conceptual proofs 
an infl uence of Piaget’s cognitive psychology which is based on the idea that 
thoughts are preceded by actions. 
 Balacheff has further refi ned the distinction between pragmatic and conceptual 
proofs into sub-categories. Pragmatic proofs split into ‘naïve empiricism’ and 
‘crucial experiment’: ‘Naïve empiricism’ refers to asserting the truth of a result by 
verifying special cases. ‘Crucial experiment’ means that a pupil considers a special 
example and argues that the proposition in question must be true if it is true for this 
(extreme) example. Argumentative behaviour of this kind shows some attention to 
the problem of a statement’s generality, but is still bound to the special case. 
 The ‘generic example’, Balacheff’s fi rst sub-category of a conceptual proof, is 
different. The generic example makes the reasons for the truth of an assertion 
explicit by operations or transformations on an object that is a characteristic repre-
sentative of its class. The difference from the ‘crucial experiment’ is subtle but 
decisive. The fi nal category, ‘thought experiment’, invokes internalised actions and 
is detached from particular representations. If we understand Balacheff, this level 
still falls short of a professional approach to proof but represents the best students 
can attain in their school lives. 
 Harel and Sowder  ( 1998 ) have proposed another infl uential system of categories. 
They give priority to the function of proof as a  convincing argument and derive from 
this idea categories for classifying individuals’ argumentative behaviours. Their 
starting point is a pedagogical motive. “The goal is to help students refi ne their own 
conception of what constitutes justifi cation in mathematics: from a conception that 
is largely dominated by surface perceptions, symbol manipulation, and proof ritu-
als, to a conception that is based on intuition, internal conviction, and necessity” 
 ( 1998 , p. 237). Consequently, their categories refl ect students’ ideas about what a 
convincing argument might be. These categories they call ‘proof schemes’: 
Individuals’ ways of thinking associated with the proving act and consisting of 
“what constitutes ascertaining and persuading for that person”  ( 1998 , p. 244). 
 Harel and Sowder’s  ( 1998 ) whole system of categories rests on a number of 
empirical studies and splits into three large domains: ‘External conviction proof 
schemes’, ‘Empirical proof schemes’ and ‘Analytical proof schemes’. In the domain 
of ‘External conviction proof schemes’ the authors distinguish between 
‘Authoritarian’, ‘Ritual’ and ‘Symbolic’ proof schemes. Authoritarian means that 
students refer to an authority – be it their teacher, a book or whatever – to convince 
themselves of the truth of a statement. Ritual and Symbolic proof schemes refl ect 
the fact that many students come to the conclusion that ritual and form constitute 
mathematical justifi cation. The Symbolic schemes describe a behaviour of approach-
ing a solution without fi rst comprehending the meaning of the symbols involved. 
 In the domain of Empirical proof schemes, the authors distinguish between 
‘inductive’ and ‘perceptual’ proof schemes (Harel and Sowder  1998 ) . ‘Inductive’ 
means obtaining a general statement from some special examples or measurements, 
whereas ‘perceptual’ designates uncritically taking for granted some visual property 
of an object or a confi guration. 
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 In general, Harel and Sowder defi ne an Analytical proof scheme as one “that 
validates conjectures by means of logical deductions”  ( 1998 , p. 258). At fi rst glance, 
it seems surprising that this scheme splits into a ‘Transformational’ and an 
‘Axiomatic’ proof scheme. The ‘Axiomatic’ can be considered as what an educated 
mathematician might mean when speaking about proof. The ‘Transformational’ 
refers to arguments which identify an invariant by systematically changing a 
confi guration. For example, consider angles inscribed in a circle over a fi xed chord. 
According to a well-known theorem these angles are equal. If the vertex of an angle 
is moved on the circumference to one of the end-points of the chord, then in the 
limiting position one of the legs coincides with the tangent and the other with the 
chord. Consequently, the inscribed angle becomes the angle between chord and 
tangent and equal to the latter. Of course, this is also a well-known theorem in ele-
mentary geometry. Obviously, such a transformational argument is not a rigorous 
proof; yet it operates on a general level and can rightly be considered as belonging 
to an analytical domain. 
 Both Balacheff’s  ( 1988 ) and Harel and Sowder’s  ( 1998 ) systems of categories 
have been applied with some modifi cations in a number of empirical studies. Both 
systems share the problem that it is not always straightforward to relate an argumen-
tative behaviour to a certain category; rather, it may require a considerable amount 
of interpretation. What distinguishes the two systems is the fact that Balacheff’s 
system involves a genetic sequence whereas Harel and Sowder do not seem to be 
interested in such a sequence; their point of view is more the co-existence or even 
competition between conceptions of proof and argumentation in various fi elds of 
human life (everyday life and other sciences). This difference might be due to the 
fact that their subjects are college students, whereas Balacheff is mostly interested 
in grade-school teaching. 
 2  Proving and Beliefs of Teachers and Students 
 2.1  The System of Beliefs 
 This sub-chapter examines the epistemological and pedagogical beliefs about the 
practice of proof in the classroom:
 beliefs about the nature and role of proof in mathematics. • 
 beliefs about the role of proof in school mathematics. • 
 beliefs about diffi culties in proving. • 
 beliefs about how proof should be taught in school. • 
 beliefs about oneself as mathematical thinker in the context of proof. • 
 Moreover, due to the central role of proof in mathematical activity, beliefs 
involved in the practice of proof are not confi ned to the subject of proof but also 
include beliefs about mathematics, about mathematics teaching and learning, about 
oneself in relation to mathematics, and so on. 
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 Furinghetti and Pehkonen  ( 2002 ) have shown to what extent beliefs and related 
concepts are controversial issues. They also have pointed out the different uses of 
the term ‘conception’ and the mutual relationship of beliefs, conceptions and knowl-
edge. Following their recommendations, below we clarify our assumptions about 
the meanings of the terms we use and their mutual relationships. 
 As regards conceptions and beliefs, we follow Philipp  ( 2007 , p. 259) who describes 
conception as “a general notion or mental structure encompassing beliefs, meanings, 
concepts, propositions, rules, mental images, and preferences”. As regards beliefs 
and knowledge, our position is expressed by the following passage by Leatham:
 Of all the things we believe, there are some things that we “just believe” and other things we 
“more than believe – we know”. Those things we “more than believe” we refer to as knowl-
edge and those things we “just believe” we refer to as beliefs. Thus beliefs and knowledge 
can profi tably be viewed as complementary subsets of the things we believe.  ( 2006 , p. 92) 
 For us, “things we know” are those that rely on a social agreement inside a given 
community (for mathematics, the community of mathematicians). 
 In the same vein, Philipp describes knowledge as “beliefs held with certainty or 
justifi ed true belief. What is knowledge for one person may be belief for another, 
depending upon whether one holds the conception as beyond question.”  ( 2007 , 
p. 259). Philipp goes on to describe beliefs as:
 Psychologically held understandings, premises, or propositions about the world that are 
thought to be true. Beliefs are more cognitive, are felt less intensely, and are harder to 
change than attitudes. Beliefs might be thought of as lenses that affect one’s view of some 
aspect of the world or as dispositions toward action. Beliefs, unlike knowledge, may be held 
with varying degrees of conviction and are not consensual. Beliefs are more cognitive than 
emotions and attitudes. (I do not indent this defi nition under affect because, although beliefs 
are considered a component of  affect by those studying affect, they are not seen in this way 
by most who study teachers’ beliefs.) (ibid., p. 259) 
 We mainly use the term ‘belief’; we use ‘conception’ (in the sense explained 
above) when referring to a set of beliefs. 
 2.2  Teachers’ Epistemological and Pedagogical Beliefs 
 Researchers have investigated the beliefs about proof of pre-service and in-service 
elementary and secondary school teachers. We have organised their fi ndings around 
four major themes: teachers’ knowledge of proof, teachers’ beliefs about the nature 
and role of proof in mathematics, teachers’ beliefs about the role of proof in school 
mathematics and teachers’ beliefs about themselves as mathematical thinkers in the 
context of proof. 
 2.2.1  Teachers’ Knowledge of Proof 
 The majority of researchers who have investigated teachers’ knowledge of proof 
have focused on teachers’ acceptance of empirical versus deductive arguments as 
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valid proofs. Knuth  ( 2002a ) , who investigated what constitutes proof for 16 in-service 
secondary school mathematics teachers, and Martin and Harel  ( 1989 ) , who assessed 
the notions of proof held by 101 pre-service elementary school teachers, gave their 
participants statements accompanied by predetermined arguments and asked them 
to rate these in terms of their validity. Whereas Martin and Harel asked for written 
responses only, Knuth conducted in-depth interviews with his participants. 
 Both Knuth  ( 2002a ) and Martin and Harel  ( 1989 ) concluded that although most 
teachers correctly identify a valid argument, they also wrongly accept invalid argu-
ments as proofs. Several pre-service elementary teachers accepted empirically based 
arguments as proofs (Martin and Harel  1989 ; see also Morselli  2006 ; Simon and 
Blume  1996 ) . What secondary school teachers fi nd convincing in an argument – 
inclusion of a concrete feature, specifi c examples and visual reference – (Knuth 
 2002a ) might also explain why elementary teachers accepted empirical arguments 
as proofs. (On visualisation, see Biza et al.  2009 ) 
 The criteria teachers used to evaluate an argument differed widely but there were 
some commonalities. Several teachers adopted Symbolic or Ritual proof schemes 
(Harel and Sowder  1998 ; see Sect.  1. 2.2 above). For example, some teachers focused 
on the correctness of the algebraic manipulations or on the form of an argument as 
opposed to its nature, (Knuth  2002a ) , whilst others accepted false proofs based on 
their ritualistic aspects (Martin and Harel  1989 ) . Although they rated correct deduc-
tive arguments as valid proofs, teachers still did not fi nd them convincing (Knuth 
 2002a ) . Treating the proof of a particular case as the proof for the general case was 
also common amongst most teachers (Knuth  2002a ; Martin and Harel  1989 ) . 
 Employing a different method, Jones  ( 2000 ) asked recent mathematics graduates 
enrolled in a 1-year course to become secondary school teachers to construct con-
cept maps refl ecting their conceptions of mathematical proof. Analysis of the 
concept maps revealed that participants who had barely received pass degrees in 
mathematics courses needed “considerable support in developing a secure knowl-
edge base of mathematics”  ( 2000 , p. 57). On the other hand, Jones reported, technical 
fl uency in writing proofs did not necessarily imply richly connected knowledge 
of proof. 
 2.2.2  Teachers’ Beliefs About the Nature and Role of Proof in Mathematics 
 Chazan stated that “many teachers do not seem to understand why mathematicians 
place such a premium on proof”  ( 1993 , p. 359). However, all of the in-service sec-
ondary school teachers in Knuth’s  ( 2002a ) study indicated that the role of proof in 
mathematics was to establish the truth of a statement. They also suggested various 
other roles: explaining why something is true with a procedural focus rather than 
promoting understanding; the communicative role of proof (social interaction, commu-
nicating and convincing others); and the creation of knowledge and systematisation 
of results. 
 In a survey study with 30 pre-service elementary school teachers and 21 students 
majoring in mathematics with an emphasis in secondary education, Mingus and 
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Grassl  ( 1999 ) asked the participants what constitutes a proof and asked about the 
role of proof in mathematics. In their defi nitions of proof, the secondary-education 
majors emphasised explanatory power, whereas the elementary-education majors 
focused on verifi cation. The majority of the participants also pointed out the 
importance of proofs in helping “students understand the mathematics they are 
doing”  ( 1999 , p. 441). Furthermore, the secondary-education majors “also consid-
ered the role of  proof for maintaining and advancing the structure of mathematics” 
(ibid., p. 441). 
 Although the teachers in Knuth’s  ( 2002a ) study could identify the roles of proof 
in mathematics and the explanatory power of proofs was mentioned by the secondary-
education majors in the Mingus and Grassl  ( 1999 ) study, Harel and Sowder later 
concluded from a review of the literature that teachers “do not seem to understand 
other important roles of proof, most noticeably its explanatory role”  ( 2007 , p. 48). 
Also, one important question is how teachers’ beliefs about proof relate to other 
aspects of their classroom practice. In a small qualitative study, Conner  ( 2007 ) 
found that three student teachers’ conceptions of proof (particularly their beliefs 
about the purpose and role of proof in mathematics) aligned closely with how they 
supported argumentation (not proof in particular, but asking for and providing data 
and warrants for claims) in secondary classrooms. 
 2.2.3  Teachers’ Beliefs About the Role of Proof in School Mathematics 
 The roles of proof in school mathematics that the secondary teachers in Knuth’s 
 ( 2002b ) study talked about included all the roles they mentioned for proof in 
mathematics in general (Knuth  2002a ) except for systematising statements into an 
axiomatic system. In the subsequent report (Knuth  2002b ) , the secondary teacher 
participants added some new roles for proof when they discussed it in the con-
text of school mathematics: developing logical-thinking skills and displaying 
student thinking. 
 Although the roles that the teachers attached to proof in secondary-school math-
ematics seemed promising, their beliefs about the centrality of proof were limited 
(Knuth  2002a,  b ) . Several teachers did not think that proof should be a central idea 
throughout secondary school mathematics, but only for advanced mathematics 
classes and students studying mathematics-related fi elds. On the other hand, all the 
teachers considered that  informal proof should be a central idea  throughout secondary-
school mathematics. This is consistent with Healy and Hoyles’ reporting: “For 
many teachers it was more important that the argument was clear and uncomplicated 
than that it included any algebra”  ( 2000 , p. 413). 
 The majority of the teachers in Knuth’s research  ( 2002b ) viewed Euclidean 
geometry or upper-level mathematics classes as appropriate places to introduce 
proof to students. All of them said that they would accept an empirically based argu-
ment as a valid argument from students in a lower-level math class. Two of them, 
however, explained that they would discuss its limitations. Probably these beliefs 
were shaped by the teachers’ own experiences with proofs, since high-school 
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Euclidean geometry is the “usual locus” (Sowder and Harel  2003 , p. 15) for 
introducing proof in U.S. curricula. Furthermore, “the only substantial treatment of 
proof in the secondary mathematics curriculum occurs” (Moore  1994 , p. 249) in 
this (usually 1-year) geometry course. Knuth’s fi ndings also point out that teachers 
view proof as a subject to be taught separately rather than as a learning tool that can 
be integrated throughout mathematics. 
 On the other hand, the majority (69%) of the pre-service teachers in Mingus and 
Grassl’s  ( 1999 ) study advocated the introduction of proof before 10th-grade geometry 
classes. Furthermore, the participants who had taken college-level mathematics 
courses believed that proofs needed to be introduced earlier, in the elementary 
grades, in contrast to the participants who had only experienced proofs at the high-
school level. Mingus and Grassl argued that the former group “may have recognized 
that a lack of exposure to formal reasoning in their middle and high school 
backgrounds affected their ability to learn how to read and construct  proofs ”  ( 1999 , 
p. 440). 
 Other studies reveal different beliefs about the role of proof. Furinghetti and 
Morselli  ( 2009a ) investigated how secondary teachers treat proofs, and which 
factors (especially beliefs) affect that treatment, in a qualitative study of ten cases 
via individual, semi-structured interviews. Nine of the ten teachers declared that 
they teach proof in the classroom. The other said that she does not because Euclidean 
geometry is not in her school curriculum. The other teachers also referred mainly to 
Euclidean geometry as the most suitable domain for teaching proof. Sowder and 
Harel  ( 2003 ) already pointed out beliefs about geometry being the ideal domain for 
the teaching of proof or, even more, the teaching of proof being confi ned to geometry. 
Concerning the way proof is treated in the classroom, Furinghetti and Morselli 
 ( 2009a ) identifi ed two tendencies: teaching theorems versus teaching via the proof. 
The fi rst sees proof as a means for convincing and systematising mathematical facts, 
whilst the second uses proof mainly to promote mathematical understanding. The 
fi rst focuses on proof as a product, the second as a process. 
 2.2.4  Teachers’ Beliefs About Proof and Themselves 
as Mathematical Thinkers 
 Teacher attitudes towards using mathematical reasoning, their abilities in constructing 
proofs, and their abilities to deal with novel ideas are especially important, because 
“ideas that surprise and challenge teachers are likely to emerge during instruction” 
(Fernandez  2005 , p. 267). In such situations teachers should be able to “reason, not 
just reach into their repertoire of strategies and answers” (Ball  1999 , p. 27). 
However, the U.S. teachers in Ma’s  ( 1999 ) study were not mathematically confi -
dent to deal with a novel idea and investigate it. Like students, these teachers relied 
on some authority – a book or another teacher – to be confi dent about the truth of 
a statement. 
 Although it was not their main purpose, Simon and Blume  ( 1996 ) also found 
evidence that prospective elementary teachers appealed to authority. Their study 
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differed from others in the sense that they investigated pre-service elementary-school 
teachers’ conceptions of proof in the context of a mathematics course “which was 
run as a whole class constructivist teaching experiment”  ( 1996 , p. 3). The partici-
pants had previously experienced mathematics only in traditional classrooms where 
the authority was the teacher; the goal of the instructor in the study was to shift the 
“authority for verifi cation and validation of mathematical ideas from teacher and 
textbook to the mathematical community (the class as a whole)” (ibid., p. 4). The 
authors argued that this shift was signifi cant because it “can result in the students’ 
sense that they are capable of creating mathematics and determining its validity” 
(ibid., p. 4). 
 Simon and Blume’s  ( 1996 ) fi ndings illustrate how pre-service teachers’ prior 
experiences with proofs (or the lack thereof) and views about mathematics infl uence 
how they initially respond to situations where proof is necessary. At the beginning 
of the semester when the study’s instructor asked them to justify mathematical 
ideas, the participants referred to their previous mathematics courses or provided 
empirical reasons. They also did not necessarily make sense of the others’ general 
explanations if they were not operating at the same level of reasoning. However, 
Simon and Blume claimed that “norms were established over the course of the 
semester, that ideas expressed by community members were expected to be justifi ed 
and that those listening to the justifi cation presented would be involved in evaluating 
them”  ( 1996 , p. 29). 
 More recently, Smith  ( 2006 ) compared the perceptions of, and approaches to, 
mathematical proof by undergraduates enrolled in lecture and problem-based 
“transition to proof” courses, the latter using the “modifi ed Moore method,”  ( 2006 , 
p. 74). Their key fi nding: “while the students in the lecture-based course demonstrated 
conceptions of proof that refl ect those reported in the research literature as insuffi -
cient and typical of undergraduates, the students in the problem-based course were 
found to hold conceptions of, and approach the construction of, proofs in ways that 
demonstrated efforts to make sense of mathematical ideas” (ibid., p. 73). These 
promising results “suggest that such a problem-based course may provide opportunities 
for students to develop conceptions of proof that are more meaningful and robust 
than does a traditional lecture-based course” (ibid., p. 73). 
 2.3  Students’ Beliefs About Proof 
 Many studies deal with students’ approaches to proof. They mainly focus on 
students’ diffi culties; only rarely do they address the issue of beliefs directly and 
explicitly. Their most prevalent fi ndings on students’ beliefs about proof are that 
students fi nd giving proofs diffi cult and that their views of the purpose and role of 
proof are very limited (Chazan  1993 ; Harel and Sowder  1998 ; Healy and Hoyles 
 2000 ) . Some students are ignorant of the need to give a mathematical proof to verify 
a statement; others appeal to an authority – a teacher, a book or a theorem – to establish 
a truth (Carpenter et al.  2003 ) . 
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 According to Ball and Bass  ( 2000 ) , third-grade students “did not have the 
mathematical disposition to ask themselves about the completeness of their results 
when working on a problem with fi nitely many solutions”  ( 2000 , p. 910) early in the 
year. Similarly, Bell  ( 1976 ) found that 70% of the 11- to 13-year-olds in his study 
could recognise and describe patterns or relationships but showed no attempt to 
justify or deduce them. Even some students at the university level may believe that 
“proof is only a formal exercise for the teacher; there is no deep necessity for it” 
(Alibert  1988 , p. 31). 
 A common research fi nding is that students accept empirical arguments as 
proofs. They believe that checking a few cases is suffi cient (Bell  1976 ) . Healy and 
Hoyles  ( 2000 ) found that 24% of 14- and 15-year-old algebra students, assigned a 
familiar mathematical problem accompanied by different arguments, indicated that 
the empirical argument would be the most similar to their own approach (39% for 
an unfamiliar problem). Chazan  ( 1993 ) , in his study of high-school geometry 
students’ preferences between empirical and deductive reasoning, documented 
similar results. 
 Some students are aware that checking a few cases is not tantamount to proof, 
but believe that checking more varied and/or randomly selected examples  is proof. 
They try to minimise the limitations of checking a few examples in a number of 
ways, including use of a pattern, extreme cases or special cases. In Chazan’s  ( 1993 ) 
study, some students believed that if they tried different kinds of triangles – acute, 
obtuse, right, equilateral, and isosceles – they would verify a given statement about 
triangles. One of Ball’s third graders gave as a reason for accepting the truth of the 
statement that the sum of two odd numbers is even that she tried “almost 18 of them 
and even some special cases” (Ball and Bass  2003 , p. 35). 
 On the other hand, some students are aware of the fact that checking a few examples 
is not enough and are also not satisfi ed with trying different cases. Interviews in 
Healy and Hoyles’s  ( 2000 ) study revealed that some students who chose empirical 
arguments as closest to their own were not really satisfi ed with these arguments but 
believed that they could not make better ones. There are also students who realise 
that some problems contain infi nitely many numbers, so one cannot try them all; 
consequently, rather than considering a general proof, these students believe that no 
proof is possible (Ball and Bass  2003 ) . 
 Bell  ( 1976 ) found that students, although unable to give complete proofs, showed 
different levels of deductive reasoning, ranging from weak to strong. Some students 
can follow a deductive argument but believe that “deductive proof is simply evidence” 
(Chazan  1993 , p. 362). Fischbein  ( 1982 ) found that although 81.5% of them believed 
that a given proof was fully correct, just 68.5% of a student population accepted the 
theorem. Some students, given a statement claiming the same result for a subset of 
elements from an already generally proven category, think that another specifi c 
proof is necessary (Healy and Hoyles  2000 ) . Some students also think that either 
further examples are necessary or that a deductive argument is subject to counterex-
amples. In Fischbein’s  ( 1982 ) study, only 24.5% of the students accepted the 
correctness of a given proof and “ at the same time ”  ( 1982 , p. 16) thought that they 
did not need additional checks. 
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 Student-constructed proofs may take various forms. Even students who can 
produce valid mathematical proofs do not tend to give formal arguments using symbols. 
Healy and Hoyles found that students who went beyond a pragmatic approach were 
“more likely to give arguments expressed informally in a narrative style than to use 
algebra formally”  ( 2000 , p. 408). In Bell’s  ( 1976 ) study, none of the students used 
algebra in their proofs. Porteous  ( 1990 ) also reported that it was “disappointing to 
fi nd an almost total absence of algebra”  ( 1990 , p. 595). According to Healy and 
Hoyles, students did not use algebraic arguments because “it offered them little in 
the way of explanation … and [they] found them hard to follow”  ( 2000 , p. 415). 
 All the aforementioned studies mainly refer to pre-secondary school. Studies 
carried out at the more sophisticated high-school and college levels have had to 
consider further elements and diffi culties. 
 As Moore claims, “the ability to read abstract mathematics and do proofs depends 
on a complex constellation of beliefs, knowledge, and cognitive skills”  ( 1994 , 
p. 250). Furinghetti and Morselli’s study  ( 2007,  2009b ) instantiates how beliefs may 
intervene in this constellation and, at the same time, hints at the interpretative dif-
fi culties linked to this kind of investigation. Their analyses show the weight and role 
of beliefs as driving forces throughout the proving process as well as their mutual 
relationship with cognitive factors. For instance, in one case study (Furinghetti and 
Morselli  2009b ) the student’s choice of the algebraic representation, and the 
revision of such a choice after a diffi culty is met, are hindered by the student’s 
beliefs about self (low self-confi dence), about mathematical activity as an automatic 
activity, and about the role of algebra as a proving tool. In another case (Furinghetti 
and Morselli  2007 ) the proving process is supported by the student’s self-confi dence 
and his belief about proof as a process aimed not only at proving but also at 
explaining. In this latter case, the authors underline the positive role of beliefs in 
supporting the construction of a proving process as well the fi nal systematisation 
of the product. 
 3  Metaknowledge About Proof 
 3.1  Metaknowledge 
 Literally, metaknowledge is knowledge about knowledge. We use the term 
‘metaknowledge about proof’ to designate the knowledge needed to refl ect about, 
teach and learn proof. We distinguish metaknowledge from beliefs by placing beliefs 
closer to individuals’ opinions, emotions and attitudes, whereas “metaknowledge” 
refers to consensually held ideas. Metaknowledge about proof includes concepts 
which refer to:
 the  • structure of mathematical theories , like axiom/hypothesis, defi nition, 
theorem; 
 formal  • logic , like truth, conditional, connectives, quantifi ers; 
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 • modes of representation , like symbolic, pictorial and verbal reasoning; and 
 relationships between proof in mathematics and related processes of argumentation • 
in  other fi elds , especially the empirical sciences. 
 Above, in Sects .  2.2 and  2.3 , we discussed research fi ndings about problematic 
dimensions of teachers’ and students’ beliefs about proof – above all, the prepon-
derance of empirical ways of justifi cation. These fi ndings are internationally valid; 
consequently, we have to consider the problematic beliefs as outcomes of the usual 
way of teaching proof at school and university. Here, we expound our  thesis that 
these shortcomings of teaching can be successfully overcome only when meta-
knowledge about proof is made a theme of mathematics teaching, beginning with 
the explicit introduction of the very notion of proof. The opinions of many educators, 
for example Healy and Hoyles  ( 2000 ) and Hemmi  ( 2008 ) support this view. 
 3.2  Place of Metaknowledge in the Curriculum 
 The role of proof in the curriculum varies across different countries. Of course, 
there is a broad international consensus that learning mathematical argumentation 
should start with the very beginning of mathematics in the primary grades (e.g. Ball 
and Bass  2000 ; Bartolini  2009 ; Wittmann  2009 ) . However, the situation is different 
with regard to the explicit introduction of the notion of proof  per se . In some coun-
tries, such as France, Germany and Japan, proof is seen as something to be explicitly 
taught. Cabassut  ( 2005 ) notes that the introduction of proof in France and Germany 
takes place mostly in grade 8, which is also the situation in Japan (Miyazaki and 
Yumoto  2009 ) . In these countries, the offi cial syllabus makes explicit what should 
be taught about proof and/or textbooks contain chapters about proof (Cabassut 
 2009 ; Fujita, Jones, and Kunimune  2009 ) . In other countries, such as Italy 
(Furinghetti and Morselli  2009a ) and the United States (National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics [NCTM]  2000 ) , proof remains a more informal concept 
but is nevertheless made a theme by individual teachers. Furinghetti and Morselli 
report that most of the Italian teachers they have interviewed respond that they treat 
proof in their classes. In the United States, ‘reasoning and proof’ is identifi ed as a 
process standard (NCTM  2000 ) to be integrated across content and grade levels 
rather than taught explicitly as one object of study. Regardless of whether proof is 
explicitly treated, it is important that mathematics teachers have well-founded meta-
knowledge about proof in order to communicate an adequate image of mathematics 
to their students. 
 3.3  Basic Components of Metaknowledge About Proof 
 In the practice of teaching, the attitude seems frequently to prevail that metaknowledge 
about proof emerges spontaneously from examples. Only a few ideas are available 
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about how to provide metaknowledge about proof explicitly to pupils or teachers. 
For example, Arsac et al.  ( 1992 ) give explicit ‘rules’ for discussions with pupils of 
the lower secondary level (11–15 years old): a mathematical assertion is either true 
or false; a counter-example is suffi cient for rejection of an assertion; in mathematics 
people agree on clearly formulated defi nitions and properties as warrant of the 
debate; in mathematics one cannot decide that an assertion is true merely because a 
majority of persons agree with it; in mathematics numerous examples confi rming an 
assertion are not suffi cient to prove it; in mathematics an observation on a drawing 
is not suffi cient to prove a geometrical assertion. However, listing such rules is not 
suffi cient to develop metaknowledge, because the latter is broader and includes 
relationships to other fi elds. 
 Here, in identifying basic components of metaknowledge about proof, we confi ne 
ourselves to metaknowledge which should be made a theme already in the lower 
secondary grades and which ( a fortiori ) should be provided to future teachers of 
mathematics. We leave aside metaknowledge related to formal logic, since this topic 
is treated in other chapters of this volume and is appropriate only for a more advanced 
level. (We also exclude ‘modes of representation’; see Cabassut  2005,  2009 ) . 
 When introducing proof in the mathematics classroom, teachers usually say two 
things to their students: fi rst, that proofs produce  certain knowledge , “We think that 
this statement might be true, but to be sure we have to prove it”; second, that proof 
establishes  generally valid statements – statements true not only for special 
cases but for all members of a class (e.g., all natural numbers or all triangles). 
Teachers all over the world thus try to explain proof to their students; we take those 
two messages as basic components of the necessary metaknowledge about proof. 
However, many teachers and educators are unaware that the two messages are 
incomprehensible by themselves and need further qualifi cations. One reason is the 
difference between these statements and statements made in science courses. Conner 
and Kittleson  ( 2009 ) point out that students encounter similar problem situations in 
mathematics and science, but the ways in which results are established differ 
between these disciplines. In mathematics, a proof is required to establish a result; 
in science, results depend on a preponderance of evidence (not accepted as valid 
in mathematics). 
 3.3.1  The Certainty of Mathematics 
 It is important to convey to students the idea that proofs do not establish facts but 
‘if-then-statements’. We do not prove a ‘fact’  B but an implication ‘If  A then  B ’. 
Boero, Garuti and Lemut  ( 2007 , p. 249  ff ) rightly speak about the conditionality of 
mathematical theorems. For example, we do not prove the ‘fact’ that all triangles 
have an angle sum of 180°; rather we prove that in a certain theory this consequence 
can be derived. The angle-sum theorem is an ‘if-then-statement’ whose ‘if’ part 
consists ultimately of the axioms/hypotheses of Euclidean geometry. Thus the 
 absolute certainty of mathematics resides not in the facts but in the logical 
inferences, which are often implicit. 
184 R. Cabassut et al.
 Whether mathematicians believe in the ‘facts’ of a theory is dependent on their 
confi dence in the truth of the hypotheses/axioms. This confi dence is the result of a 
more or less conscious  process of assessment . Mathematicians fi nd the axioms of 
arithmetic highly reliable and therefore can believe that there are infi nitely many 
prime numbers. The situation is different in geometry; with ‘medium-sized’ objects 
Euclidean geometry is the best available theory, but in cosmological dimensions 
Riemannian geometry is taken as the appropriate model. The situation is even more 
complicated with applied theories in physics and other sciences. 
 The issues of the potential certainty of mathematical proof and of the condition-
ality of the theorems have to be made frequent themes in mathematics education, 
beginning at the secondary level. Teachers should discuss them with students in 
various situations if they expect the students to get an adequate understanding of 
mathematical proof. In particular, they should make students aware of the necessary 
process of assessing the reliability of a theory. 
 3.3.2  Universally Valid Statements 
 To an educated mathematician, it seems nearly unimaginable that the phrase “for all 
objects  x with a certain property the statement  A is true” should present any diffi -
culty of understanding to a learner. Many practical experiences and some recent 
empirical studies show, however, that it does exactly that. Lee and Smith, in a recent 
study  ( 2008,  2009 ) of college students, found that some of their participants held the 
notion that “true rules could always allow exceptions” or that “true means mostly 
true” or that there might be an “unknown exception to the rule.” (Lee and Smith 
 2009 , pp. 2–24). This is consistent with the experiences of students frequently not 
understanding that  one counterexample suffi ces for rejection of a theorem. Galbraith 
 ( 1981 ) found, for example, that one third of his 13- to 15-year-old students did not 
understand the role of counterexamples in refuting general statements (see also 
Harel and Sowder  1998 ) . 
 Frequently, students do not think that the set to which a general statement refers 
has a defi nite extension but assume tacitly that under special circumstances an 
exception might occur. From the point of view of classical mathematics this is a 
‘misconception’; however considering general statements outside of classical math-
ematics one fi nds that concepts are generally seen as having indefi nite extensions. 
Both everyday knowledge and the empirical sciences consider general statements 
which under certain conditions might include exceptions. To cover this phenome-
non, one can distinguish between  open and  closed general statements, having 
respectively indefi nite and defi nite domains of validity (Durand-Guerrier  2008 ; 
Jahnke  2007,  2008 ) . In principle, closed general statements can occur only in math-
ematics, whereas disciplines outside of mathematics operate with open general 
statements with the tacit assumption that under certain conditions exceptions might 
occur. At the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries even mathemati-
cians spoke of “theorems which might admit exceptions” (on this issue see Sørensen 
 2005 ) . Also, intuitionistic mathematics does not consider the concept of the set of 
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all subsets (e.g., of the natural numbers) as a totality of defi nite extension. We well 
know that in cases where the domain for which a statement is valid does not have a 
defi nite extension the usual logical rules, especially the rule of the excluded middle, 
are no longer valid. 
 All in all, the seemingly simple phrase “for all” used in the formulation of 
mathematical theorems is not an obvious concept for the beginner. Rather, it is a 
sophisticated theoretical construct whose elaboration has taken time in history and 
needs time in individuals’ cognitive development. Durand-Guerrier  ( 2008 , pp. 379–80) 
provides a beautiful didactic example about how to work on this concept with 
younger pupils. 
 3.3.3  Defi nitions 
 The theories which mathematicians construct by way of proof are hypothetical and 
consist of ‘if-then-statements’. This fact implies that mathematical argumentation 
requires and presupposes  rigour . Hypotheses/axioms and defi nitions have to be 
understood and applied in their exact meanings. This requirement sharply contrasts 
with everyday discourse, which does not commonly use defi nitions, at least in the 
mathematical sense. Consequently, the development of a conscious use of defi ni-
tions is an important component of proof competence. 
 Most students at the end of their school careers do not understand the importance 
and meaning of mathematical defi nitions, even many university students (Lay  2009 ) . 
Explicit efforts in teaching are required to develop a habit of using defi nitions 
correctly in argumentations. Since such a habit does not emerge spontaneously, 
students need metaknowledge about defi nitions. They should know that defi nitions 
are conventions but are not arbitrary; in general, a defi nition is constructed the way 
it is for good reasons. 
 Beginning university students of mathematics encounter an impressive example 
of the importance and meaning of defi nitions when they fi rst operate with infi nite 
sets: namely, how can one determine the ‘size’ of an infi nite set? If one compares 
sets by way of the relation ‘⊂’, then the set  N of natural numbers is a proper subset 
of the set  Q of rational numbers:  N ⊂  Q , and  N is ‘smaller’ than  Q . If, however one 
compares sets by means of bijective mappings, a fundamental theorem of Cantorian 
set theory says that  N and  Q have the same cardinality. Hence, the outcome of a 
comparison of two sets depends on the defi nition of ‘size’. Numerous further exam-
ples occur in analysis: for instance, whether an infi nite series is convergent depends 
on the defi nition of convergence. 
 Not many examples of this type arise in secondary teaching. One instance of the 
importance and relevance of alternative defi nitions is the defi nition of a trapezoid 
(trapezium) as having at least two parallel sides versus having exactly two parallel 
sides. Asking whether a rectangle is a trapezium requires a student to look past the 
standard fi gures depicting the two types of quadrangle. If they apply a particular set 
of defi nitions, they conclude that answer is affi rmative. Proof and deduction enter 
the game when the student realises that consequently the formulae for the perimeter 
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and area of a trapezium must also give the perimeter and area of a rectangle. (For 
further ideas about teaching the construction of defi nitions, see Ouvrier-Buffet  2004 
and  2006 .) 
 3.3.4  Mini-theories as a Means to Elaborate Metaknowledge About Proof 
 We have suggested three basic components of metaknowledge about proof which 
naturally emerge in the teaching of proof and which should be more deeply elabo-
rated in teaching: the  certainty ( conditionality ) of mathematical theorems, the 
 generality of the theorems and the conscious use of  defi nitions . One possible method 
to further this learning is to develop  mini-theories accessible to learners and suffi -
ciently substantial to discuss meta-issues. The idea of such mini-theories, not com-
pletely new, resembles Freudenthal’s  ( 1973 ) concept of ‘local ordering’ or the use 
of a fi nite geometry as a surveyable example of an axiomatic theory. However, the 
study of fi nite geometries is not feasible in secondary teaching. Besides, our idea of 
a mini-theory differs in two aspects from Freudenthal’s concept of local ordering. 
First, we would include in the teaching of a mini-theory phases of explicit refl ection 
about the structure of axiomatic theories, the conditionality of mathematical theo-
rems and the set of objects to which a theorem applies. Second, we would also take 
into account ‘small theories’ from physics, like Galileo’s law of free fall and its con-
sequences, and other examples of mathematised empirical science (Jahnke  2007 ) . 
 Treating a mathematised empirical theory would provide new opportunities to 
make students aware of the process of assessing the truth of a theory (see above on 
certainty; Conner and Kittleson  2009 ; Jahnke  2009a,  b ) . Usually, teachers only tell 
students that the axioms are intuitively true and that therefore all the theorems which 
can be derived from them are true; however, this is a one-sided image. In many other 
cases, one believes in the truth of a theory because its consequences agree with 
empirical evidence or because it explains what one wants to explain. For example, 
teachers generally treat Euclidean geometry in the latter way, at least at pre-tertiary 
levels. In the philosophy of science, this way of constructing and justifying a theory 
is called the ‘hypothetico-deductive method’. 
 Barrier et al.  ( 2009 ) developed a related idea for teaching the metaknowledge of 
proof. They discuss a dialectic between an ‘indoor game’ and an ‘outdoor game’. The 
indoor game refers to the proper process of deduction, whereas the outdoor game 
deals with “the truth of a statement inside an interpretation domain”  ( 2009 , p. 78). 
 4  Conclusion 
 Our discussion in Sect. 1 has shown how strongly conceptualisations of proof are 
dependent of the professional background and aims of the respective researcher. 
Practising mathematicians, whilst agreeing on the acceptance of certain arguments 
as proof, stray from a formal defi nition of proof when explaining what one is. 
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Consequently, it is diffi cult to explain precisely what a proof is, especially to one 
who is a novice at proving (such as a child in school). Mathematics educators also 
differ in their distinctions between argumentation and proof (or inclusion of one in 
the other). Regardless of the classifi cation scheme of the researchers, research 
reveals that students and teachers often classify arguments as proofs differently 
from the classifi cations accepted in the fi eld of mathematics. 
 Existing research on beliefs about proof has focused on investigating proof con-
ceptions of prospective and practising elementary and secondary school teachers 
(Sect. 2). Their beliefs about proving are wrapped around two main issues: what 
counts as proof in the classroom and whether the focus of teaching proof is on the 
product or on the process. Research has clearly hinted at the fact that quite a number 
of teachers tend to accept empirical arguments as proofs and have limited views 
about the role of proof in school mathematics. Given the infl uence of beliefs on the 
teaching and learning process at all levels of schooling continued research on beliefs 
about proof that focuses not only on detecting beliefs but also on understanding 
their origins seems highly necessary. 
 Research strongly suggests that beliefs about proof should be addressed more 
intensely in undergraduate mathematics and mathematics education courses and 
during professional development programmes in order to overcome the shortcomings 
which have been identifi ed in the beliefs about proof. Consequently, we discuss in 
the last section of the chapter (Sect. 3) which type of metaknowledge about proof 
should be provided to students and how this can be done. We identify three com-
ponents of metaknowledge about proof which should be made a theme in teacher 
training as well as in school teaching. These are the certainty of mathematics , 
universally valid statements and the role of defi nitions in mathematical theories. 
The elaboration of teaching units which allow an honest discussion of metaknowledge 
about proof seems an urgent desideratum of future work. Mini-theories could 
be one possible way of achieving this, and further research is necessary both to 
examine the feasibility of the use of mini-theories and to develop other ways of 
developing metaknowledge about proof. 
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 1  Introduction 
 In this chapter we draw on papers presented at the conference (Lin et al.  2009 ) 
in order to discuss forms of proof and proving in the learning and teaching of 
mathematics. By “forms of proof and proving” we refer to a variety of aspects that 
infl uence the appearance of proof and the manner in which these may be conceived 
by students and teachers trying to cope with understanding or producing proofs. 
These aspects include:
 different representations, including visual, verbal and dynamic, that may be used • 
in the course of proof production; 
 different ways of arguing mathematically, such as inductive example-based • 
arguments, example-based generic arguments and general arguments, as well as 
individually versus socially produced arguments; 
 different degrees of rigour and of detail in proving – including different degrees • 
of pointing out assumptions, whether in terms of fi rst principles or previously 
proven statements – and where and how these are used; 
 multiple proofs; that is, different proofs for the same mathematical statement, • 
which may be used in parallel or sequentially, by a single person or a group. 
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 We read the complete conference proceedings and selected contributions that 
refer to forms of proof and proving in the above sense, grouping them appropri-
ately and integrating them, to some extent, with other relevant work. All sections 
of the chapter draw heavily on these conference contributions. The majority of 
them are either empirical studies or thought pieces by colleagues with substantial 
pedagogical experience. No conference contributions explicitly offered or dis-
cussed a theoretical framework relating to our theme, but naturally this chapter 
refl ects theoretical discussions in other chapters. Occasionally we highlight some 
of these resonances. Following careful reading of the conference proceedings – 
and given that the papers appear in the conference proceedings in their originally 
submitted version, reviewed but unrevised – we have selected only papers (or parts 
of papers) that we felt appropriate. 
 The chapter consists of four sections. In the section following this introduc-
tion we focus on external forms of proof (mostly visual, verbal and dynamic). 
We report work on student and teacher beliefs about visual aspects of proof and 
proving and discuss the importance of visibility and transparency of mathemati-
cal arguments, particularly with regard to the role of visualisation. We highlight 
the pedagogical potential of certain proving activities and also refl ect briefl y on 
whether all mathematical ideas are equally visualisable. We then briefl y relate 
some of this discussion to work presented in the conference on verbal and 
dynamic proofs. 
 The next section discusses the importance of various mathematical, pedagogical, 
and cognitive aspects related to different forms of proof. This section also includes 
a discussion of multiple-proof tasks, which explicitly require different types of 
proofs for the same mathematical statement. 
 In the light of the variety of forms discussed up to this point, and the preponder-
ance of empirical arguments and proof schemes (Harel and Sowder  1998,  2007 ) 
amongst students and sometimes even teachers, the penultimate section focuses on 
the question, which forms of proof might support students in making the transition 
from empirical arguments to general proofs. Part of this section draws lessons from 
the history of mathematics; most of the rest discusses the signifi cant role that operative 
and generic proofs can play in the classroom. 
 We conclude with a section indicating some issues relating to forms of proof and 
proving that have not yet received suffi cient research attention and where future 
research could improve the teaching and learning of proof. In this respect, we par-
ticularly highlight the need for more school-based studies, more longitudinal stud-
ies and more work on students’ conceptualisations of the need for proof – as well as 
deep refl ection and theory-building related to all these issues. 
 2  Visual and Other External Forms of Proof 
 In this section we examine issues related to visual and other forms of proof that were 
raised in a substantial number of the conference papers. These issues include: student 
and teacher beliefs about visual aspects of proof and proving (Biza et al.  2009a ; 
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Nardi  2009 ; Whiteley  2009 ) ; the importance of the ‘visibility’ and transparency of 
mathematical arguments (Hemmi and Jaworski  2009 ; Raman et al.  2009 ) ; the peda-
gogical potential of ‘geometrical sophisms’ and other proving activities (Kondratieva 
 2009 ; Perry et al.  2009a,  b ) ; and some refl ections on the non-universal visualisabil-
ity of mathematical ideas (Iannone  2009 ; Mamona-Downs and Downs  2009 ) . We 
close the section with brief notes on verbal aspects of proof and proving (Arzarello 
et al.  2009a ; Tsamir et al.  2009 ) and on dynamic forms of proof (Arzarello et al. 
 2009b ; Leung  2009 ; Stevenson  2009 ) , issues that parallel some of our discussion of 
visual aspects of proof and proving in the main part of this section. 
 In recent years, the debate about the potential contribution of visual representa-
tions to mathematical proof has intensifi ed (e.g., Mancosu et al.  2005 ) and the 
multidisciplinary community of diagrammatic reasoning (e.g., Stenning and Lemon 
 2001 ) has been steadily growing. Central to the debate is whether visual representa-
tions should be treated as adjuncts to proofs, as an integral part of proofs or as 
proofs themselves (e.g., Byers  2007 ; Giaquinto  2007 ; Hanna and Sidoli  2007 ) . 
Within mathematics education, the body of work on the important pedagogical role 
of visualisation has also been expanding (see Presmeg  2006 for a substantial review). 
Overall, we still seem far from a consensus on the many roles visualisation can 
play in mathematical learning and teaching, as well as in both pre- and post- formal 
aspects of mathematical thinking in general. 
 Recently, the relationship between teachers’ beliefs and pedagogical practice has 
attracted increasing attention from mathematics education researchers, (e.g., Cooney 
et al.  1998 ; Leatham  2006 ; Leder et al.  2002 ) . In this section, we explore this 
relationship particularly with regard to teachers’ beliefs about the role  visualisation 
can play in mathematical reasoning. 
 Teachers’ beliefs about the role of visualisation – pedagogical and epistemological 
– are complex and not always consistent. The study by Biza et al.  ( 2009b ) is a good 
case in point. Biza et al. consider two infl uences on secondary teachers’ epistemo-
logical beliefs about the role of visualisation in mathematical proof: beliefs about the 
suffi ciency and persuasiveness of a visual argument and personal concept images (in 
this case, tangent lines). The authors collected written and interview data collected 
through a task involving recognising a line as a tangent to a curve at an infl ection 
point on a graph. About half of the teachers, 45 out of 91, appear to dwell on the 
geometric image of a circle tangent and incorrectly claim that the line is not a tangent, 
although it is. These teachers’ prior extensive experiences with the image of the circle 
tangent in Euclidean Geometry were so strong that they did not feel compelled to 
explore the image offered to them (in a Calculus context) further and perhaps reshape 
their ideas about tangency accordingly. The two teachers cited in the paper rely on 
the Euclidean circle tangent image – in the words of Nogueira de Lima and Tall 
 ( 2006 ) a perfectly valid “met-before” image – in order to reject (without questioning 
their defi nition of tangency and without checking algebraically) the line as a tangent. 
Therefore, a persistent image valid in one mathematical domain (e.g., Euclidean 
Geometry) supersedes the requirements of another mathematical domain (e.g., 
Calculus). Elsewhere, Biza et al.  ( 2009b ) discuss the need to construct an explicit 
didactical contract – through, for instance, discussion in the classroom – with regard 
to the role that such images can play in different mathematical domains. 
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 Some studies focusing on university mathematicians also reported beliefs about 
the role of visualisation in mathematical reasoning. Many of these mathematicians – 
either in the form of self-reporting (Whiteley  2009 ) or in interviews (Iannone  2009 ; 
Nardi  2009 ) – made a relatively straightforward point: consider “what mathematicians 
often do” (Whiteley  2009 , p. 258, also citing Brown  1997 ) , how “mathematicians 
work” (Nardi  2009 , p. 117), as one criterion for deciding pedagogical priorities for 
university mathematics teaching. In Iannone’s (ibid.) words, “to study expert behav-
iour in doing mathematics, such as the behaviour of a research mathematician, can 
help [sic] understanding what skills students need to acquire to become experts 
themselves” (p. 224). 
 For example, Whiteley  ( 2009 ) refl ects on his own practices as a mathematician 
and highlights the signifi cance of reasoning through examples and counter- 
examples, making conjectures, evaluating plausible ideas, working with sketched 
proofs, and writing. In assessing students and refereeing research papers, he draws 
on occasions to critically analyse presentations of reasoning and his own analytical 
processes. He typically challenges students to provide a counter-example to a false 
claim or an illustrative example for a true claim. Using his knowledge of mathema-
ticians’ professional practices and of students’ typical diffi culties with mathemati-
cal proof, he places particular emphasis on the pedagogical importance of 
exemplifi cation. His support for visual, and also kinesthetic, arguments fi ts squarely 
within this emphasis: illustrations and gestures can be closer to the cognitive pro-
cesses students need to carry out in order to develop understanding, sometimes 
even of the ‘purest’ mathematical idea. The usual critique against visual reasoning, 
that visuals ‘are “merely” examples’, ‘too specifi c to be used in general proofs’ 
should not deter us, he stresses: “Visuals are strong particularly because they are 
examples’ and they can indeed ‘carry general reasoning as symbols for the general 
case, provided the readers bring a range of variation to their cognition of the  fi gure” 
(p. 260). Furthermore, not only is there nothing wrong with a ‘partial’ perception 
of a mathematical idea but also this very ‘partiality’ and any work students may do 
towards developing conventions and expressions for it can be instructive. 
Pedagogical practice that deprives students of these instructive opportunities is 
impoverished. 
 The mathematicians interviewed by Nardi  ( 2009 ) elaborate Whiteley’s “learn-
ing to see like a mathematician”  ( 2004 , p. 279) further. Part of the pedagogical role 
of the mathematician, they state, is to foster a fl uent interplay between analytical 
rigour and (often visually based) intuitive insight. The need to foster this fl uency is 
particularly poignant as students’ relationship with visual reasoning is often turbu-
lent. Even when students overcome resistance to employing visualisation, their 
reliance on it can be somewhat fraught: Pictures may appear unaccompanied by 
any explanation of how they came to be, or they may appear disconnected from the 
rest of the students’ writing. In fact, students’ reticence about employing visualisa-
tion has often been attributed (Nardi  2008 ) to what they perceive as the ‘fuzzy’ 
didactical contract (Brousseau  1997 ) of university mathematics: a contract that 
allows them to employ only previously proven statements but does not clarify 
which parts of their prior knowledge, or ways of knowing, count as proven or 
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acceptable. Like Whiteley  ( 2009 ) , the mathematicians Nardi interviewed stress the 
potentially creative aspects of this ‘fuzziness’. They argue that: a picture provides 
evidence, not proof; pictures are  natural, not obligatory elements of mathematical 
thinking; pictures are “a third type of language” (Nardi  2009 , p. 116). From these 
views emerges a clarifi ed didactical contract in which students are allowed to use 
facts that have not been formally established; later, they are expected to establish 
those facts formally. The students are encouraged to make use of the power that 
visualisation allows them. However, they are required to do so in a sophisticated 
way – for example, through including articulate accounts of their thinking in their 
writing and through acknowledging the support (e.g., of a graphic calculator) that 
facilitated the emergence of an insight. 
 Raman et al.  ( 2009 ) use videotaped proving incidents to offer a neat operationali-
sation of that didactical contract. Raman et al. aimed to highlight to students three 
crucial moments in the production of a proof that are familiar to mathematicians but 
not always articulated in teaching: “one that gives cause for believing the truth of a 
claim, one that indicates how a proof could be constructed, and one that formalizes 
the argument, logically connecting given information to the conclusion” (p. 154). 
Absent this articulation, students may see these three moments as more discon-
nected than they typically are. In the study, the students abandoned visual reason-
ing; “expecting discontinuity between a more intuitive argument and a more formal 
one, the students practically abandon their near-perfect proof for something 
that appears to them more acceptable as a formal proof” (p. 158). Clearly, students 
need more explicit explanation of what is acceptable and effective practice in 
mathematics. 
 Emerging from Raman et al.’s proposal of emphasis and explicitness are the 
questions of  what and  how these can be made available to students. Hemmi and 
Jaworski’s  ( 2009 ) discussion of the  condition of transparency (Hemmi  2008 ) aptly 
addresses this question. Adopting Lave and Wenger’s  ( 1991 ) perspective – in which 
proof is an artefact in mathematical practice – they write about the “intrinsic balance 
in learning environments between the uses of artefacts on the one hand and the 
focusing on artefacts as such on the other hand” (p. 202). Artefacts “need to be seen 
(be visible) and to be used and seen through (be invisible)” to enhance students’ 
understanding (ibid.). Combining these two characteristics creates the condition of 
transparency. Applying this theory to the artefact of proof, the authors defi ne  visibility 
as “referring to the different ways of focusing on various aspects of proof like logical 
structures, specifi c proof techniques, historical role and functions of proof in 
mathematics and meta-mathematical aspects connected to proof” (ibid.).  Invisibility 
then “is the opposite: not focusing on particular aspects of proof, […] not focusing 
on the process of proving but the products of proving like formulae and theorems 
and the justifying of solutions of problems” (ibid.). In relation to visualisation, in 
Hemmi and Jaworski’s sense visual reasoning, as part of the proof artefact, often 
remains  invisible in teaching. 
 The power of visualisation to generate insight, its  semantic potential , is indubi-
table. Kondratieva’s  ( 2009 ) use of ‘geometrical sophisms’ – a paradoxical conclu-
sion, which results from an impossible fi gure – is a telling illustration of this 
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potential. Intrigued by the absurdity of a fi gure (or a statement, i.e., ‘all triangles 
are isosceles’, ‘64 = 65’ etc.) students engage with what in essence is understan-
ding the nature and purposes of proof. Searching for a fl aw, they focus on the 
substance and details of the proving process, rather than on the truthfulness of a 
statement as perceived from either its substantive mathematical meaning or its 
fi t to a physical model. The impossible fi gure provides an opportunity to shake 
learners’ unconditional trust of images and becomes a trigger to “learn the art of 
deduction” (ibid.). 
 Analogous potential lies within the activities proposed by Perry et al.  (2009a,  b ). 
The former focuses on plane geometry proof lessons with a pronounced three-level 
process of analysing defi nitions, enunciating propositions and proposing proofs for 
conjectures. The latter focuses on three sets of tasks used in proof in the Geometry 
section of a pre-service mathematics teacher education programme: the procedure of 
proving; proof within the framework of a reference axiomatic system; and issues of 
proving in geometry. The third set of tasks in Perry et al. ( 2009 b ) includes:  Obtain or 
use information that a graphic representation on paper or product of a dynamic geometry 
construction provides . Identifying useful geometric relations, learning how to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate extraction of information from a fi gure, identifying 
clues for a proof of a statement, making a geometric statement, and studying invari-
ance – all become possible in a visually based environment. 
 But visualisation’s semantic potential is not absolute. Iannone’s  ( 2009 ) discus-
sion of the meta-mathematical skills that mathematicians view as important focuses 
on the ability to recognise when to proceed  semantically and when to proceed 
 syntactically (cf. Weber  2001 ; Weber and Alcock  2004 ) when constructing a proof, 
and on how that choice depends on the specifi c mathematical objects that appear in 
a given proof (cf. also Arzarello et al.  2009b ; Pedemonte  2007 ) . Iannone discusses 
 concept usage , “the ways one operates with the concept in generating or using 
examples or doing proofs” (Moore  1994 , p. 252). The mathematicians she quotes 
distinguish four types of concept usage: Two – “concepts for which syntactic knowl-
edge can be used for proof production but only ineffectively” (p. 222) and “concepts 
for which syntactic knowledge alone cannot be used” (ibid.) – allow for the use of 
non-syntactic procedures (presumably including visualisation). The other two – 
“concepts without initial pictorial representation for which resorting to syntactic 
knowledge is the only suitable approach” (p. 221) and “concepts for which syntactic 
knowledge is an effective tool” (ibid.) – make up those for which visualisation is 
either unusable or less effective. 
 Of these latter two types, the former concerns “concepts which are very diffi cult to 
represent via mental images, for example via something that can be drawn on a number 
line or a Cartesian plane. These concepts can be used in proof production only via 
manipulation of the syntactic statement that defi nes them” (Iannone  2009 , p. 221). 
For example, the interviewees offered the expression often used in Analysis, 
‘ N arbitrarily large’: The idea of arbitrary largeness is far more clearly expressed 
with symbols than with words or pictures. So are ‘this function is not uniformly con-
tinuous’ or ‘this series does not converge’. The latter type are concepts for which 
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“while it is possible to have a visual representation, a syntactic approach is more 
effective” (Iannone  2009 , p. 222). One such example is the negation of the state-
ment ‘the sequence converges’. 
 A complicating factor in employing visualisation in teaching can be that images, 
as well as a preference for them over other ways of expressing mathematical meaning, 
can be “very private”. Some simply feel “safer” in the syntactic world of symbolic 
manipulation; indeed, some may even be more effective in that world. As Mamona-
Downs and Downs  ( 2009 ) conclude, “a seemingly syntactic argument may have 
signifi cant semantic overtones, and vice versa” (p. 99). For a further discussion of 
syntactic and semantic aspects of mathematical thinking we refer the reader to the 
chapter by Tall et al. ( 2011 ), where these aspects are discussed in relation to ‘natural’ 
aspects of mathematical thinking (based on embodied imagery) and ‘formal’ aspects 
(based on formal deduction). 
 In contrast, few presentations at the conference dealt with the verbal aspects of 
proof and proving. However, they raised issues similar to those we raised in this 
section in relation to visualisation. Tsamir et al.  ( 2009 ) started from Healy and 
Hoyles’  ( 2000 ) conclusion that students fi nd verbal proofs appealing and tend to be 
better at deductive reasoning in verbal proofs than in other forms. Tsamir et al. 
investigated secondary teachers’ reactions to verbal forms of proof and found that 
about half of the teachers tended to reject these proofs, often because they thought 
that the proofs were not general. Their fi ndings resonate with those of other research-
ers about the impact teachers’ views have on students: For example, Harel and 
Dreyfus  ( 2009 ) found that secondary students held mixed opinions about the value 
of visual proofs – some wanted their teachers to use visual proofs or wished to use 
visual proofs themselves, whereas others did not – but they were uniformly sure that 
their teachers would not accept visual forms of proof. 
 Some of the issues around dynamic methods of proving and proof relate tangen-
tially to those around both visualisation and verbal proofs. Leung  ( 2009 ) , Stevenson 
 ( 2009 ) , and Arzarello et al.  ( 2009a ) are all concerned with the potentially transfor-
mative relationship between proof in Dynamic Geometry (DG) environments and 
formal proofs (e.g., Euclidean proof). For example, Leung’s work  ( 2009 ) can con-
tribute to a discussion of whether a Euclidean proof can be remodelled so as to 
become a DG proof. Stevenson’s work  ( 2009 ) , closely related to Leung’s, asks to 
what extent the notion of proof becomes different in a DG environment. Finally, 
Arzarello et al.  ( 2009a ) consider analogous questions, but in the context of proof in 
school Geometry and Calculus. They reports on a teaching experiment in Proof in 
Calculus, which offered students a multi-register encounter with the concept of 
functions in a variety of interactive and individual work. The students demonstrated 
a range of quasi-empirical, in Lakatos’ sense (Tymoczko  1985 ) , and quasi- 
theoretical, in Chevallard’s sense (Bosch and Chevallard  1999 ) , approaches. The 
former emerged under the infl uence also of the software used; the latter emerged in 
a largely symbolic-algebraic register throughout the activities. Even though they did 
not provide any complete, formal proofs, through these approaches, the students 
started to connect relevant pieces of knowledge in an increasingly sophisticated way. 
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Whilst neither purely inductive nor deductive (but rather abductive), their approaches 
indicate an emergence of theoretical understanding of proof in Calculus. Arzarello 
et al.’s fi ndings thus resonate with those regarding effective proving  activity in the 
classroom examined earlier in this section (e.g., Kondratieva  2009 ; Perry et al. 
 2009a,  b ) . 
 In sum, despite the caveats we have outlined, the works reported here seem to be 
underlain by a robust appreciation of visual reasoning, particularly about images’ 
capacity to encompass ideas that cannot be made overt in a formal defi nition or an 
algebraic computation. However, a concern that comes across, often intensely, from 
these works is that teachers’ and, consequently, students’ ambivalence towards 
visualisation may cause prejudice against it and a consequent loss of its unique 
benefi ts. Further research and pedagogical action are necessary to make sure that 
this is not (or ceases to be) the case. 
 3  Multiple Forms of Proof and Multiple Proof Tasks 
 Hanna et al.  ( 2009 ) point out that distinctions amongst different forms of proofs can 
be mathematical, didactic, or cognitive (understanding-related). This section is 
structured in terms of these types of distinctions. It also includes a discussion of 
multiple proof tasks (MPTs), which explicitly require different types of proofs for 
the same mathematical statement. 
 Mathematical distinctions between proofs are based on the logical, structural, fi eld-
related, representation-related, and statement-related properties of the proofs. These dis-
tinctions are expressed in specifi c proof techniques and can be related to specifi c types 
of claims (Hanna et al.  2009 ) . Some statements allow a variety of proofs in different 
forms. Based on this observation, Leikin  ( 2009a ) discusses MPTs as tasks that contain 
an explicit requirement for proving a statement in multiple ways. The differences 
between the proofs are  mathematical, because they require: (a) different representations 
of a mathematical concept (e.g., proving the formula for the roots of a quadratic function 
using graphic representation, canonical symbolic representation, and polynomial sym-
bolic representation); (b) different properties (defi nitions or theorems) of mathematical 
concepts related to a particular mathematical topic (e.g., Fig.  8.1 , Task 1; Sun  2009 ; Sun 
and Chan  2009 ) ; (c) different mathematical tools and theorems from different branches 
of mathematics (e.g., Fig.  8.1 , Task 2; Greer et al.  2009 ) or (d) different tools and theo-
rems from various disciplines (not necessarily mathematics) that explicitly require prov-
ing a statement in different ways (Leikin  2009a ; cf. Multiple Solution Tasks in Leikin 
 2007 ; Leikin and Levav-Waynberg  2007 ) . 
 The most prominent MPT is Pythagoras’ Theorem, which lends itself to numerous 
proofs of different types (for over 70 proofs of this theorem, see, e.g.,  http://www.cut-
the-knot.org/pythagoras/index.shtml ). Many specifi c, less familiar problems may also 
have multiple proofs. For example, Greer et al.  ( 2009 ) focus their attention on an MPT 
(the ISIS problem) that asks: “Find which rectangles with sides of integral length (in 
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 Fig. 8.1  Multiple proof tasks (From Leikin  2009a , 31) 
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some unit) have the area and the perimeter (numerically) equal, and prove the result.” 
They characterise this problem as “notable for the variety of proofs (empirically 
grounded, algebraic, and geometrical) using different forms of argument, and their 
associated representations” (p. 184). Sun and Chan  ( 2009 ) and Sun  ( 2009 ) use the 
term “one problem, multiple solutions” when they consider student-generated proofs 
for the “mid-point theorem of triangles” and for the “area formula of a trapezoid.” Sun 
and Chan  ( 2009 ) present nine different proofs for the “mid-point theorem” and Sun 
 ( 2009 ) demonstrates seven different proofs for the “area formula of a trapezoid.” 
 Tabach et al.  ( 2009 ) demonstrate that different types of mathematical statements 
can lead to different methods of proof. For example, a universal statement necessi-
tates a general proof and a single counter-example is suffi cient to refute the 
statement. By contrast, an existential statement can be proven by a single supportive 
example, and a general proof is necessary to refute it. 
 Mathematical differences between the proofs can also refer to different levels of 
mathematics (e.g., Fig.  8.1 , Task 2, Proofs 2.1, 2.4). Morselli and Boero  ( 2009 ) , 
referring to Morselli  ( 2007 ) , argue that proofs at different mathematical levels can 
be seen when prospective teachers investigate the “properties of divisors of two 
consecutive numbers” by using divisibility, the properties of the remainder, or 
algebraic tools. Schwarz and Kaiser  ( 2009 ) , referring to Blum and Kirsch’s  ( 1991 ) 
distinction between pre-formal and formal proofs, agree that pre-formal proofs 
contribute to a deeper understanding of theorems by using application-oriented, 
experimental, and pictorial methods but argue that they are often incomplete (see 
the next section). By contrast, the authors claim the completeness of formal proofs 
often goes hand in hand with a degree of complexity that may impede students’ 
understanding. Different levels of proofs can lead to different types of didactic 
situations (Brousseau  1997 ) for which proofs of different forms are appropriate. 
They can also result in different cognitive (understanding-related) processes and 
products, in addition to different curricular sequences and instructional designs. 
 Hanna et al.  ( 2009 ) address distinctions between different types of proofs that are 
based on pedagogical properties and didactic functions. They view inductive proofs 
and generic (or transparent) proofs as “comprehensible to beginners” (p. xxiii) and 
of high didactic potential. Inductive proofs, however, may sometimes be invalid 
mathematically, they add. Amongst critical questions, these authors ask: “At which 
level, and in which situations, should the issue of the mathematical validity or lack 
of validity of inductive proofs be discussed, and how?” (p. xxiv) and “Is it important 
to introduce proof in a diversity of mathematical domains, and which proofs are 
more appropriate in which domains?” (p. xxiv). Various researchers have attempted 
a range of answers to these questions. 
 Some have used analysis of school mathematics textbooks to shed light on the 
didactic ideas implemented by teaching proofs. For example, Cabassut  ( 2009 ) 
addressed the role of students’ mathematical level and of corresponding didactic 
contracts (Brousseau  1997 ) in the use of different forms of proof through analysis 
of mathematics textbooks in France and Germany. Using as an example the “sign of 
quadratic function”, he argues that in secondary education the didactic contracts can 
develop different techniques and functions of the proof for the same mathematical 
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concept. At the same time, formulas of the perimeter and area of a circle are validated 
in French textbooks in the sixth and seventh grades through extra-mathematical 
warrants (visual, inductive, or pragmatic arguments) because mathematical warrants 
are not being used in these grades. 
 Meanwhile, after analysing textbooks commonly used for teaching students 
about proof in geometry in lower secondary schools in Japan, Fujita et al.  ( 2009 ) 
argue that the proof and proving activities in these textbooks show geometry as a 
highly formal subject of study, which precludes discussion of the differences 
between a formal proof and experimental verifi cation. 
 Sun and Chan  ( 2009 ) and Sun  ( 2009 ) argue that MPTs (“one problem, multiple 
solutions”) are “a simple and powerful framework for guiding teaching and learning”. 
However, students, teachers, textbook writers, and perhaps many researchers do not 
necessarily perceive them as such. When Sun (Sun  2009 ; Sun and Chan  2009 ) 
compared the use of “one problem, multiple solutions” approaches in Chinese and 
American textbooks, she found that the Chinese textbook uses MPTs better than its 
American counterpart. Sun and Chan  ( 2009 ) and Sun  ( 2009 ) , following Sun  ( 2007 ) , 
claim that MPTs are widely used in China and that they appear in the Chinese 
didactical contract in Hong Kong schools as a constituent of a “spiral variation 
curriculum” (Sun  2007 ; Sun and Chan  2009 ; Wong  2007 ) . 
 Spiral curriculum development and the connection-based approach to teaching 
mathematics gain expression in classroom activities centred around MPTs. However, 
Leikin  ( 2009a ) distinguishes between teacher-initiated and student-initiated multiple 
proofs. Frequently a teacher (or teacher educator, if the students are pre-service 
teachers) plans didactic situations that do not require each learner to provide 
multiple proofs. However, student-generated proofs can differ from each other; an 
a-didactic situation develops, contrary to the teacher’s plans, led by the students 
(Leikin and Levav-Waynberg  2007 ; cf. Brousseau  1997 ) . In other cases, the teacher 
may ask students to bring multiple proofs of a theorem (Leikin  2009a ) or guide 
students in exploring their own methods of proof which differ from each other (Sun 
 2009 ) . In these cases multiple proofs are teacher-initiated and are part of a didactic 
(i.e., the teacher carefully plans it) or a-didactic situation (i.e., the teacher initiates 
and monitors it, respecting students’ responses; Leikin and Levav-Waynberg  2007 ; 
for types of didactical situations, Brousseau  1997 ) . 
 Proofs and proving activities can differ also by the types of didactic settings in 
which they are incorporated. For example, games (e.g., Nim games) can be an 
effective form of teaching proofs, their purpose being to fi nd and prove a winning 
strategy. Lin  ( 2009 ) reports an experiment that used the game Hex to help students 
understand and use proofs by practising constructive proofs and proofs by contra-
diction. Winicki-Landman  ( 2009 ) describes the design and implementation of a 
course for pre-service primary teachers based on mathematical games and analysis 
of a specifi c game. The analysis results in discovering various roles of mathematical 
proofs during engagement with the game. 
 As the suitability of various types of proof depends on the level of the students’ 
mathematical knowledge, various ways of proving may be a factor in understanding 
proofs and in learning about proving (Hanna et al.  2009 ) . First, different types of 
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proof can be more or less explanatory or convincing. Nardi  ( 2009 ) found that 
“students often have a turbulent relationship with visual means of mathematical 
expression” (p. 112). They also experience diffi culties in connecting analytic with 
visual representations (see the previous section). Moreover, students express less 
positive attitudes about visual representations than they do about other forms. Nardi 
stresses “the importance of building bridges between the formal and the informal, in 
constant negotiation with the students” (p. 114). 
 However, such bridge-building may require a shift in teachers’ attitudes. For 
example, Greer et al.  ( 2009 ) describe a study of a group of 39 Flemish pre-service 
mathematics teachers presented with the Isis problem (“so called because of its con-
nection with the Isis cult”, Davis and Hersh  1981 , p. 7). The task allowed empirical, 
algebraic and geometrical proofs. When they compared the proofs, the teachers 
preferred the empirically grounded and analytic-graphic proofs least, and the 
algebraic ones most. Tabach et al.  ( 2009 ) asked teachers which correct and incorrect 
proofs their students might construct. Overall, the teachers expected their students 
to propose mainly correct formal proofs and mainly incorrect numeric proofs. At 
the same time, the teachers did not expect students to produce many verbal proofs. 
In addition, Chin et al.  ( 2009 ) demonstrate that, although tending to favour narrative 
and empirical approaches, students think their teachers favour algebraic approaches 
to proofs. From the opposite point of view, Ersoz  ( 2009 ) argues that students’ learning 
proof in Euclidean geometry later creates obstacles when the students are learning 
to prove in other mathematical domains. 
 The use of MPTs could change both teachers’ and students’ views on various 
types of proofs (Leikin and Levav-Waynberg  2009 ) . Linking mathematical ideas by 
using more than one approach to solving the same problem (e.g., proving the same 
statement) is an essential element in developing mathematical connections (NCTM 
 2000 ; Pólya  1945/1973 ; Schoenfeld  1985 ) . Solving MPTs can develop students’ 
divergent reasoning (Kwon et al.  2006 ) , as well as their mental fl exibility and fl uency 
(Leikin  2009b ; Silver  1997 ; Sriraman  2003 ) . Using MPTs precludes fi xating on a 
single mathematical idea and increases the chances of an original mathematical 
product (Kwon et al.  2006 ; Lithner  2008 ) . 
 There is evidence that the teacher’s role is indispensable in establishing didactic 
contracts associated with the use of different forms of proofs in the mathematics class-
room (Furinghetti and Morselli  2009 ; Schwarz and Kaiser  2009 ; Stylianides and 
Stylianides  2009 ; Tabach et al.  2009 ) . Using the example of the Pythagoras theorem, 
Furinghetti and Morselli  ( 2009 ) argue that teachers should consider different proofs as 
equally valid, independently of whether they used them while they were students. Tabach 
et al.  ( 2009 ) and Stylianides and Stylianides  ( 2009 ) stress the importance of teachers’ 
awareness of the roles and validity of different forms of proofs with respect both to 
mathematics as science and to students’ mathematical level. Schwarz and Kaiser 
 ( 2009 ) point out that teaching different types of proof places high demands on teach-
ers and future teachers. They add that teachers should have university-level content 
knowledge of mathematics, including the abilities to identify different proof struc-
tures, to execute proofs on different levels, to know specifi c alternative mathematical 
proofs, and to recognise and establish connections between different topic areas. 
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 4  The Function of Forms of Proof in the Classroom 
 Considering the variety and quality of forms of proof available, and given the 
preponderance of empirical proof schemes amongst students and even some teachers 
(see e.g., Fischbein  1982 ; Harel and Sowder  2007 ; Martin and Harel  1989 ) , one 
may ask which forms of proof might help students make the transition from unso-
phisticated empirical arguments to general proofs, and how. This transition includes 
understanding that examples don’t constitute proof, experiencing a need for general 
proof at least occasionally, and acquiring an ability to produce non-example-based 
proofs, again at least for some claims. 
 The history of mathematics might provide some guidance. Siu  ( 2009 ) distin-
guishes between algorithmic and dialectic aspects of proof: Algorithmic mathematics 
is a problem-solving tool that invites action and generates results; dialectic 
mathematics, on the other hand, is a rigorously logical science, where statements 
are either true or false and where objects with specifi ed properties either do or do 
not exist, which invites contemplation and generates insight. Siu shows that these 
two aspects intertwine in both ancient mathematics and students’ thinking, and that 
one can learn from the link between them. One of Siu’s examples is Al Khowarizmi’s 
solution of quadratic equations.  Grabiner  ( 2011 ) shows that visual forms of proof 
have historically played an important role in the development of some proof ideas; 
she also points out that Al Khowarizmi used visual quadratic completion for devel-
oping the quadratic formula. Further, whilst Al Khowarizmi solved a specifi c 
equation, the same reasoning chain generalises to an entire class of equations; 
in this sense his proof is generic. Partly because of its algorithmic nature, Al 
Khowarizmi’s proof satisfi es Wittmann’s  ( 2009 ) criteria for operative proofs: It pro-
ceeds by actions on ‘quasi-real’ mathematical objects and is communicable in 
problem-oriented, non-technical language. 
 Generally, these forms of proof – algorithmic, visual, generic and operative – 
may be subsumed under the heading “preformal proofs”, defi ned by Blum and 
Kirsch as “a chain of correct, but not formally represented conclusions which refer 
to valid, non-formal premises”  ( 1991 , p. 187). Preformal proofs have an illustrative 
style, and emphasise experimental and visual aspects of mathematics. Conceptions 
of pre-formal proofs are also closely related to forms of proof that arise from experi-
mental mathematics, often via a computer-based activity. However, these proof 
forms have rather different epistemological and practical features from those dis-
cussed here and are dealt with elsewhere (e.g.,  Borwein  2011 ;  Zehavi and Mann 
 2009 ). Several researchers have proposed using such proof forms to provide bridges 
for students on the path from empirical to general proof. 
 Proofs in which visual reasoning plays a central role have been a favourite playing 
fi eld of mathematicians for some time. In particular, Nelsen  ( 1993,  2000 ) , and 
Alsina and Nelsen  ( 2006 ) have published collections of such proofs, many of which 
are suitable for the high school level. Nevertheless, high school teachers and students 
accept visual reasoning in proofs, at best, with hesitation (Dreyfus  1994 ; Harel and 
Dreyfus  2009 ; see the section on visual forms of proof above). 
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 Whilst described extensively in the German mathematics education literature 
since 1980, the idea of operative proofs is not easily accessible in the English 
literature (see, however, Selden 2005 ; Wittmann 1998, 2005, 2009 ) . Characteristically, 
operative proofs arise from the exploration of a mathematical problem, are based on 
operations with “quasi-real” mathematical objects, and are communicable in problem-
oriented language with little symbolism. Hence, they often use visual (rather than 
symbolic) representations for mathematical objects and, crucially, proceed via 
 operations applicable to these objects. In other words, operative proofs usually have 
an algorithmic aspect, for which visual reasoning may well be central. Wittmann 
 ( 2009 ) gives examples of operative proofs. First, students who have become familiar 
with odd and even numbers, represented by paired rows of counters with or without 
a leftover singleton, can operate on the representation to show that, say, the sum of 
two odd numbers is even. Or, students can deal with divisibility criteria (i.e., that a 
number is divisible by 9 if and only if the sum of its digits is) using operations on a 
visual representation of place value. Crucially, the students become familiar with 
the objects and their representations, discover properties and relationships between 
them, and the proof then becomes explanatory to them (Hanna  1989 ) . 
 Generic proof has been treated more extensively in the literature, starting with 
Tall  ( 1979 ) and including some empirical research studies. A generic proof aims to 
exhibit a complete chain of reasoning from assumptions to conclusion, just as in a 
general proof; however, as with operative proofs, a generic proof makes the chain of 
reasoning accessible to students by reducing its level of abstraction; it achieves this 
by examining an example that makes it possible to exhibit the complete chain of 
reasoning without the need to use a symbolism that the student might fi nd incom-
prehensible. In other words, the generic proof, although using an (numerical) example, 
must not rely on any properties of this specifi c example. Consequently, many operative 
proofs are generic and vice versa. 
 The following generic proof shows that the sum of two even numbers is even. 
Dreyfus  ( 2000 ) presented this proof to a group of 44 junior high school teachers, 
requesting that they comment on it as if it had been presented by one of their students. 








46 23 23  
After summing the equal parts, 7 and 16, we still have two equal parts of 
23; therefore their sum 23 + 23 is even. It is always possible to do this with 
two even numbers.
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 Nine teachers made predominantly positive comments; 27 made predominantly 
negative ones. All but four stressed that an example or a special case does not 
constitute a proof. The remaining eight teachers did not comment. Only four teachers 
explicitly commented on the student’s claim that the method always works. However, 
none of the four was fully convinced. Apparently, they appreciated the generic 
nature of the argument but were not completely satisfi ed by it. Ten other teachers 
made some comment about the student’s correct way of thinking about the example. 
Dreyfus concluded that at best a third of the teachers showed some appreciation 
for the generic nature of the proof. 
 Mason and Pimm  ( 1984 ) discuss the idea of  generic example and its use. A generic 
example is an actual example but “presented in such a way as to bring out its intended 
role as the carrier of the general” (p. 287). Examples include fi nding the sign of a 
derivative on an interval by fi nding it at a single point in the interval, or more sweep-
ingly, considering the graph of y =  x 2 as representing any quadratic, which it does. 
 Mason and Pimm also raised many crucial issues and questions about generic 
proofs: How does the student come to understand that fi nding the derivative at a 
single point (or making an argument on  x 2 only) is proof by means of a single 
example that is intended to stand for a more general case. It depends on how hidden 
or overt this intended role of generality is, and on how well the teacher can lead the 
students to investigate and become aware of the more general case which is being 
exemplifi ed. In summary, “how can the necessary act of perception, of seeing the 
general in the particular, be fostered?” (p. 287). Mason and Pimm propose diagrams 
as a useful intermediary in this transition. However, diagrams are still only examples 
showing particular cases. Given the diagram of Al Khowarizmi’s method for solving 
a quadratic (see above) how can a student know for which other equations this method 
does or does not work? Generally, how are students to learn seeing the general 
through any such particular diagram? 
 Balacheff  ( 1987 ) stressed that the example used in a generic proof is generic in 
so far as it makes the reasons for the truth of the general assertion explicit. It is 
exactly that generic character of the situation which gives it the potential for passing 
from a pragmatic, example-based proof to an intellectual, general proof. 
 Meanwhile, Rowland  ( 1998,  2001 ) argues that in order for a generic proofs to 
succeed, the generalisation made by the student needs to be of a structural nature: The 
deep structure of the argument rather than some surface features have to be put in 
evidence and generalised. Structural generalisations are based on the underlying 
meaning and achieve explanatory insight. Rowland proposes generic proofs as didactic 
devices that can be used to assist students to perceive and value that which is generic 
rather than particular in explanations and arguments. Here, generic proofs play a crucial 
role as transitional tools leading from inductive inference to deductive reasoning. 
 Like Rowland  ( 2001 ) , Malek and Movshowitz-Hadar  ( 2009 ) refer to the use of 
generic proofs, which they call transparent pseudo-proofs, at the tertiary level with 
the intention that students can see through the presented generic argument or 
pseudo-proof to the formal proof. Continuing Rowland’s formulation of guiding 
principles, they propose to look at different degrees of specialisation of general 
claims in terms of a ‘generality level pyramid’ and to analyse what considerations 
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should be taken into account when constructing a generic proof. This approach 
appears relevant for complex statements such as are common at the tertiary level, 
with different parameters or variables that can be specialised by being given particular 
values. Malek and Movshowitz-Hadar particularly stress the importance of making 
sure that nothing specifi c to the example being proved enters the proof (i.e., that the 
presented proof is indeed generic). However, their more important contribution 
(Malek and Movshovitz-Hadar  2011 ) is a small scale (n = 10) empirical study, at the 
tertiary level, examining how the use of pseudo-proofs affects the acquisition of 
transferable cognitive proof-related structures. Their results are encouraging; they 
show that exposure to a generic proof supports students in articulating the main 
ideas of the proof, in writing a full proof for the theorem, and in proving a different 
theorem with a similar proof idea. 
 Finally, Leron and Zaslavksy  ( 2009 ) add some further examples of generic 
proofs, again mostly suitable for the tertiary level; they also refi ne some of Mason 
and Pimm’s  ( 1984 ) statements. They point to the chosen example’s degree of com-
plexity as a critical attribute for making it suffi ciently general (to allow the student 
to engage with the main ideas of the complete proof) but not too general (hence 
barring the student from following the argument). They also contribute further to 
characterising proofs that are amenable to be cast in generic form; they argue the 
importance of a proof’s being constructive, since construction of a mathematical 
object or procedure can often be demonstrated by a generic example. 
 In summary, mathematics educators have invested quite a bit of thought in 
generic and other pre-formal forms of proof as steps in students’ transition from 
empirical to deductive proof conceptions. Most of this work has been theoretical, 
analysing the nature and kinds of possible pre-formal proofs. A variety of examples 
have been proposed to suggest and support this theoretical work. Anecdotal case 
studies have provided some evidence that generic examples can provide “enlighten-
ment” (Kidron and Dreyfus  2009 ; Rowland  1998 ; Tall  1979 ) . The extant empirical 
research, however, is limited and relates almost exclusively to the tertiary level. 
 5  Towards a Research Agenda 
 Empirical research on students’ conceptions of proof has been almost exclusively 
momentary, in the sense that it examined students’ current conceptions; this research 
has led to several mutually compatible classifi cations of students’ conceptions (e.g., 
Balacheff  1987 ; Harel and Sowder  1998 ) and hence to a rather solid theoretical base 
on which longer-term empirical studies could be built. 
 Researchers who have written about visual and generic proofs have started from 
the basic premise that these forms of proof can support students in the desirable 
transition from an empirical or pragmatic stance on proof to a deductive one. 
Research on students’ conceptions of proof also shows that this is a key transition in 
mathematical education. In fact, the mathematics education community has been 
aware of the idea of generic proof for more than a quarter-century, and is in possession 
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of a fair number of encouraging anecdotes and small-scale studies. However, no 
large-scale systematic research studies at the school level have been reported. 
This is surprising, given that mathematics education policy in many countries 
strongly supports the development of reasoning and proof. For example, in the USA 
the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics states that: “Mathematical 
reasoning and proof offer powerful ways of developing and expressing insights 
about a wide range of phenomena. Reasoning and proof should be a consistent 
part of students’ mathematical experiences in pre-kindergarten through grade 
12” (NCTM  2000 , p. 56). Similar recommendations can be found in documents 
of the Australian Educational Council  ( 1991 ) , the Israeli Ministry of Education 
 ( 1994 ) and others. 
 Empirical studies are necessary because we cannot on the basis of theoretical 
analyses predict in suffi ciently fi ne-grained form what might happen empirically. 
For example, Malek and Movshovitz-Hadar’s  ( 2011 ) empirical results showed that 
the presumed positive effects of generic proofs empirically held for some generic 
proofs but not for others; specifi cally, they held only in cases where the proof 
required the employment of new (to the student) ideas or establishing new connections. 
Thus, the effectiveness of generic proofs might be related to new ideas that appear 
in a proof. On the other hand, the use of operative proofs involves carrying out 
computations via operations on the (often visual) representations that serve to generate 
the proof (Wittmann  2009 ) . One might therefore expect such proofs to have an 
important role in supporting elementary-school students in the transition from 
empirical to general arguments. However, the differences between the elementary 
level, where Wittmann implemented operative proofs, and the tertiary level, where 
Malek and Movshowitz-Hadar did their research, remain considerable. Larger-scale 
empirical evidence is certainly needed: larger scale in age groups, in sub-domains 
of mathematics, in types of pre-formal proofs, even in types of proof, and in number 
of participants. In addition, different research studies might have different goals: for 
example, students’ ability to construct a valid argument or even a general proof, 
students’ insight into why an assertion is true or, at the most general level, students’ 
transition from an empirical to a deductive stance with respect to what counts as 
proof. However, the latter research faces the diffi culty that the transition from an 
empirical to a deductive proof stance may be a long-term process that depends 
heavily on the students’ previous mathematics learning. Even the 3–5 years usually 
allotted to funded or doctoral research might be insuffi cient. Nevertheless, this must 
not be a reason for desisting from all research in the area. 
 In terms of the progressive teaching of proof, researchers might ask what, in 
addition to the availability of suitable generic or other pre-formal proofs is needed 
to achieve the desired result, whether the requirements are different for reading, 
reproducing, or constructing proofs (see Mejía-Ramos and Inglis  2009 ) , what 
teacher actions and what classroom atmosphere might support or hinder achieve-
ment, and how all of these factors may vary with the age or level of the student, the 
type of mathematics, and the specifi cities of type of proof being used. For example, 
much of the existing work on generic proofs seems to deal with number theory; 
there is some work in algebra, but little or none in geometry, probability and calculus. 
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We need to know whether it is more diffi cult to fi nd or construct appropriate generic 
proofs in these areas. 
 Finally, making generic, visual or pre-formal proofs accessible to students does 
not necessarily imply that the students see why they should prove or feel that they 
need to prove. Some researchers have addressed this need for proof (Buchbinder 
and Zaslavsky  2009 ; Dreyfus and Hadas  1996 ; Hadas et al.  2000 ; Kidron et al. 
 2010 ; Nardi  2008 ; Nardi and Iannone  2006 ) . The issue of students’ need for proof 
seems to us equally as important as the accessibility of proof. It should be taken into 
account; research programmes such as outlined above should investigate the 
infl uence of students’ need for proof on their proof production. 
 In summary, we urgently and crucially need research studies on the long-term 
(several years) effects of specifi c approaches and interventions – in particular, the 
use of generic, operative or visual proof starting from elementary school onwards – 
on students’ conceptions of proof and on their ability to produce and/or understand 
more formal proofs in later stages of learning. Long-term empirical studies on students’ 
transition to deductive proof could provide the basis researchers need to build a 
coherent theory of learning proof and proving. 
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 We will organise our discussion of the need for proof and proving around three main 
questions: Why teach proof? What are (or may be) learners’ needs for proof? How 
can teachers facilitate the need for proof? 
 First, we examine the close connection between the functions of proof within 
mathematics and the needs those evoke for teaching proof. We also examine the 
epistemology of proof in the history of mathematics in order to elucidate the needs 
that propelled the discipline to develop historically. The second section takes a 
 learner’s perspective on the need to prove. Learners face a problematic situation 
when they confront a problem that cannot be routinely solved by their current 
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 knowledge. A person’s  intellectual need is a necessary condition for constructing 
new knowledge (Harel  1998 ) . We examine categories of intellectual need that may 
drive learners to prove (i.e., for certitude, to understand, to quantify, to communi-
cate, and for structure and connection; Harel  in press ) . Interestingly, Harel’s  ( in 
press ) categories of learners’ needs align with the roles that proof and proving play 
in mathematics. The third section addresses pedagogical issues involved in teach-
ers’ attempts to facilitate learners’ need to prove. Uncertainty and cognitive confl ict 
are the driving forces for proving. We discuss how a teacher can foster necessity-
based learning that motivates the need to prove. 
 1  The Need for Teaching Proof 
 The role of proof and proving in mathematics directs us to the needs for teaching 
proof in schools. Here, we focus on proof’s central roles within mathematics: 
validation, explanation, discovery, systemisation of results, incorporation into a 
framework, and conveying mathematical knowledge (de Villiers  1990 ; Hanna  2000 ; 
Rav  1999 ) . A proof demonstrates that a mathematical assertion is true, assuming 
certain axioms. Yet, mathematicians look beyond establishing truth to seek insight 
into why; proofs can have explanatory power (Hanna  2000 ; Thurston  1994 ) . Through 
the process of proof, mathematicians may discover new results. Proofs communicate 
mathematical knowledge and situate that knowledge systematically within a frame-
work. Finally, Rav  ( 1999 ) proposes that proofs are of primary importance in mathe-
matics because they embody tools, methods, and strategies for solving problems. 
 It follows that one need for teaching proof in school is to support students’ understand-
ing of proof as practised in the discipline. Within the community of mathematicians, the 
truth of a mathematical assertion follows through valid deductive reasoning from 
established results; proof is a deductive “…demonstration that compels agreement 
by all who understand the concepts involved.” (Hersh  2008 , p. 100). 
 Hence, the mathematics curricula of countries worldwide have in common the 
goal of training students in deductive reasoning and logical inference (cf. Balacheff 
 1991 ; Healy and Hoyles  2000 ; Herbst  2002 ; Kunimune et al.  2008 ) . In this respect, 
mathematics teachers play the role of a broker with membership status in both the 
mathematics community and the classroom community, bridging the two (Rasmussen 
et al.  2009 ; Yackel and Cobb  1996 ) . Whether in secondary or elementary class-
rooms, teachers play an active role in judging and instructing on what arguments 
can establish validity or count as proof (Stylanides  2007 ) . 
 Another role for proof in mathematics is explaining why a mathematical state-
ment is true given certain assumptions. Often mathematicians undertake a proof 
because they are personally convinced of the truth or validity of a mathematical 
assertion, having explored it empirically and through its structure (de Villiers  1990, 
 2010 ; Weber  2008 ) . Proofs communicate mathematical knowledge and its place 
within an organised structure. Therefore, another need for teaching proof is to ‘shed 
light on’ the origins and connections of mathematical knowledge. 
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 If proof’s only purpose were to establish validity, there would be no need to prove 
things in multiple ways (Dawson  2006 ; Hanna  2000 ; Siu  2008 ) . Multiple perspectives 
provided by multiple proofs, coupled with reliance on examples provide a network of 
connections and deeper understanding of mathematical concepts. Mathematicians 
also generate multiple proofs of theorems “to demonstrate the power of different 
methodologies” or to discover new techniques (Dawson  2006 ; Rav  1999 ) . 
 Hence, another reason to teach proof is the potential to teach methods of problem 
solving. For example, Hanna and Barbeau  ( 2010 ) argued that mathematics teachers 
could ‘leverage’ proofs common in secondary curricula in order to explicitly intro-
duce strategies, methods, and tools. They suggest, for instance, the derivation of the 
quadratic formula, which introduces students to the strategy of completing the 
square. They argue that students can thus learn a technique whose applicability 
extends beyond that situation as well as learning what can be discovered by reducing 
equations to a canonical form. 
 Proofs from geometry could be thus ‘leveraged’; in fact, high school geometry is 
often where students fi rst encounter proof. Geometry is a part of high school math-
ematics, which most obviously lends itself to the intellectual necessitation of rigor-
ous mathematical structure. This could perhaps be enhanced by a programme that 
begins with  neutral geometry; that is, geometry without the parallel postulate (Harel 
 in press ) . 
 Obviously, students’ experiences with proof and proving differ from mathemati-
cians’ experiences because their purposes differ; students in schools are not engaged 
in the activity of proving in order to discover new mathematical results (Herbst and 
Brach  2006 ; Hilbert et al.  2008 ) . The reasons for teaching proof and proving in 
schools follow from the expectation that students have experiences in reasoning 
similar to those of mathematicians: learning a body of mathematical knowledge and 
gaining insight into why assertions are true. However, the proofs that students 
encounter in school are often presented complete in order to teach students the pro-
cesses of logical thinking and communicating and, perhaps implicitly, problem 
solving by example. From the students’ perspective, proving as merely an exercise 
in confi rming assertions and learning theorems lacks intellectual purpose (Harel  in 
press ; Herbst  2002 ; Herbst and Brach  2006 ) because in this kind of situation students 
are not fully engaged in an attempt to search for a solution to a mathematical 
problem that they appreciate. 
 Historically, a proof is a rhetorical device for convincing someone else that a 
mathematical statement is true (Harel and Sowder  2007 ; Krantz  2007 ) . In order to 
convince, a proof has to align with the norms (e. g., forms of reasoning, logical rules 
of inference, modes of argumentation and modes of argument representation) of the 
community to which it is presented (Harel and Sowder  2007 ; Siu  2008 ; Stylianides 
 2007 ) . The standards that a proof must fulfi l arise from an agreement amongst 
members of the community. A review of the history of the development of proof 
makes it clear that the rules and form have evolved over time and vary from culture 
to culture (cf. Arsac  2007 ; Hanna and Jahnke  1993 ; Kleiner  1991 ; Siu  1993 ) . 
 Understanding the intellectual needs that might have brought about these changes 
in the development of proof historically does not directly lead to understanding a 
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person’s intellectual necessity for proof, though it may be instructive. In this brief 
account, we focus on the historical means of proving and the motives for change as 
they relate to the possible implications for pedagogy. For extensive descriptions of 
the history of the development of proof in mathematics, cf. Arsac  2007 ; Harel and 
Sowder  2007 ; Kleiner  1991 ; Krantz  2007 ; Siu  2008 . 
 Historians characteristically discuss the historical-epistemological factors in 
three phases: pre-Greek, post-Greek, and modern. Prior to the Greeks’ concept of 
deductive reasoning within an axiomatic system, Babylonians and Chinese provided 
justifi cations for mathematical assertions. Proofs, as explanations that convinced 
and enlightened, abounded in ancient texts (Siu  1993 ) . Conjectures were proved by 
empirical evidence and commonly involved quantitative measures of actual physical 
entities. The subsequent evolution in mathematical practice from the pre-Greek to 
Greek phases encompassed a shift to abstract ideal entities and the development of 
a formal system. 
 The reasons for the shift encompass both internal and external factors; historians 
do not agree on which takes precedence. The needs in the mathematical community 
to generate changes were due to perturbations that needed resolution. The Greeks 
needed to alleviate inconsistencies found in their predecessors’ mathematical work; 
they wished to create a system free of paradoxes (Harel and Sowder  2007 ) . The 
Greeks were also driven by a need to resolve problems of incommensurability and 
irrationality (e. g., a square’s diagonal is incommensurable with its side, 2 has no 
rational square root; Arsac  2007 ; Harel and Sowder  2007 ) . Furthermore, the dialectic 
and intellectual milieu of the culture contributed to the promotion of the notion of 
deductive proof (Arsac  2007 ; Harel and Sowder  2007 ; Siu  2008 ) . 
 In the post-Greek era, mathematics continued developing in Africa, India, China 
and the civilisations of Central and South America. The Arabs developed some of 
the seminal ideas in algebra. Symbolic algebra, beginning with Vieta’s work, seems 
to have played a critical role in reconceptualisation of mathematics in general and 
proof in particular (Arsac  2007 ; Harel and Sowder  2007 ) . The shift from Greek 
mathematics to modern mathematics entailed a shift from idealised physical reali-
ties to arbitrary entities not necessarily evident in “natural experience.” In modern 
mathematics, a mathematical entity is dependent upon its connection to other enti-
ties within a structure. From the beginning of the 1900s, discussions about the 
foundations of mathematics resulted in insight into the need for axioms that can 
only be justifi ed extrinsically, by virtue of their fruitfulness and explanatory power 
(Jahnke  2010 ) . Axioms are viewed not as absolute truths but as agreed proposi-
tions. This shift, too, was born from a desire to create a system free of paradoxes. 
In addition, ongoing philosophical debate about the nature of understanding and 
Aristotlean causality, in particular, has played a role (Harel and Sowder  2007 ; 
Jahnke  2010 ) . 
 The consequences of this history are borne out in the teaching of proof. Secondary 
school geometry in the Euclidean tradition is often the fi rst (and possibly only) place 
where students learn to do proof. The limits of proof in this tradition include a lack 
of methods of discovery and the prominence of methods for proving without expla-
nation (reductio ad absurdum, proof by exhaustion; Arsac  2007 ) . Though modern 
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mathematicians adopt axioms or hypotheses without perceiving them as evident or 
absolutely true, the Euclidean view of proof as taught in schools today communicates 
that proof establishes truth rather than validates assertions based on agreed axioms. 
The hypothetical nature of axioms “remains hidden from most pupils” (Jahnke  2010 , 
p. 29). Furthermore, as Arsac  ( 2007 ) notes, Euclidean mathematics is characterised 
by wanting to prove everything even when it is evident. 
 Mathematics educators need to understand  students’ perspectives on the need for 
proof and which situations, tasks and knowledge encourage that need in students. In 
the next section, we offer an overview of what research and practice tell us about 
learners’ conceptions and beliefs regarding the need to prove. 
 2  The Need for Proof and Proving: A Learner’s Perspective 
 Students can lack understanding of the functions of proof in mathematics. In studies 
in Japan of lower secondary school students, even though most performed well at 
proof writing, more than 60% of students did not understand why proofs are needed 
(Fujita and Jones  2003 ; Kunimune et al.  2008 ) . Healy and Hoyles  ( 2000 ) studied 
nearly 2,500 capable 14- and 15-year old British students, more than a quarter of 
them could not articulate the purpose or meaning of proof. About half of the stu-
dents referred to verifi cation as a purpose of proof; roughly one-third of them cited 
proof’s function in explanation and communication. In follow-up interviews, many 
more students seemed to hold a view of proof as explanation. Twenty years earlier, 
Williams  ( 1980 ) found that out of 255 11th-grade Canadian college preparation 
students in ten randomly selected classes from nine different senior high schools, 
about half expressed no need to prove a statement that they regarded as obvious. 
Fewer than 30% showed a grasp of the meaning of proof. 
 Coe and Ruthven’s  ( 1994 ) study illustrated how students may theoretically 
understand the function of proof yet not employ proof in their mathematics practice. 
The study was conducted with a cohort of advanced-level mathematics students 
towards the end of their fi rst year college, who had followed a reformed secondary 
curriculum. The authors examined 60 pieces of student coursework and analysed 
the types of proof used. Seven students were interviewed. The students were aware 
that proof is required for mathematical knowledge; but only the best students said 
that proof convinced them of the truth of mathematical assertions. 
 Often, external requirements affect the need to prove. Some students produce 
proof because their teacher demands it, not because they recognise that proof is 
necessary in their practice (Balacheff  1988 ) . Consequently, they may fail to under-
stand reasons for the truth of a statement; they are convinced because their teacher 
asserts it. In the classifi cation of proof schemes (means by which one obtains certainty), 
this authoritarian conception of proof belongs amongst the “external conviction” 
proof schemes (Harel and Sowder  1998,  2007 ) . 
 Balacheff  ( 1991 ) claims that the reason students do not engage in proving is not 
so much because they cannot but rather because they see no reasons or need for it. 
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If students lack understanding of proof’s role and display external conviction proof 
schemes, a question arises: Is there only an external need for proving or can we fi nd 
some inner need that may drive learners to prove? 
 To answer this question, we examine fi ve categories of intellectual need: for 
certainty, for causality, for computation, for communication and for structure. These 
needs are linked and relate to functions of proof as practised in mathematics, as 
well as to proof schemes (Harel and Sowder  1998,  2007 ) . The fi rst two needs, for 
certainty and causality, are particularly salient to research on the learning and 
teaching of proof. 
 2.1  Need for Certainty 
 The fi rst need, for certainty, is the human desire to verify an assertion. Though 
verifi cation is one of the central roles of proof, students see no need for mathematical 
proof, because their need for certainty is personal, in the sense of requiring 
“personal” rather than “mathematical” convincing. For many students, empirical 
work is personally convincing. Observations of students’ performance of proofs 
have produced some indirect evidence along these lines. 
 For example, Fischbein and Kedem  ( 1982 ) studied 400 high school students who 
were presented with a mathematical theorem and its complete formal proof. The 
majority of the students affi rmed that they were sure that the proof was complete 
and irreproachable but simultaneously claimed that analysis of examples would 
strengthen their confi dence. In some ways this is not surprising, given the history of 
proof prior to the Greeks; in pre-Greek mathematics, concerned with actual physical 
entities, conjectures were proven by empirical evidence (Harel and Sowder  2007 ) . 
Besides, this practice of looking for examples and counterexamples after reading a 
proof is one means mathematicians employ ( Lakatos  1976 ) . As Fischbein  ( 1982 ) 
mentioned, the role of intuitive structures does not come to an end when analytical 
(formal) forms of thinking become possible. 
 However, when they declare that one might fi nd contradictory evidence of a 
proven statement by examining further examples, students demonstrate that they do 
not understand the meaning of “mathematical proof.” In addition to the conceptual 
logical schemes, the students need a feeling of agreement, a basis of belief expressed 
in this need for verifi cation by further examples. 
 In Fischbein and Kedem’s  ( 1982 ) study, students needed verifi cation by examples 
in addition to formal proof. In many other cases, exemplifi cation replaced the formal 
proof. For example, Thompson  ( 1991 ) studied advanced students in a course that 
emphasised reasoning and proof; nevertheless, a large number of the students 
‘proved’ a statement by providing a specifi c example. This behaviour reveals an 
inductive proof scheme (Harel and Sowder  1998 ) , one kind of empirical proof scheme. 
Several studies have observed students’ adopting such empirical proof schemes. In 
fact, many school students, including advanced or high-attaining secondary students, 
(e.g., Coe and Ruthven  1994 ; Healy and Hoyles  2000 ; Knuth et al.  2002 ) and 
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university students, including mathematics majors (e.g., Goetting  1995 ; Sowder and 
Harel  2003 ; Stylianides and Stylianides  2009a,  b ) , consider empirical arguments to 
be proofs of mathematical generalisations. Although not universal (Iannone and 
Inglis  2010 ; Weber  2010 ) , this pervasive misconception inhibits students’ perceiving 
an intellectual need for proof as a mathematical construct. 
 In addition, a student who has this misconception, even if seeing a reason for 
developing a proof, will probably produce an empirical argument for a mathematical 
generalisation. Such students do not recognise the importance of producing a more 
general argument that meets the standard of proof (for a mathematician); for them, 
the empirical argument  is the proof. A student thus satisfi ed with empirical 
arguments has little reason to bother to (learn how to) construct general arguments 
(notably proofs). Constructing general arguments is incomparably more complex 
than constructing empirical arguments. General arguments aim to cover appropri-
ately the entire domain of a generalisation (which can have infi nite cardinality; cf. 
Stylianides and Stylianides  2009a ), whereas empirical arguments can be satisfi ed 
with the examination of only a subset of that domain. They may verify that subset, 
but the generalisation remains unverifi ed and hence uncertain, though the student 
may not recognise this. 
 2.2  Need for Causality 
 Just as with certainty, humans have a desire to determine the cause of a phenomenon – to 
explain why an assertion is true. Causality relates to a proof’s function as explana-
tion (Harel  in press ) . In fact, instructors can fi nd it relatively easy to elicit students’ 
curiosity about why a result is true. 
 Kidron and Dreyfus  ( 2010 ) describe the need for causality in their case study of 
a teacher and a single learner’s process of mathematical justifi cation during the 
investigation of bifurcation points in dynamic systems. The learner’s need to estab-
lish causality arose from justifi cation of results obtained numerically by means of 
interaction with the computer. The learner was sure of this result, since it agreed 
with previous empirical results. Thus, the learner was interested in neither verifi ca-
tion nor a formal proof, but felt the need to explain in order to gain more insight into 
the connections in the data. 
 This kind of need for insight into “why” may vary from person to person and 
from context to context. In Harel and Sowder’s  ( 1998 ) terms, it fi ts the causality 
proof scheme, a part of the deductive proof scheme. It might appear in situations of 
contradiction, followed by surprise or uncertainty, that lead students to seek for 
explanations (e.g., Movshovitz-Hadar and Hadass  1990 ) . Students might seek cau-
sality after an experimental investigation convinces them and they are encouraged 
to explain why (deVilliers  1998 ) . It might appear in the interplay of conjectures and 
checks of certainty and uncertainty, for example, when students feel the need to fi nd 
the cause of their assertion’s untruthfulness as in Hadas et al. study  ( 2000 ) . 
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 2.3  Needs for Computation, Communication and Structure 
 The needs for computation and communication are interrelated and often concurrent 
(Harel  in press ) . Harel refers to the need to compute as humans’ propensity to 
quantify, determine or construct an object, or to determine the property of an object 
or relations amongst objects (e.g., a number, geometric fi gure, function) by means 
of symbolic algebra. Again, this necessity was signifi cant in the development of 
mathematics and proof, in particular. Computing by means of symbolic algebra 
enabled a shift in focus from the attributes of spatial fi gures to nineteenth-century 
investigations into underlying operations, algebraic representations and their 
structures (Harel and Sowder  2007 ) . The need for communication refers to both 
formulating and formalising, rooted in the acts of conveying and exchanging ideas. 
Students with an intuitive explanation for “why” can be pressed to be systematic in 
expressions of their reasoning and modify their use of notation in order to better 
express what they have in mind (Harel  in press ;  Thompson  1992 ), This need also 
connects to the role of proof in communicating methodologies and techniques for 
problem solving. 
 The need for structure refers to the need to (re-)organise information into a 
logical structure. Harel  ( in press ) distinguishes between an earlier stage, in which 
one organises one’s own knowledge by assimilating it into her or his existing cogni-
tive structure that may not be logically hierarchical, and a later stage where a need 
may arise to re-organise the structure into a logical structure. Historically, the need 
to structure Euclidean geometry in  Euclid’s Elements arose from a need to organise 
and communicate an accumulated body of knowledge. Furthermore, the need to 
perfect this structure led to the attempt to prove the parallel postulate (Harel  in 
press ) . The need for structure may lead from disconnected ideas to unifying 
principles or concepts. 
 Proof in classroom instruction is sometimes perceived as an exercise in justify-
ing what is obvious rather than proof as a tool to know with (Healy and Hoyles 
 2000 ; Herbst and Brach  2006 ) . When proof is a tool to know with and to commu-
nicate methodologies, communication is linked with the need to compute and to 
structure. 
 3  Facilitating the Need to Prove: A Teacher’s Perspective 
 According to Harel  ( 1998 ) , “[s]tudents feel intellectually aimless in mathematics 
courses, because we [teachers] usually fail to present them with a clear intellectual 
purpose” (p. 501). Students are often introduced to mathematical concepts, without 
however being assisted to see a need for learning what we intend to teach them. As 
a result, students tend to make little sense of mathematical concepts, in general, 
(e.g., Harel et al.  2008 ) and of the construct of proof, in particular. 
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 As discussed above, students often (a) see no real reason for developing a proof in 
the context of particular activities that call for a proof (from a mathematical standpoint) 
or (b) have some deeply rooted misconceptions about what it means to validate 
mathematical claims (e.g., generalisations). The former refl ects a lack of apprecia-
tion for the need for proof at a local level, whereas the latter refl ects a lack of appre-
ciation for the broader need for proof as a mathematical construct. These two 
problems are obviously interconnected, though the second seems to be more encom-
passing: A student who does not understand what counts as evidence in mathematics 
is unlikely to see a reason for developing a proof (as understood by a mathematician) 
in the context of particular activities. 
 Instructors therefore face the challenges of how to facilitate the development of 
an intellectual need for proof amongst students – both in the context of particular 
activities and more broadly a need for proof as a mathematical construct. Harel 
 ( 1998 ) ,discussing how instruction might help students see an intellectual need for 
learning what teachers intend to teach them, pointed out:
 “Intellectual need” is an expression of a natural human behavior: When we encounter a 
situation that is incompatible with, or presents a problem that is unsolvable by our existing 
knowledge, we are likely to search for a resolution or a solution and construct, as a result, 
new knowledge. Such knowledge is meaningful to the person who constructs it, because it 
is a product of a personal need and connects to prior experience. (p. 501) 
 Here, Harel essentially lays out the grounds for three main guiding strategies for 
instructional approaches that may lead to necessitating proof for the learner: evoking 
uncertainty and cognitive confl ict; facilitating inquiry-based learning; and conveying 
the culture of mathematics. 
 3.1  Uncertainty and Cognitive Confl ict as Driving Forces 
for Creating a Need for Proof 
 Introducing  uncertainty and  cognitive confl ict can serve to motivate people to 
change or expand their existing ways of thinking about a particular concept or 
to learn about the concept in the fi rst place. The terms “cognitive confl ict” and 
“uncertainty” have overlapping but distinctive meanings (Zaslavsky  2005 ) ; here, 
we use them interchangeably: We also subsume in these two terms a range of other 
related terms from the mathematics education literature, such as contradiction, 
perplexity, and surprise. Zaslavsky  ( 2005 ) provided a detailed discussion about the 
roots of the notion of cognitive confl ict in Dewey’s concept of refl ective thinking 
and its relations to psychological theories such as Piaget’s equilibration theory, 
Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance, and Berlyne’s theory of conceptual 
confl ict. Zaslavsky suggests that these theoretical perspectives support the use of 
tasks that elicit uncertainty and cognitive confl ict. 
 Some recent research studies on the teaching and learning of proof have examined 
the role of cognitive confl ict as a driving force for creating a need for proof amongst 
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students (e.g., Hadas et al.  2000 ; Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ; Zaslavsky 
 2005 ; cf. also Brown  2003 ) . These studies substantiated and exemplifi ed the claim 
that, through appropriate didactical engineering, cognitive confl ict  can create in 
students a need for proof. However, different studies developed this claim in different 
ways. Of the three illustrative studies we present, two (Hadas et al.  2000 ; Zaslavsky 
 2005 ) were concerned primarily with creating a need for proof in the context of 
particular activities, whereas the third focused on creating a need for proof as a 
mathematical construct beyond the context of particular activities (Stylianides and 
Stylianides  2009b ) . 
 Hadas et al.  ( 2000 ) designed two activities, in the context of Dynamic Geometry 
(DG) environments, intended to lead students to contradictions between conjectures 
and fi ndings, thereby motivating a need for proof. According to the researchers, 
“[t]he two activities exemplify a design in which learning in a DG environment 
opens opportunities for feeling the need to prove, rather than considering proving as 
superfl uous” (p. 148). In the second activity, the students were left uncertain about 
the correctness of the result they obtained from the DG software. As a result of this 
uncertainty (which did not occur in the fi rst activity), the students oscillated between 
two alterative hypotheses and relied on deductive considerations (amongst other 
things). Consequently, Hadas et al. explained, the second activity provoked a much 
higher proportion of deductive arguments amongst students (56%) than the fi rst 
activity (18%). 
 Zaslavsky  ( 2005 ) described a classroom situation that spontaneously evoked 
cognitive confl ict through  competing claims that two students had expressed. One 
student proved a certain statement and the other came up with a (supposed) counter-
example. The proof that the fi rst student presented had no explanatory power; thus, 
it was not helpful in resolving the contradiction. Zaslavsky told how the instructor 
encouraged the students to reach an agreed resolution. This process naturally led to 
establishing the need to prove not only as a means of resolving the uncertainty but 
also as a means of determining the cause of the phenomenon. In an iterative process, 
Zaslavsky analysed this learning experience further, and developed a task to facili-
tate the need for proof. This type of iterative process, performed by a refl ective 
instructor, could lead to many other similar tasks. 
 Stylianides and Stylianides  ( 2009b ) discussed the theoretical foundation and 
implementation of an instructional intervention that they developed in a 4-year 
design experiment in an undergraduate university class. The intervention relied 
heavily on two deliberately engineered cognitive confl icts that motivated stepwise 
progressions in students’ knowledge about proof. The instructor played a critical 
role in helping students resolve the emerging cognitive confl icts and develop under-
standings that better approximated conventional knowledge. In addition, the instructor 
facilitated social interactions that enabled students to learn from each other. The 
process culminated in the students’ recognising empirical arguments (of any kind) 
as insecure validations of mathematical generalisations and developing an intellectual 
need to learn about secure validations. Thus, the intervention provoked an intellec-
tual curiosity about issues of validation that surpassed the context of its activities: in 
other words, a need for proof. 
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 3.2  Inquiry-Based Learning as Means for Creating 
the Need for Proof 
 Recent calls for improved mathematics education recommend incorporating 
investigative approaches and problem solving whilst valuing students’ own 
mathematical reasoning (e.g., Brown and Walter  2005 ; Hiebert and Stigler  2000 ; 
NCTM  2000 ; NRC  1996 ) . Such an open learning environment involves students in 
an ongoing process of exploration, conjecturing, explaining, validating and disproving 
tentative claims (cf. Lakatos  1976 ) . De Villiers  ( 2003,  2010 ) extensively discussed 
and demonstrated the value of an experimentation approach to learning mathematics 
and proof. This approach lends itself to opportunities that necessitate proof for 
certitude and at the same time addresses the needs for causality, communication 
and structure. 
 Buchbinder and Zaslavsky  ( 2011 ) designed a generic task titled “Is this a coinci-
dence?” that leads students to explore the nature of generality. Each specifi c task 
presents a hypothetical student’s observation about a single geometrical example. It 
asks whether the observed outcome is a coincidence or not; that is, whether it holds 
for every relevant case or just coincidently for some specifi c cases. The task implic-
itly encourages either proving that the described geometrical phenomenon is gen-
eral or constructing a counterexample showing that it is not. The task contains no 
explicit requirement to prove any claim. 
 Buchbinder and Zaslavsky  ( 2011 ) had two groups of participants: six pairs of 
high school students and six experienced mathematics teachers. For both groups, 
the task created a need to prove and convince, due either to a sense of uncertainty 
regarding the mathematical phenomenon in question or to an over-confi dence in a 
false conjecture. In the latter case, the eagerness to prove and convince resulted in 
fl awed arguments and inferences. Hence, facilitating the need to proof should 
proceed carefully. 
 3.3  The Teacher as an Agent of the Culture of Mathematics 
 Hanna and Jahnke  ( 1996 ) emphasised the limitations that arise when teachers 
assume completely passive roles in the teaching of proof:
 A passive role for the teacher… means that students are denied access to available methods 
of proving. It would seem unrealistic to expect students to rediscover sophisticated 
mathematical methods or even the accepted modes of argumentation. (p. 887) 
 Similarly, it seems unrealistic to expect students to feel a need for proof without 
the teachers taking focused actions to provoke that need whether by creating uncer-
tainty and cognitive confl ict, or by employing inquiry-based learning activities. 
 The teacher’s actions have the ultimate goal of inducing students to explore and 
employ conventional mathematical knowledge. In this case, the teacher serves as an 
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agent of the culture of mathematics in the classroom (Lampert  1992 ; Stylianides 
 2007 ; Yackel and Cobb  1996 ) . The teacher assists students to resolve emerging 
problems by modifying their existing understandings about proof to better approxi-
mate mathematical conventions (Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ) . This approach 
to teaching places high demands on the teacher’s mathematical knowledge. 
 4  Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter provides an overview of the intellectual needs associated with learning 
to appreciate mathematical proof as a fundamental and purposeful mathematical 
construct. It examines learners’ barriers to understanding and appreciating proof 
and discusses teachers’ possible ways of addressing these barriers. Teachers can 
lead classrooms of inquiry, orchestrating opportunities for uncertainty and cognitive 
confl ict whilst serving as ‘brokers’ of mathematical proof practices. Such practices 
place strong demands on teachers in terms of the required mathematical knowledge 
and degree of confi dence as well as the challenging and time-consuming task of 
instructional design. Just as it is unrealistic to expect students to see a need for proof 
without purposeful and focused actions by the teacher, it is unrealistic to expect teach-
ers to be able to attend to this element of teaching without appropriate preparation and 
support. We hope this chapter contributes to understanding the needs on both sides. 
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 1  Introduction 
 It is widely known that mathematics education is out of step with contemporary 
professional practice: Professional practice changed profoundly between about 
1890 and 1930, while mathematics education remains modeled on the methodologies 
of the nineteenth century and before. See Quinn  ( 2011a ) for a detailed account. 
 Professional effectiveness of the new methodology is demonstrated by dramatic 
growth, in both depth and scope, of mathematical knowledge in the last century. 
Mathematics education has seen no such improvement. Is this related to continued 
use of obsolete methodology? Might education see improvements analogous to 
those in the profession, by appropriate use of contemporary methods? 
 The problematic word in the last question is “appropriate”: Adapting contem-
porary methods for educational use requires understanding them in a way that relates 
sensibly to education, and until recently such understanding has been lacking. 
The thesis here is that the description of contemporary proof in Quinn  ( 2011a ) could 
be useful at any educational level. 
 According to Quinn  ( 2011a ) , contemporary proofs are fi rst and foremost an 
enabling technology. Mathematical analysis can, in principle, give the right answer 
 every time , but in practice people make errors. The proof process provides a way 
to minimise errors and locate and fi x remaining ones, and thereby come closer to 
achieving the abstractly-possible reliability. 
 This view of proof is much more inclusive than traditional ones. “Show work”, 
for instance, is essentially the same as “give a proof”, while the annotations often 
associated with proofs appear here in “formal proofs” (Sect.  2.2 ), as aids rather 
than essential parts of the structure. To emphasise the underlying commonalities, 
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the word “proof” is used systematically in this essay, but synonyms such as “show 
work” are appropriate for use with students. 
 The fi rst section carefully describes proof and its components, but the essence is: 
“A transcript of work with enough detail that it can be checked for errors.” The second 
section gives examples of notations and templates designed to let students easily 
generate effective work transcripts. Good template design depends, however, on deep 
understanding of student errors. The third section illustrates how carefully designed 
methods can remain effective for “long problems” well outside the scope of usual 
classroom work. The fi nal section describes the confl ict between contemporary 
methodology and the way real-world (word) problems are commonly used. Changes 
and alternatives are suggested. 
 2  Proofs, Potential Proofs, and Formal Proofs 
 Too much emphasis on the correctness of proofs tends to obscure the features 
that help  achieve correctness. Consequently, I suggest that the key idea is actually 
“potential proof”, which does not require correctness. Variations are described in 
Sects.  2.1 – 2.2 , and the role of correctness is described in Sect.  2.3 . Some educational 
consequences are discussed in Sect.  2.4 ; others occur later in the essay. 
 2.1  Potential Proof 
 A  potential proof is a record of reasoning that uses reliable mathematical methods 
and is presented in enough detail to be checked for errors. 
 Potential proofs are defi ned in terms of what they  do rather than what they  are , and 
consequently are context-dependent. At lower educational levels, for instance, more 
detail is needed. Further, the objective is to enable individual users to get better results, 
so even in a single class different students may need different versions. Commonalities 
and functionality are illustrated here, but individual needs must be borne in mind. 
 2.1.1  Example, Integer Multiplication I 









1111    
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 This is essentially the traditional format, and is designed to effi ciently support 
the algorithm rather than display mathematical structure; see Sect.  2.2.1 for an 
alternative. It is also not annotated, so it is not a  formal proof in the sense of Sect.  2.2 . 
Nonetheless, it provides a clear record of the student’s work that can be checked for 
errors, so it is a potential proof that the product is 1111. 
 2.1.2  About the Example 
 The example is not a proof because it contains an error. However: 
 The error is localised and easily found. Ideally, the student would fi nd and fi x it • 
during routine checking. 
 The error is not random, and a possible problem can be diagnosed: 11 in the third • 
line is the  sum of 4 and 7, not the product. 
 The diagnosis can be used for targeted intervention. If the error is rare the student • 
can be alerted to watch for it in the future. If it resulted from a conceptual confu-
sion then teachers can work with the student to correct it. 
 2.1.3  About the Idea 
 In the last decade I have spent hundreds of hours helping students with computer-
based practice tests. In the great majority of cases they more-or-less understand how 
to approach the problem and have a record of the work they did, but something went 
wrong and they can’t fi nd the error. The goal is to diagnose the error, correct it, and 
perhaps look for changes in work habits that would avoid similar errors in the future. 
 Sometimes the student’s work is easy to diagnose: Intermediate steps are clearly 
and accurately recorded; the reasoning used in going from one to the next can be 
inferred without too much trouble; the methods used are known to be reliable; etc. 
In other words it is what is described here as a potential proof. In these cases the 
mistakes are often minor, and the student often catches them when rechecking. 
Sometimes I can suggest a change in procedure that will reduce the likelihood of 
similar mistakes in the future (see Sect.  3 on Proof Templates). The occasional 
conceptual confusions are well-localised and can usually be quickly set right. 
 In most cases my students’ work does not constitute a potential proof. Problems 
include: 
 Intermediate expressions are incomplete or unclear. For instance when simplifying • 
a fragment of a long expression it is not necessary to copy the parts that do not 
change, but without some indication of what is going on it is hard to follow such 
steps and there are frequently errors in reassembly. 
 Steps are out of order or the order is not indicated, for instance by numbering. • 
 Too many steps are skipped. • 
 The student is working “intuitively” by analogy with an example that does • 
not apply. 
 Notations used to formulate a problem (especially word problems) are not clear. • 
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 All these problems increase the error rate and make fi nding errors diffi cult for 
either the student or a helper. If not corrected they limit what the student can 
accomplish. 
 The point here is that “potential proof” is to some extent an abstraction of the work 
habits of successful students. The same factors apply to the work of professional 
mathematicians, though their role is obscured by technical diffi culty and the fact 
that checking typically proceeds rapidly and almost automatically once a genuine 
potential proof is in hand. 
 2.2  Formal Potential Proof 
 A  formal potential proof includes explicit explanation or justifi cation of some of 
the steps. 
 The use of justifi cations is sometimes taken as part of the defi nition of proof. Here 
it appears as useful aid rather than a qualitatively different thing: The objective is 
still to make it possible to fi nd errors, and formality helps with complicated prob-
lems and sneaky errors. 
 The best opportunities for formal proofs in school mathematics are in introducing 
and solidifying methods that in standard use will not need formality. This process 
should improve elementary work as well as make the formal-proof method familiar 
and easily useable when it is really needed. The next example illustrates this. 
 2.2.1  Example, Integer Multipication II 
 Multiply 24 and 47 using single–digit products. 
 Solution: 
 Explanation  Result 
 Write as polynomials in powers of 10  1 0 1 0(2 10 4 10 )(4 10 7 10 )´ + ´ ´ + ´  
 Set up blank form for output  2 1 010 ( ) 10 ( ) 10 ( )+ +  
 Enter products in the form, without processing  2 1 010 (2 4) 10 (2 7 4 4) 10 (4 7)´ + ´ + ´ + ´  
 Compute coeffi cients  2 1 010 (8 ) 10 (30 ) 10 (28 )+ +  
 Recombine as a single integer  800 300 28 1128+ + =  
 2.2.2  Comments 
 This example uses a “structured” format for proof (see Mannila and Wallin  2009 ; 
Peltomaki and Back  2009 ) . I have not had enough experience to judge the benefi ts 
of a standardised structure. 
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 The procedure follows the “template” for multiplication of polynomials described 
in Sect.  3.1 . (See Sect.  4.1 for a version used to multiply large numbers.) 
 Writing in expanded form with explanations clarifi es the procedure. Once the 
procedure is mastered a short-form version can be used: 
  
2 1 0
8 14 16 28
30
10 (2 4 ) 10 (2 7 4 4 ) 10 ( 4 7)´ + ´ + ´ + ´   

  
  + + =800 300 28 1128   
 In this form: 
 The numbers are not rewritten explicitly as polynomials because the coeffi cients • 
can be read directly from the decimal form. Some students may have to number 
the digits to do this reliably. 
 The extra space in the outer parentheses after the powers of 10 indicates that the • 
blank template was set up fi rst. 
 The products for the coeffi cients were entered without on-the-fl y arithmetic • 
(explained in Sect.  3.1 ). 
 Individual steps in the arithmetic are indicated, as is the fi nal assembly. • 
 Thus, when the method is familiar, a compressed notation provides an effective 
potential proof that the outcome is correct. 
 2.2.3  Example, Solutions of Linear Systems 
 For which values of  a is the solution of the system  not unique? 
  








x y    
 Solution: 
 The solution to a square linear system is not unique exactly when the determinant 
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- - = - - - = - -2
1 4
(1)(3)( 8 ) 24 (1 4 ) 4 24
3
a
a a a a a
  
This is zero for  = - ±( 1 385) / 8a  . 
 2.2.4  Comments 
 This example is a bit less detailed than the previous one in that some calculations 
(effects of the row operations and application of the quadratic formula) are not 
recorded. Presumably they are on a separate paper, but because the operations 
themselves are recorded the calculations can be completely reconstructed. At the 
level of this example, students should be able to reliably handle such hidden steps 
and explicit display should not be necessary. 
 An alternative evaluation of the determinant might be: “Cramer’s rule applied to 
the second row gives  + - ´ + - - ¼( 1)(3)( 4 2) ( 1)( )(1 4 )a a  ”. 
 Cramer’s rule involves adding up: a sign times the entry times the determinant 
of the matrix obtained by omitting the row and column containing the entry. 
The expression refl ects this structure, with the 2 ×2 determinants evaluated. Giving 
relatively unprocessed expressions like this both reduces errors (by separating 
organisation from calculation) and allows quick pin-pointing of them when they 
occur. For example, it would be possible to distinguish a sign error in the second 
term due to a misunderstanding of Cramer’s rule, from a sign error in the evaluation 
of the sub-determinant. 
 Students will not give this sort of explanation without examples to copy and quite 
a bit of guidance. This guidance might include: 
 When using a theorem (e.g. nonzero determinant if and only if unique solutions), • 
say enough about it to inspire confi dence that you know a precise statement and 
are using it correctly. Confused statements indicate that conceptual errors are 
likely in the future, even if this wasn’t the problem in this case. 
 In particular, mention of the theorem is an essential part of the work and must be • 
included even in short–form versions. (For additional discussion of style in 
short–form proofs, see  Proof Projects for Teachers in Quinn  ( 2011b ) .) 
 In lengthy calculations, rather than showing all details, describe the steps and • 
carry out details on a separate sheet. The descriptions should be explicit enough 
to enable reconstruction of the details. Organising work this way both reduces 
errors and makes it easier to check. 
 It can be helpful to have students check each others’ work and give explicit 
feedback on how well the layout supports checking. The eventual goal is for them 
to diagnose their own work; trying to make sense of others’ work can give insight 
into the process. 
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 2.2.5  Further Examples 
 For further discussion, and examples of elementary formal proofs concerning fractions 
and area, see  Proof Projects for Teachers (Quinn  2011b ) . 
 2.3  Proof and Correctness 
 A  proof is a potential proof that has been checked for errors and found to be error-free. 
 Work that does not qualify as a potential proof cannot be a proof even if the 
conclusion is known to be correct. In education, the goal is not a correct answer but 
to develop the ability to routinely get correct answers; facility with potential proofs 
is the most effective way to do this. Too much focus on correctness may undercut 
development of this facility. 
 This is usually not an issue with weak students because potential proofs are an 
enabling technology without which they cannot succeed. Weak students tend to have 
the opposite problem: the routines are so comforting and the success so rewarding 
that it can be hard to get them to compress notation (e.g. avoid recopying) or omit 
minor details even when they have reached the point where it is safe to do so. 
Similarly, some persist in writing out formal justifi cations even after they have 
thoroughly internalised the ideas. 
 Strong students are more problematic, because the connection between good 
work habits and correct answers is less direct. I have had many students who were 
very successful in high-school advanced placement courses, but they got by with 
sloppy work because the focus was on correctness rather than methodology. Many 
of these students have trouble with engineering calculus in college: 
 The better students fi gure it out, especially with diagnostic support and good • 
templates (Sect.  3 ). Most probably never fully catch up to where they might have 
been, but they are successful. 
 Unfortunately a signifi cant number were good enough to wing it in high school and • 
good enough to have succeeded in college with good methodological preparation, 
but are not good enough to recover from poor preparation. 
 All students stand to benefi t from a potential-proof-oriented curriculum rather than 
a correctness-oriented one, but for different reasons. Gains by weak and mid-range 
students are likely to be clearest. 
 2.4  The Role of Diagnosis 
 The thesis of this article is that the reliability possible with mathematics can be realised 
by making mathematical arguments that can be checked for errors,  checking them , 
and correcting any errors found. Other sections describe how checkable arguments 
could become a routine part of mathematics education. However they won’t produce 
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benefi ts unless  checking also becomes a routine part. To be explicit: Diagnosis and 
error correction should be key focuses in mathematics education. 
 Answers are important mainly as proxies for the work done. Incorrect answers • 
indicate a need for diagnosis and correction. Ideally,  every problem with a wrong 
answer should be diagnosed and corrected. 
 Mathematics uniquely enables quality, so the emphasis should be on quality not • 
quantity. In other words, doing fewer problems to enable spending more time on 
getting them right is a good tradeoff. 
 An important objective is to teach students to routinely diagnose their own work. • 
The fact that diagnosis is possible and effective is the essence of mathematics, so 
teaching self-diagnosis is mathematics education in the purest sense. 
 Ideally, teachers would regularly go through students’ work with them so students 
can see the checking process in action. Students should be required to redo problems 
when the work is hard to check, not just when the answer is wrong. As explained in 
the previous section, the goal is to establish work habits that will benefi t students; 
but students respond to feedback from teachers, not to long–term goals. 
 2.5  Other Views of Proof 
 There are many other—and quite different—views of the role of proof (cf. Hanna 
and Barbeau  2008 ; Rav  1999 ; Thurston  1994 ) . These generally emphasise proofs as 
sources of understanding and insight, or as repositories of knowledge. 
 The basic difference is that I have emphasised proofs as an enabling technology for 
users. Most other views focus on “spectator proofs”: arguments from which readers 
should benefi t, but that are not intended as templates for emulation. Both views are 
valid in their own way, and this should be kept in mind when considering specifi c 
situations. 
 What counts as user-oriented or spectator-oriented, and the mix in practice, 
varies enormously with level. In school mathematics—as illustrated here—almost 
everything is designed for emulation. Spectator proofs play little or no role. Issues 
that might be addressed with spectator proofs (e.g., how do we know the multiplica-
tion algorithm really works?) are simply not addressed at all. 
 At intermediate levels, college math majors for instance, spectator proofs 
play a large role. They provide ways for students to learn and develop skills long 
before they can be emulated. At the research frontier the primary focus is again 
on user-oriented work. It is a nice bonus if an argument functions as a spectator 
proof (i.e., is “accessible”), but if the argument cannot be fl eshed out to give a 
fully-precise user-oriented proof it is unsatisfactory. 
 Misunderstanding these different roles of proof has led to confl ict and confusion. 
For example, Thurston  ( 1994 ) justifi ed his failure to provide a proof of a major 
claim by observing that the technology needed for a good spectator proof was 
not yet available. This point resonated with educators since they have a mainly 
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spectator-oriented conception of proof. However Thurston was responding to 
criticism (Jaffe and Quinn  1993 ) that he had failed to provide a user-oriented proof 
for use in the research community. An inability to provide a spectator proof 
was not accepted as justifying the failure to provide any proof at all. The problem was 
later declared unsolved, and complete proofs were eventually provided by others 
(see Quinn  2011a ) . 
 3  Proof Templates 
 Students learn mainly by abstraction from examples and by imitating procedures. It is 
important, therefore, to carefully design examples and procedures to guide effective 
learning. 
 A “proof template” is a procedure for working a class of problems. Design 
considerations are: 
 Procedures should clearly refl ect the mathematical structures they exploit. This • 
makes them more reliable and fl exible, and often provides subliminal preparation 
for more complex work. 
 Procedures should minimise problems with limitations of human cognitive abilities. • 
For example, conceptually distinct tasks such as translating word problems, 
organising a computation, or doing arithmetic, should be separated. 
 Effi cient short–form versions should be provided. • 
 Examples in this section explain and illustrate these points. 
 3.1  Polynomial Multiplication 
 This material is adapted from a polynomial problem developed for a working group of 
the American Mathematical Society. See  Neuroscience Experiments for Mathematics 
Education in Quinn  ( 2011b ) for further analysis of cognitive structure. 
 3.1.1  Problem 
 Write  - + + - -2 3 2(3 5 )( (2 ) )z z a z a z a  as a polynomial in  z . Show steps. 
 3.1.2  Step 1: Organisation 
 There are three terms in each factor, so there will be nine terms in the product. Some 
organisational care is needed to be sure to get them all. Further, we would like to 
have them sorted according to exponent on  z rather than producing them at random 
and then sorting as a separate step. To accomplish this, we set up a blank form in 
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which to enter the terms. A quick check of exponents shows that all exponents from 




[ ] [ ] [ ]




+ +   
Next, scan through all possible combinations of terms, one from each factor. 
(Use a fi nger to mark your place in one term while scanning the other.) For each 
combination, write the product of coeffi cients in the row with the right total expo-
nent. The result is: 
  
+ - + - + - - + +
- + - + - - + -
5 4 3
2 1 0
[(3)(1) ] [(3)(2 ) ( 1)(1)] [( 1)(2 ) (5 )(1)]
[(3)( ) (5 )(2 )] [( 1)( ) ] [(5 )( ) ]
z z a z a a
z a a a z a z a a   
Note the products were recorded with  absolutely no arithmetic, not even writing 
(3)(1) as 3. Reasons are: 
 Organisation and arithmetic are cognitively different activities. Switching back • 
and fourth increases the error rate in both, with sign errors being particularly 
common. 
 This form can be diagnosed. We can count the terms to see that there are nine of • 
them and the source of each term can be identifi ed. The order of scanning can 
even be inferred, though it makes no difference. 
 Note also that every term is enclosed in parentheses. This is partly to avoid 
confusion, because juxtaposition is being used to indicate multiplication. The main 
reason, however, is to avoid thinking about whether or not parentheses are necessary 
in each case. Again, such thinking is cognitively different from the organisational 
task and may interfere with it. 
 3.1.3  Step 2: Calculation 
 Simplify the coeffi cient expressions to get the answer: 
  + - + - + - + + -
5 4 3 2 2 23 (5 3 ) (6 2) (7 5 ) ( 5 )z a z a z a a z az a   
In this presentation the only written work is the organisational step and the answer. 
More complicated coeffi cient expressions, or less experienced students, would 
require recording some detail about the simplifi cation process. A notation for this is 
shown in the arithmetic example in Sect.  2.2.1 . 
 3.1.4  Comments 
 The separation of organisation and computation makes the procedure reliable • 
and relatively easy to use. 
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 The close connection to mathematical structure makes the procedure fl exible. • 
It is easily modifi ed to handle problems like “Find the coeffi cient on  z 3 ” or “Write 
a product involving both  x and  y as a two-variable polynomial”. 
 Variations provide methods for by-hand multiplication of integers (Sect.  • 2.2.1 ) 
and multiplication of large integers using a calculator (Sect.  4.1 ). 
 If the baby version in Sect.  • 2.2.1 is used to multiply integers, then students will 
fi nd the polynomial version familiar and easy to master. 
 Similarly, students who work with polynomials this way will fi nd some later • 
procedures (e.g., products of sums that may not be polynomials, or iterated 
products like the binomial theorem) essentially familiar and easier to master. 
 This procedure should be contrasted with the common practice of restricting to 
multiplication of binomials, using the “FOIL” mnemonic 1 . That method is poorly 
organised even for binomials, infl exible, and doesn’t connect well even with larger 
products. In particular, students trained with FOIL are often unsuccessful with 
products like the one in the example. 
 3.2  Solving Equations 
 This is illustrated with a very simple problem, so the structuring strategies will 
be clear. 
 3.2.1  Problem 
 Solve  - = -5 2 3 7x a x  for  x . 
 Annotated Solution : 
 Explanation  Result 
 Collect terms: move to other side by adding negatives  5 3 7 2x x a- = - +  
 Calculate  
2
(5 3) 7 2x a- = - +  
 Move coeffi cient to other side by multiplying by inverse  1
( 7 2 )
2
x a= - +
 
 3.2.2  Comments 
 The primary goals in this format are effi ciency and separation of different cognitive 
activities (organisation and calculation). 
 1  First, Outer, Inner, Last. 
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 The fi rst step is organisational: we decide that we want all  x terms on one side 
and all others on the other. Collecting  x terms can be accomplished by adding − 3 x 
to each side. However it is ineffi cient to do this as a separate calculation step because 
we know ahead of time what will happen on the right side: we have chosen the 
operation exactly to cancel the 3 x term. Instead we think of it as a purely organisa-
tional step: “move 3 x to the other side…”. To keep it organisational we refrain from 
doing arithmetic (combining coeffi cients) and include “by adding negatives” to the 
mental description. 
 The second step is pure calculation. 
 The fi nal step is again organisational, and the description is designed to emphasise 
the similarity to the fi rst step. 
 Finally, the steps are guided by pattern–matching: The given expression is 
manipulated to become more like the pattern  x = ? . (See the next section for another 
example.) 
 3.3  Standardising Quadratics 
 This is essentially “completing the square” with a clear goal. 
 3.3.1  Problem 
 Find a linear change of variables  = +y ax b  that transforms the quadratic 
 - +25 6 21x x  into a standard form  r ( y 2 +  s ) with  s one of 1, 0 − 1, and give the 
standard form. 
 This is done in two steps, each of which brings the expression closer to the 
desired form. A short-form version is given after the explanation. 
 3.3.2  First Step 
 Eliminate the fi rst-order term with a change of the form  = +0y x t  :  
Square the general form and multiply by 5 to get  = + +2 2 205 5 10 5y x tx t  , which 
has the same second-order term as that of the given quadratic. To match the fi rst-
order term as well we need  = -10 6t  , so  = -3 / 5t  and  = -0 3 / 5y x  . Moving the 
constant term to the other side gives  - = -2 2 205 5 5 6y t x x  . Use this to replace the 








5( ) 5( 3 / 5) 21y
   (1) 
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 3.3.3  Second Step 














y y+ = +
    (2) 
The number factored out must be positive because we had to take the square root 
of it. 










y y x= = -  . 








5( ) 5 10 5
y
x t x t x t
  































y  . 
 Methods must be introduced with explanations, but compression is necessary for 
routine use. It is important for teachers to provide a carefully-designed short format 
because the compressions which student invent on their own are rarely effective. 
 For example, it is often necessary to simplify a fragment of an expression. 
The underbrace notation here indicates precisely which fragment is involved and 
connects it to the outcome. I have never seen a student do this. Usually, the student 
either writes fragments without reference or rewrites the whole expression. 
 Experience often reveals errors that need to be headed off by the notation. In the 







5 5(3 / 5) 21y
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clearly indicates that the sign on  - 25(3 / 5)  is part of the fragment being simplifi ed. 
Many students seem to think of this sign as the connector between the expression 
fragments, and hence do not include it in the sub-expression. It then gets lost. This 
is a common source of errors, and may well have resulted in the student making an 
error in this case. Providing a clear notation and being consistent in examples will 
avoid such errors. 
 3.3.5  Pattern Matching 
 Routine success requires that at any point the student can fi gure out “What should 
I do next?” In the problem above there is a direct approach: Plug  = +y ax b  into the 
given quadratic, set it equal to  r ( y 2 +  s ), and solve for  a ,  b ,  r ,  s . This can be simplifi ed by 
doing it in two steps, as above, but even so it requires roughly twice as much calcula-
tion as the method given above. This is a heavy price to pay for not having to think. 
 By contrast, the suggested procedure uses pattern matching to guide the work. 
It can be summarised as “What do we have to do to the given quadratic to get it 
to match the standard pattern?” In the fi rst step we note that the given one has a 
fi rst-order term and the pattern does not. We get closer to the pattern by eliminating 
this term, getting something of the form  Ay 
0
 2 +  B . If  B is not 1, 0, or − 1 we can get 
closer to the pattern by factoring something out to get  C ( Dy 
0
 2 +  s ) with standard  s . 
The only thing remaining to exactly match the pattern is to rewrite  Dy 
0
 2 as a square, 
and whatever result we get is the  y we are seeking. 
 Pattern matching is a powerful technique, a highly-touted feature of computer 
algebra systems, and humans can be very good at it. Much of the work in a calculus 
course can be seen as pattern-matching. Students could use it more effectively if 
teachers presented the idea more explicitly. 
 3.4  Summary 
 Carefully-designed procedures and templates for students to emulate can greatly 
improve success and extend the range of problems that can be attempted. Important 
factors are: 
 Procedures should follow the underlying mathematical structure as closely as • 
possible. Doing so reveals connections, provides fl exibility, and expands appli-
cation. It also ensures upward-compatibility with later work, and frequently 
provides subliminal preparation for this work. 
 Ideas that guide the work, pattern matching for example, should be abstracted • 
and made as explicit as possible for the level. 
 Procedures should separate different cognitive tasks. In particular, organisational • 
work should be kept separate from computation. 
 Short-form formats that show the logical structure (i.e., are checkable) and • 
encourage good work habits should be provided. 
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 Good test design can also encourage good work habits. For example: 
 Ask for a single coeffi cient from a good-sized product like the example in • 
Sect.  3.1 . This rewards students who understand the organisational step well 
enough to pick out only the terms that are needed. 
 A computer-based test might ask for an algebraic expression that  • evaluates to 
give the coeffi cient 2 . The students could then enter the unevaluated output from 
the organisational step. This approach rewards careful separation of organisation 
and calculation, by reducing the time required and reducing the risk of errors in 
computation. 
 4  Long Problems 
 Current pre-college mathematics education is almost entirely concerned with short, 
routine problems. Advanced-placement courses may include short tricky problems. 
However, much of the power of mathematics comes from its success with long 
 routine problems. Because the conclusions of each step can be made extremely 
reliable, many steps can be put together and the combination will still be reliable. 
Further, carefully-designed methods for dealing with short problems will apply to 
long problems equally well. 
 Long problems have an important place in elementary mathematics education. 
They give a glimpse into the larger world and illustrate the power of the methods 
being learned. They also reveal the need for care and accuracy with short problems. 
It is not clear how long problems might be incorporated into a curriculum, but group 
projects are a possibility. The examples here are presented as group problems about 
multiplication and addition of large integers (with calculators) and logic puzzles. 
 4.1  Big Multiplications 
 The goal is to exactly multiply two large (say 14- or 15-digit) integers using ordinary 
calculators. This cannot be done directly so the plan is to break the calculation into 
smaller pieces (e.g., 4-digit multiplications) that can each be done on a calculator, 
and then assemble the answer from these pieces. The method is the same as the 
by-hand method for getting multi-digit products from single-digit ones, and uses a 
notation (like that of Sect.  2.2.1 ) modeled on polynomial multiplication. 
 The number of digits in each piece depends on the capability of the calculators 
used. The product of two 4-digit numbers will generally have 8 digits. We will be 
 2  Tests with this sort of functionality are a goal of the EduTE X project (Quinn  2009 ) . 
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adding a list of these, but no more than 9, so the outcome will have 9 or fewer digits. 
Four-digit blocks will therefore work on calculators that can handle nine digits. 
Eight–digit calculators would require the use of three-digit blocks. 
 4.1.1  Problem 
 Multiply 638521988502216 and 483725147602252, using calculators that handle 9 
or more digits, by breaking them into 4–digit blocks. 
 4.1.2  Step 1: Organise the Data 




638521988502216 2216 8850 5219 638
483725147602252 2252 4760 7251 483
x x x
x x x
= + + +
= + + +   
where  x = 10 4 . 
 The power-of-10 notation should be used even with pre–algebra students, because 
it is a powerful organisational aid. The exponent records the number of blocks of 
four zeros that follow these digits. 
 4.1.3  Step 2: Organise the Product 
 The product of two sums is gotten from all possible products, using one piece from 
each term. Individual terms follow the rule  +=( )( ) ( )n k n kax bx ab x  , which we use 
to organise the work. The product will have terms  x  r  for  = ¼0, ,6r  and seven indi-
viduals or teams could work separately on these. 
 For instance, the  x 2 team would collect the pairs of terms whose exponents add 
to 2:  x 0 ( x not written) from the fi rst number and  x 2 from the second, then  x 1 from the 
fi rst and  x 1 from the second, etc. They would record: 
  
2 (2216 7251 8850 4760 5219 2252)x ´ + ´ + ´   
This is an organisational step; no arithmetic should be done. The students can infer 
how the pieces were obtained, and can double–check each other to see that nothing 
is out of place and no pieces were left out. 
 4.1.4  Step 3: Compute the Coeffi cient 
 Carry out the arithmetic indicated in the second step, using calculators. If the 
students can use a memory register to accumulate the sum of the successive products 
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then the output is the answer,  x 2 (69947404). If the multiplications and addition have 





(2216 7251 8850 4760 5219 2252)x ´ + ´ + ´  

  
Again, different students or teams should double-check the outcomes. 
 4.1.5  Step 4: Assemble the Answer 








+ + + +
+ +   
and the next step is to evaluate at  x = 10 4 , or in elementary terms translate the powers 
of  x back to blocks of zeros, and add the results. The next section gives a way to 
carry out the addition. 
 4.2  Big Additions 
 The goal is to add a list of large integers using ordinary calculators. This cannot be 
done directly, so the plan is to break the operations into smaller pieces (e.g., 6–digit 
blocks) that can be done on a calculator and then assemble the answer from these 
pieces. The procedure is illustrated with the output from the previous section. 
 4.2.1  Problem 
 Use calculators to add 4990432 + 30478360 ´ 10  4  + 69947404 ´ 10  8  + 91520894 ´ 
10 12  + 45154399 ´ 10 16  + 7146915 ´ 10 20  + 308154 ´ 10 24  using 6–digit blocks. 
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 Here we have written the seven numbers to be added in a column with aligned 
digits. Vertical lines are drawn to separate the 6-digit blocks, and we omit blocks 
that consist entirely of zeros. We have not, however, omitted zeros at the end of 
blocks because doing this would mix organisational and arithmetic thinking. 








308868 1 517888 1 590432
1 143134 1 045187
 Each column is added separately, for instance by fi ve different students; again, the 
outcomes should be double–checked. 
 Most of the sums overfl ow into the next column. We have written the sums of the 
even–numbered columns one level lower to avoid overlaps. Since there are fewer 
than nine entries in each column, the sum can overfl ow only into the fi rst digit of the 
next column to the left. 
 4.2.4  Step 3: Final Assembly 
 Add the sums of the individual columns:
308868 1 517888 1 590432
1 143134 1 045187
308869 143135 517889 045188 590432
 In this example the fi nal addition is easy, because the overfl ow from one column 
only changes one digit in the next. This happens in most cases; if examples are 
chosen at random, it is very unlikely that students will see more than two digits 
change due to overfl ow. 
 Students should realise, however, that digits in sums are unstable in the sense that, 
very rarely, an overfl ow will change  everything to the left. Teachers should ensure 
that students encounter such an example, or perhaps challenge them to contrive an 
24910 Contemporary Proofs for Mathematics Education
example that makes the simple-minded pattern crash. This phenomenon illustrates 
the difference between extremely unlikely events and mathematically impossible 
ones, and the “low–probability catastrophic failures 3 ” that can occur when the 
difference is ignored. 
 4.3  Digits in Big Products 
 The goal here is to fi nd a specifi c digit in a product of big numbers, and be sure it is 
correct. An attractive feature of the formulation is that careful reasoning and under-
standing of structure are rewarded by a reduction in computational work. 
 The least-thought/most-work approach is to compute the entire number and then 
throw away all but one of the digits. I give three variations with increasing sophistica-
tion and decreasing computation. In practice, students (or groups) could be allowed 
to choose the approach that suits their comfort level. More-capable students will 
enjoy exploiting structure to achieve effi ciency. Less-capable ones will be aware of 
the benefi ts of elaborate reasoning, but may see additional computation as a safer 
and more straightforward. 
 4.3.1  Problem 
 Find the 18th digit (from the right, i.e. in the 10 17 place) in the product 
52498019913177259058 × 33208731911634712456. 
 4.3.2  Plan A 
 We approach this as before, by breaking the numbers into 4-digit blocks and writing 
them as coeffi cients in a polynomial in powers of  x = 10 4 . These are 20-digit 
numbers so there are fi ve 4-digit blocks and this gives polynomials of degree 4 
(powers of  x up to  x 4 ). The product has terms up to degree 8. 
 The 18th digit is the second digit in the fi fth 4-digit block ( = ´ +18 4 4 2  ). When 
working with polynomials in  x = 10 4 this means it will be determined by the terms of 
degree  x 4 and lower (the coeffi cient on  x 5 gets 20 zeros put after it, so cannot effect 
the 18th digit). 
 Plan A is to compute the polynomial coeffi cients up to  x 4 , combine as before to 
get a big number, and see what the 18th digit is. This gives a signifi cant savings over 
computing the whole number because we don’t fi nd the  ¼5 8x x  coeffi cients. 
 3  A term from the computational software community, where this is a serious problem. 
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 4.3.3  Plan B 
 This refi nement of Plan A reduces the work done on the  x 4 coeffi cient. 
 We only need the 18th digit, so only need the second (from the right) digit in the 
coeffi cient on  x 4 . To get this we only need the product of the lowest two digits in 
each term. To make this explicit, the terms in the coeffi cient on  x 4 are: 
  ´ + ´ + ´ + ´ + ´
4 (9058 3320 7725 8731 9131 9116 8019 3471 5249 2456)x   
But we only need the next-to-last digit of this. If we write the first term as 
 + ´ +(9000 58) (3300 20)  , then the big pieces don’t effect the digit we want. It is 
suffi cient just to compute 58 ×20. 
 This modifi cation replaces the  x 4 coeffi cient by 
  ´ + ´ + ´ + ´ + ´
4 (58 20 25 31 31 16 19 71 49 56)x   
Lower coeffi cients are computed and the results are combined to give a single 
number as before. This number will have the same lower 18 digits as the full product, 
and in particular will have the correct 18th digit. 
 4.3.4  Plan C, Idea 
 Plans A and B reduce work by not computing unneeded higher digits. Here, we 
want to reduce work by not computing unneeded  lower digits. The overfl ow 
problem makes this tricky, and some careful estimation is needed to determine how 
bad lower-digit overfl ows can be. This is a nice opportunity for good students to 
exploit their talents.
 1.  The coeffi cients in the product polynomial have at most nine digits (products of 
4–digit numbers have at most 8 digits, and we are adding fewer than nine of these 
in each coeffi cient). The  x 2 term therefore has at most  + ´ =9 2 4 17  digits. This 
can effect the 18th digit only through addition overfl ow. 
 2.  The plan, therefore, is to compute the coeffi cients on  x 4 and  x 3 , combine these to 
get a number, and see how large a 17-digit number can be added before overfl ow 
changes the 18th. We will then have to estimate the  x 2 and lower terms and com-
pare this to the overfl ow threshold. 
 If the lower-order terms cannot cause overfl ow into the 18th digit, then the • 
18th digit is correct. 
 If lower terms might cause overfl ow, then we will have to compute the  • x 2 
coeffi cient exactly, combine with the part already calculated, and see what 
happens. In this case, we will also have to check to see if degree 0 and 1 
terms cause overfl ow that reaches all the way up to the 18th digit. This is 
extremely unlikely: These terms have at most  + ´ =9 1 4 13  digits, so over-
fl ow to the 18th can only happen if the 14th–17th digits are all 9. 
 In this unlikely worst-case scenario we will have to compute the lower-order • 
terms too. 
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 4.3.5  Plan C, Setup and Compute 




(58 20 25 31 31 16 19 71 49 56)
(9058 8731 7725 9116 9131 3471 8019 2456)
x
x
´ + ´ + ´ + ´ + ´
´ + ´ + ´ + ´   
Computing gives 200894863 x 3 + 6524 x 4 . Substituting  x = 10 4 gives 
  + ´ = ´
12 12(200894863 65240000) 10 266134863 10 .   
The 18th digit (from the right) is 1. It is not yet certain, however, that this is the same 
as the digit in the full product. 
 4.3.6  Plan C, Check for Overfl ow 
 The 17th digit in 266134863 ×10 12 is 3. If the top (i.e. 9th) digit in the  x 2 coeffi cient 
is 5 or less then adding will not overfl ow to the 18th digit. ( + =3 5 8  , and overfl ow 
from the  x 1 and  x 0 terms can increase this by at most one). 
 The next step is to estimate the top digit in this coeffi cient.
 1.  The  x 2 coeffi cient has three terms (from  x 0 x 2 ,  x 1 x 1 , and  x 1 x 0 ). 
 2.  Each term is a product of two 4-digit numbers, so each has at most 8 digits. 
In other words the contribution of each term is smaller than 10 9 . Adding three 
such terms gives a total coeffi cient smaller than 3 ×10 9 . 
 3.  When we substitute  x = 10 4 we get a number less than 3 ×10 17 . The top digit is 
therefore at most 2. 
 4.  Since the top digit of the lower-order term is smaller than the threshold for 
overfl ow (2  £ 5), we conclude that the 18th digit found above is correct. 
 We were fortunate: If the 17th digit coming from the higher–order terms 
had been 7, 8, or 9 then we could not rule out overfl ow with this estimate. For 
borderline cases I describe a refi ned estimate that gives a narrower overfl ow 
window. 
 The actual coeffi cient on  x 2 is 131811939. Knowing this, we see that a 17th digit 
7 would not have caused an overfl ow, while a 9 would have increased the 18th digit 
by 1, and 8 is uncertain. This conclusion can be sharpened by using more digits: 
If digits 15–17 are 867 or less, then there is no overfl ow; if they are 869 or more then 
there is an overfl ow of 1; and the small interval between these numbers remains 
uncertain. As noted above, in rare cases lower–order terms have to be computed 
completely to determine whether or not overfl ow occurs. 
 4.3.7  Grand Challenge 
 Use this method to fi nd the 25th digit of the product of two 50–digit numbers. 
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 4.4  Puzzles 
 We will not explore them here but logic puzzles deserve mention as opportunities 
for mathematical thinking (see Wanko  2009 ; Lin  2009 ) . These should incorporate an 
analog of proof: a record of moves that enables reconstruction of the reasoning and 
location of errors. The notation for recording chess moves (see the Wikipedia entry) 
may be a useful model. 
 A minor problem is that the rules of many puzzles are contrived to avoid the need 
for proof-like activity and should be de-contrived. 
 For example, the usual goal in Sudoku is to fi ll entries to satisfy certain con-
ditions. The fi nal state can be checked for correctness and—unless there is an 
error—would seem to render the record of moves irrelevant. A better goal is to 
fi nd  all solutions. If the record shows that every move is forced, then the solution is 
unique. However, if at some point no forced moves can be found and a guess is 
made, all branches must be followed. If a branch leads to an error, that branch 
can be discarded (proof by contradiction). If a branch leads to a solution, then other 
branches still have to be explored to determine whether they also lead to solutions. 
This would be made more interesting by a source of Sudoku puzzles with multiple 
solutions. 
 Notations and proof also enable collaborative activity. All members of a group 
would be given a copy of the puzzle, and one appointed “editor”. On fi nding a move, 
a member would send the notation to the editor as a text message. The editor would 
check for correctness and then forward the move to the rest of the group. Maintaining 
group engagement might require a rule like: Whoever submits a move must wait for 
someone else to send one before submitting another. 
 5  Word Problems and Applications 
 This essay concerns the use of contemporary professional methodology in education. 
Up to this point the ideas have been unconventional and possibly uncomfortable but 
more-or-less compatible with current educational philosophy. 
 There are, however, genuine confl icts where both professional methodology 
and direct experience suggest that educational practices are counterproductive, 
not just ineffi cient. Some of the methodological confl icts are discussed in this 
section. A more systematic comparison is given in  Mathematics Education versus 
Cognitive Neuroscience in Quinn  ( 2011b ) , and confl icts in concept formation 
are discussed in  Contemporary Defi nitions for Mathematics Education in Quinn 
 ( 2011b ) . Historical analysis in Quinn  ( 2011a ) indicates that many educational 
practices are modeled on old professional practices that were subsequently found 
ineffective and were discarded. 
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 5.1  Word Problems and Physical-World Applications 
 The old view was that mathematics is an abstraction of patterns in the physical world 
and there is no sharp division between the two. The contemporary view is that there 
is a profound difference and the articulation between the two worlds is a key issue. 
The general situation is described in Quinn  ( 2011a ) ; here I focus on education. 
 5.1.1  Mathematical Models 
 In the contemporary approach, physical-world phenomena are approached indirectly: 
a  mathematical model of a phenomenon is developed and then analyzed mathemati-
cally. The relationship between the phenomenon and the model is not mathematical, 
and is not accessible to mathematical analysis. 
 5.1.2  Example 
 A beaker holds 100 ml. of water. If 1 ml of  X is added, what is the volume of the 
result? 
 Expected solution:  + =100 1 101 ml. 
 5.1.3  Discussion 
 The standard expected solution suppresses the modelling step. Including it gives: 
 Model: volumes add. 
 Analysis:  + =100 1 101 so the model predicts volume 101 ml. 
 The analysis of the model is certainly correct, so it correctly predicts the outcome 
when the model applies: for example, if  X is water. If  X is sand, salt, or alcohol, 
then the volume will be more than 100 ml. but signifi cantly less than the predicted 
value of 101 ml. If  X is metallic sodium a violent reaction takes place. When the 
smoke clears, the beaker will contain considerably less than 100 ml., and may be 
in pieces. 
 In the latter instances, the prediction fails because the model is not appropriate. 
This is not a mathematical diffi culty. In particular no amount of checking the written 
work can reveal an error that accounts for the failure. One might try to avoid the 
problem in this case by specifying that  X should be water, but discrepancies could 
result from differences in temperature. Even elaborately legalistic descriptions of 
the physical circumstances cannot completely rule out reality/model disconnects. 
 The point is that the reality/model part of real-world applications is essentially 
non-mathematical. Applications have an important place in mathematics courses, 
but the reality/model aspect should not be represented as mathematics. 
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 Equally important, modelling, and analysis of the model are different cognitive 
activities. Failing to separate them increases error rates, just as happens with 
organisation and calculation (see Sect.  3.1 ). Educational practice is to make success 
possible by making the mathematical component trivial rather than separating the 
components. This, however, makes signifi cant applications impossible. 
 5.2  Applications 
 Mathematics is brought to life through applications. In this context the word 
“application” is usually understood to mean “physical-world application”. However, 
such applications alone do a poor job of bringing elementary mathematics to life. 
After explaining why, I suggest that there are better opportunities using applications 
from within mathematics. 
 5.2.1  Diffi culties with the Real World 
 The main diffi culty with physical-world applications is a complexity mismatch. 
In one direction, there are impressive applications of elementary mathematics, but 
they require signifi cant preparation in other subjects. On the other hand there are 
easily-modeled real-world problems but these tend to be either mathematically 
trivial or quite sophisticated. 
 Examples: 
 One can do interesting chemistry with a little linear algebra, but the model-• 
building step requires a solid grasp of atomic numbers, bonding patterns, etc. 
The preparation required is probably beyond most high-school chemistry courses 
and certainly beyond what one could do in a mathematics course. 
 There are nice applications of trig functions to oscillation and resonance in • 
mechanical systems, electric circuits, and acoustics. Again, subject knowledge 
requirements makes these a stretch even in college differential equations courses. 
 Multiplication of big integers, as in Sect.  • 4.1 , plays an important role in crypto-
graphy, but it is not feasible to develop this subject enough to support cryptographic 
“word problems”. 
 Problems with easily-modeled situations include: 
 It is diffi cult to fi nd simple problems that are not best seen as questions in calculus • 
or differential equations (or worse). 
 Special cases may have non-calculus solutions, but these solutions tend to be • 
tricky and rarely give insight into the problem. 
 Even as calculus problems, most “simple” models lead to mathematical questions • 
too hard for use in college calculus. 
 Our world is at least three-dimensional. Many real problems require vectors in • 
all but the most contrived and physically-boring cases. 
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 In other words, real-world problems should be part of a serious development of 
a scientifi c subject in order to be genuinely useful. The next section describes dif-
fi culties that result when this constraint is ignored. 
 5.2.2  Bad Problems 
 The practical outcome of the complexity mismatch described above is that most 
word problems—in the US anyway—have trivial or very constrained mathematical 
components and the main task is formulation of the model (e.g., the example in 
Sect.  5.1.1 ). 
 Some elementary–education programmes exploit this triviality with a “keyword” 
approach: “When a problem has two numbers, then the possibilities are multiplication, 
division, addition or subtraction. Addition is indicated by words ‘added’, ‘increased 
by’ …”. The calculator version is even more mindless, because the operations 
have become keystrokes rather than internalised structures that might connect to the 
problem: “Press the “ + ” key if you see ‘added’, ‘increased by’, ….” 
 The higher-level version of this can be thought of as “reverse engineering”: Since 
only a few techniques are being tested, one can use keywords or other commonalities 
to fi gure out which method is correct and where to put the numbers. 
 Other problem types amount to translating jargon: Replace “velocity” with 
“derivative”, “acceleration” with “second derivative”, …. 
 In other words, there is so little serious contact with any real-world subject that • 
translation and reverse-engineering approaches that  avoid engagement are rou-
tinely successful, and are fast and reliable. Students who master this skill may 
enjoy word problems, because the trivial math core makes success easy. 
 The errors I see make more sense as translation problems than conceptual • 
problems. A common example: When one is modelling the liquid in a container, 
liquid fl owing  out acquires a negative sign, because it is being  lost from the 
system. Translators miss the sign, students who actually envision the situation 
should not. 
 Some of my students despise word problems, regarding them as easily-solved math • 
problems made hard by a smokescreen of terminology and irrelevant material. 
These students may be weak at this cognitive skill, or they may be thinking too 
much and trying to engage the subject. In any case, the most effective help I can 
offer is to show them how to think of it as an intelligence-free translation problem. 
 Finally, many problems are so obviously contrived that they cannot be taken seri-• 
ously. The one that begins “If a train leaves Chicago at 2:00…” has been the butt 
of jokes in comic strips. 
 Conventional wisdom holds that word problems engage students and provide an 
important connection to real-world experience. This notion is abstractly attractive, 
but the diffi culties described above keep it from being effective in practice. Further, 
a curriculum justifi ed by, or oriented toward, word problems is likely to be weak, 
because weak development is good enough for immediately-accessible problems. 
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 5.3  Mathematical Applications 
 A common justifi cation for word problems is that mathematics is important primarily 
for its applications, and math without applications is a meaningless formal game. 
I might agree, with the following reservations: 
 Goals should include preparation for applications that will not be accessible for • 
years, not just those that are immediately accessible. 
 “Application” should be interpreted to include applications  • in mathematics as 
well as real-world topics. 
 The application of polynomial multiplication to multiplication of big integers in 
Sect.  4.1 , and the refi nements developed in Sect.  4.3 to minimise the computation 
required to fi nd individual digits, are examples: 
 These two topics clearly have genuine substance, and they support extended • 
development. 
 Unlike physical-world topics, they are directly accessible, because they concern • 
mathematical structure that has already been extensively developed. 
 The multiplication algorithm (Sect.  • 4.1 ) does have real-world applications, even 
if these are not accessible to students. In any case, it is a good example of the 
kind of mathematical development that has applications. 
 The single-digit refi nement (Sect.  • 4.3 ) is a very good illustration of a major activity 
in computational science: carefully exploiting structure to minimise the compu-
tation required to get a result. 
 The Plan C variation (Sect.  • 4.3.4 ) provides an introduction to numerical instability 
and “low-probability catastrophic failure” of algorithms. This is a major issue in 
approximate (decimal) computation but is completely ignored in education. 
 Both projects signifi cantly deepen understanding of the underlying mathematical • 
structure, and develop mathematical intuition. 
 The usual educational objection to mathematical applications is that, because 
they lack contact with real-world experience, they do not engage students. I believe 
this underestimates the willingness of students to engage with almost anything if 
they can succeed with it. Further, the more obviously nontrivial the material, the 
more pride and excitement they get from successful engagement. 
 Student success is the key, and the key to success is methods and templates 
carefully designed to minimise errors. In other words, methods informed by con-
temporary approaches to proof. 
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 1  Introduction 
 This chapter takes up the challenge of theorising about proof, proving, and 
teacher-student interactions in mathematics classrooms across diverse contexts 
around the world. We aim to contribute to what Hanna and de Villiers  ( 2008 , p. 331) 
identify as the need to review “what theoretical frameworks … are helpful in under-
standing the development of proof” and what Balacheff  ( 2010 , p. 133) argues is “the 
scientifi c challenge …to better understand the didactical characteristics” of proof 
and proving. The theme of the chapter is  the role of the teacher in teaching proof 
and proving in mathematics, with a particular focus on theories that illuminate 
 teacher-student interaction in the context of mathematics teachers’ day-to-day 
instructional practice. 
 By using phrases like ‘teacher-student interaction in the mathematics classroom’ 
and ‘the teaching of proof in the context of the day-to-day instructional practice of 
teachers’, we are deliberately choosing to avoid terms such as  pedagogy or  didactics . 
Both terms come with signifi cant theoretical baggage and neither is unproblematic 
in English. As Hamilton  ( 1999 ) , for example, shows, some Anglo-American usage 
of the term  pedagogy mirrors, in many ways, the use of term  didactics in mainland 
 K.  Jones (*)
 Mathematics and Science Education Research Centre, School of Education , 
 University of Southampton ,  Highfi eld ,  Southampton ,  UK 
e-mail:  d.k.jones@soton.ac.uk 
 P.  Herbst 
 School of Education ,  University of Michigan ,  Ann Arbor ,  MI ,  USA 
e-mail:  pgherbst@umich.edu 
 Chapter 11 
 Proof, Proving, and Teacher-Student 
Interaction: Theories and Contexts 
 Keith  Jones and  Patricio  Herbst  
© The Author(s) 2021
G. Hanna and M. de Villiers (eds.), Proof and Proving in Mathematics Education,
New ICMI Study Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2129-6_11
and licenses please read the Correction https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2129-6_20 
This book has been made open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. For details on rights
262 K. Jones and P. Herbst
Europe (c.f., Best  1988 ; Chevallard  1999a ; Murphy  2008 ) . The word  instruction , as 
used by Cohen et al.  ( 2003 ) to refer to the interactions amongst teacher-students-
content in classroom environments, is probably a better word to designate the 
locus of the phenomena we target. In focusing on teacher-student interaction, we 
acknowledge that what learners bring to the classroom (from developmental experi-
ences prior to schooling, to ongoing experiences across varied out-of-school 
contexts) impacts on such interactions, just as, most certainly, can the diversity of 
countries, of instructional courses, of student ages, of levels of teacher knowledge, 
and so on, around the world. Whatever the terminology, our over-arching focus is on 
 the teacher – and, in particular, on the teacher’s part in the  teacher-student interactions 
that occur day-to-day in mathematics classrooms. 
 In theorising about proof, proving, and teacher-student interaction, we are aware 
that theories can appear in different guises and operate at different levels and grain 
sizes. As Silver and Herbst  ( 2007 ) identify in their analysis, there can be “grand 
theories”, “middle-range theories”, and “local theories”: where “grand theories” aim 
at the entirety of phenomena within, say, mathematics education; “middle-range 
theories” focus on subfi elds of study; and “local theories” apply to specifi c phenomena 
within the fi eld. We also note Kilpatrick’s  ( 2010 , p. 4) observation: “To call 
something a theory … is an exceedingly strong claim”. It is not our intention to consider 
whether or not some proposed approach is, or is not, a “theory”; rather, we use the 
term “theory” as short-hand for ‘theoretical framework’, ‘theoretical perspective’, 
‘theoretical model’, or other equivalent terms. 
 Across all these considerations, we take proof and proving to be “an activity 
with a social character” (Alibert and Thomas  1991 , p. 216). As such, mathematics 
classroom communities involve students in communicating their reasoning and in 
building norms and representations that provide the necessary structures for 
mathematical proof to have a central presence. Hence, our focus on the role of the 
teacher in teaching proof and proving in mathematics encompasses the teacher 
managing the work of proving in the classroom even when proof itself is not the 
main object of teaching. Clearly, in such situations proofs may be requested, and 
offered, even when proof itself is not the object of study; such possibilities hinge on 
customary practices (including matters of language) that the teacher has the respon-
sibility to establish and sustain. Balacheff  ( 1999 ) , Herbst and Balacheff  ( 2009 ) and 
Sekiguchi  ( 2006 ) , for examples, have studied these forms of classroom practices, 
and the role of the teacher in establishing and sustaining the practices. 
 As Balacheff  ( 2010 , pp. 116–117) shows, basing classroom practices on “grand 
theories” such as those of Piaget or Vygotsky has not worked very well. Balacheff 
argues “The responsibility for all these failures does not belong to the theories which 
supposedly underlie the educational designs, but to naive or simplifying readers 
who have assumed that concepts and models from psychology can be freely trans-
ferred to education”. Balacheff goes on to consider the didactical complexity of 
learning and teaching mathematical proof by analysing the gap between knowing 
mathematics and proving in mathematics. In contrast, our approach in selecting 
relevant theories to review is to choose ones that represent ongoing and current foci 
for classroom-based research and, importantly, that start from the abstraction of 
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observations in existing school mathematics classrooms. Using these criteria, we 
review the  theory of socio-mathematical norms , the  theory of teaching with variation , 
and the  theory of instructional exchanges . We conclude by giving pointers to future 
research – both empirical and theoretical – that we hope can advance the fi eld. 
 2  The Teaching of Proof and Proving in Diverse Contexts 
 The contexts within which proof and proving are taught around the world vary 
enormously in terms of curriculum specifi cation, student age-level, teacher knowl-
edge, and so on. In this connection, Stigler and Hiebert  ( 1999 ) have argued that the 
teaching of mathematics lessons in different countries follows different lesson 
scripts. Furthermore, Clarke et al.  ( 2006 , p. 1) report on “the extent to which students 
are collaborators with the teacher…. in the development and enactment of patterns 
of participation that refl ect individual, societal and cultural priorities and associated 
value systems”. Such research recognises the impact that diversity worldwide can 
have on the form of instructional courses in mathematics, on the student age-levels 
at which educational ideas of proof and proving are introduced, on the scale and 
nature of teachers’ mathematical knowledge, and so on. 
 Hoyles  ( 1997 ) uses the term  curricular shaping to refer to the ways in which 
school and curriculum factors infl uence and shape students’ views of, and com-
petency in, proof and proving in mathematics. Knipping’s  ( 2002,  2004 ) research 
comparing classroom proof practices in France and Germany stands out as an 
attempt to understand the role of culture in shaping classroom proof and proving 
practices. Other studies include the work of Jones and colleagues on the teaching 
of proof in geometry at the lower secondary school level in the countries of China, 
Japan and the UK, some of which is summarised in Jones, Kunimune, Kumakura, 
Matsumoto, Fujita and Ding ( 2009 ) and Jones, Zheng and Ding ( 2009 ). 
 Within this diversity in the teaching of proof and proving, we can nevertheless 
discern some common elements. Proof in elementary school, for example, is gen-
erally viewed in terms of informal reasoning and argumentation. In middle school, 
students continue exploring proof as argumentation whilst at the same time being 
exposed to forms of symbolic notation and representation. At the high school 
level, proofs begin to take on a more formalised character, often (but not always) 
within topics in geometry – and in some places in a manner commonly called two-
column proofs (e.g., Herbst  2002a ; Weiss et al.  2009 ) . For an international over-
view of proof and proving across the stages of education, see, for example, Ball 
et al.  ( 2002 ) . 
 Given such diversity, building theory that might help us understand and explain 
the teacher’s role in the classroom teaching of mathematical proof and proving is a 
complex proposition. In this context, in the next section we consider three carefully 
selected theories of mathematics teacher-student interaction in more detail, focusing 
on their relevance to proof and proving. 
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 3  Theories of Teacher-Student Interaction 
 3.1  Introduction 
 Mathematics education includes a range of theories that in one way or another 
concern themselves with proof and proving. As Silver and Herbst  ( 2007 ) note, 
mathematics education theories can be classifi ed by their ‘grain size’. Some are 
 grand theories ; theories that attempt to organise the whole fi eld, like Chevallard’s 
 ( 1999b )  théorie anthropologique du didactique within which it would be possible to 
give an account of proof and the work of the teacher. Others are  local theories ; they 
take on specifi c roles articulating the relationships between problems, research, and 
practice. An example can be found in Martin and Harel’s  ( 1989 ) study of prospective 
elementary teachers, where the authors theorise about ‘inductive verifi cation types’ 
and ‘deductive verifi cation types’ to design an instrument they use to study participants’ 
views of proof. Yet a third class of theory is what Merton (see Silver and Herbst 
 2007 ) termed a  middle range theory; this starts from an empirical phenomenon, 
rather than with broad organising concepts, and builds up abstract concepts from the 
phenomenon whilst accumulating knowledge about the phenomenon through 
empirical research. Our three examples below – the theory of  socio-mathematical 
norms , the theory of  teaching with variation , and the theory of  instructional 
exchanges – are all middle range theories. 
 3.2  The Theory of Socio-Mathematical Norms 
 The notion of  socio-mathematical norm is a component of what Cobb and Bauersfeld 
 ( 1995 ) term an “emergent theory” (in that, in coordinating individual and group 
cognitions within classroom settings, it seeks systematically to combines various 
“mini-theories”). The theory of  socio-mathematical norms aims to describe and 
explain the construction of knowledge in inquiry-based mathematics classrooms 
(Cobb et al.  1992 ) by complementing a constructivist account of how individuals 
learn with a sociological account of those classrooms where teachers promote learn-
ing by inquiry. Taking the notion of  norm (as conceptualised by Much and Schweder 
 1978 ) , Cobb and his colleagues made the observation that students engage in acts of 
challenge and justifi cation during the process of holding each other accountable for 
their assertions. The authors proposed that the notion that learners should justify their 
assertions constituted a social norm in the observed inquiry-based classrooms. 
 Voigt  ( 1995 ) and Yackel and Cobb  ( 1996 ) then argued that teachers, in their role 
as representatives of the discipline of mathematics in the classroom, could promote 
 socio-mathematical norms associated with those social norms. In particular, teachers 
could promote normative understandings of what counts as an appropriate mathematical 
justifi cation. In proposing this theory of  socio-mathematical norms , Yackel and 
Cobb  ( 1996 ) provided means to understand how the notion of a proof as an explanation 
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accepted by a community at a given time could result from the interaction and 
negotiation amongst individuals who are both adapting their cognitive schemes in 
the face of perturbations and responding to the values and practices of the discipline 
of mathematics. Specifi c studies, such as that by Sekiguchi  ( 2006 ) have shown how 
it is possible to track the development of a socio-mathematical norm for what counts 
as a proof in an inquiry-based classroom. 
 Martinet al.  ( 2005 ) , in their study of the interplay of teacher and student actions 
in the teaching and learning of geometric proof, use the notion of socio-mathematical 
norms to show how the teacher’s instructional choices are key to the type of class-
room environment that is established and, hence, to students’ opportunities to hone 
their proof and reasoning skills. More specifi cally, Martin et al.  ( 2005 ) argue that in 
order to create a classroom climate in which participating students make conjec-
tures, provide justifi cations, and build chains of reasoning, the teacher should 
“engage in dialogue that places responsibility for reasoning on the students, analyse 
student arguments, and coach students as they reason” (Martin et al.  2005 , p. 95). 
These instructional choices create a classroom environment in which teacher and 
students can negotiate socio-mathematical norms such as what counts as an 
acceptable proof. 
 This emergent theory with its notion of socio-mathematical norms exemplifi es a 
middle-range theory. In an effort to characterise inquiry-based mathematics class-
rooms, it uses microanalysis of classroom interactions to track the development of 
shared norms of classroom mathematics practice. The notion of socio-mathematical 
norm results from abstracting the directions towards which teachers push classroom 
norms through social negotiation, not only of what is acceptable mathematical 
justifi cation but also of other mathematical values. 
 3.3  The Theory of Teaching with Variation 
 In the 1990s, the theory of  teaching with variation emerged from two different, 
though related, academic fi elds: the work of Gu  ( 1992,  1994 ) in mathematics educa-
tion in mainland China, and the work of Marton (Marton  1981 ; Marton and Booth 
 1997 ) on phenomenology in Sweden. The meeting of these two ideas in the form of 
the theory of  teaching with variation is presented by Gu et al.  ( 2004 ) ; see also Ko 
and Marton ( 2004 , especially pp. 56–62). In this section we review the theory of 
 teaching with variation and illustrate how it is beginning to be applied to studies of 
proof and proving in the mathematics classroom. 
 Teaching with variation has a long tradition in mainland China. For example, 
Kangshen et al.  ( 1999 ) , in their presentation of  Jiuzhang Suanshu or  The Nine 
Chapters on the Mathematical Art (a Chinese mathematics corpus compiled by 
several generations of scholars from the tenth century BCE to the fi rst century CE) 
document the use of methods of varying problems dating back at least 2,000 years. 
In contemporary school classrooms in China, Gu  ( 1992,  1994 ) conducted a large-
scale study that examined how mathematics teachers varied the tasks that they used 
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with their students. At about the same time, Marton and colleagues (Marton and 
Booth  1997 ) were focusing on the variation in ways in which people are capable of 
experiencing different situations or phenomena. 
 In the  theory of teaching with variation (in Chinese,  bianshi – see Bao et al. 
 2003a,  b,  c ; Sun and Wong  2005 ) , classroom teaching is seen as aiming to promote 
learning through the students experiencing two types of variation deemed helpful 
for meaningful learning of mathematics. Gu et al.  ( 2004 ) classifi ed the fi rst form of 
variation as  conceptual variation , in which the teacher highlights the key features of 
a mathematical concept by contrasting examples of the concept with counter- or 
non-examples. The teacher aims thus to provide students with multiple experiences 
of the selected mathematical concept from different perspectives. The second form 
of variation, called  procedural variation , is the process of forming concepts not 
from different perspectives (as in  conceptual variation ) but through step-by-step 
changes. An example of  procedural variation provided by Gu et al.  ( 2004 , pp. 320–321) 
concerns the concept of equation. With  procedural variation , the teacher might 
begin with examples of representing an unknown by concrete items, such as when 
solving a problem involving the purchase of three pencils. The next step might be 
the use of symbols in place of the concrete items. A third step might be fully 
symbolic. 
 However, Park and Leung  ( 2006 ) argue that the terms  conceptual variation and 
 procedural variation may not be the best way of capturing how contemporary 
mathematics teachers in China promote student learning through teaching with 
variation. A key reason, even according to Gu et al.’s own defi nition, is that  procedural 
variation is also related to the formation of mathematical concepts for learners. As 
such, Park and Leung suggest replacing  conceptual variation with  multi-dimensional 
variation (thus capturing teaching through multiple representations) and  procedural 
variation with  developmental variation (since students learn to construct concepts 
through step-by-step acquisition). Sun  ( 2011 ) adds that other Chinese researchers 
use still other terms (e.g.,  explicit variation ,  implicit variation ,  form variation , 
 solution variation , and  content variation ). 
 Whatever the chosen terminology, Gu et al.  ( 2004 ) helpfully provide a diagram 
(Fig.  11.1 ) to illustrate how a teacher structures a series of classroom problems 
through the use of variations. The variations serve as means to connect something 
the learners know how to solve (the known problem) to something that they are to 
solve (the unknown problem). Through this way of varying problems in class, “stu-
dents’ experience in solving problems is manifested by the richness of varying 
problems and the variety of transferring strategies” (Gu et al.  2004 , p. 322). 
 To date, a number of researchers have used the  theory of teaching with variation 
to analyse mathematics teaching. Some have aimed to provide an account of 
mathematical problem-solving in Chinese mathematics teaching (e.g., Cai and Nie 
 2007 ; Wong  2002 ) , whilst others utilise  teaching with variation when accounting 
for the classroom teaching of mathematics (e.g., Huang and Li  2009 ; Park and 
Leung  2006 ) . Some research is beginning to use the theory of variation to research 
the teaching and learning of proof and proving. For example, Sun  ( 2009 ) and Sun 
and Chan  ( 2009 ) provide reports illustrating that the teaching approach of using 
26711 Proof, Proving, and Teacher-Student Interaction: Theories and Contexts
‘problem variations with multiple solutions’ (where one problem has a number of 
solutions) successfully helped older students to reconstruct their own proof solu-
tions by regenerating their past proving experience. 
 Ding and Jones  ( 2009 ) and Jones, Zheng and Ding ( 2009 ) report on the instruc-
tional practices of a sample of expert teachers of geometry at Grade 8 (pupils aged 
13–14) in Shanghai, China. From an analysis of the data collected, the research 
found that two factors characterise the instructional strategies used by the teachers 
to help their students to understand the discovery function of proof in geometry: the 
 variation of mathematical problems , and the  variation of teaching questions . In the 
variation of mathematical problems, the teachers started by guiding their students to 
understand the principles of a ‘ problem to fi nd ’ in order to begin engaging them in 
seeking the logical connections to the principal parts of a ‘ problem to prove ’. The 
data also provided evidence of the variation of teacher questions, in which the 
teacher used questions both to encourage students to formulate plausible reasons for 
the properties and relations of a chosen geometric fi gure and to increase students’ 
awareness of the discovery function of deductive proof. 
 Whilst such studies provide a start, we need more empirical data on using the 
theory of teaching with variation. Researchers such as Mok et al.  ( 2008 ) have raised 
the issue that whilst students might master the target mathematical ideas being 
taught, teaching with variation can mean that they miss opportunities for indepen-
dent exploration. When the difference between one variation and another is rather 
small, the students have little room to think independently. Thus, teaching with 
variation does not  necessarily lead to the full development of mathematical compe-
tency (c.f. Huang et al.  2006 ) . Similarly, the type of engagement the teacher creates 
in the lesson may fail to foster students’ higher-order thinking in terms of proof and 
proving. We need further research on instructional designs that use teaching with 
variation to develop the appropriate range of mathematical skills and approaches. 
One such avenue for research is on how teachers can provide for students’ mathematical 
 Fig. 11.1  Variation for solving problems (Source: Gu et al.  2004 , p. 322) 
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exploration in a way that supports proof and proving whilst not limiting the 
students’ thinking by making the variations of problems too small. 
 3.4  The Theory of Instructional Exchanges 
 The  theory of instructional exchanges proposed by Herbst, and based on prior work 
by Brousseau  ( 1997 ) and by Doyle  ( 1988 ) on the study of classrooms, is a descrip-
tive theory of the role of the teacher in classroom instruction. It is another example 
of a “middle range theory” (Silver and Herbst  2007 ) in that it does not attempt to 
account for all practices related to mathematical thinking, learning, and teaching but 
rather concentrates on understanding the phenomena associated with the teaching 
and learning of prescribed knowledge in school classrooms as they exist (i.e. not 
only of ‘inquiry-type’ mathematics classrooms). It proposes that mathematics 
instruction proceeds as a sequence of exchanges or transactions between, on the one 
hand, the moment-to-moment, possibly interactive, work that students do with their 
teacher and, on the other hand, the discrete claims a teacher can lay on what has 
been accomplished. 
 Central to this theory of instructional exchanges is the notion of  didactical con-
tract (Brousseau  1997 ) : the hypothesis that a bond exists that makes teacher and 
students mutually responsible vis-à-vis their relationships with knowledge; in par-
ticular, a contract that makes the teacher responsible for attending not only to the 
students as learners of mathematics but also to mathematics as the discipline that 
needs to be represented to be learned. Particular classrooms may have specifi c cus-
tomary ways of negotiating and enacting that contract and these may vary quite a 
bit, but in general these various ways will always amount to establishing the 
teacher’s accountability not only to the students but also to the discipline of 
mathematics. 
 A second, related hypothesis that is helpful when analysing the teacher’s 
instructional work derives from the observation that classroom activity takes place 
over multiple timescales. For example, whilst meaningful classroom interactions 
(e.g., utterances) can be detected at a timescale of the fraction of a second, prog-
ress in the syllabus and consequent examinations take place over a larger times-
cale of weeks and months. Thus, the second key hypothesis is that the work of the 
teacher includes managing activities and objects within two different timescales: 
the work done moment-to-moment (at the scale of the utterance) and the mathe-
matical objects of knowledge that exist at the larger scales of the week, month, or 
year-long curriculum (Lemke  2000 , p. 277). In other words, the teacher needs to 
operate symbolic transactions or exchanges between activities in one timescale 
and objects of knowledge in the other: moment-to-moment activities serve the 
teacher to deploy or instantiate large-scale mathematical objects of knowledge; 
reciprocally, objects of knowledge serve to account for the moment-to-moment 
activities. 
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 Herbst  ( 2003,  2006 ) has proposed two basic ways in which that exchange can be 
facilitated. One, “negotiation of task”, describes how a teacher needs to handle 
‘novel’ tasks, ones that are completely new to the students. In these tasks the teacher 
needs to engage students in identifying, perhaps deciding upon, how the didactical 
contract applies to the task at hand. In particular, the negotiation includes identify-
ing what aspects of the task embody the target knowledge and what aspects of 
students’ work on that task attest that they are learning the knowledge or know 
it already. 
 The second way in which that exchange is facilitated is by ‘default to an instruc-
tional situation’, by framing the exchange according to norms that have framed 
other exchanges (possibly set up previously through negotiation). In this case, the 
work done is not one of identifying the mathematics in the task as much as identifying 
the situation, or cueing into the situation, by acting in compliance with the norms 
that constitute the situation. Thus, the situation frames that exchange, saving the 
effort of having to negotiate what needs to be done and what is at stake. 
 Negotiation of task, and default to a situation, are two ‘ideal types’ (in the 
Weberian sense) of teacher-student interaction about content. In practice, there 
would always be some amount of default and some amount of negotiation of how to 
handle breaches to the default situation. Nevertheless, this theorisation helps 
describe how regularities in interaction about content structure much of the 
workings of the didactical contract. More importantly, the hypothesis explains that 
novelty is constructed against a background of customary situations; specifi cally, 
that novel interaction is constructed by negotiating how to handle a breach in a 
customary situation. 
 Some of the tasks in which students might engage, and which (according to the 
second hypothesis above) the teacher needs to exchange for items of knowledge, 
involve mathematical moves like those identifi ed by Lakatos  ( 1976 ) as part of the 
method of proofs and refutations. Those operations could include deriving a logical 
consequence from a given statement; proposing a statement whose logical conse-
quence is a given statement; reducing a given problem into smaller problems whose 
solutions logically entail that problem’s solution; bringing new, warranted mathe-
matical objects to a problem in order to translate or reduce the problem; translating 
strings of symbols into other, equivalent, strings of symbols; operating on one set of 
objects as if they behaved like other similar set of objects, and so forth. Hence, the 
mathematical work of proving involves a host of actions that students could perform 
as transient moves when working on tasks, and for which, the theory anticipates, 
a teacher might need to fi nd exchange values within the elements of the target 
knowledge. 
 In the US high school curriculum, as well as in other countries, proof has 
traditionally appeared as an element of target knowledge in the context of the study 
of Euclidean geometry (González and Herbst  2006 ; Herbst  2002b ) . Teachers of 
geometry create work contexts in which students have the chance to experience, 
learn, and demonstrate knowledge of ‘proof’. The notion of an instructional situa-
tion as a ‘frame’ (a set of norms regulating who does what and when) for the 
exchange between work done and knowledge transacted was initially exemplifi ed in 
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what Herbst and associates called the ‘doing proofs’ situation (Herbst and Brach 
 2006 ; Herbst et al.  2009 ) . That work of modelling classroom interaction as a system 
of norms produced the observation that many of the operations in the work of 
proving (e.g., those listed in the previous paragraph) are not accommodated in 
classroom work contexts where knowledge of proof is exchanged. In other words, 
‘doing proofs’ has become a stable work context where students can learn some 
of the work of proving but this, at the same time, excludes other important math-
ematical actions of proving, perhaps by exporting them to other instructional 
situations where they are disconnected from the functions of proof in the discipline 
of mathematics. 
 An important question is whether the practical rationality (Herbst and Chazan 
 2003 ) that underpins the teacher’s work contains resources that could be used to 
give value to classroom work that embodies the different functions of proof in math-
ematics (which contain all the actions that constitute the work of proving). To study 
that rationality, Herbst and Chazan, and their associates (see  http://grip.umich.edu/
themat ) have created classroom scenarios (complete with animated cartoon characters) 
depicting mathematical work that create contexts for the work of proving; the latter 
is sometimes explicitly executed and other times glaringly absent. The researchers 
have used those animations to engage groups of geometry teachers in conversations 
about instruction. They have found that, as a group, teachers have resources to justify 
positive appraisals of certain elements of the work of proving: the use of an unproven 
conjecture as a premise in proving a target conclusion; the identifi cation of new 
mathematical concepts and their properties from objects introduced and observa-
tions made in justifying a construction; the deductive derivation of a conditional 
statement connecting two concomitant facts about a diagram; the prediction of an 
empirical fact by operating algebraically with symbols representing the quantities to 
be measured; the breaking up of a complicated proof problem into smaller problems 
(lemmas); the application of a specifi c proving technique (e.g., reduction to a previ-
ously proven case); and the establishment of equivalence relationships amongst a 
set of concomitantly true statements. 
 Herbst et al.  ( 2010 ) have proposed that teachers might use the various functions 
of mathematical proof documented in the literature (e.g., verifi cation, explanation, 
discovery, communication, systematisation, development of an empirical theory, 
and container of techniques) (de Villiers  1990 ; Hanna and Barbeau  2008 ; Hanna 
and Jahnke  1996 ) to attach contractual value to actions like those listed above. There 
remain two questions; whether classroom exchanges are possible (manageable) 
between these actions and the elements of currency; and whether the exchanges can 
be contained within instances of the ‘doing proofs’ situation or otherwise whether 
they require more explicit negotiations of the didactical contract. The theory of 
instructional exchanges thus illustrates another middle range theory that starts from 
abstracting from observations in mathematics classrooms where there has been no 
special instructional intervention (in other words,  intact mathematics classrooms) 
and uses those observations to probe into how teachers manage and sustain those 
work contexts and also how these might be changed. 
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 4  Directions for Future Research 
 The development of each of the three theories above began with abstraction from 
observations of mathematics classrooms. Simon  ( 1987 , p. 371) wrote that pedagogy 
(or didactics) is:
 the integration in practice of particular curriculum content and design, classroom strate-
gies and techniques, and evaluation, purpose and methods. All of these aspects of educa-
tional practice come together in the realities of what happens in classrooms. Together they 
organize a view of how a teacher’s work within an institutional context specifi es a particu-
lar version of what knowledge is of most worth, what it means to know something, and 
how we might construct representations of ourselves, others and our physical and social 
environment. 
 This passage, famously taken up by McLaren  ( 1998 , p. 165), returns us not only 
to the complexity of developing theory about the role of the teacher in the teaching 
and learning of proof and proving, but also the diversity of contexts within which 
proof and proving are taught around the world – for example, in terms of curriculum 
specifi cation, student age-level, teacher knowledge and so on. 
 Pollard  ( 2010 , p. 5) offers the representation in Fig.  11.2 (slightly amended 
here) as a way of capturing teacher-student interaction as a science, a craft and an 
art. This representation might point to a way to take into account the complexity 
and diversity of classroom teaching strategies when “All of these aspects of educa-
tional practice come together in the realities of what happens in classrooms” Simon 
 ( 1987 , p. 371). 
 Of the three theories reviewed here, the theory of teaching with variation (Gu 
et al.  2004 ) appears closer to “craft” (the “craft” vertex of the triangle in Fig.  11.2 ) 
than the other two, in that teaching with variation entails teacher mastery of an 
appropriate repertoire of classroom teaching skills and processes. In Cobb and col-
leagues’ (Cobb and Bauersfeld  1995 ; Cobb et al.  1992 ) account of teaching in dif-
ferent mathematical traditions and its use of the idea of socio-mathematical norms 
to examine the work that a mathematics teacher does in an inquiry-based approach 
to teaching, this encompasses a responsive and creative capacity, a way in which the 
teacher responds both to mathematical demands and to students’ cognitive demands 
at the same time. As such, the theory of socio-mathematical norms might fi t with the 
“art” vertex of the triangle (Fig.  11.2 ). The theory of instructional exchanges, with 
 Fig. 11.2  Teaching as a science, a craft and an art (Adapted from Pollard  2010 , p. 5) 
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its pretence of universality (to describe all kinds of teaching and to focus on 
concepts that are general enough to describe all observations) may come closer to 
the “science” vertex. 
 All three theories are  middle range theories ; and it remains an open question 
whether a  grand theory of the teacher’s role in teaching proof and proving in math-
ematics is a reasonable longer-term goal, especially in terms of accounting for the 
nature of teacher-student interaction. Pollard’s  ( 2010 , p. 5) representation (Fig.  11.2 ) 
may provide some ideas towards a way of encompassing all the complexity and 
diversity of classroom proof teaching. 
 It is worth refl ecting on Sfard’s  ( 2002 ) caution about the over-proliferation of 
theories. Prolifi c theorising may signify a “young and healthy scientifi c discipline” 
(p. 253), but, in contrast, it may mean that “theories are not being suffi ciently exam-
ined, tested, refi ned and expanded” (op cit.). Sfard elaborates that “one of the 
trademarks of a mature science is that it strives for unity; that it directs its collective 
thought toward unifying theories and frameworks” (op cit.), at the same time noting 
that this is “neither a quick nor an easy process” (op cit.). As to directions for future 
research on proof, proving, and teacher-student interaction in the mathematics 
classroom, we list Sfard’s challenges for the mathematics education community as 
ones which might inform further research work:
 To carry out research studies within frameworks determined by existing theories • 
with the intention to establish the range of applicability or validity or usefulness 
of these theories. 
 To carry out comparative surveys of several theories, in particular of theories that • 
purport to provide frameworks for dealing with the same or related areas, topics 
and questions. 
 To compare the terminologies used by different theories in order to identify cases • 
where different terms are used for essentially the same idea or where the same 
term is used to designate ideas that are essentially different. 
 To attempt to see the common ideas between different theories and work toward • 
their partial unifi cation; this might be particularly promising in cases where the 
theories deal with different but closely related issues or areas (op cit.). 
 Rising to Sfard’s challenge, we suggest that one goal for further research in the 
fi eld of research on the teaching and learning of mathematical proof and proving is 
to probe the existing theories, perhaps by focussing on what each allows us to 
accomplish as far as describing, explaining and reconciling novel phenomena in the 
mathematics classroom. The methodologies for such studies might adopt approaches 
reviewed by Herbst and Chazan  ( 2009 ) and might look to using Pollard’s  ( 2010 , 
p. 5) representation of teacher-student interaction as a science, a craft, and an art 
(Fig.  11.2 ). 
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 5  Concluding Comments 
 At the start of this chapter, we chose to avoid using terms such as  pedagogy or 
 didactics , instead using phrases such as  teacher-student interaction in the mathe-
matics classroom and  the teaching of proof in the context of teachers’ day-to-day 
instructional practice . In the US, at least, the promotion of the term  instruction 
(following Cohen et al.  2003 ) has had the good effect of getting people to see 
that the interactions that mathematics educators need to examine are ternary 
(teacher-student-content) rather than binary (teacher-student). In that sense, the term 
 instruction has been able to achieve what  didactics (at least in the Anglo-American 
world) has not. However, a lingering problem is that ‘instruction’ can conjure up 
notions of giving orders. In this sense, rather than ternary (teacher-student-content), 
or even binary (teacher-student), ‘instruction’ might evoke the idea of the teacher 
unilaterally issuing orders. 
 In another starting point to this chapter, we recognised the diversity of countries 
worldwide and the impact that this has on forms of instructional courses, on the 
student age-level at which educational ideas are introduced, on teacher knowledge, 
and so on. Our prior comments about terms like  pedagogy ,  didactics and  instruction 
reminded us of the infl uence of language on the ways in which people express 
themselves. Linguists predominantly think that the fundaments of language are 
somehow encoded in human genes and are, as such, the same across the human 
species. From such a perspective, all languages share the same  Universal Grammar , 
the same underlying concepts, the same degree of systemic complexity, and so on. 
The resulting conclusion is that the infl uence of one’s mother tongue on the way one 
thinks is negligible or trivial. Yet recent work (e.g., Deutscher  2010 ) is challenging 
this conclusion, arguing that cultural differences are refl ected in language in profound 
ways, and that emerging evidence indicates that mother-tongue can affect how 
individuals in different cultural settings think and perceive the world (concurring 
with the longstanding view of some anthropologists of language). 
 How such cultural infl uences might impact on collective work towards a theory 
of the role of the teacher in teaching proof and proving in mathematics (possible 
 grander than the  middle range theories covered in this chapter), especially in terms 
of teacher-student interaction, remains to be seen. As Stylianou et al.  ( 2009 , pp. 
5–6) point out, to date there have not been enough research studies “focused on the 
teaching of proof in the context of teachers’ day-to-day instructional practice”. 
More is currently known about the  learning of proof (e.g., Harel and Sowder  1998, 
 2007 ) ; the  teaching of proof warrants equally close attention (e.g., Harel and Rabin 
 2010a,  b ) . Our review of a carefully selected trio of theoretical frameworks is offered 
as support for further theorising about teaching proof and proving in mathematics 
classrooms worldwide. 
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 The authors of this chapter, collectively, have signifi cant experience as teacher 
educators, more than 20 years each on average, and have also authored national 
mathematics textbooks which emphasised integrating exploration in the teaching 
of proof (Hsieh  1997 ) . Drawing on this experience, and in light of the data 
presented below, we attempt in this chapter to introduce how exploration, espe-
cially hands-on exploration, is integrated into the teaching of proof in Taiwan. 
In the fi rst section, we briefl y discuss the role of exploration with different 
media in the teaching of proof in Taiwanese schools. We present two extracts 
from a Taiwanese textbook which demonstrate the integration of hands-on 
exploration in proving. In the second and third sections below, we describe our 
position with regard to exploration in the context of proving and why it is valu-
able in this context. In the fourth section, we propose and discuss a conceptual 
model for the relationship of exploration, problem solving, proving and proof, 
which will be illustrated through the use of two exploratory teaching experi-
ments. In the concluding section, we briefl y compare the use of dynamic geometry 
software (DGS) and hands-on exploration, summarise some of the positive and 
negative issues raised by integrating exploration, and suggest areas worthy of 
future research. 
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 1  Background 
 It is impossible to list with certainty all the factors necessary for the successful 
 construction of a mathematics proof; however, they certainly include cognition of 
the necessary theories to be used, the ability to employ sequencing steps according 
to accepted logical rules, and the competence to use accepted mathematics registers 
to express the steps to be conveyed. Developing these abilities poses a range of 
diffi culties for students which mathematics educators have attempted to overcome. 
 One such attempt has been the use of dynamic geometric software (DGS), such 
as  Geometer’s Sketchpad (Goldenberg and Cuoco  1998 ) and  Cabri-géomètrie 
(Jones  2000 ) . However, this method is not always convenient and viable, because of 
its time-intensive nature and the requirement in many school systems that students 
must be able to construct a proof manually (without the aid of electronic devices) 
for school examinations, as in Taiwan’s demanding mathematics curriculum. 
 A recent national random-sample survey of more than two thousands each of 
junior and senior high school students in Taiwan reveals a relative disapproval of the 
use of computers in teaching mathematics. When asked what teaching media an 
ideal mathematics teacher should use, both senior and junior high school students 
regarded the use of computer aids such as DGS or PowerPoint to be less ideal media 
(approximately a 55% approval rating) than concrete teaching-aids such as paper 
cards or models (approximately a 90% approval rating; Hsieh  2010 ) . Further, the 
vast majority of students thought that an ideal mathematics teacher should engage 
students in exploration (approximately 80%) as well as hands-on activities (approx-
imately 81%) in order for them to appreciate mathematics (Hsieh et al.  2008 ) . 
 The students’ preferences grow out of, and are refl ected in, the incorporation of 
hands-on exploration tasks, especially those related to proving, in many standard 
Taiwanese mathematics textbooks. 
 1.1  Taiwanese Textbook Examples 
 Figure  12.1 is an image from the most commonly used mathematics textbook in 
Taiwan (Hung et al.  2009 ) . It is a modifi ed replica of an example used previously in 
the national textbook. The property to prove is “the segment connecting the two 
midpoints of the two sides of a trapezoid is parallel to the upper and lower bases and 
is equal to a half of the sum of the bases.” The publisher provides paper cards 
required to perform the actions in the exploration in the back of the textbook. The 
text poses several questions to guide the exploration: “(1) are D, C, and Q on the 
same line? Are P, N, and Q on the same line? Why?”, “(2) are the quadrilateral 
DAPQ and DMNQ parallelograms?”, and “(3) what are the relationships of DQ, 
MN, and AP?” This exploration precedes the proof of the property. 
 Figure  12.2 is another image from the same textbook (Hung et al.  2009 ) . Hsieh 
 ( 1994 ) fi rst introduced this example when demonstrating how to use paper-folding 
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 Fig. 12.1  Trapezoid exploration activity in Taiwanese mathematics textbook (Copyright 2009 by 
Kang Hsuan Educational Publishing. Adopted with permission of the author) 
 Fig. 12.2  Exploration about the size of angles in a triangle in Taiwanese mathematics textbook 
(Copyright 2009 by Kang Hsuan Educational Publishing. Adopted with permission of the author) 
in helping students to construct auxiliary lines. Hsieh raised an operational principle 
that “one can compare an object with another object of the assumptions of a proving 
problem through paper-folding in order to construct auxiliaries”. She demonstrated 
that this principle could also be applied to the objects in the results. For example, in 
Fig.  12.2 , the assumption is “AB > AC” and the result to be claimed is “ÐC > ÐB ”. 
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Seeing that AB is greater than AC, one can try to compare AB with AC by folding 
AC to AB; the auxiliary lines then become obvious. 
 These excerpts exemplify the extent to which hands-on exploration is entrenched 
in the teaching of mathematics, including proof, in Taiwan. 
 2  Position on Exploration 
 The importance of integrating exploration in proving has been the topic of consid-
erable academic discussion. Various scholars consider exploration in general 
(Arzarello et al.  2009 ) , and hands-on exploration in particular, a valuable component 
in the learning or construction of proof (MacPherson  1985 ; Semadeni  1980 ) . 
Some studies have proposed including exploration via the use of dynamic com-
puter environments (De Villiers  2004 ; Gonza´lez and Herbst  2009 ; Larios-Osorio 
and Acuña-Soto  2009 ; Mariotti  2000 ; Yerushalmy and Chazan  1990 ) . However, 
advocates of “exploration” have often not explicitly defi ned it. Ponte  ( 2007 ) 
attempted to clarify the term, claiming “explorations” have an open nature. From 
her perspective, even “the problems are not completely formulated beforehand 
and the student has a role to play in defi ning the mathematical question to pursue” 
(p. 421). Notwithstanding, the term “exploration” remains open to multiple 
interpretations. 
 In our opinion, two different positions of interpreting “exploration” provide an 
operational heuristic for considering the relationship between exploration and 
proving. The fi rst position views exploration as a mental process, the second as an 
activity that involves manipulation of and interaction with external environments 
(e.g., hands-on or DGS tools). The former position sees exploration as a necessary 
component in proving due to its problem-solving nature, which requires the use of 
observation, connection, inquiring and reasoning. The latter position encourages 
mental exploration reinforced through the interaction with external objects. 
 Piaget and Inhelder  ( 1967 ) claimed that some students have diffi culty in imagining 
the result of an action on objects without actually performing the action themselves. 
For such students, undertaking exploration via hands-on activities can aid in 
actually  seeing the image after its construction. The use of concrete objects increases 
the possibility of students performing actions due to the invitation provided by these 
materials’ “perceived affordance” (will be discussed in a later section; Norman 
 1988 ,  1999 ). The actions may start either randomly or start in order and progress 
towards the students’ goal; either process helps to make the transformation of 
objects such as fi gures more accessible. 
 In addition, exploration, if used in proving, should be devoted not only to discov-
ering mathematical properties but also to the discovery or mental construction of 
logical steps required in proof. Because manipulating objects also requires mental 
exploration, the combination of mental and hands-on exploration encourages both 
intuitive and analytical thinking which, in turn, promotes the discovery or mental 
construction of logic steps. 
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 This paper attempts to merge the two by fi rst employing the mental process and 
then embedding additional hands-on exploration as a means to enhance it. The term 
“hands-on exploration” refers to organised activity that adopts the use of concrete 
objects to build an interactive environment, thereby inviting manipulation and 
encouraging discovery. In what follows, the terms “exploration” and “hands-on 
exploration” refer to the same concept unless otherwise specifi ed. 
 3  Exploration’s Value in Proving 
 Here, we focus on analysing the characteristics of exploration and the various 
notions of proving, as well as the teaching and learning of proving for the class-
room. The discussion includes not only the extrinsic notions of exploration but also 
some intrinsic features, such as discovery and “perceived affordance”. We then use 
the results of our analysis as evidence supporting the value of exploration in the 
context of proving. 
 3.1  Exploration and Discovery 
 Discovery is an essential element in exploration. Bruner  ( 1960 ) argues that mastery 
of the fundamental ideas of a fi eld, including mathematics, involves not only grasping 
general principles but also developing an approach to guesses and hunches, as well 
as realising the possibility of solving problems on one’s own. To instil this attitude, 
Bruner proposes the including an important ingredient in curricula, namely, creating 
“excitement about discovery–discovery of regularities of previously unrecognized 
relations and similarities between ideas” (p. 20). According to Bruner, what students 
learn through discovery will be both useful and meaningful in their thinking, 
features considered as extremely signifi cant in the learning of mathematics proof. 
Exploration, thus predicated on the notion of discovery, comprises both meaningful 
and usable elements in the context of proving. 
 3.2  Characteristics of Exploration 
 In addition to a sense of discovery, the notion of exploration has to be analysed to 
clearly demonstrate why exploration is valuable in the process of proving (Chazan 
 1990 ; Lakatos  1976 ; Pólya  1981 ) . Here, we concentrate on hands-on exploration. 
However, the issue of the characteristics of hands-on exploration remains an open 
question; various articles (e.g., Boakes  2009 ; Rosen and Hoffman  2009 ) have 
mentioned these, either explicitly or implicitly. From the literature and our experiences 
and observations in mathematics or mathematics education, the concepts that we 
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especially noticed are interaction, dynamics, tangibility, manipulation, immediate 
feedback, intuition and divergent thinking. To sum up, hands-on exploration provides 
an opportunity for an individual to (a) construct mathematics objects, (b) transform 
fi gures, (c) probe in multiple directions, (d) perceive divergent visual information, 
and (e) receive immediate feedback on one’s actions. These fi ve factors contribute 
to the success of constructing a proof. 
 3.3  Perceived Affordance and Hands-on Exploration 
 The above aspects of exploration may take effect when a mental exploration is 
implemented with the medium of only paper-and-pencil. Therefore, one may ask 
“Why do we need to supply a hands-on environment with concrete objects?” The 
reason can be clearly explained using Norman’s (Norman  1999 ) idea of “perceived 
affordance”. Gibson  ( 1977,  1979 ) had originally defi ned “affordance” as all “action 
possibilities available” to an individual in the environment. Norman subsequently 
revisited the concept and divided it into two: actual affordance and perceived affor-
dance. The latter refers to those fundamental properties of an object that determine 
action possibilities readily perceivable by an individual. That is, the action possibili-
ties are dependent not only on an object’s actual affordance, but also on one’s visual 
perception of the object based on one’s goals, plans, and learned conventions about 
the object’s logical and cultural constraints. The concept of perceived affordance 
explains why a hands-on environment enhances exploration. For example, take two 
sheets of paper, one featuring a graph accompanied by text describing what proof is 
desired and a space to respond and the other featuring only a fi gure with no description 
about what to do. The perceived affordances of these two sheets are different. The 
fi rst sheet’s perceived affordance stimulates students to perform a paper-and-pencil 
task, whilst the second’s invites students to perform various motive actions, such as 
to move, rotate, fl ip, fold, cut and draw. If they employ some of these latter actions, 
the visual feedback they receive encourages them to subsequently react to their 
artefacts; this process would be less possible if the students were constructing proof 
by employing only mental exploration. 
 3.4  Concept of Proving 
 Without an operational concept of proving or proof, any discussion as to why explo-
ration is valuable in the process of proving will be ambiguous. What constitutes an 
acceptable mathematical proof has been the subject of considerable academic 
debate; however, a consensus is yet to be reached (Arzarello  2007 ) , because math-
ematicians and researchers cannot ignore the various turning points in the evolution 
of the concept of proof (Kleiner  1991 ) . Two concepts of proof have received consid-
erable attention from mathematics educators: the cognitive aspect, which relates to 
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the conceptual understanding or semantic notion of proof, and, the social aspect, 
which relates to the syntactic notion (forms and languages) used to express it 
(Hanna  2000 ) . We regard the conceptual or semantic notion as an essential element of 
proof and the syntactic aspect as an indispensable element of proof with variant 
requirements of its forms. 
 The Chinese language expresses both “proving” and “proof”, related but distinct 
terms in English, by a single term, “zhèng míng” (證明): The fi rst word, “zhèng” (證), 
literally means “to prove” or “to demonstrate”, and the second word, “míng” 
(明), means “clear” or “to understand”. In other words, “proving”, as expressed 
within the Chinese lexicon, is to demonstrate as well as to make things clear and 
understandable. This idea represents a focus on both the conceptual and semantic 
notions of proving, which characterises the dominant approach to proving in 
Taiwan’s system of mathematics education. 
 When asked “What is proof?”, a student at one of Taipei’s elite high schools 
referred to a term attributed to Confucius in the  Analects of Confucius . The term – 
also pronounced “zhèng míng” (正名) – literally translates as “to justify the name 
[title];” that is, ensuring that one’s social role and rank are correctly labelled, thus 
lending credibility to one’s statements. The student claimed that “zhèng míng” 
(proving, 證明) is “zhèng míng” (justifying the name, 正名). 
 Although, by citing Confucius, the student’s response diverts focus away from 
mathematics, it is surprisingly accurate in delineating one aspect of mathematical 
proof. Justifi cation is one of the most important elements of proof, as justifi cation 
validates what is being claimed and thus allows it to be used to solve follow-up 
problems. The student’s analogy not only applies to mathematics but also highlights 
an intrinsic human desire to justify one’s claims and statements. This point is impor-
tant from a pedagogical point of view. When teaching how to construct a proof, 
justifying “why a property is supposed to be proved in such a way” is as signifi cant 
as justifying the statement itself. 
 3.5  Reason for Embedding Exploration in Proving 
in the Classroom 
 Exploration is important for learners in the process of proving. One reason may be 
found in mathematics history: mathematicians have devoted their energies to 
exploration, making mathematical discoveries and then justifying them. Exploration 
activates their intuitions and encourages their thinking. The processes of discovery 
and justifi cation are essential work that one can view as the  real task in mathematics. 
Such processes, with necessary learning adaptations, are within the range of what 
most students can do and should not be exclusive to mathematicians (Ponte  2007 ) ; 
students dealing with mathematics also deserve a chance to experience this real 
mathematics task. Learners, like expert mathematicians, can apply their intuitions to 
seek patterns – following hunches, testing ideas and formulating generalisations 
that may become conjectures (Lakatos  1976 ; Pólya  1981 ) . 
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 A review of the relevant literature (Fischbein  1987 ; Hanna  2000 ; Harel and 
Sowder  1998 ; Lakatos  1976 ; Pólya  1981 ) and our own experiences and observa-
tions working in the fi eld make it clear that constructing mathematics proofs via 
exploration may additionally benefi t learners because the process itself has positive 
psychological effects, such as enhancing motivation, self-confi dence and cognition. 
Here, we concentrate on notions that relate especially to cognition. 
 3.5.1  Exploration Reveals Information Necessary to Prove 
 Educators have introduced certain methods – such as working backwards or for-
wards in a graphic proof representation – to enhance students’ approach to proving 
(e.g. Croy  2000 ) . However, one of the major problems students encounter in proving 
is not which direction to proceed, but rather where and how to start. One reason may 
lie in the notion of learner ability; in this case, the learner lacks the ability for forma-
lised perception of mathematical materials (Krutetskii  1976 ) . Such perception is 
crucial for understanding information presented by a proving problem and for 
initiating a solution. 
 In many cases, information required to solve a proving problem is either hidden 
or not immediately obvious to students, for example, when starting or continuing a 
proving exercise requires the construction of auxiliary lines. In this case, exploration, 
with its interactive and manipulative nature, allows students to probe in multiple 
directions and transform fi gures effortlessly. These actions, in turn, reveal additional 
information that prompts students to think about how to start the process of proving. 
Furthermore, when students perform actions with objects, such as folding a piece of 
paper, they receive immediate feedback on those actions and can then react to the 
new fi gures accordingly. This crucial process allows students to continue with the 
remaining steps of proving. 
 3.5.2  Exploration Facilitates the Understanding of Proving 
 When teaching proof, educators aim to help students gradually develop an under-
standing of proof consistent with the approach practised in contemporary mathe-
matics (Harel and Sowder  2007 ) . In addition, Hanna  ( 2000 ) points out that the best 
proof of the theorem is one that not only allows students to see “that it is true, but 
also why it is true” (p. 8). In other words, it is important for students to know not 
only a particular proof but also why it validates the statement. The process of 
exploration may facilitate the acquisition of this dual knowledge because it tends 
to activate the use of intuition. As Bruner  ( 1960 ) noted, “Intuition implies the act of 
grasping the meaning, signifi cance, or structure of a problem or situation without 
explicit reliance on the analytic apparatus of one’s craft.” When they activate their 
intuitions in proving, students regard their constructions of certain steps or structures 
as self-evident and as something of which they have an inherent understanding. 
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Therefore, by encouraging the use of intuition, exploration contributes to the 
understanding of the process of proving. 
 Furthermore, the interactive and manipulative environment used in explora-
tion invites students to actively work with available materials. These actions 
allow students to have a multitude of incidental experiences through observing 
such phenomena as the correlations of mathematical objects, the derivative prop-
erties of objects, and the relationship between their artefacts and the proving 
problem in question. Incidental experiences, according to Ausubel  ( 1963 ) , may 
reshape students’ cognitive structures and increase their readiness to learn; that 
is, “the adequacy of existing capacity in relation to the demands of a given learn-
ing task” (p. 31). Both readiness and the cognitive structure are always relevant 
and crucial variables for meaningful learning (ibid.). The incidental experiences 
acquired during exploration for the purpose of constructing proof embody 
Ausubel’s theory. With an appropriate design, steps of proving may be closely 
related to, or even generated from, those incidental experiences, giving rise to 
meaningful learning. 
 3.5.3  Exploration Encourages the Generation of Conjectures 
 Pedemonte  ( 2007 ) , after reviewing some experimental studies, concluded teaching 
proof primarily by presenting proofs to students without asking them to construct 
conjectures and argumentations makes proof less “accessible” to students. 
Exploration is characteristic of encouraging students to probe in multiple directions 
and perceive large amounts of divergent information prompts students to come up 
with guesses and provides them with many examples. These effects encourage 
inductive reasoning which, in turn, gives rise to the generation of conjectures. This 
benefi t of integrating exploration into learning tasks has been addressed repeatedly 
in the literature (Mariotti  2000 ) . 
 3.5.4  Exploration Supports Justifi cation for the Process of Proving 
 Many mathematical educators agree that justifi cation is the very essence of mathe-
matical proof (Pedemonte  2007 ) . Taking this position, Harel’s and Sowder  ( 1998 ) 
conducted a study aimed “to help students refi ne their own conception of what con-
stitutes justifi cation in mathematics” through the developing of their understanding 
of proof, proof production, and proof appreciation. Harel and Sowder’s concept of 
justifi cation resembles the concept presented here; namely, mathematical justifi ca-
tion is based on intuition, internal conviction and necessity. 
 When presented with a proving task, students try to initiate a solution on their 
own and then complete the task in a way they believe will be acceptable to their 
teacher. This process involves using mathematical information, causal relations of 
mathematical information, and mathematical theorems to support their  justifi cations. 
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As mentioned above, students profi t from exploration by discovering just such 
mathematical information and causal relations; they then connect these to mathe-
matical theorems in justifi cation. 
 Furthermore, the process of justifi cation requires making arguments. Exploration, 
by providing an interactive environment that encourages students to manipulate 
concrete objects (or computer graphics) and probe in multiple directions, creates a 
setting for students to adapt their mental structures to proving. Students’ actions, 
artefacts and discoveries provide a point of reference for this adaption of their 
cognitive structures; this, in turn, strengthens the foundation of students’ argumen-
tation, because it is based on their own experiences and constructions. Moreover, 
reshaping their cognitive structures provides students with chances to construct 
more structured arguments. 
 4  The EP-Spectrum 
 4.1  Introduction to the EP-Spectrum 
 The spectrum we are going to propose centres on the concept of justifi cation. We 
regard the process of proving in the classroom as a process of justifying a conjecture 
or a property, and proof as the production of the process of justifi cation, requiring 
general statements structured with legitimate logical steps. 
 We propose this spectrum principally for pedagogical purposes, though we have 
also considered historical, cognitive and social aspects of proof. A proof for the 
classroom can be viewed as the product of a spectrum of activities starting with 
exploration, and progressing to the stages of conjecturing, informal explanation, 
and justifi cation. All these activities closely relate problem-solving in a wide sense 
and seek to generate a proof at the end (see Fig.  12.3 ). 1 We hereafter refer to this 
spectrum as the  EP-spectrum ( E for “exploration” and  P for “proof”). The stages in 
the spectrum are not mutually exclusive; students can simultaneously experience or 
work at more than one stage. In addition, not all proving activities require going 
through all the stages in sequence; for example, a quick solution may only contain 
the stages of exploration and proof production. However, in designing proving 
activities, each stage in the EP-spectrum has its own value in terms of aiding 
students’ learning and constructing proof. Therefore, when deciding whether to 
include or omit any stage of the EP-spectrum in a proving activity, one must take 
into account the activity’s substantive content, the intended participants’ mathemat-
ics level, and the activity’s pedagogical goals. 
 1  This spectrum was initially developed by the working group WG5. It was then revised by the 
authors. 
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 The process of solving a problem that requires the production of proof is referred 
to as the process of proving. It necessitates a variety of mental explorations to 
 discover the relationship between mathematical objects, to make connections 
between objects/relations and concepts/properties, to switch between different 
reasoning modes, and to organise deductive inferences with general statements. 
Accordingly, drawing on personal experiences and observations as well as the 
results of teaching experiments, we propose three factors as crucial to the success of 
the process of proving in the EP-spectrum: creation, inference and connection. Each 
factor corresponds to a certain capacity within each individual. 
 The creation factor relates to an individual’s intuition and divergent thinking in 
adaptation to new environments (Csikszentmihalyi  1996 ;  Poincaré  1956 ) . A creative 
action may also be initially unconscious and become conscious later on. The con-
nection factor refers to the cognitive domain, where students have to link the content 
they have internalised – such as concepts, procedures, problem-solving schemes, 
and languages in some particular registers – in order to cope with problem situations. 
The inference factor refers to the capacity of reasoning and making judgements in 
accordance with available information. It is not restricted to inference using valid 
logic rules that imply certainty; in addition, it includes inferences applied in daily 
























 Fig. 12.3  Constructs of EP-spectrum 
 
290 F.-J. Hsieh et al.
explanation. These three factors are the  primary factors of the EP-spectrum. When 
students engage in tasks at any stage of the EP-spectrum, their capacities in the three 
primary factors are combined through an  additive model. 2 Each combination pro-
duces a variety of powers for students to deal with the incidences they face. 
 Figure  12.3 shows how the main constructs of the EP-spectrum relate to each 
other in action. First, representation plays an important role in all kinds of activities 
and processes in the EP-spectrum. Representations such as providing numerical 
examples, drawing pictures, making tables, writing words, and using symbols are 
potential ways to mentally organise and physically express the actions of reasoning, 
conveying reasons, and making arguments. Teachers use these representations to 
clarify ideas, derive conclusions, and confi rm proofs, whilst students use them 
to structure actions, describe discoveries, make conjectures, explain ideas, and 
formulate arguments. 
 In order to demonstrate the EP-spectrum in a practical setting, we fi rst introduce 
two teaching experiments, which demonstrate the integrating of exploration in proof. 
 4.2  Teaching Experiment Applying the EP-Spectrum 
 Two teaching experiments applying two processes of the EP-spectrum activities 
were conducted with 31 ninth-graders in a regular class in Taiwan. On average, 
the students ranked in the 38th percentile of a national pool of ninth-graders in 
terms of overall academic competence 3 ; approximately 60% of the participants 
ranked below the 50th percentile. In other words, the class’s academic level was 
below average for Taiwan. At the time the experiments were conducted, the stu-
dents in question had not yet been formally introduced to the concept of proof, 
which would be taught two months later. Nevertheless, they had seen their teacher 
solving problems with rigorous solution steps (in fact, proofs) and had been asked 
to do the same thing throughout their learning of geometric concepts, such as 
congruent triangles. 
 2  The term  additive model is borrowed from colour theory. In contrast to a  subtractive model , which 
employs an assumption of a  minimum whole requirement to be successful in the process of prov-
ing, there is no requirement in an additive model for a fi xed minimum whole. We have chosen the 
additive model since its combinations – produced by the intertwining of varying capacities in each 
of the three primary factors – have potentially unlimited results, many of which work well in the 
process of proving. Conversely, according to the subtractive model, lacking a certain capacity in a 
primary factor will inhibit an individual from being able to successfully complete the proving 
process, due to the minimum whole requirement. 
 3  The students’ academic competence was measured by their performance in the simulated national 
senior high school entrance examinations for ninth-graders. Often, the results of these examina-
tions can accurately predict students’ performance in actual national entrance examinations. 
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 4.2.1  EP-Spectrum Tasks 
 Two properties were to be introduced to the students. In cooperation with the 
authors, the students’ usual mathematics teacher conducted two sequences of 
activities with the class, applying the EP-spectrum in each. We designed these activ-
ities to provide students with a chance to actively prove the properties instead of just 
passively listening to the teacher. 
 4.2.2  Property to be Proved 
 The fi rst property we asked students to prove was the  Tangent-line-property , which 
states:
 Let A be a point on circle O. If line L intersects the radius OA at A at a right 
angle, then L is a tangent line of O. 
 The second property we asked students to prove was the  Tangent-segment-
property , which states:
 Let P be a point outside circle O. If PM and PN are two tangent lines of O 
which intersect O at M and N, respectively, then PM = PN. 
 4.2.3  Desired proof 
 The teacher’s desired proofs are as follows: 
 Tangent-line-property 
  L^OA 
 \ OA is the distance of point O to L 
 Let B be an arbitrary point on L other than A 
 Then OB  >  OA (OA is the distance) 
 \ B is outside of circle O (OA is the radius) 
 \ L intersect O at only A 
 \ L is a tangent line of O 
 Tangent-segment-property 
 Connecting OM, ON, and OP (see Fig.  12.4 ) 





M Fig. 12.4  Graph of 
Tangent-segment-property 
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 4.2.4  Exploration Activity 
 The  Tangent-line-property activity required students to use a toothpick to represent 
line L to manipulate on paper including Fig.  12.5a , b respectively in sequence. Open 
questions were posed to students and they were instructed to put the toothpick on A 
and rotate it to observe the instances (see Fig.  12.5c ). 
 The  Tangent-segment-property activity asked students to work on Fig.  12.6 by 
paper-folding. Open questions were again posed to students. The desired creases are 
the dashed lines in Fig.  12.4 if fold correctly. 
 4.3  EP-Spectrum Activities 
 The results of classroom experiments showed the students’ progress through the 











 Fig. 12.6  Paper for exploration (3) 
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 4.3.1  Exploration 
 In our  Tangent-line-property experiment, a toothpick was used to represent a line 
for students to manipulate on the top of the sheets of paper with Fig.  12.5a, b . Open 
questions such as “What location of L makes OA the distance of O to L?” were 
posed to students. The use of this toothpick, of which the perceived affordance 
encourages concrete actions such as moves and rotations, transforms the original 
fi gures to multiple new fi gures for students to discover and examine. If students 
were only given the paper (with Fig.  12.5a, b ) but without using a toothpick to 
represent a line, the perceived affordance of this object (i.e., the paper with the fi gures) 
does not encourage students to draw multiple lines (such that each line is a rotation 
of the line drawn in previous step) in reaction to the fi gures. 
 In the exploration with respect to Fig.  12.5a , the students were asked, inter 
alia: “If B is any point on L other than A (when L is the line such that OA is 
the distance from O to L), then compare the distance between B and O to the 
length of OA”. Experienced teachers have noted that this exploration, which 
focuses on building the logic scheme that is required in a logic step (the step 
underlined in the  Tangent-line-property proof above), is difficult for students 
to undertake. However, the results of our experiment saw 55% of students 
employing this logic step in their arguments or proofs, with 76% of this group 
executing it correctly and in completion. Students with their level of academic 
competence would not have easily achieved these percentages without using 
an exploration aid. 
 In the  Tangent-segment-property experiment, a sheet of paper with a picture (see 
Fig.  12.6 ) was given to each student. The perceived affordance of this sheet with the 
picture invites students to perform various actions, such as fold, fl ip, and draw. 
These actions add new creases or segments to the paper, which transforms the origi-
nal fi gure; and the visual feedback students received encourages them to subse-
quently react to their artefacts to create new creases or segments, and which, in turn, 
produces a sequence of transformations. This process would not be effortless if 
students only employ mental exploration. 
 Our experiment asked students to (a) use paper-folding to confirm if M and 
N are really tangent points (see Fig.  12.6 ), and (b) compare PM and PN to 
check if they have the same length. We found that 58% of students success-
fully constructed all the auxiliary lines (dashed segments in Fig.  12.4 ) in 
their justification arguments or proofs to the  Tangent-segment-property and, 
amongst this group, 93% completed them correctly. Both research and experi-
ence have shown that many students do not know how to start a proof when 
auxiliary objects are required in that proof (Ding and Jones  2006 ; Matsuda 
and Okamoto  1998 ) . However, this proof had not previously been taught to the 
students and, further, requires auxiliary lines. The results of the experiment 
appear to demonstrate that both the manipulative feature of exploration, sup-
ported by a hands-on environment, and the procedural feature of exploration, 
supported by a chain of procedures, enhance students’ willingness to solve a 
proving problem. 
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 4.3.2  Conjecturing 
 Two completely different approaches may guide the direction of exploration. The 
fi rst, an abducted situation, provides many opportunities for producing incomplete 
and erroneous conjectures, as in Douek’s  ( 2009 ) study. The second, an adducted 
situation, provides an opportunity for producing  one-shot errorless conjecture. 
Taiwanese textbooks and classroom instruction usually use the adductive approach 
because it saves time and works well in terms of heuristics. 
 In our  Tangent-line-property case, we utilised the adducted situation. In the 
exploration of how to determine when L (represented by the toothpick) turned out 
to be a tangent line, 23 (74%) of the students used the defi nition of tangents and 
secants as their method of determination. This high percentage shows that in such 
cases students can easily imitate what their teachers have often done; that is, apply 
defi nitions to make judgements. The expected conjecture, an innovative one, relates 
to the size of the included angle of OA and L. Only two students noticed the included 
angle of OA and L. After being cued by the teacher with the question “Is it possible 
to determine using the included angle”, 35% of the students were still unable to 
write down a conjecture by themselves based on the included angle. These phenom-
ena demonstrate that to make an innovative conjecture is much more diffi cult than 
to make an imitative one. 
 4.3.3  Informal Explanation 
 The informal explanation stage, rather than that of justifi cation argument, conveys 
what teachers usually ask students to do and what students are usually aware of and 
intend to do in the classroom. Its less rigorous character is an important factor; in 
formal mathematics it has led to the development of irrational numbers and infi nity, 
which have proved invaluable in solving physical problems and modelling physical 
phenomena (Harel and Sowder  1998 ; Kleiner  1991 ) . 
 During the  Tangent-segment-property experiment, when asked to explain why 
the two tangent segments were equivalent, some students came up with explana-
tions about their actions using words that had personal relevance and meaning, 
rather than the mathematical terms or symbols expected by the teacher. We interpret 
this observation to mean that students informally explaining why they believe a 
certain conjecture is true are attempting to explain to others what they have discov-
ered in their explorations (with or without certainty); namely, they begin the process 
of persuading. This process is connected to (a) the retrieval and recollection of what 
they have done with the external materials; (b) the search for appropriate vocabulary 
to represent the visual objects and their relations; (c) the quest for a suitable logic 
rule that chains the causal relations of the objects or operations in their discovery; 
(d) the elimination from their answers of redundant actions performed in the 
exploration; and (e) the attempt to make and organise sentences. These fi ve issues 
demonstrate the signifi cance of this stage in helping students’ transition from explo-
ration to argumentation. Students have to switch their attention from manipulative 
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actions to linguistic/visual constructions through presenting explanations. Factors 
in the social domain, such as teachers’ interventions, also play an important role in 
the success of helping students to gradually transit from the preliminary explanation 
to argumentation. 
 At this informal explanation stage, teachers must impose some control on the 
classroom discourses in order to get effective results in both cognitive and affective 
domains. These include controls on the scope and depth of, and time allocated to: 
(a) the substantive content to be proved; (b) the ideas and thoughts relating to the 
exploration; (c) the usage of ordinary language and symbolic notations relating to 
the representation; and (d) the adoption and transition of different reasoning types. 
Though in the cognitive domain, these four issues also relate to the affective domain, 
as the controls relate to students’ motivation to participate in classroom discourses. 4 
For example, when a student’s short-term goal is to make sure whether a particular 
procedure or answer (own or peers’) works, a lengthy discussion about different 
strategies will often weaken the student’s motivation to actively participate in the 
discussion. Our observations of classroom discourses in Taiwan have revealed that 
teachers often either focus heavily on all the above issues and devote considerable 
time to discussing them with students or, in contrast, fail to address any of these 
issues at all. 
 4.3.4  Justifi cation Argument 
 The use of logical steps distinguishes the stage of informal explanation from the 
stage of justifi cation argument. The latter stage helps students to structure their 
explanations (when persuading others) by utilising mathematically accepted state-
ments. Based on our experiments and experiences, we found that the features of 
justifi cation arguments differ from those of proof in at least the following ways  5 :
 1.  It is not necessary to be “rigorous” when undertaking justifi cation arguments; 
 2.  Justifi cation arguments may have many redundant components; 
 3.  The inclusion of an inferring step in justifi cation arguments does not need to be 
directly from the preceding step of inference or other axioms; 
 4.  A mixed use of results obtained from inferring steps and from exploration steps 
often appears in justifi cation arguments; and 
 5.   Inferences made in the justifi cation argument stage may be context- or content-
bound (for example, relating to specifi c pictures, objects, or actions, rather than 
a general statement). 
 During our experiments, it was common for some students to use formally 
unproved data they found in exploration as evidence to warrant their  justifi cation 
 4  Although the affective domain is not our focus, it is relevant to the effectiveness of this stage in 
the EP-spectrum. 
 5  Some literature or studies do not distinguish argumentation from proof. 
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arguments; that is, they used abductive reasoning. For example, in the  Tangent-
segment-property case, some students constructed OP by connecting points O and P, 
although, at this moment, OP was only a segment connecting two points, students 
used “OP as the internal bisector of ÐMPN”, because, to make inferences in their 
proofs, they needed this information, which they perceived as correct on the basis of 
their paper-folding. Though this phenomenon can be seen as a defect in the students’ 
approach, it may also be viewed in a positive sense, insofar as a partly completed of 
a proof is better than no proof at all. Further, by merely changing their source of data 
to a proved one, students will be able to correctly complete the proof deductively. 
 At the justifi cation argument stage, students often use verbal statements to 
express their intuitive ideas or defi nitions of mathematical concepts. Historically, 
mathematicians have initially done the same with concepts they invented, such as 
Cauchy’s defi nition of limit. This verbal form, not the symbolic form, carries and 
conveys intuitive ideas. But, we emphasise that it may also be appropriate for students 
to use symbolic representations during the justifi cation argument stage if they are 
comfortable doing so. 
 4.3.5  Proof Production 
 It has been recommended by some researchers that less emphasis be placed on 
demanding rigour in students’ writing of proof (Usiskin  1980 ) . However, the 
historical development of mathematics has illustrated the effectiveness of symbolic 
notation as a method of discovery (Kleiner  1991 ) . The use of symbols in proof also 
appears to be commonplace in mathematics instruction at the high-school level. In 
our opinion, the requirement for providing deductive reasons marks another differ-
ence between justifi cation arguments and proof, suggesting that students are actu-
ally providing deductive reasoning instead of putting together major components of 
proofs (Hsieh et al.  2009 ) . Furthermore, these high standards in the classifi cation of 
proof are born of a belief that students possess a higher level of mathematics com-
petence if they can justify a property with a clear explanation as to why each step is 
valid through the use of symbolised notations. 
 Some research claims that some high school students, even at end of their geom-
etry classes, cannot construct a simple triangle congruence proof (Usiskin  1987 ). 
However, our  Tangent-segment-property experiment turned out differently. With the 
help of paper-folding exploration for the construction of the auxiliary lines, 54% of 
students wrote out formal proofs, despite not being advanced students nor having 
been previously taught the concept of proof formally. This result, coupled with the 
fact that the students’ written proof often closely resembled the symbolic form used 
by their teacher in previous lessons, provides evidence that:
 1.  Teachers can instil in students a familiarity with writing mathematical proof by 
using it in everyday teaching; 
 2.  Sometimes grasping the idea of  how to prove is much harder for students than the 
mere writing out of a proof; 
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 3.  If students have internalised a proof scheme, (e.g., “to prove the congruence of 
segments is to prove the congruence of triangles” as used in the  Tangent-segment-
property experiment) they will be able to apply it easily once they discover a part 
of it (e.g., “to prove the congruence of segments”) is required to complete a 
proof; and 
 4.  Students, like their teacher, prefer to use symbols when writing proofs (if possible), 
as these are shorter and faster to use than words. 
 4.4  Summary of EP-Spectrum 
 4.4.1  Three Primary Factors 
 Which intertwining of the three primary factors – creation, inference and connection – 
best contributes to the success of each stage of the EP-spectrum remains an open 
question. In our opinion, the creation factor is crucial in exploration, as this stage 
encourages multidirectional inquiries and multiple types of reasoning that strongly 
relate to divergent thinking and intuition. The reliance on the creation factor 
decreases, however, in the stages of the EP spectrum closer to proof production. 
 One might think that, as the stages advance from exploration to proof produc-
tion, the inference factor becomes progressively more important. However, this is 
not the case. In practice, the relative success of exploration depends heavily on the 
diversity of inferences. Inference by analogy, inference to the best explanation, and 
abductive as well as inductive inferences, all play an extremely important role at this 
stage. As the stages progress towards proof production, a demand for deductive 
inference arises. 
 The connection factor weighs equally on all stages, but may have different 
connotations. At the exploration stage, connection of mathematical concepts and 
that of daily life experiences or physical phenomena play equally signifi cant roles. 
At the stage of informal explanation, connection to mathematical “words” and com-
munication schemes becomes valuable, whilst the stage of justifi cation argument 
encourages connection to proof schemes. The fi nal production of proof requires a 
further connection to the register used in proof and to the legitimate way of sequencing 
and writing a proof. 
 4.4.2  Justifi cation 
 Most of the time, instructors introduce proof in a “passive” mode, without students 
actively participating in its construction. Even if the semantic production is care-
fully introduced, students may not be convinced of the validity of the meanings and 
rules introduced, which have been previously invented by others, let alone use 
them to justify. We employ and name two kinds of justifi cation in the EP-spectrum: 
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(a) self-justifi cation, namely that one justifi es something to oneself with evidence 
one believes true; and (b) social-justifi cation, namely that one justifi es something to 
others with evidence one believes true and acceptable as true by others. Different 
EP-spectrum stages highlight the two types of justifi cation differently. At the explo-
ration stage, students direct their actions and construct their own meanings by using 
self-justifi cation. When they start to explain their ideas informally to others, students 
reciprocally associate their explanations with their own actions; this requires the 
operation of both self-justifi cation and social-justifi cation. The evidence used in the 
self-justifi cation has to be fi ltered and adapted in order to pass the scrutiny of 
others. That is, the informal explanation stage provides an opportunity to refi ne 
self-justifi cation by merging it with social-justifi cation. This process renders proving 
accessible to students, because the self-justifi cation constitutes “real” justifi cation 
for them and the social-justifi cation helps them to construct other people accepted 
justifi cation. Students learn contemporary, accepted forms of proof through social-
justifi cation at both the justifi cation argument and proof production stages. 
 4.4.3  Representation 
 Representation plays an important role in mathematics learning and problem solving. 
We cannot here discuss in detail the functions of representation in the context of 
integrating exploration in proof, but will examine two important issues using terms 
and concepts developed by Goldin and Kaput  ( 1996 ) . First, these authors distin-
guish “inert” versus “interactive” media that embody representation systems. In an 
inert medium, “the only state-change resulting from a user’s input is the display of 
that input, as when one writes on a piece of paper” (p. 412). In contrast, an interactive 
medium enables “the addition of something new to the result of a user’s actions, 
something to which the user may then respond” (p. 412). Goldin and Kaput defi ne 
a representation system as: “an action representation if it contains rules or mecha-
nism for the manipulation of its elements, and a display representation if it does not” 
(p. 413). Second, they distinguish “imagistic or analogic” systems from the formal 
systems of representation. They interpret imagistic representation as “‘imagined’, 
visualized, represented kinesthetically and/or auditorily” (pp. 414–415). The imag-
istic representation may include what Bruner  ( 1960 ) described as “enactive” and 
“pictorial” representations. 
 These concepts of representation are applicable to the context of integrating 
exploration into proving. At the exploration stage in the EP-spectrum, the interactive 
environment, which allows performing all manner of translations, fl ips, rotations, 
cutting and so forth, invites students to construct their internal representations in the 
form of an action representation. Godlin and Kaput  ( 1996 ) consider this form of 
representation leads to powerful internal representations, which students can act on 
or transform mentally. That is, the manipulative and interactive environment of 
exploration produces internal representation systems of which mental transforma-
tions, often required in problem-solving, are possible. In contrast, an environment 
using an inert medium, such as paper-and-pencil, to embody representations restricts 
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itself to the development of display representations, which are relatively static and 
less fl exible when used in problem-solving. Moreover, the manipulative feature of 
exploration generally involves external representations, such as concrete objects 
and actions with these objects, which include multiple pictorial images and, probably, 
constructs of the objects and actions. These kinds of external representations, in 
turn, encourage students to construct imagistic internal representations, which 
Godlin and Kaput consider “essential to virtually all mathematical insight and 
understanding” (p. 417). 
 Equally important, the external representations, the “virtual” ones, appear physically 
in the classroom. In terms of Kaput’s  ( 1991 ) idea of “representational acts”, students 
performing all activities in the EP-spectrum use notations and languages, including 
natural languages, “to organize the creation and elaboration of their own mental 
structures” (p. 56). Prior mental activities conducted in the exploration stage are 
re-structured both physically and mentally to form physical records (e.g., notations) 
and actions on these records (e.g., sequencing the notations). 
 Another point also relates to the issue of representation in the EP-spectrum. 
Teachers often switch between different forms of representations when they are 
conducting different activities. For instance, when introducing ideas or clarifying 
tasks in the exploration stage, they will tend to use a kinesthetically imagistic, action 
representation; however, as process progresses to the informal explanation stage, 
they tend to switch to an auditorily imagistic representation; and in the justifi cation 
argument stage, they often switch to a formal representation to derive conclusions. 
This switching of forms is often due to the teachers having different instructional 
goals at different stages. However, neither the teachers nor the students necessarily 
always notice this transformation of representations. 
 5  Conclusion 
 5.1  Computer Assisted Exploration Versus 
Hands-on Exploration 
 This chapter focuses on hands-on exploration. Many other studies have instead 
concentrated on dynamic computer-assisted exploration, due to its unique charac-
teristics not inherent in hands-on exploration: the accuracy of the drawing (Hanna 
 2000 ) , the effortless construction of a fi gure, and the possibility of producing unlimited 
number of fi gures through dragging (De Villiers  1997 ) . 
 The consequently emerging view amongst researchers and educators that computer 
experimental activities are an equally valid form of mathematical confi rmation is a 
milestone in the mathematics community (Hanna  2007 ) . True, dynamic computer 
software is superior in assisting in the discovery of existing (or sometimes not yet 
known) properties and making conjectures. However, its ability to deal with the 
logical sequences required in rigorous proof remains problematic. 
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 Computer exploration also poses problems in practical teaching. In particular, 
the feature of specifi cation (i.e., easily adapting to specifi c learning content as well 
as a learner’s individual ability) is not built into the DGS microworld. To resolve 
this problem, teachers may design a sequence of activities prior to instruction periods 
by creating a specifi cation program within the computer software system. However, 
it requires considerable effort (and is sometimes impossible) for teachers to prepare 
in advance the sequences in a computer environment. In contrast, hands-on activity 
is superior with respect to specifi cation, but lacks access to resources such as the 
powerful supporting system embedded in computer software. 
 Besides, the affordances of “paper fi gures or physical objects” and “computer 
screen fi gures or objects” are quite different. The latter affords pointing, touching, 
and clicking on computer devices rather than directly on the fi gures or objects, 
providing the computer does not feature a touch screen. Even with a touch screen, 
the motions possible in a three-dimensional space, such as a fl ipping and folding, 
can only be simulated rather than physical or actual interactions. However, the 
exploration using physical materials and actions such as suggested by our research, 
may signifi cantly increase student learning along the EP-spectrum. 
 In sum, the issues of when and in what conditions each mode should be used, and 
whether each mode should be used separately or in tandem with the other, remain 
open questions requiring further research. 
 5.2  Further Problems in Exploration 
 In the exploration stage, some students tend to make justifi cations based on specifi c 
examples or fi gures resulting from their own actions rather than on general cases. 
This may refl ect what the students have experienced in mathematics instruction; 
often, instructors introduce a concept or justify a property through a similar 
approach. This teaching phenomenon, emerging in aspects of Taiwanese mathematics 
learning, seems to emerge also elsewhere: for example, the United States and 
Canada, as evidenced by the composition of their mathematics textbooks. The ques-
tion of how to deal with this problem is a topic worthy of future research. 
 Another phenomenon also relates to the issue of students’ proof and  mathematics 
instruction. For example, in our experiments, many Taiwanese students were able to 
produce meaningful symbolic proofs. That Taiwanese teachers use symbols regu-
larly in teaching suggests a hypothesis: If teachers use a large amount of symbols, 
accompanied by thorough explanation of their meanings, in the everyday teaching 
of mathematics, students may acquire the ability to use these symbols correctly. 
Furthermore, when asked why so many students were able to use symbols in argu-
mentation and proof, Taiwanese teachers noted that students prefer using symbols if 
possible, as they believe the method is short and quick. Evidence of these trends 
currently derives only from observations; further research is necessary to enable 
conclusive claims. 
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 Our experiment showed that carefully developed exploration can help students 
in constructing not only conjectures but also proof schemes, as in Pedemonte’s 
 ( 2007 ) concept of “process pattern generalisation”. However, few empirical studies 
have focused on the factors that should be embedded in an exploration activity in 
order to advance students’ production of proofs. In addition to the factors infl uencing 
the spectrum from exploration to proof, many other issues are worthy of investiga-
tion: For example, how to overcome some students’ habit of providing only partly 
complete answers to proving problems, using the limited information they have 
discovered during exploration, rather persisting with completing the proof. A 
related point also deserves further research: how to deal with students who, encoun-
tering an exploration problem, perform a range of actions without thinking they 
need to justify these actions. Furthermore, the specifi cation feature of hands-on 
exploration provides the possibility of designing less-error or one-shot tasks, 
amongst the many alternatives such exploration offers. When or whether an envi-
ronment should provide only one expedient course or a variety of alternatives also 
requires a great deal of research. 
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 This chapter aims to develop principles for designing tasks that teach  conjecturing 
and proving. First, we search for principles by referring to design research and to 
the literature on designing tasks for learning mathematics. Next, we propose a ratio-
nale for conjecturing and proving and formulate a framework for conjecturing and 
proving. We then develop principles of task design for conjecturing and proving, 
and for transiting the two in practical tasks. Finally, we present our conclusions and 
discuss further applications of our principles. 
 1  Searching for Principles of Designing Tasks 
 According to  www.dictionary.com , the fi rst three defi nitions of “principle” are:
 1.  An accepted or professed rule of action or conduct. 
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 2.  A fundamental, primary, or general law or truth from which others are derived. 
 3.  A fundamental doctrine or tenet; a distinctive ruling opinion. 
 As can be seen, the concept of principle in task design incorporates elements of 
all three defi nitions. As Reigeluth  ( 1999 ) expressed it, a principle (basic method) is 
a rule (relationship) that is always true under appropriate conditions, regardless of a 
specifi c task (practice) or an approach consisting of a set of tasks (programme). In 
other words, a principle of task design should be “fundamental,” in the sense that 
such a principle would be theory-based and not too specifi c to generalise. However, 
we are also concerned that the principle should not be too theoretical to be practical. 
Principles for designing tasks are also expected to be used as criteria for task designers, 
critical friends, or educators to evaluate designed tasks. For us, a principle of task 
design has both the fundamental function of clearly relating to the learners’ roles, 
learning powers or hypothetical learning trajectories and the practical function of 
easily evaluating many similar tasks. If these two criteria are satisfi ed, principles for 
designing tasks will be useful in identifying diverse goals of conjecturing and 
proving activities, revealing multiple phases of learning, and serving to mediate 
theories to practical design. 
 Thus, Ruthven and his colleagues could position principle in the rank of interme-
diate theoretical frameworks (Ruthven et al.  2009 ) . In their paper, they demonstrate 
how intermediate frameworks and design tools serve to mediate the contribution of 
grand theories to the design process by coordinating and contextualising theoretical 
insights about the epistemological and cognitive dimensions of a subject for the 
purposes of designing teaching sequences and studying their operations. In other 
words, grand theories, intermediate theoretical frameworks and design tools are 
three essentials of the design approach. Moreover, intermediate theoretical frame-
works and the associated design tools are used to make links between grand theories 
and task design. 
 Lesh et al.  ( 2000 ) based their principles for developing thought-revealing 
activities on the models and modelling perspective. Their six principles for designing 
productive model-eliciting activities include (1) the model construction principle, 
(2) the reality principle, (3) the self-assessment principle, (4) the construct documen-
tation principle, (5) the construct shareability and reusability principle, and (6) the 
effective prototype principle. These suggested principles are crucial in developing 
model-eliciting tasks and in helping teachers or designers evaluate these activities’ 
appropriateness. Therefore, the six principles serve as an intermediate framework 
mediating the models and modelling perspective to the design tools; a four-step 
modelling cycle including description, manipulation, translation and verifi cation 
could be used as the design tool for sequences of modelling tasks. 
 For another example, ‘what-if-not’ ( Brown and Walter  1993 ) could be consid-
ered as a tool for designing tasks of conjecturing. A what-if-not task provides a 
correct statement already known by the students, and asks them to conjecture the 
consequence of a change in the statement’s premise or conclusion. What-if-not 
could be applied for many statements familiar to students; each statement can be 
designed as a task of conjecturing. What-if-not tasks could provide students with a 
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cognitive tool to construct their own statements, and dynamic software or other 
instruments can assist them to refl ect on their constructions. 
 In another example, Wittmann  ( 2009 ) mentioned a series of tasks about numbers 
which required transformations between perceptual counters and numerical num-
bers. These tasks implied that providing manipulative and transformable representa-
tions for students is a good strategy for teaching conjecturing. Therefore, thinking 
tools embedded within tasks could be design tools. However, they still require an 
intermediate theoretical framework to mediate them to grand theories. 
 Using a lesson sequence of mathematical activity focused on concept, Bell et al. 
 ( 1993 ) discussed perspectives on the nature of the mathematical activity, the con-
ceptual content, and the nature of learning, for the purpose of designing a diagnostic 
teaching programme. Under the grand perspectives, Bell et al.  ( 1993 ) suggested 
principles for the design of diagnostic teaching, including identifying key con-
ceptual points and misconceptions, focusing on these, giving substantial open 
challenges, provoking cognitive confl icts, and resolving these through intensive dis-
cussion. Bell et al.  ( 1993 ) also studied some teaching experiments according to the 
principles which connected the grand perspectives and task design through the use 
of associated design tools (e.g., familiar strategies for resolving misconceptions, 
questions for challenging students’ misconceptions). 
 2  Conjecturing, Proving and the Transition 
 The main aim of all science is fi rst to observe phenomena, then to explain them, and 
fi nally to predict. The method of explanation in mathematics is proof  Gale ( 1990 , 4). 
Proofs and refutations could be viewed as a dialectical mechanism of mathematical 
discovery (Lakatos  1976 ) . Lakatos stressed the similarity and dissimilarity between 
the scientifi c and mathematical nature of these elements. In speaking of the contrast 
between science and mathematics, Lakatos states:
 Mathematical heuristic is very like scientifi c heuristic – not because both are inductive, but 
because both are characterized by conjectures, proofs, and refutations. The important dif-
ference lies in the nature of the respective conjectures, proofs, (or, in science, explanations), 
and counterexamples (p. 26). 
 He points out that the similarity between science and mathematics involves 
heuristic processes of producing a conjecture and looking for plausible arguments 
to support it; the dissimilarity involves what counts as a conjecture and a proof. 
 We have identifi ed the characteristics of mathematical conjectures on the basis of 
two famous mathematical conjectures: Poincaré’s Conjecture and Fermat’s 
Conjecture. Poincaré conjectured, “if a space that locally looks like ordinary three-
dimensional space but is fi nite in size and lacks any boundary has the additional 
property that each loop in the space can be continuously tightened to a point; then 
it is just a three-dimensional sphere”. Fermat’s Conjecture says, “if an integer  n 
is greater than 2, then the equation  n n na b c+ =  has no solutions in non-zero 
integers”. These two examples – “if a space…, then it is…”; and “if an integer 
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n …, then the equation ….” – show that conjectures are explicitly (sometimes 
implicitly) delineated as propositions or conditional statements. These conjectures’ 
generality was extended as far as possible. For instance, “no solution in non-zero 
integers” is more general than “no solution in positive integers”. Inevitably, conjec-
tures provide conclusions specifi ed under the tension of simplifying conditions; that 
is, conjectures denote propositions in mathematics. The main reason conjectures are 
so named is because they have not been formally proven. 
 In addition to the function of validating the truth of a conjecture, proof has many 
other functions in mathematics. For example, Hanna  ( 2000 ) emphasised proof that 
provides a satisfactory explanation of why the conjecture is true; de Villiers  ( 1999 ) 
argued that proof has several important functions including verifi cation, discovery, 
explanation, communication, intellectual challenge, and systematisation. Moreover, 
one value of proof is that it provides a form for critical debate (Davis  1986 ) ; hence, 
proof is a norm for communicating mathematical results, which develops the criteria 
for acceptable arguments besides the negotiation of meaning. 
 Mathematical tasks, especially conjecturing and proving tasks, entail intellectual 
challenge which can be conquered with self-realisation and fulfi lment (de Villiers 
 1999 ) . Without proofs, it would be impossible to organise the results of mathematical 
research into a deductive system of axioms, defi nitions and theorems. For example, 
the primary function of proofs for secondary students to learn to prove some proper-
ties of parallelograms is that of systematisation; the purpose is not to check whether 
the results are true but to logically organise these related results – already known to 
be true – into a coherent, unifi ed whole (de Villiers  2004 ) . 
 Conjecturing and proving intertwine in human activities not only for discovering 
and verifying mathematical knowledge (Lakatos  1976 ; Pólya  1981 ) but also for 
other educational purposes (e.g. Boero  1999 ; Koedinger  1998 ; Smith and Hungwe 
 1998 ) . Conjecturing and proving can also initiate mathematical thinking and develop 
mathematical methods; therefore, tasks of conjecturing and proving should be 
designed to be embedded into any level of mathematics classes in order to 
enhance students’ conceptual understanding, procedural fl uency, or problem solving 
(see Kilpatrick et al.  2001 ) . However, for teachers to practise the tasks of conjectur-
ing and proving in their classes is still not simple, in part because of the vagueness 
of the principles of task design. 
 For us, a task can be a solitary question or a sequence of questions. In addition 
to content, tasks can include instructional descriptions, which could be fundamen-
tal guidelines or supportive hints, in the task settings. For example, the description 
could be: “After you join two segments from two vertices in a square to their 
opposite sides, what new elements can you observe (shapes, segments, angles, 
etc.)?” The description will lead students to think in certain directions; it is a kind 
of general intervention. 
 Design principles of tasks for the learning of conjecturing and proving serve an 
essential learning goal of promoting ways of thinking, namely, proof schemes. 
Students are led to internalise diverse proof schemes through developing them and 
become aware of their plausibility and feasibility. Harel and Sowder  ( 1998 ) offered 
a framework for examining students’ conceptions of proof (schemes). The proof 
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scheme framework we introduce here is a revision of Harel and Sowder’s  ( 2007 ) . 
The new framework labels three classes of proof schemes: external conviction, 
empirical and deductive. The external conviction category involves authoritative, 
ritual and non-referential symbolic proof schemes; the empirical includes inductive 
and perceptual proof schemes; and the deductive covers transformational and 
axiomatic proof schemes. The plausibility and feasibility of proof schemes depend 
on the purposes of the task, either conjecturing or proving. For example, a perceptual 
proof scheme is plausible and feasible for conjecturing rather than for formally 
proving. If they can engage learners in perceiving various proof schemes with 
different levels of validity and utility, tasks will further strengthen learners’ profi -
ciency of conjecturing and proving. 
 In curriculum, students are asked to prove many propositions that have already 
been shown to be true (Hoyles  1997 ; Lin et al.  2004 ) ; the students may then 
conceive of proving as a ritual. In order to engage them in understanding multiple 
functions of proof and internalising proof schemes, teachers need to ask students to 
come up their own conjectures and to prove conjectures that are not already known 
by them to be true (Zaslavsky  2005 ) . In the conjecturing task setting, students are 
asked to formulate conjectures according to some given information which could 
include either ill-defi ned or well-defi ned problems. Proving tasks provide a setting 
where students need to prove conjectures which could be either ill-formed or well-
formed propositions. 
 Furthermore, proving tasks are classifi ed by the sources of conjectures, either 
students’ own conjectures or others’. The two sources may result in different transi-
tional diffi culties. In the fi rst case, students may have unclear boundaries between 
conjecturing and proving – for example, they may consider empirical arguments as 
deductive proof (Stylianides and Stylianides  2009 ) ; they need to learn about each 
mode of reasoning and its appropriate level of validity. In the second, students may 
feel it unnecessary to prove others’ conjectures, because they have accepted the 
truth on the basis of epistemic values (see Duval  1998 ) . Therefore, tasks for helping 
students smoothly transit either from conjecturing to deductive proofs or from 
epistemic values to logical values are distinguished. Figure  13.3 shows the classifi -
cation of conjecturing, proving and transitional tasks. 
 Below, each section is identifi ed on the basis of Fig.  13.1 ’s classifi cation of tasks. In 
each, we will formulate principles for designing appropriate tasks, using examples. 
 3  Developing Principles for Conjecturing Task Design 
 Harel and Sowder  ( 1998 ) defi ned a conjecture as an “observation” made by a person 
who has no doubt about its truthfulness; that observation ceases to be a conjecture 
and becomes a fact, from the person’s viewpoint, once the person is certain of its 
truth (p. 241). Pólya  ( 1954 ) showed how a mathematical conjecture may be gener-
ated after observation of one or several examples for which the conjecture is true. In 
addition, de Villiers  ( 1997,  1999 ) discussed how students may propose conjectures 
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whilst engaging in generalisations in technology-enhanced math classrooms. 
According to de Villiers, students not only generate conjectures but also search for 
proofs to verify their truthfulness, using tools available in technology-enhanced 
learning environments. The tasks discussed in these aforesaid studies provide us a 
foundation for our conjecturing task “principles” – general standards or guidelines 
for effective or effi cient conjecturing task design. Besides the literary sources, the 
principles are founded on the provision of opportunities to: (1) observe, (2) construct, 
(3) transform, and (4) refl ect. 
 Principle 1: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity to engage in 
observation. 
 As Harel and Sowder  ( 1998 ) illustrated, a conjecture is the result of constant obser-
vation through which one sees regularity or a pattern. For this chapter, the term 
“observation” refers to activities that involve purposeful and/or systematic focus on 
specifi c cases in order to understand and/or make a generalisation about the cases. 
Opportunities for observation may include assessments of fi nite examples; that is, 
each student can be asked to systematically observe a particular example, following 
specifi c directions, as in the following task:
 Take any two-digit number and reverse the digits  –
 You now have two numbers  –
 Subtract the smaller number from the larger number  –
 What can you conclude from the result?  –




















 Fig. 13.1  Classifi cation of tasks 
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 A learning environment that embraces technology may facilitate students’ 
 observation opportunities dynamically (Arzarello et al.  2002 ) . For example, the 
“dragging” function in dynamic geometry software makes conjecturing more acces-
sible. Students are able to explore drawings by moving them and viewing form 
changes or the absence of form changes, which facilitates discovery of invariant 
properties. The following task demonstrates how dragging modalities are used to 
make a conjecture:
 You are given a triangle ABC. Consider any point P on AB and the two resultant triangles 
APC and PCB. Hypothesize about the properties of ABC essential to guarantee APC and 
PCB are isosceles. (Arzarello et al.  2002 , p. 67) 
 Observation-based conjecture production may also be stimulated by effective 
visualisation or mental representation. For instance, odd and even numbers could 
be introduced through a special pattern of counters (Fig.  13.2 ). The pattern can 
be painted on cardboard and cut out so that children can manipulate the pattern 
pieces and form sums of numbers (Wittmann  2009 , p. 251). Using this visual and 
operational representation, children can make conjectures regarding the sum of two 
even numbers, the sum of two odd numbers, and the sum of an even number and an 
odd number. In addition to translating observed arrays into a number language, 
observation of the resultant arrays for even numbers and odd numbers, as well as of 
the emergent array produced by combining the two number counters, may increase 
learning pleasure and ease conjecturing for students. 
 Principle 2: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity to engage in 
construction. 
 When learning fundamental rules or structures, encouraging students to construct 
new mathematical knowledge based on prior knowledge may lead to conjectures. For 
example, the question “What do you think is the answer to ( a +  b )² ?” asks students to 
participate in a very simple conjecturing task that gives them the opportunity to 
construct multiplication principles related to algebraic expressions. This opportunity 
is lost if the teacher opts to teach the principles only through explanation; that is, 
choosing not to implement the opportunity as a student activity or task. Giving students 
the opportunity to complete an open-sentence question via conjecturing could 
increase their interest in conjecture postulation along with conjecture truth analysis. 
 Fig. 13.2  Visual representation (Wittmann  2009 , p. 251) 
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Moreover, if students were to incorrectly conjecture that “( a +  b )² =  a ² +  b ²”, the 
teacher could use the conjecture to encourage consideration of the general property 
as their starting point (Lin  2006 ) . In this sense, incorrect conjectures emerging during 
construction of new knowledge can also be useful starting points in class. 
 The task below, suggested by Cañadas et al.  ( 2007 ) , asks students to construct 
relationships between geometric fi gures. To solve the task, students need to select 
particular lines based on learnt knowledge, create tentative relationships, and test 
creations in order to make a conjecture.
 Given a triangle ABC and a point P inside the triangle construct the three lines from each 
vertex A, B, C to the point P. What can you say about the relationships between the lines 
and the sides of the triangle? (Cañadas et al.  2007 , p. 59) 
 Cañadas et al.  ( 2007 ) proclaim that students improve understanding by construct-
ing and testing conjectures; yet they also recognise that students could generate 
false conjectures. For the above task, students might incorrectly conjecture, “if two 
lines cut the sides in a 2:1 ratio, the third one will, too” (p. 60); nevertheless, that 
conjecture can be productive if used as a means to investigate other new properties 
of a triangle (Cañadas et al.  2007 ) . Besides, conjecturing is typically not an isolated 
event; it is connected, at least potentially, to the learners’ prior or new knowledge. 
Whilst refl ecting on their prior knowledge from different perspectives, learners also 
maintain an eye for new knowledge. Hence, the “construction” principle also pro-
vides opportunities to (a) construct new knowledge through interpolation and 
extrapolation based on conjecture creation; and (b) to make further conjectures 
based on the constructed new knowledge. 
 Principle 3: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity to transform prior 
knowledge. 
 This third design principle, “transformation”, means that the task gives the students 
opportunities to generate conjectures by transforming given statements, formulae, 
algorithms, principles, and so on. Partly altering a hypothesis or conclusion in a 
statement and transforming a dimension or elements in a formula are useful 
approaches to making conjectures. For example, the task below, developed by Lin 
 ( 2006 ) , encourages students not only to transform the given formula but also to fi nd 
meaning in their transformation(s).
 Try to make sense of the following formula. What do you think “A” stands for in the for-
mula? Notice the beauty of the formula. What conjectures can you think of for a quadrilat-
eral with sides  a ,  b ,  c ,  d ? 
  
( )1A ( )( )( ),
2
s s a s b s c where s a b c= − − − = + +
   
 Probably the students will start by transforming the formula, perhaps proposing 
quadrilateral conjectures like:
  
( )1B ( )( )( )( ),
2
s a s b s c s d where s a b c d= − − − − = + + +
   
31313 Principles of Task Design for Conjecturing and Proving
 Then, they may embark on investigating the truthfulness of their conjectures by 
examining them in terms of a square, rectangle, and so on, which may lead to their 
learning new knowledge about the formula for the area of an inscribed quadrilateral 
of circle with side lengths of  a ,  b ,  c , and  d . 
 Carpenter et al.  ( 2003 , p. 54) detail how easily students elicit mathematical con-
jectures by generalising given number sentences. More interesting, they discuss 
how students, after establishing a conjecture’s truthfulness, make similar state-
ments by transforming it. For example, after formulating the conjecture, “when 
you add zero to a number, you get the number you started with”, students are likely 
to transform it to (a) “when you subtract zero from a number, you get the number 
you started with;” (b) “when you multiply a number by 1, you get the number you 
started with;” (c) “when you divide a number by 1, you get the number you started 
with;” and so on. 
 Principle 4: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity for refl ection. 
 Learners’ conjectures based on observation, of several examples or even one 
particular example, can be incorrect and meaningless, as Cañadas et al.  ( 2007 ) 
discussed. Conjecturing by transformation may also lead students to incorrect 
and meaningless statements, as may conjecturing through the “what if not” strat-
egy without proper understanding or goals (e.g., Lavy and Bershadsky  2003 ) . 
Thus, learners’ refl ecting on their conjectured constructs and on the conjecturing 
process is essential to the teaching of mathematics via conjecturing. Refl ection 
gives students the chance to further explore mathematical problems and improve 
their conjectures. Therefore, this last principle for designing a conjecturing task 
is “refl ection”, in the sense that opportunities for refl ection need to be integrated 
into the task. 
 Pedemonte  ( 2008 ) claims that constructive argumentation contributes to 
constructing a conjecture, whilst structural argumentation aids in justifying it 
(p. 390). These two types of argumentation, as they relate to conjecturing, can be 
combined into a single criterion: reflection on both the conjecturing process 
and the resultant conjectures. The following task, discussed by Lee  ( 2011 ) , illus-
trates how refl ection on both the soccer ball model conjecturing process and the 
generated conjectures may lead to discovery of Descartes’ formula for semi-regular 
polyhedrons.
 Observe a virtual soccer ball picture and then construct a soccer ball using tan- –
gible material. Make a list of mathematical questions and/or statements about the 
generated soccer ball model. From the list, choose several items such as “Why do 
manufacturers make soccer balls from regular pentagons and regular hexagons?” 
and “What other possible shapes could be used to create a soccer ball?” that you 
would like to investigate. 
 Examine your proposed soccer ball model conjectures and their corresponding  –
justifi cations by refl ecting on actions carried out on the emerged models. Include 
your creation of defi nitions, representations, and conjectures when presenting 
solutions to your chosen questions. 
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 To motivate and facilitate refl ection, several exemplary questions could be 
 incorporated in a conjecturing task:
 1.  Is your conjecture clear? How is it possible to change your conjecture wording so 
that unnecessary ambiguity is avoided? 
 2.  Explain why you believe your conjecture holds true for the given condition. Does 
your conjecture still hold true when conditions change? 
 3.  Is there any case for which your conjecture would not hold true? Is it possible to 
generalise your conjecture? 
 4.  What is the basis for your conjecture? Is there any argumentation for it? 
 4  Developing Principles for Designing Transiting Tasks 
Between Conjecturing and Proving 
 Mathematicians do not construct proofs for the sake of proofs but for specifi c 
 reasons: for example, to establish new knowledge by verifying or refuting conjec-
tures. Several mathematics education researchers (e.g., Ellis  2007 ; Hadas et al. 
 2000 ; Jones  2000 ; Mariotti  2000 ; Marrades and Gutiérrez  2000 ; Stylianides and 
Stylianides  2009 ) have developed tasks and conducted studies, including teaching 
and design experiments, aimed to engage students, including prospective teachers, 
in tasks related to proofs and conjectures that authentically refl ect the “wider math-
ematical culture” (Lampert  1992 ) . These investigations raised the issue of how 
teachers, including teacher educators, can help students make a smooth transition 
between conjecturing and proving. 
 In school mathematics, students’ generation of conjectures frequently results 
from examinations of specifi c cases through patterning tasks (Ellis  2007 ) . 
Unfortunately many students of all levels of education have the persistent, robust 
misconception that empirical arguments 1 are proofs (e.g., Coe and Ruthven  1994 ; 
Goetting  1995 ; Harel and Sowder  1998 ; Healy and Hoyles  2000 ; Lannin  2005 ; 
Martin and Harel  1989 ) . Teachers need to help these students understand that 
confi rming evidence from an examination of cases does not constitute conclusive 
evidence for the truth of a general mathematical claim; that is, proof. Such evidence 
supports the development of a reasoned hypothesis about the truth of the claim that 
requires further investigation; namely, a conjecture. 
 The increased availability in school mathematics instruction of dynamic mathe-
matics software, such as dynamic geometry software (DGS), raised the concern that 
such programmes would make the boundaries between conjecturing and proving 
even less clear for students and would reinforce their misconception that empirical 
arguments constitute proofs. Different dynamic mathematics softwares allow 
 1  Empirical arguments are arguments that purport to show the truth of a claim by validating the 
claim in a proper subset of all the possible cases it covers. 
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 students to check easily and quickly a very large number of cases, thus helping 
 students “see” mathematical properties more easily and potentially “killing” any 
need for students to engage in actual proving. 
 In a 2000  Educational Studies in Mathematics ( ESM ) special issue, four papers 
(Hadas et al.  2000 ; Jones  2000 ; Mariotti  2000 ; Marrades and Gutiérrez  2000 ) exam-
ined whether and how DGS can be used to help students make the transition from 
conjecturing and constructing empirical arguments to developing deductive arguments 
(including proofs). These papers, using various theoretical frameworks, “present 
results of empirical research which demonstrates that the judicious use of dynamic 
geometry software in heuristics, exploration and visualisation can foster an under-
standing of proof” (Hanna  2000 , p. 20). In addition to the  ESM special issue, two 
more recent studies (Ellis  2007 ; Stylianides and Stylianides  2009 ) also directly 
relate to our focus on conjecturing and making the transition to proof. Both studies 
reinforce and extend the fi ndings of the  ESM special issue studies, reporting fi nd-
ings that can be useful for teachers trying to help students make a smooth transition 
between conjecturing and proving through the development of more sophisticated 
“justifi cation schemes” (Harel and Sowder  1998 ) . We use these six studies as a 
source for principles for designing transiting tasks between conjecturing and prov-
ing, fi rst summarising them. 
 Ellis  ( 2007 ) conducted a teaching experiment with seven lower secondary school 
students (12 year-olds) working on algebra and using SimCalc Mathworlds 
(Roschelle and Kaput  1996 ) , a speed simulation computer program that allowed 
students to generate and test conjectures involving two quantitative variables. The 
study examined how students’ generalisations and justifi cations in answer to linear 
patterning tasks were connected. The tasks were based on real-world situations, one 
of them with real physical devices, and were characterised by a request to use more 
than one representation. The students created some representations with the aid of 
the SimCalc software; hence, these were dynamic. Ellis  ( 2007 ) identifi ed four non-
hierarchical connective mechanisms that teachers could use to help their students 
engage in more sophisticated justifi cation schemes: (a) iterative action/refl ection 
cycles, (b) mathematical focus, (c) generalisations that promote deductive reasoning, 
and (d) infl uence of deductive reasoning on generalising. Yet, as Ellis noted, research 
is needed to examine the applicability of these findings in typical classroom 
settings; the seven students in the study worked in a technology-based, small-
group environment. 
 Jones  ( 2000 ) discussed an instructional environment in which lower secondary 
students were asked to use DGS to classify quadrilaterals in a set of tasks of increas-
ing diffi culty. The tasks involved visual explorations of similarities and differences 
between quadrilaterals and then creating hierarchical classifi cations. The dynamic 
property of the software was a crucial aspect of the task. Jones observed a shift in 
the students’ “thinking from imprecise, ‘everyday’ expressions, through reasoning 
mediated by the software environment to mathematical explanations of the geometric 
situation” (p. 80). The students showed improvement in their ability for deductive 
reasoning; they made progress in formulating accurate mathematical statements and 
valid deductive arguments. 
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 Mariotti  ( 2000 ) worked with older students than Jones  ( 2000 ) and Ellis  ( 2007 ) – 
with upper secondary students, 15–16 year-olds. Adopting a Vygotskian perspective, 
she initiated a long-term teaching experiment that aimed to introduce students to 
theoretical thinking. Mariotti’s experiment drew heavily on the fact that Cabri-
géomètre (hereafter, Cabri), the DGS used, allowed for the creation of systems of 
commands in a way that paralleled the way mathematical axioms and theorems are 
constructed. The set of software tools initially available to the student participants 
corresponded to the straightedge and compass of traditional paper-and-pencil geom-
etry. As the students built different geometrical constructions, such as the angle 
bisector, the Cabri menu was enlarged to include corresponding new commands, 
such as the “angle bisector” command, which then became available for use in 
subsequent constructions. This progressive enlargement of the Cabri menu paralleled 
the enlargement of the theoretical system; the new constructions were subsequently 
added to the theory. Proof served a twofold function in Mariotti’s experiment. First, 
it ensured the validity of new constructions based on the system of commands available 
at each chronological point. Second, proof stood in a dialectical relationship to the 
classroom social contract establishing conjectures or constructions that had to be 
justifi ed and accepted by the classroom community 
 Proof served a similar function in the teaching experiment that Marrades and 
Gutiérrez  ( 2000 ) conducted, also with upper secondary students. Marrades and 
Gutiérrez summarised the social role assigned to proof thus:
 The agreed didactical contract between teacher and pupils, in reference to what kinds of 
answers are accepted, is an important element to success in promoting students’ progress. 
In our experiment, the didactical contract made explicit by the teacher can be summarized 
as the need to organize justifi cations by using defi nitions and results (theorems) previously 
known and accepted by the class. (p. 120) 
 However, Marrades and Gutiérrez followed a different approach from Mariotti’s 
 ( 2000 ) . Specifi cally, they engaged students in working with Cabri to solve a series 
of geometrical tasks in a unit that aimed to help students improve their understanding 
about proof and their justifi cation schemes. The software allowed the students to 
test their solutions and then discuss them during the lesson. The authors showed 
how the facility that Cabri offered for exploration and visualisation helped the students, 
over time, jointly understand the limitations of informal approaches and develop 
more sophisticated justifi cation schemes. 
 Both Hadas et al.’s  ( 2000 ) study and Stylianides and Stylianides’  ( 2009 ) experiment 
added to the issue of creating in students a social need for proof – prominent in Marrades 
and Gutiérrez’s  ( 2000 ) and Mariotti’s  ( 2000 ) studies – another kind of need, “intellec-
tual need” (Harel  1998 ) arising from cognitive confl icts: contradictions, disequilibria, 
and surprise. Both the former studies showed how carefully designed sequences of 
tasks can encourage students to feel an internal motivation for proof rather than to con-
sider proof as superfl uous or something compulsory to please the teacher. 
 Hadas et al.  ( 2000 ) had students make conjectures about certain geometrical 
properties – namely, the sums of interior and exterior angles of convex polygons – and 
check them with the DGS. The conjectures turned out to be wrong when examined 
with the DGS. These contradictions between conjectures and fi ndings created a 
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fruitful context for engaging students in the development of deductive arguments 
about the geometric properties in question. Specifi cally, cognitive confl ict helped 
students delve into and develop their understanding of a complex comprehensive 
topic in geometry in deeper, more mathematically appropriate ways with the use of 
deductive arguments. 
 Stylianides and Stylianides’  ( 2009 ) 4 year study included a design experiment 
that aimed to help prospective elementary teachers develop their understanding of 
proof; it did not involve the use of any mathematics computer software and was not 
specifi c to any single content area. The authors developed a mathematical task 
sequence which led prospective teachers to face cognitive confl icts. The study used 
these confl icts to help the participants investigate the mathematics involved in 
deeper/more mathematically appropriate ways and most important, to help them 
refl ect on and better understand broader issues of mathematical validation. 
Specifi cally, they helped the prospective teachers realise the limitations of empirical 
arguments as validations for mathematical conjectures and feel an intellectual need 
to learn about secure validations, namely proofs, that they could generalise to simi-
lar contexts beyond the particular task sequence. 
 Though we did not discuss it specifi cally, the role of the instructor, teacher or 
teacher educator was a common theme across all six studies. The instructor (in many 
cases the researcher) was not only responsible to implementing the tasks and facili-
tating students’ engagement in them, but also played a major role in establishing the 
classroom social norms that guided the acceptance or rejection of participants’ 
mathematical arguments. Hence our fi rst principle. 
 Principle 1: The task requires that norms be established in the classroom that allow 
discussions, under the facilitation of the instructor, about accepting/
rejecting mathematical ideas, including conjectures, based on the logical 
structure of the mathematical system rather than by appeal to the 
authority of the instructor. 
 All six studies purposefully developed the participants’ need to engage in proving 
in the course of several lessons, and in some cases along a sequence of tasks. In 
most cases, this need related to the social norms established in the classroom: social 
need, but, in some other cases, it also related to cognitive confl ict generated by 
engagement in carefully designed task sequences and the associated desire of the 
students to resolve the confl ict: intellectual need. Also, the need to move between 
representations may have played in some cases (cf. Ellis  2007 ; Jones  2000 ) a role in 
creating the need for proving. 
 Principle 2: The task generates a need for the students to engage in proof. 
 Although fi ve of the six studies used different mathematics instructional computer 
software, the sixth (Stylianides and Stylianides  2009 ) did not. So, we hesitate to 
propose a principle about a computer/technological environment appearing particu-
larly important for the transition between conjecturing and proving. However, the 
software used in the fi ve studies helped create a dynamic environment that allowed 
students to explore their hypotheses and become active participants in the lesson. 
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 Finally, we draw no design principle from the specifi c characteristics of the tasks 
used in the six studies, because they seem to have no common methodological 
theme. This observation might relate to Principles 1 and 2 above: Different kinds of 
tasks have the potential to facilitate the transition from conjecturing to proving, as 
long as the classroom norms and the instructor play a supportive role and the stu-
dents can be led to feel the need to prove. 
 5  Developing Principles for Designing Proving Tasks 
 We aim to identify design principles that instructors can use both to generate new 
proving tasks and to identify existing tasks that have good potential to promote 
proofs and proving. Therefore, we adopt a working defi nition for the act of proving 
that is embedded in the classroom context, be it at the elementary school, secondary 
school, university, or teachers’ professional development level: 
 Proof is mathematical argument, a connected sequence of assertions for or 
against a mathematical claim, with the following characteristics:
 1.  It uses statements accepted by the classroom community (set of accepted state-
ments) that are true and available without further justifi cations; 
 2.  It employs forms of reasoning (modes of argumentation) that are valid and known 
to, or within the conceptual reach of, the classroom community; and 
 3.  It is communicated with forms of expression (modes of argument representation) 
that are appropriate and known to, or within the conceptual reach of, the class-
room community (Stylianides  2007 , p. 107). 
 Given this defi nition, we suggest design principles for proving tasks involving 
the following fi ve aspects of modes of argumentation and modes of argument repre-
sentation: classifying mathematical statements, expressing arguments in several 
modes, changing roles in a task, defi ning suffi cient and necessary proof, and creat-
ing and sharing proof. We explain each principle and demonstrate it by example 
from the research literature. 
 Principle 1: Promote classifying mathematical statements. 
 This fi rst principle relates to the learners’ need to understand that different modes of 
argumentation are appropriate for different types of statements. Consider the state-
ment: “The sum of three consecutive natural numbers is divisible by six”. One may 
fi nd triples of consecutive natural numbers that fulfi l it, like 1 + 2 + 3; one may fi nd 
triples of consecutive numbers that do not fulfi l it, like 2 + 3 + 4. This statement 
involves a predicate, which is “sometimes true” and “sometimes false”. If we add a 
quantifi er to the predicate, we get a mathematical statement, which can be either 
true or false: Adding the universal quantifi er “for any” will result in a false statement – 
“the sum of any three consecutive natural numbers is divisible by six”, however 
adding the existential quantifi er “there exists” will result in a true statement – “there 
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exists a sum of three consecutive natural numbers divisible by six”. Each of the two 
statements needs a different mode of argumentation as proof: to refute the universal 
statement one counter-example is suffi cient; to prove the existential statement one 
supportive example is suffi cient. So, the combination of a quantifi er and a predicate 
both results in a mathematical statement and determines the appropriate mode of 
argumentation needed to prove the statement. Considering the two quantifi ers (uni-
versal and existential) and the three possible predicates (always true, sometimes 
true and never true), results in a six-cell matrix; each cell corresponds to one type of 
statement, which is either true or false, and determines the mode of argumentation 
needed (Table  13.1 ). 
 One way of explicating the variety of statements and the resulting mode of argu-
mentation may be done by the following task (Fig.  13.3 ). The design principle of 
asking the learner to classify is not new. Classifying and sorting involves comparing 
the classifi ed objects, in this case mathematical statements, in order to pinpoint 
similarities and differences amongst them. This may explicate for the learner that 
there are several well-defi ned types of statements. Part b of this task gives students 
more practice and helps them reinforce/abstract what they learned in part a. We can 
elaborate the fi rst design principle as to say a task should involve classifying math-
ematical statements in order to explicate the various types of statements and their 
appropriate modes of argumentation. 
 Table 13.1  Six cell matrix, showing the truth-value of any statement and (in italics) the minimal 
necessary and suffi cient mode of argumentation needed as proof 
 Predicate quantifi er  Always true  Sometimes true  Never true 
 Universal  Cell 1. True statement 
 general proof 
 Cell 2. False statement 
 counter example 
 Cell 3. False statement 
 counter example 
 Existential  Cell 4. True statement 
 supportive example 
 Cell 5. True statement 
 supportive example 
 Cell 6. False statement 
 general proof 
(a) Classify the following statements. You may use the six cells matrix.
(b) Create your own mathematical statement for each category you used.
S1. The sum of any arithmetic sequence with four elements and a difference of 5 is 
divisible by 2.
S2. The sum of any arithmetic sequence with four elements and a difference of 5 is 
divisible by 3.
S3. The sum of any arithmetic sequence with four elements and a difference of 5 is 
divisible by 4.
S4. There exists a sum of arithmetic sequence with four elements and a difference of 
5 that is divisible by 2.
S5. There exists a sum of arithmetic sequence with four elements and a difference of 
5 that is divisible by 3.
S6. There exists a sum of arithmetic sequence with four elements and a difference of 
5 that is divisible by 4.
 Fig. 13.3  Classifi cation task Supported by The Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 900/6) 
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Jamie solved   38x26 = with the following computation steps.  Her 
justification was also included below.  
Discuss with your group member whether this justification is “Clear”, 
“Complete” and “Correct.”  
If not, please revise to make it a better justification so it will meet the 
three Cs criteria.  






We had the original starter at 8 groups of 25 which is equal to 200. Since
we had 30 less in each group, we need to add 30 to all 25 groups so we 
ended up adding 750 to the 200. We still need one more group of 38 to 
make 26 groups. So we added 8 and one more group of 30. Then when 
you add together 200, 750, 8 and 30, your final answer is 988.
 Fig. 13.4  Evaluation task (Lo 2009) 
 Principle 2: Expressing arguments in several modes of argument representation. 
 The second design principle relates to our working defi nition about representing 
the same argument via different representations. Given that using symbolic nota-
tion in proving is not the fi rst choice of many students (e.g., Healy and Hoyles 
 2000 ) , it may be a good practice to encourage students to start by using verbal 
representation, probably with non-mathematical language, as an entry to the 
world of proofs and proving. The second design principle in practice means a 
task requires students to express their arguments in several modes of argument 
representation. 
 Principle 3: Promote changing roles whilst engaging with a task. 
 A well-documented diffi culty with respect to students’ proving at all levels relates 
to the formulation of the argument. That is, an argument should be clear to the 
reader, complete and of course correct. The following task, suggested by Jane-Jane 
Lo (2009) (personal communication; Fig.  13.4 ), adopts a somewhat unusual 
approach to promote students’ ability to create such arguments. 
 The role of the learner in this task is to evaluate the justifi cation and improve it if 
it does not meet the established standards of the community in terms of clarity, 
completeness and correctness. In order to do so, the learner must fi rst read the pro-
posed justifi cation and understand it, only then becoming able to determine its clar-
ity, completeness and correctness. In fact, the design principle involved may be seen 
as “changing roles”; that is, reversing the traditional roles of instructor and learner 
by positioning the learner as evaluator of the proposed justifi cation. 
 Bell et al.  ( 1993 ) identifi ed this third principle of changing roles whilst engaging 
with a task with respect to task design in general. Tasks which allow students to 
change roles and explain and teach one another may signifi cantly contribute to 
learning and to knowledge building. 
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 Principle 4: Raise the issue of suffi cient and necessary proof. 
 The use of this kind of task may further elicit the learners’ “awareness” (Mason 
 1998 ) of the problem of suffi ciency of an argument. The example in Fig.  13.5 is 
mathematically a correct proof for the existential statement. However, it is not a 
minimal proof, and the issue is whether it is a legitimate proof (for more detail, see 
Tsamir et al.  2009 ) . The fourth principle leads students to decide whether a proof is 
suffi cient and necessary for the type of statement involved. 
 Principle 5: Learners create and share their own proofs. 
 Traditional classroom practice, where the instructor lectures to the learners, may 
cause the learners to think that proofs are “given” and one can only learn to prove 
by memorising. Tasks which may be categorised as “create your own proof” may be 
especially appropriate for changing this misconception. Consider, for example, the 
task “Prove the Midpoint Theorem for the case of triangle” (Sun and Chan  2009 ) . 
Each learner fi rst creates a proof, and later presents it to the whole class not only for 
verifi cation of its validity but also for consideration of qualities such as “simple”, 
“effi cient” or “elegant”. At the same time, each learner is exposed to the proofs 
raised by the others, this time evaluating their proofs. 
 Each of the above fi ve tasks aims to promote the practice of proving in class. We 
have presented them in order to illustrate each of our fi ve underlying design prin-
ciples for proving tasks. We selected most of the tasks from mathematical fi elds 
other then Geometry, in order to highlight that proof and proving could and should 
be embedded across the mathematics curriculum. 
 6  Conclusion 
 We have developed a total of 11 principles for task design for learning the mathe-
matical skills of conjecturing (four), transiting between conjecturing and proving 
(two), and proving (fi ve), based on some theory and practical tasks in the literature. 
Do you accept the following as justifications for statement: "There exists a 






















 All the results are divisible by 6. Therefore the statement is true.
 Fig. 13.5  Evaluation task (Tsamir et al.  2009 ) 
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Because of different degrees of richness in the literature with respect to each skill 
area, the consistency of presentation and the number of each set of principles has 
varied. The principles are: 
 6.1  Conjecturing 
 Principle 1: Promote conjecturing by providing opportunity to engage in observation. 
 Principle 2: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity to engage in construction. 
 Principle 3: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity to transform prior knowledge. 
 Principle 4: Promote conjecturing by providing an opportunity for refl ection. 
 6.2  Transiting 
 Principle 1: The task requires that norms be established in the classroom that allow 
discussions, under the facilitation of the instructor, about accepting/
rejecting mathematical ideas, including conjectures, based on the logi-
cal structure of the mathematical system rather than by appeal to the 
authority of the instructor. 
 Principle 2: The task generates a need for the students to engage in proof. 
 6.3  Proving 
 Principle 1: Promote classifying mathematical statements. 
 Principle 2: Promote expressing arguments in several modes of argument representation. 
 Principle 3: Promote changing roles whilst engaged with a task. 
 Principle 4: Raise the issue of suffi cient and necessary proof. 
 Principle 5: Learners create and share their own proofs. 
 Here, we further analyse a common feature that links these three sets of principles 
and provide examples of applying them. 
 One of the educational principles emphasised in Realistic Mathematics Education 
is that lines of learning are intertwined (Streefl and  1991 , p. 21). Intertwining is a 
specifi c feature common to our three sets of design principles. With the help of the 
following two examples, we will discuss this intertwining characteristic and show it 
operating in relation to practical application of our principles. As a fi rst example, 
the suggested questions for conjecturing tasks based on the “refl ection” principle 
(conjecturing, 4) could also generate many tasks appropriate for the transitional section. 
The two questions: “Explain why you believe your conjecture holds for condition 
A? Does your conjecture still hold when A is changed?” and “Is there any case for 
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which your conjecture would not hold true?” initiate a process that leads learners to 
invoke norms in the classroom that allow discussions about accepting/rejecting 
mathematical ideas based on the logical structure of the mathematical system, 
namely, Principle 1 of Transiting task design. 
 Second, Principle 1 of Proving task design promoting classifying mathematical 
statements in order to explicate their various types, can generate tasks whose learn-
ing process intertwines with the experiences resulting from involvement in tasks 
based on Transiting Principle 1 and Conjecturing Principle 4. Thus, amongst the 
three learning categories, the lines of learning intertwined to create a continuity of 
learning between conjecturing and proving. All our principles for task design have 
this intertwining feature. 
 To further validate the functioning of our design principles we encourage more 
empirical research, particularly investigating their use in conjunction with educational 
variables, such as different teachers’ backgrounds and different educational systems. 
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 1  Introduction 
 This chapter examines the three essential components of teachers’ professional 
learning on teaching proof and proving: teachers’ knowledge of proof, practice of 
proof and beliefs about proof. The challenges teachers may face in teaching proof 
and proving, as well as current teacher professional learning activities on proof and 
proving are also discussed. 
 For instance, the proof method of mathematical induction introduced in second-
ary school mathematics is proved to be a problematic content for learning and teach-
ing. Briefl y, the method of mathematical induction proceeds in two steps: the starting 
step establishes that P(n) is true for an initial value n = n 
0
 ; and the implicative step 
proves that if P(k) is true, then P(k + 1) is true for an arbitrary k  Î  {n|n Î  N, n  ³ n 0 }. 
Some researchers (e.g., Harel  2001 ; Stylianides et al.  2007 ) found that students and 
pre-service teachers had diffi culties in understanding the requirement and suffi ciency 
of the two steps for proving propositions with the form ‘P(k), k Î  {n | n Î  N, n  ³ n 0 }’. 
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 To make sense of the three essential components, we contrasted how an experienced 
teacher and a prospective teacher introduce the concept of mathematical induction 
in their teaching. The experienced teacher, T1, studied by Chin and Lin  ( 2000 ) , 
fruitfully used the “Hanoi Tower” activity 1 as a basis for introducing the concept of 
mathematical induction. T1 had a master’s degree in mathematics and had taught 
mathematics in a public senior high school for 20 years. He used two critical ques-
tions to invite the students to think inductively:
 1.  Can you do it [the puzzle] when N [discs] = 3? 
 2.  Do you believe that if N = 3 is possible then N = 4 will also be possible? 
 Having had the students solve the puzzle with three discs, T1 introduced a strategy 
of moving the three-disc solution as a unit in solving the puzzle with four discs, then 
suggesting the same strategy with the four-disc solution to show how the puzzle 
could be done with fi ve discs. Meanwhile, T1 used a sequence of relevant questions 
to lead students to conjecture that the puzzle could be solved with any  n discs, 
thus demonstrating the two steps of the principle of mathematical induction. This 
procedure also revealed two of T1’s pedagogical beliefs:
 1.  mathematics teaching ought to teach students the nature of mathematical 
knowledge rather than mathematical forms; 
 2.  mathematics teaching ought to motivate students’ interests and willingness to 
learn. 
 (Chin and Lin  2000 ) 
 On the other hand, the prospective teacher, P1, studied by Hsieh  ( 2005 ) , planned 
a lesson using the “Hanoi Towers” to teach mathematical induction in a teaching 
practice with classmates acting as “pseudo-learners”. However, P1 initially mis-
stated the rules of the puzzle as:
 1.  Only one disc may be moved at a time; 
 2.  No disc may be placed on top of a smaller disc; 
 3.  A stack of discs may be taken from one peg to the target peg through the third 
(spare) peg. 
 His fi rst and third rules contradicted each other, enabling one of this classmates 
to replicate T1’s method of demonstrating how any number of discs might be used. 
This led another to question why P1 had chosen to consecutively increase the number 
of discs, rather than reasoning that if, say, four discs was possible, any  n was pos-
sible. However, P1 did not take this chance to enrich the discussion about the nature 
of mathematical induction. In fact, P1 scarcely interacted with his pseudo-learners, 
although he did assign some tasks to them. 
 1  The “Hanoi Tower” puzzle requires the user to move a conical stack of  n discs from one of three 
pegs (A, B, C) and reconstruct it on another, moving only one disc at a time and never placing a 
larger disc on a smaller, and using the third (spare) peg as a way station when necessary. 
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 Both T1 and P1 used the “Hanoi Tower” activity on the premise that students 
could make sense of the two steps of mathematical induction through solving three 
discs, four discs and so on. However, the same activity conducted by an experienced 
teacher led to a development of students’ understanding but produced a little learn-
ing when conducted by a prospective teacher who had confused the given rules with 
the principle of demonstrating mathematical induction. 
 Three essential components of teachers’ competency in teaching proof emerge 
from these two examples: knowledge specifi c to proof content and proof method, 
belief specifi c to the nature and didactics of proof, and practice specifi c to planning 
and teaching for motivating and guiding students’ argumentation and proof. These 
three essential components offer understanding and guidance for mathematics 
teachers’ professional development in teaching proof. 
 1.1  Three Essential Components of Teacher 
Professional Development 
 As teaching mathematics involves mathematical concepts, strategies, and reasoning 
methods, mathematics teachers should have “the mathematical knowledge needed 
to carry out the work of teaching mathematics” (Ball et al.  2008 , p. 395). Similarly, 
teaching proof requires teachers’ understanding of the content. Moreover, teaching 
proof demands specifi c knowledge to explain why one proof or some proof method 
is valid and to validate students’ proofs. 
 The choice and design of tasks provide teachers’ main approach to the imple-
mentation of their mathematical knowledge. Whilst selecting learning tasks, imag-
ing and evaluating students’ various modes of argumentation, and responding to 
students’ misunderstanding in proof, mathematics teachers make many decisions 
according to their beliefs about proofs and the didactics of proofs (Hanna  1995 ; 
Knuth  2002 ; Mingus and Grassl  1999 ) . 
 Whilst engaging students into mathematical argumentation and proof, mathe-
matics teachers may negotiate new classroom norms for doing mathematics and 
discuss what counts as justifi cation with students (see Simon and Blume  1996 ) . 
Teachers’ beliefs about mathematics learning – in particular, whether they have a 
conceptual or a calculational orientation – have a substantial impact on the way that 
they teach mathematics in their own classrooms (see Philipp  2007 ) . 
 Just knowing or believing what to do is not suffi cient for practice in planning 
and teaching lessons. Three related components – object, subject, and community – 
compose practice in planning and teaching (Engeström  1999 ) . For example, how 
to motivate one student to frame or focus on an object in the classroom commu-
nity requires mathematics teachers to turn what they know and believe into action 
to help students develop mathematical understanding by the investigation of dif-
ferent levels of mathematical validity. The literature has paid much attention to 
knowledge for teaching proof and belief about the nature and didactics of proof 
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(e.g. Knuth  2002 ; Stylianides and Ball  2008 ) . How teachers turn knowledge and 
belief into practical instruction has been less investigated. 
 Traditionally, school mathematics has focused primarily on formal types of 
proof, such as methods of mathematical induction and algorithmic proofs (e.g., two-
column geometric proof at the high-school level). The releases of two Standards by 
the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics ( NCTM  1989 ,  2000 ) in the U.S., 
and of other curriculum documents around the world, represent a growing recogni-
tion that proof should be treated as a tool for learning mathematics at all grade 
levels. However the set of accepted statements, the modes of argumentations and 
modes of argument representation differ between primary and secondary mathematics 
classrooms. Thus, teachers might encounter pedagogical challenges specifi c to 
their teaching levels. So, the following three sections will elaborate on teachers’ 
knowledge of proof, practice of proof, and belief about proof separately for primary 
and secondary levels. 
 2  Teachers’ Knowledge of Proof 
 2.1  Primary Teachers’ Knowledge of Proof 
 Wittmann  ( 2009 ) argued that elementary-school students, and thus their teachers, 
should be provided with opportunities to develop “operative proofs” with these 
characteristics:
 1.  They arise from the exploration of a mathematical problem; 
 2.  They are based on operations with “quasi-real” mathematical objects; 
 3.  They are communicable in a problem-oriented language with little symbolism. 
 (p. 254) 
 So, representing odd and even numbers with mathematics counters in two rows, 
e.g.   and   , instead of formal symbols such as A = 2n + 1, would be appropriate 
for elementary students to use to prove that “the sum of two odd numbers is an even 
number”: 
 Past research studies on primary teachers’ knowledge of proof have focused 
mainly on pre-service teachers and on modes of argumentation. Lo and McCrory 
 ( 2009 ) propose that future elementary teachers need to learn proof at three differ-
ent levels: as a mathematical tool; as a mathematical object; and as a development, 
with the level of assumptions, arguments and representations depending on the 
students’ age and grade level. Researchers have found that many primary teachers 
rely on external authority, such as textbooks, college instructors or more capable 
peers, as the basis of their conviction (e.g., Lo et al.  2008 ; Simon and Blume  1996 ) ; 
they also believe it is possible to affi rm the validity of a mathematical generalisa-
tion through a few examples (Goetting  1995 ; Goulding et al.  2002 ; Martin and 
Harel  1989 ; Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ) . Frequently, the ritualistic aspects 
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of the proof (e.g., it has the look of a proof) rather than the correctness of the argument, 
infl uence such teachers’ judgement of the validity of a mathematical argument 
(Martin and Harel  1989 ) . 
 Stylianides et al.  ( 2004,  2007 ) , studying 70 primary pre-service teachers at the 
University of Cyprus, found that primary teachers are weak in their understanding 
of the contraposition equivalence rule  ( 2004 ) and mathematical induction  ( 2007 ) . 
These researchers’ in-depth analysis revealed pre-service teachers had two main 
types of diffi culties with proof. First, they lacked understanding of the logic-
mathematical underpinnings of different modes of argumentation: What contributes 
to the validity of a particular mode of proof and what’s being proved (and not being 
proved) by a valid application of a particular proof method? Second, many of the 
participants were unable to use different modes of representations correctly and 
appropriately, for example, Grant and Lo  ( 2008 ) found that U.S. pre-service teach-
ers’ erroneous understanding of the number line impeded their ability to use it as a 
tool for constructing a valid proof for justifying computation with whole numbers 
and fractions. 
 2.2  Secondary Teachers’ Knowledge of Proof 
 Secondary teachers’ necessary knowledge of proof comprises three components: 
constructing proofs, evaluating proofs, and knowledge of content and students. 
Often, prospective secondary mathematics teachers have to complete a fi rst 
degree with a required focus on mathematical content at the tertiary level. Thus, 
one might assume, secondary teachers are knowledgeable in constructing proofs, 
a part of the mathematical knowledge which Shulman  ( 1986 ) called subject-matter 
knowledge (SMK). Yet, research reports are confl icting on this point. For example, 
Barkai et al.  ( 2009 ) asked 50 practising high school teachers to prove or refute 
six statements within the context of Elementary Number Theory. All teachers 
gave valid proofs (or refutations) using either a symbolic or numeric mode of 
argument. For geometry, Sun  ( 2009 ) and Sun and Chan  ( 2009 ) found that pro-
spective teachers were able to construct a variety of original and creative proofs 
for different theorems. On the other hand, Schwarz and Kaiser’s  ( 2009 ) compara-
tive study of future teachers in Germany, Hong Kong, and Australia found that 
the majority could not construct formal proofs, even though these proofs required 
only lower-secondary mathematical content. In Zaslavsky and Peled’s  ( 1996 ) 
study of 36 high-school teachers’ SMK, only a third of the teachers could pro-
vide counter-examples to the (false) statement “All commutative actions are also 
associative.” 
 Being able to evaluate whether a proof is valid also forms an element of SMK. 
Brown and Stillman  ( 2009 ) found that only some recent graduates could recognise 
generality in pre-formal proofs, whilst others could not. Other studies found that 
the mode of argument may also be related to teachers’ value judgements of proofs. 
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Dreyfus  ( 2000 ) , following Healy and Hoyles’  ( 1998 ) work with high school 
students, presented 44 secondary school teachers with nine justifi cations for the 
claim “The sum of any two even numbers is even”. He found that most of the 
teachers easily recognised formal proofs, but had little or no appreciation for 
other types of justifi cations, such as verbal, visual or generic. In contrast, other 
studies have shown that students may prefer a verbal mode over symbolic repre-
sentation (Healey and Hoyles  2000 ) . Nevertheless, in a study of 50 high school 
teachers evaluating verbal proofs, half of the teachers rejected correct verbal 
proofs, claiming that these justifi cations lacked generality and were mere exam-
ples  ( Tsamir et al. 2009b). In addition, only about half of the teachers identifi ed 
the incorrectness of a symbolic justifi cation that was not general (Tsamir et al. 
 2008 ) . Similarly, Knuth  ( 2002 ) reported that, when needing to determine an 
argument’s validity, teachers seem to “focus solely on the correctness of the alge-
braic manipulations rather than on the mathematical validity of the argument” 
(p. 392). In other words, when presented with an algebraic justifi cation, the 
teachers focused on the examination of each step, ignoring the need to evaluate 
the validity of the argument as a whole. 
 Yet, even if able to do so themselves, teachers also require pedagogical-content 
knowledge (PCK) in order to be able to teach their students how to construct and 
evaluate proofs. Ball and colleagues (Ball et al.  2008 ) differentiated two compo-
nents of PCK, knowledge of content and students (KCS) and knowledge of content 
and teachers (KCT): KCS “combines knowing about students and knowing about 
mathematics,“ whereas KCT ”combines knowing about teaching and knowing 
about mathematics” (p. 401). 
 Regarding the teaching of proofs, KCS includes knowing the types of proofs 
students may construct in different mathematical contexts. For instance, Tabach 
et al.  ( 2009 ) asked their 50 high school teachers to suggest correct and incorrect 
proofs their students might construct for each of six statements within the context of 
Elementary Number Theory. As to mode of representation, the teachers (predict-
ably) suggested verbal representations less often than numeric or symbolic ones for 
both correct and incorrect suggested proofs. The suggestions for incorrect proofs 
most frequently cited mistakes related to the formal content of proof. This result 
may be related to teachers’ SMK of the formal nature of proof and their PCK of 
students’ diffi culties with this formality. 
 Although it may shed light on teachers’ SMK, evaluating proofs may also shed 
light on teachers’ KCS. For example, a teacher may reject a student’s proof, even 
though it is mathematically correct, when the proof is not minimal (e.g., Tsamir 
et al.  2009 a). This may refl ect the teacher’s PCK. A teacher’s judgement of a proof 
may take into consideration not only mathematical validity and the student’s ability 
to validate or refute a statement, but also the student’s knowledge of what is suffi -
cient for proving or refuting a given type of statement. In other words, the evalua-
tion may go beyond the correctness of the justifi cation, refl ecting the teacher’s 
SMK, to consider the student’s familiarity with the relevant “big ideas”, refl ecting 
the teacher’s PCK. 
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 3  Teachers’ Practice of Proof 
 3.1  Primary Teachers’ Practice of Proof 
 The studies on primary teachers’ knowledge of proof focused primarily on individual 
teachers and treated their knowledge as a static variable. However, the studies on 
primary teachers’ teaching of proof frequently consider the proving activities in the 
classroom as interactive. Collectively, the classroom community infl uences what can 
be accepted as an acceptable explanation or valid justifi cation; it establishes a sociom-
athematical norm (Yackel and Cobb  1996 ) . Various theoretical frameworks, such as 
Toulmin’s scheme of argumentation that includes claims, data, warrants, and back-
ing, have been used to analyse explanation and disagreement arising in these class 
discussions (Yackel  2002 ) . As a member of the classroom community, the teacher 
plays a central role in establishing an inquiry-based classroom environment that hon-
ours both mathematics as a discipline and students as learners (e.g., Ball and Bass 
 2003 ; Lampert  2001 ; Stylianides  2007a,  b ; Wood  1999 ) . 
 Stylianides  ( 2007a ) analysed three proof-learning episodes from Grade 3 class-
room to illustrate various moves teachers made after the base argument (the prevail-
ing student argument at the beginning of the proving activity) was established. The 
analysis led to the development of a framework of instructional practices for proof 
and proving in school mathematics that includes four possible courses of action 
(Stylianides  2007a ) . Upon recognising a proving instance in the classroom, the 
teacher fi rst evaluates the base argument with respect to the three components of a 
proof: set of accepted statements, modes of argumentation and modes of argument 
representation. If the base argument qualifi es as a proof, then the teacher can either 
(a) bring the proving activity to a close, or (b) help the class develop a more advanced 
proof by further expanding the tools available in one or more of the components. 
If it does not qualify as a proof, then the teacher can focus the instruction on the 
component(s) that disqualify it. Subsequently, the class community develops either 
a proof or a more advanced argument. The latter occurs when one or more of the 
proof components are beyond the students’ current conceptual reach. This frame-
work further emphasises the importance of teachers’ taking an active role in manag-
ing the proving activities in their classrooms. 
 3.2  Secondary Teachers’ Practice of Proof 
 The implementation of proof tasks in the secondary classroom is not simple. In a 
survey of 27 high school teachers in Brazil, most teachers were not able to describe 
a single proof-related activity they had developed with their students (Healy et al. 
 2009 ) . Bieda  ( 2009 ) observed middle school teachers and their students who 
participated in the Connected Mathematics Project, a curriculum incorporating 
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proof-related tasks. Even though most teachers implemented the tasks as written, 
not all the students’ generalisations were followed up with justifi cations. When 
justifi cations were not forthcoming, many teachers did not provide necessary feed-
back, missing the opportunities to engage students in proving activities. In other 
words, even when teachers are provided with tasks that encourage proving, imple-
menting the proof part of the activity does not necessarily follow. 
 Herbst  ( 2002 ) analysed high school geometry lessons to identify teachers’ actions 
that help students in proving geometrical statements. He found that focusing on the 
form of proving, without stressing the ideas of the proof, may lead students to focus 
on the form but not on the logic. Herbst  ( 2009 ) hypothesised that a didactical con-
tract exists between the teacher and students about the knowledge of proofs that 
students are expected to learn. Herbst  ( 2002 ) identifi ed three proof-related situa-
tions: “installing a theorem”, “doing a proof”, and “calculating (a measure)”. The 
activities in each situation were guided by norms. For example, when “doing 
proofs”, it was the norm for the teacher to state the “given” and provide the conclu-
sion to be reached – “prove”. It was then the norm for students to write a sequence 
of statements and a reason to follow each statement. 
 4  Teachers’ Beliefs/Values About Proof 
 Teachers’ values and beliefs regarding mathematics and the kind of mathematics 
they bring to the classroom also relate to classroom practice. Thus, a teacher who 
values proofs and believes that it is important for students to experience proving 
will provide students with related activities. Philipp  ( 2007 ) distinguished between 
value and beliefs: “Whereas beliefs are associated with a true/false dichotomy, values 
are associated with a desirable/undesirable dichotomy” (p. 259). Although we 
acknowledge this distinction between the two terms, here we follow the terminology 
used in the specifi c studies discussed. 
 4.1  Primary Teachers’ Values About Proof 
 Bishop  ( 1999 ) called for more investigations on the values of teaching and learning in 
mathematics classrooms almost 20 years ago. However, research studies in this area 
are still few and have tended to deal in larger generalities, like beliefs about mathemat-
ics as a scientifi c discipline; about teaching and learning mathematics, about teaching 
and learning in general, about teacher education and professional development 
(cf. Kaiser et al.  2007 ) , or about pedagogical values systems (Chin and Lin  2000 ) . 
 Raymond  ( 1997 ) found that many primary teachers still hold traditional views 
about the nature of mathematics; for example, “Mathematics is an unrelated collection 
of facts, rules and skills” and “Mathematics is fi xed, predictable, absolute, certain, and 
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applicable” (p. 556). This view of mathematics frequently accompanies traditional 
teaching practices, including teacher-centred and-controlled lectures and demon-
strations, ample individual seatwork and no student input other than providing yes/
no or short answers. 
 4.2  Secondary Teachers’ Values About Proof 
 Cirillo  ( 2009 ) found that a secondary school teacher was able to defl ect his students’ 
exasperation at the diffi cult and time-consuming construction of proofs because he 
believed that “real math” had to involve proof; his belief about mathematics affected 
his classroom practice. Beliefs are also related to the teaching of mathematics. For 
example, some teachers see proof as a means of convincing, whilst others see it as 
a means of promoting mathematical understanding (Furinghetti and Morselli  2009 ) . 
Although the manual Principles and Standards for School Mathematics ( NCTM 
 2000 ) recognises that reasoning and proof are fundamental in all content areas, 
some teachers believe that geometry is the ideal domain for teaching proofs 
(Furinghetti and Morselli  2009 ) . 
 Teachers may also hold beliefs regarding proof methods, which in turn may 
infl uence their evaluation of students’ proofs. When investigating secondary school 
teachers’ evaluation of arguments based on visual reasoning, Biza et al.  ( 2009 ) 
found that some teachers may accept a visual argument that refutes a statement but 
not one that is used to prove a statement. These teachers believed that in order to 
prove the validity of a statement an algebraic argument is necessary; one teacher 
would not accept any graphic argument because she believed that students should be 
able to provide an algebraic argument. Biza et al.’s results exemplify the ongoing 
debate within the mathematics community about whether a visual representation 
may be accepted as a proof (Hanna  2000 ) . 
 4.3  How do the Three Components of Teachers’ Profession 
Interact with Each Other? 
 The above three components necessary for proofs and proving in the elementary 
and secondary schools are interrelated. First, a teacher’s SMK, including being able 
to construct and evaluate proofs, is necessary. Teachers’ PCK, including knowledge 
of students’ proving methods and knowledge of appropriate tasks that encourage 
proofs, is also necessary. Research studies have shown that primary teachers are 
generally weak in both areas. Even secondary teachers with strong SMK, provided 
with appropriate tasks, missed proving opportunities. This situation suggests a miss-
ing element, perhaps knowledge regarding how to implement tasks or a belief about 
the value proofs have in mathematics classrooms. 
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 A closer look at the lessons observed by Herbst  ( 2002,  2009 ) in geometry 
classes reveals how the three components are interrelated. For example, the 
teachers’ knowledge of proving tasks in geometry may have been limited to a 
specifi c form. This limited knowledge then affected their practice so that the 
specifi c task form became the “task norm” in their classes. In addition, the teach-
ers observed by Herbst apparently believed that all geometric proofs must be 
formal and follow a certain path, leading them to focus on form over logic. 
Similarly, the proving activities may become an exercise of teachers demonstrat-
ing specifi c steps for students to memorise if that the practice is compatible with 
their beliefs about doing proof in elementary classrooms. Thus, beliefs as well as 
knowledge affect practice. 
 Knowledge and beliefs not only affect practice, they affect each other. A teacher 
familiar only with algebraic proof may in turn believe that it is the only acceptable 
form. However, a teacher exposed to other proof methods, such as visual proofs, 
may learn to value those methods as well. On the other hand, a teacher with a hard 
and fast belief that all proofs must be formal and rigorous may not be open to learning 
about other proof methods. Teachers’ PCK regarding students’ diffi culties with 
formal proofs may lead teachers to believe that formal proofs are usually inacces-
sible and thus inappropriate for students. 
 Often, teachers’ knowledge and beliefs rest on their past experiences as teachers 
and students. Thus, it is important to give teachers new experiences to build on. 
Research has shown that collaboration between researchers and school teachers 
may have a positive impact not only on teachers’ knowledge but on their beliefs and 
practices as well. In one such study, teachers evaluating students’ arguments, who 
initially dismissed generic examples as purely empirical, eventually accepted this 
type of argument and became cognisant of the general reasoning inherent in it 
(Healy et al.  2009 ) . In addition, the teachers went from valuing only formal proofs 
to allowing natural language as well. In other words, the collaboration led teachers to 
increase their knowledge (regarding generic examples) which in turn affected their 
values (regarding formal proofs) which in turn affected their practice (regarding the 
evaluation of students’ proofs). 
 5  Challenges About Teaching Proof 
 A teacher may face several challenges relating to the domain of proofs and proving: 
different mathematical domains, different perceptions of the role of proofs, class-
room norms, curriculum materials, a variety of statement types to present, and use 
of exemplifi cation versus deductive proof. Here we aim to highlight the dilemmas 
and to point out possible directions for resolutions. 
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 5.1  Mathematical Domains 
 First, consider the choice of mathematical domains involved in teaching proof and 
proving. On the one hand, curricula often require implementing proof and proving 
as part of classroom practice in various mathematical domains: “By exploring 
phenomena, justifying results, and using mathematical conjectures in all content 
areas and—with different expectations of sophistication—at all grade levels, students 
should see and expect that mathematics makes sense,” as the NCTM Standards put 
it (NCTM  2000 , p. 4). On the other hand, many teachers teach proofs only in sec-
ondary school geometry courses. Furinghetti and Morselli  ( 2009 ) interviewed 10 
practising secondary school teachers in order to understand why. These teachers 
referred to Euclidean geometry as “the most suitable domain for the teaching of 
proof” (p. 170). The researchers concluded that teachers’ beliefs infl uence how and 
when teachers incorporate proofs. Berg  ( 2009 ) called for attention to the importance 
of the mathematical context within which the idea of proof is addressed. She found 
a substantial difference in practising middle-school teachers’ attitudes towards geo-
metrical and numerical tasks, both of which she considered as proving tasks. 
However, the teachers related to only the geometrical task as a proving task; they 
considered the numerical task as merely a pattern inquiry task. 
 5.2  Proofs for Mathematicians vs. Proofs in School 
 The teacher’s knowledge about proofs in the domain of mathematics, as compared to 
proofs in school mathematics, constitutes another issue. Sun  ( 2009 ) contrasts the role 
of proofs in the two settings: “mathematicians write own proofs in order to establish 
the truth of a proposition. In contrast, students … receive the ready-made proofs 
mainly presented by their teachers according to their textbooks and syllabus and then 
routinely memorize theorems and proofs” (p. 180). Teachers may value the role proofs 
play for practising mathematicians, and yet teach proofs only by rote learning because 
they do not believe their students can create proofs. The teacher’s beliefs and values 
interact with their knowledge to result in the enacted practice. For example, Cirillo 
 ( 2009 ) followed one high-school teacher for 3 years, observed him in class and inter-
viewed him in order to better understand his conceptions of proofs in the context of 
school mathematics. Cirillo argued that both the teacher’s past experience with rigor-
ous proofs in college level courses and the available curriculum materials were an 
obstacle to enacting a practice of proving in his class. The teacher recalled the trau-
matic shock he felt when fi rst asked to create what he called “real proof” at university 
level; he felt that until then he had never had to. In order to prevent their experiencing 
the same trauma, he decided to introduce his high-school students to rigorous proofs. 
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 5.3  Classroom Norms 
 Proofs are usually not the fi rst thing a mathematics teacher presents in class. 
Hence, by the time the issue of proofs emerges, some other sociomathematical 
norms may already be established in the class. Douek  ( 2009 ) , drawing on her 
experience with middle-school teachers and Pythagoras’ theorem, identifi ed two 
diffi culties in establishing the habit of proving in class: “One diffi culty consists in 
the fact that ’to produce a conjecture’ is a task that does not fi t the most frequent 
didactical contract … Moreover the presentation and management of the tasks in 
a way that guides students’ work but does not prevent creativity is not easy” 
(p. 147). According to Douek, incorporating proofs and proving in classroom 
practice necessitates a profound change in the already established mathematical 
habits of mind. In other words, a teacher needs to consider whether and how to 
productively renegotiate the didactic contract and arrive at more amenable sociom-
athematical norms. 
 5.4  Available Curriculum Materials 
 Amongst other things, a teacher planning a learning sequence considers the mate-
rials available for both teacher and students. However, the agenda expressed in 
written curricular materials may not be compatible with the teacher’s agenda 
regarding the issues of proofs and proving. For example, Bieda  ( 2009 ) reported on 
a study done in seven middle-grade classrooms. The teachers used a reform-
oriented curriculum, the Connected Mathematics Project (CMP), in which at least 
40% of the curriculum tasks encourage students to reason and justify. Bieda’s 
analysis of 49 lessons revealed that 71% of the lesson time was devoted to tasks 
that involved reasoning, but only about half of the possible proving activities were 
carried out. 
 5.5  Types of Statements to Present to Students 
 Traditionally, teachers present valid universal statements in class. However, dur-
ing inquiry-based activities, students may also raise conjectures and validate or 
refute them; these conjectures may not be valid universal statements. Prior to 
inquiry activities, the teacher could ‘prepare the ground’ for students by system-
atically introducing a variety of statements as well as their relevant proving meth-
ods. For example, Tsamir et al.  ( 2008 ) suggested a systematic way for categorising 
statements according to the quantifi er, which may be universal or existential, and 
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the predicate, which may be “always true”, “sometimes true” or “never true”. 
The combination of predicate and quantifi er determine the statement’s degree of 
validity, and hence the possible methods of proving it. This statement organiser 
can be presented as a six-cell matrix as follows: 
 Predicate quantifi er  Always true  Sometimes true  Never true 
 Universal  Cell 1.  Cell 2.  Cell 3. 
 True statement  False statement  False statement 
 General proof  Counter example  Counter example 
 Existential  Cell 4.  Cell 5.  Cell 6. 
 True statement  True statement  False statement 
 Supportive example  Supportive example  General proof 
 In  italic – the truth-value of a statement and the minimal necessary and suffi cient mode of 
argumentation needed as a proof 
 Such a matrix may help the teacher to decide which type of statements to choose. 
It may also help the teacher in considering mathematical statements during various 
phases of practice: whilst planning, whilst making sense of curriculum materials, 
whilst teaching a lesson, whilst assessing students’ knowledge, and so on. 
 5.6  Shifting Students Proofs Towards Deductive Thinking 
 Many students consider experimental verifi cations suffi cient to demonstrate the 
validity of a statement. This tendency may dominate even more in their use of 
dynamic geometry software, where they can generate numerous examples by ‘drag-
ging’. Teachers face a dilemma: how to turn general proofs from a ritual imposed on 
students to a need motivating them to search for general arguments. Kunimune et al. 
 ( 2009 ) studied this problem in the context of teachers’ practices in secondary 
schools in Japan. They found that the tendency towards experimental proof is hard 
to change, especially in lower-level students. Fischbein  ( 1982 ) also found a similar 
tendency towards empirical proof in the context of number theory. However, as 
Kunimune et al.  ( 2009 ) reported, a class discussion aimed at shaking students’ 
beliefs about experimental verifi cation and making deductive proof meaningful for 
them can make a crucial difference. 
 Taking into consideration the above mentioned dilemmas, one may wonder what 
teacher educators can do to help teachers in the complex domain of implementing 
proofs and proving as an integral part of everyday practice. One answer is to raise 
awareness; that is, teacher educators ought to expose teacher trainees to these 
tensions and dilemmas and provide a secure environment for both practising and 
prospective teachers to discuss these and other problems. 
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 6  Professional Learning Activities for Teaching 
Proof and Proving 
 One early study that focused on teachers’ learning of proof, by Simon and Blume 
 ( 1996 ) , provided useful insights into how mathematics teacher educators can estab-
lish norms in mathematics courses for prospective elementary teachers. According 
to these norms, members of the classroom community need to justify their ideas and 
the other members need to be involved in evaluating those ideas. More recent work 
with prospective elementary teachers (Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ) and pro-
spective and practising secondary teachers (Zaslavsky  2005 ) capitalised on Simon 
and Blume’s concepts and added the notion of cognitive confl ict as a mechanism to 
help teachers develop their knowledge about proof. All three studies used a range 
of activities to help teachers develop their understanding of proof: solving proof 
tasks individually or in small groups, having whole group discussions, sharing and 
critiquing each others’ proofs, and so on. Yet, these studies’ most important contri-
bution lies in the method they used to implement such activities, which involves 
three important dimensions: establishing conviction, the role of the teacher educa-
tor, and the notion of cognitive confl ict. 
 6.1  Establishing Conviction 
 When introducing teachers to the notion of proof, it is important to consider how an 
argument can establish conviction in the truth or falsity of mathematical claim. 
Mason  ( 1982 ) distinguished amongst three levels of conviction ( in increasing level 
of sophistication): (a) convince yourself, (b) convince a friend, and (c) convince a 
sceptic. The fi rst emphasises the cognitive/individual dimension of conviction in 
relation to the process of “ascertaining” (Harel and Sowder  2007 ) ; that is, removing 
one’s own doubts about a claim’s truth or falsity. The other two levels emphasise the 
social dimension of conviction in relation to the process of “persuading” (Harel and 
Sowder  2007 ) ; that is, removing others’ doubts about a claim’s truth or falsity. 
 In nonmathematical communities, to justify an idea (i.e., to establish conviction) 
an argument;
 must proceed from knowledge that is taken-as-shared in the community, must be seen by 
the community as logical (i.e., each assertion following reasonably from the previous one), 
and the idea must fi t with knowledge that has previously been accepted by that community 
(Simon and Blume  1996 , p. 6). 
 This excerpt relates to Mason’s  ( 1982 ) second and third levels of conviction. The 
criteria described in the excerpt and the criteria adopted in our three focal studies 
(Simon and Blume  1996 ; Styliandides and Stylianides  2009b ; Zaslavsky  2005 ) 
relate to the third level of conviction in mathematics. According to the excerpt, in 
nonmathematical communities the community is the sole judge of whether or not an 
argument establishes conviction. In the three focal studies, the teacher educators 
were trying to help teachers develop arguments consistent with the conventional 
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understandings and criteria of mathematics. In Stylianides and Stylianides’s study 
 ( 2009b ) , for example, attaining the third level of conviction required additionally 
that the persuasion satisfi ed certain criteria developed with the teacher educators’ 
guidance (see Stylianides and Stylianides  2009a ), and rooted in criteria shared in 
the mathematical community. Both Simon and Blume  ( 1996 ) and Stylianides and 
Stylianides ( 2009b ) observed that arguments to persuade a sceptic had to be seen as 
logical not only by the standards of the teacher education classroom community but 
also according to the conventions about proof of the mathematical community. 
These conventional understandings served as criteria for considering an argument 
persuasive enough to convince a sceptic. 
 6.2  The Role of the Teacher Educator 
 In all three studies (Simon and Blume  1996 ; Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ; 
Zaslavsky  2005 ) , teacher educators played an important role in designing and 
implementing professional activities in the area of proof. They did not communicate 
conventional understandings to the teachers merely by means of asserting their 
authority. Rather, they tried to help the teachers develop better understandings of 
proof through social interactions. In all three studies, the teacher educators imple-
mented scaffolding strategies, such as focusing the class discussion on why a certain 
approach to a task was appropriate, asking prompting questions, and encouraging 
the trainees to develop “compelling arguments” for why a general claim “always” 
held. However, this aid did not always result in the students’ recognition of the limi-
tations of “weak arguments” they had developed, arguments that did not meet the 
standard of proof. For example, Simon and Blume  ( 1996 , pp. 10–17) describe an 
episode when the prospective teachers could not see a problem in their empirical 
arguments to justify a mathematical claim and resisted developing more “sophisti-
cated” deductive arguments. In other words, the prospective teachers did not engage 
spontaneously in a “situation of justifi cation” (ibid.). 
 Such episodes raised a need for the development of ways to motivate teachers’ 
engagement in sophisticated proofs. Yet, there remained situations in which the pro-
spective teachers saw the need for more sophisticated arguments but could not 
develop them due to time constraints, conceptual barriers or other problems. In such 
situations, one teacher educator (Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ) took a more active 
role than scaffolding, offering the prospective teachers access to the conventional 
mathematical knowledge which they needed but could not access themselves. 
 6.3  The Notion of Cognitive Confl ict 
 Simon and Blume  ( 1996 ) suggested the usefulness of creating classroom norms for 
engaging prospective teachers in proof. More recently, Zaslavsky  ( 2005 ) and 
Stylianides and Stylianides ( 2009b ) introduced the notion of cognitive confl ict. 
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Confl ict teaching aims “to help students refl ect on their current mathematical 
understandings […] confront contradictions that arose in situations in which some 
of these understandings no longer held, and recognize the importance (need) of 
modifying these understandings to resolve the contradictions” (Stylianides and 
Stylianides  2009b , p. 319). 
 Zaslavsky  ( 2005 ) and Stylianides and Stylianides ( 2009b ) used cognitive confl ict 
(a) to address robust and persistent student misconceptions about proof, for instance 
that empirical arguments count as proofs (e.g., Coe and Ruthven  1994 ; Goetting 
 1995 ; Harel and Sowder  1998 ; Healy and Hoyles  2000 ; Martin and Harel  1989 ) , 
and (b) to achieve students’ spontaneous engagement in situations of justifi cation 
(Simon and Blume  1996 ) . 
 More specifi cally, Zaslavksy  ( 2005 ) illustrated how cognitive confl ict can be 
used to motivate students’ engagement in specifi c proving tasks, thereby promoting 
important mathematical and pedagogical knowledge. Stylianides and Stylianides 
( 2009b ) suggested engaging teachers in activities that provoked a “cognitive confl ict” 
in them, helped them realise the limitations of their current “justifi cation schemes” 
(Harel and Sowder  1998 ) , and thus created in them an “intellectual need” (Harel 
 1998 ) to develop more sophisticated arguments. Stylianides and Stylianides ( 2009b ) 
also implemented theoretical ideas through “instructional sequences” (i.e., a series 
of tasks and associated instructor actions) developed in their “design experiment” 
(see, e.g., Cobb et al.  2003 ; Schoenfeld  2006 ) . In order to address problems faced 
by the cognitive confl ict approach:
 An attempt to create uncertainty by confronting a learner with a mathematical contradiction 
may not necessarily lead to cognitive confl ict as appears to be the case in many examples of 
people living at peace with mathematical inconsistencies (Tall  1990 ; Tirosh  1990 ; Vinner 
 1990 ) . Even when confl ict is evoked, it may not be effective, as in the case of intuitive rules 
that to a large extent are stable and resistant to change (Tirosh et al.  1998 ) . (Zaslavsky  2005 , 
p. 318) 
 Finally, both groups of researchers used “critical refl ection” (Zaslavsky  2005 ; cf. 
Stylianides and Stylianides  2009b ) in their practice to refi ne and improve the use of 
cognitive confl ict in their work. 
 7  Conclusion 
 We argued that the three components – knowledge, practice and values/beliefs – 
of teachers’ professional development in teaching proof and proving are inter-
related. The survey in Sects.  2 – 6 above of research regarding knowledge, practice 
and values revealed that the literature on aspects of teachers’ knowledge was 
noticeably larger than that on the other two components. For the most part, this 
refl ects research studies presented at the ICMI Study 19 Conference (2009). Not 
to say that knowledge is more important than practice and beliefs: rather, we need 
to further investigate teachers’ beliefs and practice, as well as the interrelationship 
amongst knowledge, beliefs and practice in the teaching of proofs and proving. 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to invite studies that focus on the three components 
simultaneously, as well as the interrelationship between them. Taking the current 
trend of mathematics education research into consideration, we discuss here pos-
sible designs for such research studies. 
 7.1  Teacher as Designer in a Three-Tiered Design Research 
 Lesh et al.  ( 2007 ) have addressed the research trend of multi-tiered design experi-
ments. Taking the teacher as designer, we propose “tasks designing” as a learning 
strategy for teachers’ professional development (Lin  2010 ) . Imagine a three-tiered 
research design: educator level, teacher level and student level. Educators would 
design learning activities for teachers; participating teachers would design proving 
task sequences for their students; these tasks would then be tested with the designers’ 
students, fi rst in small groups, and then in whole classes (Lin  2010 ) . 
 Teachers designing instructional task sequences of proof are involved in both 
constructing and testing: constructing and sequencing the tasks, and testing these 
with students and against the principles of conjecturing and proving. 
 Therefore, teachers acting as designers are expected to gain knowledge on con-
structing proof, evaluating proofs and about students; to put this knowledge into and 
to develop their beliefs about proof and its teaching. Researchers should then be 
able to view all three components of teachers’ professional development in interac-
tions amongst teachers who are designers. 
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 This chapter arose out of discussions of the working group on argumentation, 
logic, and proof and proving in mathematics. It concerns the relationships between 
argumentation and proof and begins by addressing the question of what we mean by 
argumentation and whether it includes mathematical proof. For the purposes of 
education, we regard argumentation as any written or oral discourse conducted 
according to shared rules, and aiming at a mutually acceptable conclusion about a 
statement, the content or the truth of which is under debate. It thus includes proof 
as a special case. 
 Study of the relationships between argumentation and proof holds great potential 
for helping teachers and students deal with the tension between the process leading 
up to the development of a student’s proof and the requirements placed on the fi nal 
 V.  Durand-Guerrier (*)
 Département de mathématiques, I3M, UMR 5149,  Université Montpellier 2, 
 Montpellier ,  France 
e-mail:  vdurand@math.univ-montp2.fr 
 P.  Boero 
 Dipartimento di Matematica,  Università di Genova,  Genova,  Italia
 e-mail: boero@dima.unige.it 
 N.  Douek 
 Institut Universitaire de Formation des Maîtres,  Université de Nice,  Nice,  France 
e-mail:  ndouek@wanadoo.fr 
 S. S.  Epp 
 Department of Mathematical Sciences,  DePaul University,  Chicago,  IL,  USA 
e-mail:  sepp@depaul.edu 
 D.  Tanguay 
 Département de mathématiques,  Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM),  Montreal, 
 QC,  Canada 
e-mail:  tanguay.denis@uqam.ca 
 Chapter 15 
 Argumentation and Proof in the Mathematics 
Classroom 
 Viviane  Durand-Guerrier ,  Paolo  Boero ,  Nadia  Douek , 
 Susanna  S.  Epp , and  Denis  Tanguay  
© The Author(s) 2021
G. Hanna and M. de Villiers (eds.), Proof and Proving in Mathematics Education,
New ICMI Study Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2129-6_15
and licenses please read the Correction https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2129-6_20 
This book has been made open access under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. For details on rights
350 V. Durand-Guerrier et al.
product. Students need to experience freedom and fl exibility during an initial 
 exploratory phase, whilst ultimately producing a proof that conforms to specifi c 
cultural constraints involving both logical and communicative norms in the class-
room and in the mathematical community. 
 We also discuss whether the activity of developing proofs under a teacher’s guid-
ance can be used to introduce students to meta-mathematical concepts, just as ascer-
taining the truth of a mathematical statement or the validity of a proof can provide an 
opportunity for increasing students’ mastery of the related mathematical concepts. 
 Finally, we use examples from the contributions of the members of the working 
group to illustrate aspects of these issues and suggest some possible activities to 
gradually increase students’ awareness about proving and proof. We also examine 
the theoretical perspectives and educational issues involved in choosing and designing 
such activities. 
 1  Relationships Between Argumentation and Proof 
 From the time of ancient Greece, philosophers have linked argumentation to three 
disciplines: rhetoric, dialectic and logic. For the Greeks, rhetoric was the art of 
effective communication through discourse, especially persuasive public speaking 
on moral, legal or political issues. Dialectic was the art of conducting a discussion 
between two or more people who hold differing views but are free to express them-
selves whilst also seeking to reach agreement. Plato’s philosophical dialogues are 
typical examples of dialectic. Logic was the art of correct thinking, of engaging in 
well-formed reasoning. Logical argumentation was the verbal manifestation of logical 
thinking, whether the intended interlocutors were specifi cally identifi ed or fi ctitious, 
or were “ideal” or “universal.” Aristotle analysed these concepts in his  Organon , 
using  propositions organised into  syllogisms as elementary units of discourse, and 
making a distinction between contingent statements (that could happen to be true, 
but could also be false) and necessary statements (that could not possibly be false). 
 1.1  Mathematical Argumentation 
 Historians (e.g. Boyer  1968 ) generally agree that the concept of mathematical proof 
in a form closely related to the modern view was initiated by the Greeks, with 
Euclid’s  Elements (ca. 300 B. C. E.) as the paramount exemplar. Euclid’s treatise 
starts with a collection of 23 defi nitions, which are used to state a set of postulates 
and axioms. 1 Propositions are then derived from the defi nitions, postulates, and 
 1  For a discussion about possible meanings of the terms  axiom and  postulate according to the 
Greeks, see Jahnke  ( 2010 ) . 
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 axioms through a process of deductive reasoning. In Aristotle’s terms, the results 
thus established are “necessary truths.” For many centuries, Euclid’s  Elements was 
used as the principal model of argumentation for the purpose of determining the 
truth of mathematical statements. 
 In the seventeenth century, Pascal described the excellence of the Euclidean 
method for “demonstrating truths already found, and of elucidating them in such a 
manner that the proof of them shall be irresistible” (Pascal  2007 , p. 428). However, 
his contemporary Descartes complained that “the Ancients” were more careful 
about proving than explaining (Barbin  1988 ) . Emphasising methods and processes, 
Descartes wrote that argumentation should be conducted through an analytical pro-
cess, which would reveal “… the true way along which something has been method-
ically invented; … so that a reader eager to follow it … would understand the point 
thus demonstrated and make it his own as if himself were the inventor.” (Descartes 
 1961 , quoted in Barbin, p. 603; our translation). 
 In the nineteenth century, with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, the 
role and status of axioms in mathematical theory changed, passing progressively 
from assertions that cannot be reasonably doubted, to “rules of the game” that pro-
vide relations amongst the objects of a theory, which are defi ned only through the 
web of relationships thus posited. For mathematicians, research was no longer a 
matter of discovering a supra-reality that describes an objectively determined world, 
but rather a question of creating theories that are intrinsically coherent, possibly 
pairwise inconsistent, each of which would provide a  model in the sense given that 
word by Tarski  ( 1944 ) . 
 The 1950s marked a renewed interest in the formal study of argumentation, cul-
minating with the works of Toulmin  ( 2008 ) and Perelman (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca  2008 ) . These authors viewed argumentation as a reasoned (and reasonable) 
discourse about an issue under debate, in which appeals to emotion are excluded but 
in which rationality need not be conveyed solely through deductive reasoning. Their 
work was deeply grounded in the study of language, which distinguishes it from 
epistemology and the methodology of science (Plantin  2005 , p. 74). These consid-
erations lead to even further questions about the relations amongst exploration, 
argumentation, proof, explanation, and justifi cation in mathematics. 
 Thus, a fundamental tension, probably related to the very nature of mathemati-
cal activity, has pervaded the history of mathematical argumentation. Mathematical 
theories are constructed and developed along multiple paths. Some researchers 
lay special emphasis on the process of mathematical invention: taking care to 
keep their minds open to new ways of viewing topics; exploring, through careful 
analysis, multiple approaches to problems; and gathering insight from alternative 
perspectives. Other researchers “put energy into making mathematical arguments 
more explicit and more formal” (Thurston  1994 , p. 169): searching for a synthe-
sis to tighten and strengthen mathematical arguments; and for a broad framework 
into which to fi t individual mathematical results. The work of Bourbaki in the 
twentieth century is certainly an example of the latter approach, as might also be 
considered the work of logicians such as Frege, Russell, Tarski, and Gödel. For 
these logicians, it was not only a matter of strengthening the foundations of 
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mathematics but also of understanding and  clarifying the nature of its  formalisation 
at a “meta” level. 
 Yet a majority of working mathematicians who have written about their own 
ways of doing research stress the role of formal verifi cation and the logical checking 
of proofs less than do logicians. For example, in drawing up the list of “brain and 
mind facilities” researchers use when searching for new results and their justifi ca-
tion, Thurston  ( 1994 ) sets “logic and deduction” side by side with “intuition, asso-
ciation and metaphor,” the importance of which he highlights:
 Personally, I put a lot of effort into “listening” to my intuitions and associations, and build-
ing them into metaphors and connections. This involves a kind of simultaneous quieting 
and focusing of my mind. Words, logic, and detailed pictures rattling around can inhibit 
intuitions and associations. (op. cit., p. 165) 
 Concerning the phase of checking an argument, Thurston adds, “Reliability does 
not primarily come from mathematicians formally checking formal arguments; it 
comes from mathematicians thinking carefully and critically about mathematical 
ideas” (op. cit., p. 170). 
 Hadamard and Poincaré  ( 2007 ) referred to a similar psychological phenomenon. 
Each described having solutions to problems pop suddenly from their unconscious 
to their conscious minds, following a period of intense, conscious, but apparently 
fruitless work. Pólya  ( 1957 ) also promoted problem-solving methods in which 
formal deductive reasoning is not the chief consideration. Thom  ( 1974 ) went further, 
linking the psychological aspects of the research process to the epistemological role 
of  meaning in mathematics, which he referred to as “the ‘ontological justifi cation’ 
for mathematical objects” (op. cit., p. 49). 
 However, the signifi cance these mathematicians gave to the intuitive aspects of 
their research activity may proceed from their desire to rectify the rigid, formalistic 
image often associated with the fi eld. None of them rejected the importance of care-
ful deductive reasoning. For example, Thurston  ( 1994 ) wrote,
 We have some built-in ways of reasoning and putting things together associated with how 
we make logical deductions: cause and effect (related to implication), contradiction or 
negation, etc. (op. cit., pp. 164–165). 
 The importance of rigorous verifi cation of arguments to mathematicians was 
made clear in the 1990s following the announcement in June 1993 of a proof for 
Fermat’s Last Theorem, which was reported on the front pages of newspapers 
around the world. Although Andrew Wiles had worked through many of the details 
of his “proof” with his colleague Nicholas Katz during the months before the dra-
matic announcement, it was only during the summer and fall of 1993, when he was 
writing out the proof for publication, that he found a mistake. After almost a year of 
painstaking effort, during which he and an associate carefully examined every step 
of the argument, Wiles fi nally realised that an approach he had previously thought 
to be a dead end was, in fact, the way to complete the proof (Singh  1997 ) . 
 Thus, to varying degrees depending on the mathematician and the particular cir-
cumstances of the work, it appears that mathematical activity integrates two 
approaches. Alcock  ( 2009 ) describes one as  semantical : the study of examples 
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and counterexamples; experimentation; instantiation of concepts, properties, and 
 theorems; and development of analogies, associations, mental images, metaphors, 
and so forth. She describes the other approach as  syntactical : use of formal defi ni-
tions and symbolism; manipulation of formulas; and production of inferences that 
have been checked for logical correctness. Wilkerson-Jerde and Wilensky also com-
mented upon this duality of approaches as they observed mathematicians attempting 
to solve problems they had not seen before:
 For some experts, specifi c instantiations of the mathematical object being explored serve a 
central role in building a densely-connected description of the proof; while for others a 
formal defi nition or several small components of the mathematical object serve this pur-
pose.  ( 2009 , p. 271) 
 Barrier et al.  ( 2009 ) , Blossier et al.  ( 2009 ) and Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  ( 2009 ) 
proposed that the mathematical work done when searching and developing proofs is 
essentially dialectical, with frequent movement back and forth between semantic 
exploration of the mathematical objects under consideration and more formal syn-
tactical analysis of their defi nitions, properties, theorems, and formulas. To support 
their thesis, these authors cite examples from Bolzano, Liouville, Cauchy, Euclid, 
and the Pythagoreans. 
 The dividing line between semantics and syntax is seldom clearly fi xed for indi-
viduals; it evolves through their activities and also depends on their levels of math-
ematical maturity and mastery of formalisms. Fischbein  ( 1982 ) suggests that the 
related  intuitions also evolve, being a springboard  for argumentation and proof and 
simultaneously being enriched, refi ned and strengthened  by them. Moreover, indi-
viduals might themselves regard their activities as semantic, whereas an observer 
might regard them as syntactic, and vice-versa. 
 1.2  Argumentation, Proof, and Proving in Mathematics 
Education 
 The tension between the syntactic and semantic aspects of mathematical argumen-
tation for mathematicians has its counterpart for mathematics educators. Didacticians 
(e.g., Balacheff  1987 ; Duval  1991 ; Hanna  1989 ) have pondered the relationships 
and potential oppositions involved: between proof as a cultural product subject to 
constraints of consistency and communication and proving as the process aiming at 
that product: between mathematical outputs that must fi t some rules (i.e., some logical 
and textual models) and the creative and constructive side of mathematicians’ activity; 
and between mathematical proof and ordinary argumentation. They have consid-
ered,  inter alia , whether rigorous proof and ordinary argumentation create obstacles 
for each other and which educational conditions would foster fruitful use of either 
or both of the two approaches. 
 For example, Duval  ( 1991 ) argued that (informal) argumentation impedes the 
learning of (mathematical) proof. He claimed that in argumentation propositions 
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assumed as conclusions of preceding inferences or as shared knowledge are 
 continuously reinterpreted (ibid., p. 241), with primary importance being placed on 
their semantic content. By contrast, in a deductive step in a mathematical proof, 
“propositions do not enter directly by reason of their content, but rather through 
their operational status” (ibid., p. 235; our translation). In other words, because it is 
a deductive chain of inferences, similar to a chain of calculations, the structure of a 
proof strongly depends on the operational status of the propositions that compose it. 
Now, in a given inference (or deductive step), the operational status of a proposition – 
whether premise,  énoncé-tiers 2 or inferred proposition – is independent of its 
content, since a proposition may change its status within the same proof: for instance, 
when an inferred proposition is “recycled” as a premise for the next deductive step. 
The possible operational status of the propositions involved in an argument are dif-
ferentiated according to their  theoretical epistemic value ; namely, as hypotheses or 
previously inferred propositions for the premises, and as defi nitions, theorems, or 
axioms for the  énoncé-tiers . Duval argues that students have diffi culty in learning 
mathematical proof because they do not easily grasp its specifi c requirements and 
hence deal with it as simply argumentation. 
 Other authors (e.g., Bartolini Bussi  1996,  2009 ; Grenier and Payan  1998 ; Lakatos 
 1976 ) studied the activity of proving from a  problem-solving perspective. Some, 
such as Bartolini Bussi  ( 1996,  2009 ) , Bartolini Bussi et al.  ( 1999 ) and Douek  ( 2009 ) , 
have differed with Duval  ( 1991 ) , claiming that argumentation can be used as an 
effective basis for mathematical classroom discussions concerning not only mathemat-
ical reasoning in general but also the rules for mathematical proof and the mathe-
matical practices that play important roles in proof production. These include 
changing the frame of reference (e.g., from geometric to algebraic), using different 
representation registers, introducing a new object (e.g., a fi gure), and reviewing the 
role played by defi nitions in the production of a proof (cf. Durand-Guerrier and 
Arsac  2009 ) . Written proofs, of course, do not include discussion of the practices 
that led up to their production. 
 The problem-solving perspective considers a “written proof” as the outcome of 
a process in which it is helpful to take fully into account the initial and intermediate 
phases. These phases vary, depending on how the problem is presented to the 
students; in particular, whether the result is stated or must be discovered; and, if 
stated, whether its truth-value is given (“Show that…”) or is left to the students to 
determine. Students asked to fi nd a result or to establish its truth-value start the 
process with an exploratory phase, in which they use various heuristics, such as 
studying examples, searching for counterexamples, and refl ecting on defi nitions and 
theorems that may be linked to the problem. This phase normally leads to the state-
ment of a conjecture. 
 2  An  énoncé-tiers is a statement already known to be true – namely an axiom, a theorem, or a 
 defi nition – and generally is (or could be put) in the form “if  p , then  q ”. In Toulmin’s  ( 2008 ) model 
(see below), an  énoncé-tiers corresponds to a warrant in an inference step. 
35515 Argumentation and Proof in the Mathematics Classroom
 Barrier et al.  ( 2009 ) described and analysed the relation between the exploratory 
phase and the organisation of a proof by extending the concepts of  indoor and  outdoor 
games, introduced by Hintikka  ( 1996 ) . They defi ned outdoor games as concerned 
with determining the truth of statements within a given interpretative domain, in 
which the mathematical objects, their properties, and their relationships are investi-
gated and tested. By contrast, indoor games are concerned with establishing the 
validity of statements inside a given theory; they consist of strategically using math-
ematical properties and assertions, such as hypotheses, axioms, and theorems avail-
able in the theory, in order to combine them syntactically into a proof, using 
computation, symbolical manipulations, and deductions. Barrier et al. argued that 
the construction of a proof most often rests upon a back-and-forth process between 
outdoor games and indoor games, and that semantic (outdoor) and syntactic (indoor) 
reasoning are both necessary and dialectically related. In addition, Blossier et al. 
 ( 2009 ) proposed that quantifi cation, whether explicit or implicit, is crucial for the 
semantic control realised through outdoor games. Epp  ( 2009 ) also noted its impor-
tance, pointing out and describing students’ diffi culties with quantifi cation in various 
contexts involving proof and disproof. Finally, Inglis et al.  ( 2007 ) described an 
experiment where an advanced student eventually succeeded in developing a proof 
through a dialectical interplay between examination of numerical examples and 
syntactical analysis of defi nitions. 
 To characterise the possibility that heuristic argumentation can result in a conjec-
ture with arguments or ‘reasons’ suitable for constructing a proof, Garuti et al. 
 ( 1996 ) introduced the notion of  cognitive unity , giving evidence for it in an experi-
ment involving 36 students (two classes) in grade 8, where the arguments students 
gave in support of their conjecture about the “geometry of sun shadows” are essen-
tially the same as those they arranged into a proof. (See also Boero et al.  2007 ) . 
Pedemonte  ( 2007 ) showed experimentally (with two geometry theorems proposed 
to 102 students in grades 12 and 13) that in some cases where cognitive unity seems 
possible, some students encounter diffi culties in constructing a deductive chain 
from the otherwise suitable arguments that they produced through exploring and 
conjecturing, especially when the conjecture is obtained through abduction. She 
then distinguished between  cognitive unity (concerning the referential system) and 
 structural continuity . Structural continuity between argumentation and proof occurs 
when inferences in argumentation and proof are connected through the same struc-
ture. Pedemonte  ( 2008 ) also used the notion in examining the same students’ alge-
braic work, showing how in that case cognitive unity more easily results in structural 
continuity. As concerns cognitive unity and structural continuity, the educational 
and didactical context in which students are asked to produce conjectures and justi-
fi cations seems crucial. In particular, tasks designed to lead to a conjecture, which 
include a request for providing reasons to support it, enhance argumentative activi-
ties that may facilitate a link between conjecturing and proving. 
 In order to study more precisely the articulation between argumentation and proof, 
Douek  ( 2009 ) made use of Lolli’s analysis of proof production (cf. Arzarello  2007 ) . 
She considered three modes of reasoning: heuristic exploration, reasoned organisation 
of relevant propositions, and production of a deductive text obeying mathematicians’ 
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norms. Her detailed analysis of these modes showed that  producing a proof depends 
not only on deductive reasoning but also on other activities, almost all dependent 
primarily on semantic content, including exploration using inductive reasoning, empiri-
cal verifi cation of results, and abductive reasoning and argumentation. One diffi culty of 
teaching proof is that the different modes of reasoning obey different rules of validity. 
For example, exploration that relies solely on examples cannot substitute for the kind 
of argument needed to establish the truth of a general mathematical proposition. 
According to Douek, effective use of the different modes of reasoning requires a cer-
tain amount of meta-mathematical refl ection about the “rules of the game” of proving. 
 In an endeavour to fi nd a unifying frame to analyse all these aspects of argumen-
tation and proof, authors such as Pedemonte  ( 2007 ) , Inglis et al.  ( 2007 ) , Arzarello 
et al.  ( 2009a ) , and Boero et al.  ( 2010 ) 3 refer to the work of Toulmin  ( 2008 ) . Toulmin 
proposed a ternary model for the inference step in argumentation, which consists of 
a Claim, Data, and a Warrant, along with auxiliaries such as a Qualifi er, a Rebuttal, 
and Backing. Use of this model allows one to compare argumentation and mathe-
matical proof. For proof, the warrants (and ultimately the “backings”) come from a 
mathematical theory, 4 whereas for argumentation they may consist of visual evidence 
or properties established empirically, for example. 
 Considering Toulmin’s  ( 2008 ) model and Duval’s  ( 1991 ) thesis together raises a 
fundamental didactical problem: namely, how to make students aware that when the 
fi nal product is to be a “proof,” the warrants must be chosen from amongst proposi-
tions with a precise theoretical status and selected according to specifi c criteria. 
Balacheff  ( 1987 ) suggested a necessary shift from the pragmatic to the theoretical. 
Tanguay  ( 2007 ) described the necessity to refocus students’ outlook from  truth to 
 validity : students must understand that it no longer matters whether the involved 
propositions are intrinsically true or false but whether a sequence of deductive steps 
is valid. Barrier et al.  ( 2009 ) and Durand-Guerrier  ( 2008 ) go still further, considering 
how students need to coordinate their ideas of truth in an interpretative domain and 
the concept of validity in a theory. The didactical and pedagogical questions concern-
ing how to move students towards such a shift are addressed in the next section. 
 2  Paths to Constructing Argumentation and Proof 
in the Mathematics Classroom 
 The emergence of proof refl ects a variety of cultural characteristics. Amongst these 
is a desire for justifi cation, for providing rational support to back up arguments, 
and for organising processes algorithmically. Attempting to assess the extent to 
 3  More precisely, the frame proposed by Boero et al.  ( 2010 ) results from the combination of 
Toulmin’s model with Habermas’  ( 2003 ) criteria of rationality. 
 4  This agrees with Mariotti’s defi nition of “theorem” (Mariotti et al.  1997 ) : a system consisting 
of a statement, a proof – derived from axioms and other theorems according to shared inference 
rules – and a reference theory. 
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which argumentation in a wide range of disciplines constitutes logically valid proof 
is an important means of examining the grounds on which arguments and infer-
ences are conducted in the “real world.” It also promotes understanding for the 
nature and specifi c qualities of mathematical proof and their connections to various 
mathematical fi elds. 
 Therefore, not only mathematical theories but also the various modes of reasoning 
used in mathematics are important for students’ intellectual development. Especially 
at the beginning, students are not exposed to any meta-mathematical refl ection 
concerning the terms used in mathematics or to the differences from their ordinary 
uses and the systemic connections amongst them. As Vygotsky  ( 1986 ) put it, these 
ideas are not treated as “scientifi c concepts” (i.e., as an explicit area of scientifi c 
knowledge), whereas organised exposure to them could lead students to master 
argumentation that extends beyond mathematics to science or further (e.g., to law; 
cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca  2008 ) . Students could thus benefi t from famil-
iarity with the wide variety of mathematical, ‘meta-’ and ‘extra-’ mathematical 
practices linked to the activity of proving. 
 2.1  What Do We Want Students to Experience? 
 Exploration, validation, and interpretation engender students’ need for understanding 
when they are confronted with unexpected results, contradictions, or ambiguities. 
Complex tasks, which lead to doubt because of possible contradictions or obvious 
ambiguities (through solo activities or with peers), produce a didactic situation that 
favours proof and stimulates the development of several aspects of its practice. By 
contrast, the simplifi ed tasks all too frequently proposed to students may obscure 
the need for proof and proving. Similarly, asking for proofs of statements that appear 
obvious to students’ perception (often the case in middle-school geometry) or of 
which neither the meaning nor the truth is questioned may have a detrimentally 
effect on students’ understanding of the nature and purpose of proof. 
 For example, students are rarely, if ever, presented with false mathematical state-
ments and asked to determine whether or not they are true, or under what conditions, 
they might become so. In fact, it is desirable for students to experience uncertainty 
about (mathematical) objects, statements, and justifi cations in order to cultivate an 
attitude of reasonable scepticism. Problems whose truth is in question or open-ended 
problem situations require students to engage in exploration and hence argumenta-
tion (e.g., Arsac and Mante  2007 ; Grenier and Payan  1998 ; Legrand  2001 ) . 
 An emphasis on exploration naturally generates a need to refl ect on the place of 
conjectures. Whether for mathematical reasons (e.g., lack of cognitive unity between 
the thought processes leading to the conjecture and those required for a proof) or for 
curricular reasons (cf. Tanguay and Grenier  2009,  2010 ) , conjecturing does not nec-
essarily prompt proving. Crucially, conjecturing should go beyond mere guessing or 
unbridled speculation and encompass in some way a search for a structural 
 explanation. Only then does it involve meaningful exploration and interpretation 
and a genuine need for validation. 
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 Previous experiences of doubt about the truth or falsity of mathematical  statements 
can lead students to see the need for validation as meaningful in terms of their own 
experiences, conjectures, and mathematical backgrounds, as well as in ways that 
they have shared with others in their class. Also important is the need for students 
to realise that various levels of validation are appropriate in various situations, which 
depend on context, the norms of practice of the community, their own and others’ 
reference knowledge, and so forth. In addition, some important meta-mathematical 
concepts and their systemic interconnections, especially the relationships between 
axioms and validity of arguments, can be developed through activities using state-
ments that are valid in one “theory” and not in another, and yet are accessible to a 
broad range of students (e.g., Parenti et al.  2007 ) . Argumentation within class delib-
erations about what is acceptable (or not) and under what circumstances may open 
the way towards a more theoretical way of thinking; appreciation for theory may be 
enhanced by meta-mathematical discussions. These class discussions can address 
such questions as “Why do we prove?” and “What does it mean to have proved 
something?” as well as the relation to axioms, defi nitions, and more broadly the 
“rules of the game.” For example, what is meant by “checking a proof” or “checking 
a program” may concern the mode of reasoning (whether deduction, induction, or 
abduction), the respective roles of syntax and semantics, the relationship between 
truth and validity, and the logic relevant to the given context. 
 In addition, in learning about theorems and their proofs, students need to expe-
rience not only how to validate statements according to specifi c reference knowledge 
and inference rules within a given theory, but also how the “truth” of statements 
depends on defi nitions and postulates of a reference theory (e.g., in geometry; 
cf. Henderson  1995 ) . 
 Later, when refl ection on meta-mathematical concepts needs to become deeper, 
more exhaustive, and more systematic (e.g., in higher secondary school or in the 
education of mathematics teachers), tasks could be employed that illustrate the 
central role defi nitions play in the formulation of statements, in argumentation, and 
in proof. 
 Meta-mathematical issues such as the variability of the means and tools for 
validation, the conventions for defi nitions, and the ambiguity of everyday speech 
compared with the precision of mathematical language, underline the central role of 
interpretation in argumentation and proof. Interpretation calls for various mathe-
matical skills, such as the ability to change the semiotic register or frame of reference; 
relate certain mathematical objects to others; use theories, whether mathematical or 
not; use analogies and metaphors; and transfer procedures from one problem situa-
tion to another. At a higher, more specialised, level, we can explain these issues in 
terms of Tarski’s  ( 1983 ) theory of logical interpretation as the process of validating 
a mathematical construction by embedding it into a  mathematical model . More 
pragmatically, they represent instances of going back and forth from a general state-
ment to examples (whether generic or particular), relating schemas to situations, 
and referring to a precise context to understand a general statement. Students should 
experience the need to interpret fi gures, expressions, statements, and representa-
tions in various semiotic registers and develop virtuosity in doing so. Such activity 
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would help make them aware that one cannot take effective communication for 
granted in mathematics. 
 Developing competence in  communication is important, but exercising it relies 
on the presence of one or more listeners to react, contradict, and make use of what 
is communicated. Success in communicating in the classroom also depends on con-
sciously shared references and on some form of shared theoretical scaffolding, 
which enhances the importance of debating mathematical issues in the classroom. 
However, as Duval  ( 2001 ) pointed out, the form of control needed for (mathematical) 
proof development requires that students be able to fi gure out connections or simul-
taneities between propositions remote in the discourse, to come back to propositions 
already stated, to reconsider how propositions are organised, and to allow pauses 
and refl ection. All of these activities only take place to the fullest extent when a 
 written product is required. 
 In sum, students need to experience two main practices: a divergent explor-
atory one and a convergent validating one. They would then become familiar with 
the openness of exploration, that is, its “opportunistic” character and its fl exible 
validation rules. They would also learn the rigorous rules needed to write a deduc-
tive text and the strict usage of words, symbols, and formulas when constructing 
or organising a theory. Previous curricula have enhanced the latter, but more recent 
ones have swung towards the former. However, isolating one to the detriment of 
the other weakens both, because they are related dialectically. Besides, once we 
consider exposing them to a wide range of experiences, it is crucial to help stu-
dents face the contradictory differences amongst the diversity of practices used in 
argumentation and proof and to make them aware of when and how they can use 
these practices. 
 2.2  Designing Learning Environments and Activities 
 Here, we discuss various classroom activities aimed at developing both mathematical 
and meta-mathematical concepts. The majority were presented at the 19th  ICMI 
Study Conference, Proof and Proving in Mathematics Education. 
 In one example, Arzarello et al.  ( 2009a,  b ) described a long-term teaching exper-
iment extending over the 5 years of Italian secondary school (grades 9–13). The 
experimenters gradually introduced students to local linearity through graphical, 
symbolic and numerical exploration using extensive technology, group work and 
class discussion. The problem-solving activities were intended to foster cognitive 
continuity between the exploration and production phases of developing a proof. A 
main result of the particular experiment reported in Arzarello et al.  ( 2009a ) was the 
creation of explicit links between the pieces of knowledge that were involved. 
 Perry et al.  ( 2009a,  b ) implemented an innovative course for pre-service high 
school mathematics teachers, which features the collaborative construction of an 
axiomatic system involving points, lines, planes, angles, and properties of triangles 
and quadrilaterals. 
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 Tanguay and Grenier  ( 2009,  2010 ; cf. Dias and Durand-Guerrier  2005 ) reported 
an experiment conducted with preservice teachers in France and in Quebec, to 
whom the following classroom situation was submitted: (a) defi ne and describe 
regular polyhedra; (b) produce them with given materials; and (c) prove that the list 
produced in (b) is complete. Very few of the students could conceptualise the rela-
tionship between the angles of the faces and the dihedral angles in a polyhedron in 
a way that would have accessed a proof that only fi ve regular polyhedra exist. 
Instead, the students uncontrollably used intuition and analogy; some erroneously 
believed in an infi nite sequence of regular polyhedra (therefore, e.g., trying to con-
struct a regular polyhedron with hexagons). This error may have resulted because in 
a typical classroom proof and verifi cation are closely associated with algebra and 
manipulation of formulas, with conjectures viewed empirically rather than as neces-
sitating structural explanations. 
 Boero et al.  ( 2009 ) suggest that random phenomena can provide teachers with 
opportunities to deal with defi nitions as well as more subtle aspects of mathematical 
argumentation and proof. For example, in spite of its potential logical and theoreti-
cal weaknesses, the classical defi nition of probability can be used in primary school 
as a basis for approaching the notion of an event’s probability and of quantitatively 
estimating it on the basis of the search for an appropriate set of equally-likely cases. 
In high school and at the university level, the defi nition can be used for refl ecting on 
the requirements of a good defi nition within a theory and related meta-mathematical 
issues concerning proof. 
 Brousseau  ( 1997 ) described a didactical situation in which students aged 9–10 
were given the task of enlarging the size of a jigsaw puzzle. Engaging in the task 
led them to discover for themselves that adding the same amount to the dimensions 
of all the pieces did not work because the pieces no longer fi t together! Of course, 
at primary school, students cannot provide a mathematical proof that multiplica-
tion rather than addition is necessary; the teacher is responsible for asserting the 
result. Nevertheless, the situation promoted students’ understanding that the result 
did not come from an arbitrary decision by an authority and helped them to take 
responsibility for their own learning. The activity was originally developed in the 
1970s by Brousseau in France as part of a study on the teaching of rational num-
bers and fi nite decimals at primary school, and the results were subsequently repro-
duced many times. 
 In particular, secondary and tertiary level students have signifi cant diffi culty in 
developing an understanding about the nature of the set of real numbers (cf. Barrier 
et al.  2009 ) . In an earlier experiment, Pontille et al.  ( 1996 ) analysed the work of 
several groups of 3–4 students in grade 11. One group was followed for the entire 
year. The students were asked whether every increasing function from {1, 2, …,  n } 
to {1, 2, …, n } has a fi xed point. Once they had resolved this problem, they were asked 
to study generalisations to functions defi ned on the set of all fi nite decimals (i.e., 
real numbers with fi nite decimal expansions) in the interval [0;1], and then on or any 
subset of the real numbers. The students conducted their work outside of the classroom, 
under the supervision of a researcher. They wrote results, questions, conjectures and 
proofs in notebooks, which the researchers analysed along with student interviews. 
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Students initially managed to solve the problem for the integers, using proofs that 
relied strongly on the fact that every natural number has a successor. When they 
then considered the further problems, they encountered signifi cant epistemological 
questions: (a) Is there a fi xed distance between any two “consecutive” fi nite deci-
mals (i.e., can the notion of successor be used here?) (b) Given any positive fi nite 
decimal, can one fi nd a smaller such number ? 5 (c) Is there a relation between ques-
tions (a) and (b)? The students fi nally concluded that there is no such thing as a 
smallest positive fi nite decimal or a fi xed distance between any such number and 
its ‘successor.’ 
 The students then examined a more complex problem involving the graph of an 
increasing function. Through discussion, the students developed various represen-
tations of the numbers involved (e.g., representing two kinds of numbers with 
different-coloured squares; drawing a straight line graph that contained holes). 
After a number of exchanges, they found a solution, which also led them to discover 
a counterexample. 6 Pontille et al.’s description of the students’ work shows that 
students can develop reasoning ability and mathematical knowledge in tandem. It 
also shows that they may need a long period of intensive work before fi nding a 
counterexample. That discovery only occurred following the students’ reconsid-
ering, reorganising and adapting their knowledge about real numbers. The research 
supports the desirability of giving students tasks that lead them back and forth 
between formal and informal approaches, thus deepening their understanding of 
mathematical objects whilst simultaneously challenging their reasoning powers. 
Taking into account both the syntactic and semantic aspects of mathematical 
proof, such tasks promote the development of both mathematical concepts and 
meta-mathematical concepts. 
 In Italy, the Modena group led by M. Bartolini Bussi and the Genoa group led by 
P. Boero have performed several long-term teaching experiments, in Grades 4–8, to 
introduce students to validation and proof on both the practical and theoretical lev-
els. 7 In order to implement their experiments, they attempted to construct suitable 
contexts, easily accessible or already familiar to students, where postulates repre-
sented basic “obvious” properties but where statements to be validated were not 
obvious and required reasoning. 
 For example,  Parenti et al.  ( 2007 ) reported a teaching experiment, performed 
with 80 students by three teachers in four classes from Grades 6–8, which used the 
potential of two contexts: the context of the  representation of visual spatial situa-
tions in Grades 6–7 (cf. Bartolini Bussi  1996 ) and the context of  sun shadows in 
Grade 8 (cf. Garuti et al.  1996 ) . In both cases, students moved from a familiar 
 5  Notice that if we consider decimal numbers with a given fi xed number of digits following the 
decimal point, then these two questions are answered in the affi rmative. 
 6  The activity was also given to French students at a more advanced mathematical level, where it 
gave rise to very similar results. 
 7  See Hsu et al.  ( 2009 ) for another example of an instructional experiment concerning validity. 
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 context (e.g., sun shadows) to the geometry of that context and to some of its 
 obvious properties. (E.g., in the geometry of  sun shadows , straight lines are pro-
jected onto a plane as straight lines or points). In both cases, students learned to 
infer statements from the properties that seemed obvious to them and to move pro-
gressively towards the format of standard proofs. At the end of the experiment, in 
Grade 8, students came to realise that statements validated in the  sun shadows 
geometry may be invalidated in the  representation of visual spatial situations 
geometry. They also discovered that proof in  sun shadows geometry was based on 
an “obvious property” (parallel straight lines are projected onto a plane as parallel 
or coincident straight lines or points) which in general is not acceptable in the  rep-
resentation of visual spatial geometry . 
 Thus, the students learned that one can regard spatial situations from more than 
one point of view, each of which may lead to valid conclusions in its own terms. 
Regarding systems of postulates as obvious properties of spatial representations 
according to specifi c ways of thinking about them not only recalls the discovery of 
non-Euclidean geometries but also resonates with some recent epistemological 
positions concerning the close connections between geometric axiomatics and 
related ways of seeing and thinking about space (cf. Berthoz  1997 ; Longo  2009 ) . 
 3  Management, Didactical Organisation, and Teachers’ Roles 
 The preceding examples of activities focused on the development of mathematical 
and meta-mathematical concepts rather than on how students were asked to carry out 
their work. However, when aiming to develop competence in argumentation and 
proof, one needs to carefully organise student-teacher interactions and activities. 
 A main challenge in teaching argumentation and proof is to motivate students to 
examine whether and why statements are true or false. Mathematics educators 
broadly agree that we need alternatives to traditional tasks, which ask students to 
provide proofs for statements already presented as true. Thus, many mathematics 
educators now promote the development, at every level of the curriculum, of prob-
lems where the truth-goal is at stake. Such problems fall into two categories: prob-
lems used to introduce and develop a mathematical concept and to prove theorems 
about it; and problems used to develop competence in argumentation and proof. 
 Recently, a number of mathematical educators have turned their attention to 
developing theoretical frameworks for developing teaching experiments that involve 
students in solving such problems (cf. Lin et al.  2009 ) . 
 Given increasing scepticism about the once common view that mathematics 
teachers should simply deliver mathematical truths, Brousseau  ( 1997 ) created a set 
of situations leading to the development of all the required knowledge about fi nite 
decimals in elementary school. He also provided a theoretical framework for his 
work whereby students develop intended knowledge through collective engage-
ment in a succession of phases involving action, formulation, validation, and 
institutionalisation. 
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 Similarly, in France in the 1980s, the concept of  scientifi c debate was introduced 
into tertiary-level mathematics courses so that students would come to feel personal 
responsibility for the conjectures they formulate (Alibert  1988 ) . Instructors led 
students to consider themselves as a community of mathematicians (a specialised 
instance of a  community of practice ; cf. Wenger  1998 ) needing to engage in scientifi c 
debate on topics proposed by the teacher. They were invited to formulate conjec-
tures and take sides as to the relevance and the truth of these (Legrand  2001 ) . 
 In another theoretical framework (the  didactic of fi elds of experience ), students’ written 
solutions and related discussions play a crucial role (Boero et al.  2007,  2008,  2009 ) . 
 Tanguay and Grenier  ( 2009 ) pointed out that “implementation in the classroom 
or in the curricula of the fi ndings of didactical studies are almost always accompa-
nied by alterations and even distortions.” Effective implementation of the insights 
from such studies as those above poses a complex challenge for the designers of 
teaching experiments. 
 To take one example, Douek  ( 2009 ) implemented many of the principles dis-
cussed above in experiments in a class of 27 students aged 13–14 in a French middle 
school. Her aim was to involve students in reorganising the arguments in a proof 
through discussion about their various roles. Theorems with no cognitive unity had 
been chosen, in order to allow the teacher to put some features of proof into evi-
dence whilst guiding the process of proving. Argumentation leading to a conjecture 
was promoted through classroom debate (cf. Bartolini Bussi  1996 ) , and then the 
experimenter, after leading the students through a proof, encouraged them to see its 
rationale as meaningful by making a story out of the steps in their reasoning and 
calculations, and to express themselves both by explaining and by raising questions. 
Creating a story was intended to help students connect the various steps with the 
reasons that supported the conclusion, sort the ‘blocks’ of reasoning into which the 
proof was divided, and explain how the blocks were joined logically and their pos-
sible hierarchical relationship (Knipping  2008 ) . It also provided students with 
opportunities for personal expression and internalisation of newly-encountered 
mathematical practices. 
 For example, in a class session about the Pythagorean theorem, several tasks led 
students to conjecture the theorem. Then, they had to prove their conjecture by veri-
fying statements prepared by the teacher. Six students were able to prove all the 
statements. A follow-up task invited students to review the reasons for the steps they 
had been led through. It triggered class discussion, guided by the teacher, that iden-
tifi ed why the statements were needed, and how they were linked together to form a 
general argument. Some blocks used abductive reasoning ( What property makes 
such-and-such claim possible? How can you view  A so that such-and-such relation 
appears?). Others used deduction. Therefore, mathematical proof practices, such as 
the different types of logical reasoning used and movements from geometric to 
algebraic analysis, became a signifi cant part of the discussion. Then the students 
were asked to write, individually, the story of the proof. Eleven wrote reasonably 
coherent stories, but only two explicitly described why all the steps were needed 
and useful. The experiment showed that some students can accept the logical fl ow 
of a proof but lack consciousness about the reasons that enable it. 
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 4  Conclusion 
 In the fi rst part of this chapter, we tried to elucidate the complex relationships 
between argumentation and proof in mathematics from mathematical and educa-
tional perspectives, noting the general lack of consensus about the interrelations 
between the two, both amongst mathematicians and amongst mathematics edu-
cators. In the second part, we examined the aims, conditions, and constraints that 
affect planning and implementation of appropriate situations for facilitating 
argumentation and proof in mathematical classes. First, we considered what 
we want students to experience and what aspects of learning proof should be the 
goal of instruction. We need to develop students’ awareness about the core 
aspects of theorems and proofs and thus support their use when needed. We must 
engage students in mathematical tasks that also foster the development of meta-
mathematical concepts. In the third part, we presented short descriptions of 
examples of learning environments supportive of the goals for the crucial activi-
ties of proving identifi ed in the second part. In sum, engaging students in situa-
tions which make them aware of the constructive character of mathematical 
activities, especially those involving conjecture and proof, poses complex chal-
lenges. One needs to consider:
 1.  The types of tasks: open-ended problems, such as statements whose truth or fal-
sity students are to determine; critical study of students’ arguments; discussion 
about the basis for justifi cation; story-telling; work on proof development; and so 
forth; 
 2.  Management of activities: for example, student discussions; production of writ-
ten work; use of software, diagrams, and instruments; class management tech-
niques: use of reasoning diagrams; meta-level discourses; managing different 
semiotic registers; whole-class debate; working in groups; working individually; 
and so on; 
 3.  The respective roles of students and teachers. 
 We hope that we have succeeded in making clear the various perspectives under-
lying the educational proposals, giving insight into their richness, and providing 
elements for further research and innovation. 
 Acknowledgements  We wish to thank the members of Working Group 2: Thomas Barrier, 
Thomas Blossier, Paolo Boero, Nadia Douek, Viviane Durand-Guerrier, Susanna Epp, Hui-yu 
Hsu, Kosze Lee, Juan Pablo Mejia-Ramos, Shintaro Otsuku, Cristina Sabena, Carmen Samper, 
Denis Tanguay, Yosuke Tsujiyama, Stefan Ufer, and Michelle Wilkerson-Jerde. 
 We are grateful for the support of the Institut de Mathématiques et de Modélisation de 
Montpellier, Université Montpellier 2 (France), IUFM C. Freinet, Université de Nice (France), 
Università di Genova (Italy), DePaul University (USA), and the Fonds québécois de recherche sur 
la société et la culture (FQRSC, Grant #2007-NP-116155 and Grant #2007-SE-118696). 
 We also thank the editors and the reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this 
chapter. 
36515 Argumentation and Proof in the Mathematics Classroom
 References* 
 Alcock, L. (2009). Teaching proof to undergraduates: Semantic and syntactic approaches 
(Vol. 1, pp. 29–34) .* 
 Alibert, D. (1988). Toward new customs in the classrooms.  For the Learning of Mathematics, 8 (2), 
31–43. 
 Arsac, G., & Mante, M. (2007).  Les pratiques du problème ouvert . Lyon: Scéren CRDP de Lyon. 
 Arzarello, F. (2007). The proof in the 20th century. In P. Boero (Ed.),  Theorems in school 
(pp. 43–63). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
 Arzarello, F., Paola, D., & Sabena, C. (2009a). Proving in early calculus (Vol. 1, pp. 35–40).* 
 Arzarello, F., Paola, D. & Sabena, C. (2009b). Logical and semiotic levels in argumentation (Vol. 1, 
pp. 41–46).* 
 Balacheff, N. (1987). Processus de preuve et situations de validation.  Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 18 (2), 147–176. 
 Barbin, E. (1988). La démonstration mathématique: signifi cations épistémologiques et questions 
didactiques.  Bulletin de l’APMEP, 36 , 591–620. 
 Barrier, T., Durand-Guerrier, V., & Blossier, T. (2009). Semantic and game-theoretical insight into 
argumentation and proof (Vol. 1, pp. 77–82).* 
 Bartolini Bussi, M. G. (1996). Mathematical discussion and perspective drawing in primary 
school.  Educational Studies in Mathematics, 31 , 11–41. 
 Bartolini Bussi, M. G. (2009). Proof and proving in primary school: An experimental approach 
(Vol. 1, pp. 53–58).* 
 Bartolini Bussi, M. G., Boni, M., Ferri, F., & Garuti, R. (1999). Early approach to theoretical 
thinking: Gears in primary school.  Educational Studies in Mathematics, 39 , 67–87. 
 Berthoz, A. (1997).  Le sens du mouvement . Paris: Editions Odile Jacob [English translation. The 
Brain’s sense of movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000]. 
 Blossier, T., Barrier, T., & Durand-Guerrier, V. (2009). Proof and quantifi cation (Vol. 1, pp. 83–88).* 
 Boero, P., Garuti, R., & Lemut, E. (2007). Approaching theorems in grade VIII. In P. Boero (Ed.), 
 Theorems in school (pp. 261–277). Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
 Boero, P., Douek, N., & Ferrari, P. L. (2008). Developing mastery of natural language: Approach 
to theoretical aspects of mathematics. In L. English (Ed.),  Handbook of international research 
in mathematics education (pp. 262–295). New York/London: Routledge. 
 Boero, P., Consogno, V., Guala, E., & Gazzolo, T. (2009). Research for innovation: A teaching 
sequence on the argumentative approach to probabilistic thinking in grades I-V and some 
related basic research results.  Recherches en Didactique des Mathématiques, 29 , 59–96. 
 Boero, P., Douek, N., Morselli, F., & Pedemonte, B. (2010). Argumentation and proof: A contribution 
to theoretical perspectives and their classroom implementation. In M. F. F. Pinto & 
T. F. Kawasaki (Eds.),  Proceedings of the 34th Conference of the International Group for the 
Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol. 1, pp. 179–205). Belo Horizonte: PME 
 Boyer, C. B. (1968).  A history of mathematics . New York: Wiley. 
 Brousseau, G. (1997).  Theory of didactical situations in mathematics . New York: Springer. 
 Descartes, R. (1961).  Les méditations métaphysiques . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
 Dias, T., & Durand-Guerrier, V. (2005). Expérimenter pour apprendre en mathématiques.  Repères 
IREM, 60 , 61–78. 
 Douek, N. (2009). Approaching proof in school: From guided conjecturing and proving to a story 
of proof construction (Vol. 1, pp. 148–153).* 
 * NB: References marked  with * are in F. L. Lin, F. J. Hsieh, G. Hanna, & M. de Villiers (Eds.) 
(2009).  ICMI Study 19: Proof and proving in mathematics education . Taipei, Taiwan: The 
Department of Mathematics, National Taiwan Normal University. 
366 V. Durand-Guerrier et al.
 Durand-Guerrier, V. (2008). Truth versus validity in mathematical proof.  ZDM The International 
Journal on Mathematics Education, 40 (3), 373–384. 
 Durand-Guerrier, V., & Arsac, G. (2009). Analysis of mathematical proofs: Some questions and 
fi rst answers (Vol. 1, pp. 148–153).* 
 Duval, R. (1991). Structure du raisonnement déductif et apprentissage de la démonstration. 
 Educational Studies in Mathematics, 22 (3), 233–262. 
 Duval, R. (2001). Écriture et compréhension: Pourquoi faire écrire des textes de démonstration par 
les élèves ? In  Produire et lire des textes de démonstration. Collectif coord. par É Barbin , 
 R. Duval, I. Giorgiutti, J. Houdebine, C. Laborde. Paris: Ellipses. 
 Epp, S. (2009). Proof issues with existential quantifi cation (Vol. 1, pp. 154–159).* 
 Fischbein, E. (1982). Intuition and proof.  For the learning of mathematics, 3 (2), 8–24. 
 Garuti, R., Boero, P., Lemut, E., & Mariotti, M. A. (1996). Challenging the traditional school 
approach to theorems: A hypothesis about the cognitive unity of theorems. In  Proceedings of 
PME-XX (Vol. 2, pp. 113–120). Valencia: PME. 
 Grenier, D., & Payan, C. (1998). Spécifi cités de la preuve et de la modélisation en mathématiques 
discrètes.  Recherches en didactiques des mathématiques, 18 (1), 59–99. 
 Habermas, J. (2003).  Truth and justifi cation . Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 Hadamard, J., & Poincaré, H. (2007).  Essai sur la psychologie de l’invention dans le domaine 
mathématique – L’invention mathématique . Paris: Éditions Jacques Gabay. 
 Hanna, G. (1989). More than formal proof.  For the Learning of Mathematics, 9 (1), 20–25. 
 Henderson, D. W. (1995).  Experiencing geometry on plane and sphere . Upper Saddle River: 
Prentice Hall. 
 Hintikka, J. (1996).  The principles of mathematics revisited . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 Hsu, H. Y, Wu Yu, J. Y., Chen, Y. C. (2009). Fostering 7th grade students understanding of validity. 
An instructional experiment (Vol. 1, pp. 214–219).* 
 Inglis, M., Mejia-Ramos, J.-P., & Simpson, A. (2007). Modelling mathematical argumentation: 
The importance of qualifi cation.  Educational Studies in Mathematics, 66 , 3–21. 
 Jahnke, H. N. (2010). The conjoint origin of proof and theoretical physics. In G. Hanna, H. N. Jahnke, 
& H. Pulte (Eds.),  Explanation and proof in mathematics (pp. 17–32). New York: Springer. 
 Knipping, C. (2008). A method for revealing structures of argumentation in classroom proving 
processes.  ZDM, 40 , 427–441. 
 Lakatos, I. (1976).  Proofs and refutations . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Legrand, M. (2001). Scientifi c debate in mathematics courses. In D. Holton (Ed.),  The teaching 
and learning of mathematics at university level: An ICMI study (pp. 127–135). Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 Lin, F. L., Hsieh, F. J., Hanna, G. & de Villiers M. (Eds.) (2009).  ICMI Study 19: Proof and proving 
in mathematics education . Taipei, Taiwan: The Department of Mathematics, National Taiwan 
Normal University. 
 Longo, G. (2009). Theorems as constructive visions (Vol. 1, pp. 13–25).* 
 Mariotti M. A., Bartolini Bussi, M. G., Boero, P., Ferri, F., & Garuti, R. (1997). Approaching 
geometry theorems in contexts: from history and epistemology to cognition. In  Proceedings of 
the 21th PME Conference , Lathi. 
 Parenti, L., Barberis, M. T., Pastorino, M., & Viglienzone, P. (2007). From dynamic exploration to 
“theory” and “theorems” (from 6th to 8th grades). In P. Boero (Ed.),  Theorems in school: From 
history, epistemology and cognition to classroom practice (pp. 265–284). Rotterdam: Sense 
Publishers. 
 Pascal, B. (2007).  Thoughts, letters, and minor works .  The fi ve foot shelf of classics (Vol. XLVIII) 
(C. W. Eliot, Ed. & W. F. Trotter, Trans.). New York: Cosimo Classics. 
 Pedemonte, B. (2007). How can the relationship between argumentation and proof be analysed? 
 Educational Studies in Mathematics, 66 (1), 23–41. 
 Pedemonte, B. (2008). Argumentation and algebraic proof.  ZDM, 40 (3), 385–400. 
 Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (2008).  Traité de l’argumentation (6th ed., 1st ed. in 1958) . 
Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles. 
36715 Argumentation and Proof in the Mathematics Classroom
 Perry, P., Samper, C., Camargo, L., Molina, Ó., & Echeverry, A. (2009a). Learning to prove: 
Enculturation or …? (Vol. 2, pp. 124–129).* 
 Perry, P., Samper, C., Camargo, L., Molina, Ó., & Echeverry, A. (2009b). Assigning mathematics 
tasks versus providing pre-fabricated mathematics in order to support learning to prove (Vol. 2, 
pp. 130–135).* 
 Plantin, C. (2005).  L’argumentation. Coll. Que sais-je? (1st ed., in 1996). Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
 Pólya, G. (1957).  How to solve it . Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 Pontille, M. C., Feurly-Reynaud, J., & Tisseron, C. (1996). Et pourtant, ils trouvent.  Repères 
IREM, 24 , 11–34. 
 Singh, S. (1997).  Fermat’s enigma . New York: Walker & Company. 
 Tanguay, D. (2007). Learning proof: From truth towards validity . In  Proceedings of the Xth 
 Conference on Research in Undergraduate Mathematics Education (RUME), San Diego State 
University, San Diego, CA. On the Web.  http://www.rume.org/crume2007/eproc.html 
 Tanguay, D., & Grenier, D. (2009). A classroom situation confronting experimentation and proof 
in solid geometry (Vol. 2, pp. 232–238).* 
 Tanguay, D., & Grenier, D. (2010). Experimentation and proof in a solid geometry teaching situation. 
 For the Learning of Mathematics, 30 (3), 36–42. 
 Tarski, A. (1944). The semantic conception of truth.  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
4 , 13–47. 
 Tarski, A. (1983).  Logic, semantics and metamathematics, papers from 1923 to 1938 . Indianapolis: 
John Corcoran. 
 Thom, R. (1974). Mathématiques modernes et mathématiques de toujours, suivi de Les mathéma-
tiques « modernes », une erreur pédagogique et philosophique ? In R. Jaulin (Ed.),  Pourquoi la 
mathématique ?, (pp. 39–88). Paris: Éditions 10–18. 
 Thurston, W. P. (1994). On proof and progress in mathematics.  Bulletin of the American 
Mathematical Society, 30 (2), 161–177. 
 Toulmin, S. E. (2008).  The uses of argument . (8th ed., 1st ed. in 1958) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Vygotsky, L. S. (1986).  Thought and language (2nd ed., 1st English ed. in 1962). Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
 Wenger, E. (1998).  Communities of practices: Learning, meaning and identity . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Wilkerson-Jerde, M. H., & Wilensky, U. (2009). Understanding proof: Tracking experts’ developing 
understanding of an unfamiliar proof (Vol. 2, pp. 268–273).* 
369
 In this chapter, we examine the relevance of and interest in including some  instruction 
in logic in order to foster competence with proof in the mathematics classroom. In 
several countries, educators have questioned of whether to include explicit instruc-
tion in the principles of logical reasoning as part of mathematics courses since about 
the 1980s. Some of that discussion was motivated by psychological studies that 
seemed to show that “formal logic … is not a model for how people make infer-
ences” (Johnson-Laird  1975 ) . At the same time, university and college faculty com-
monly complain that many tertiary students lack the logical competence to learn 
advanced mathematics, especially proof and other mathematical activities that 
require deductive reasoning. This complaint contradicts the view that simply doing 
mathematics at the secondary level in itself suffi ces to develop logical abilities. 
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In addition, in many countries prospective elementary and secondary teachers arrive 
at university with poor logical reasoning abilities. One questions whether, if they do 
not learn basic logical principles, these candidates will graduate as teachers able to 
guide their own students’ reasoning. 
 Enhancing the teaching of mathematics thus calls for increasing teachers’ aware-
ness of crucial logical aspects of proof. The question is how best to achieve this aim. 
We discuss this question and offer some examples intended to provide ideas about 
how to develop teachers’ and students’ logical competence and how to modify cur-
ricula to foster development of these abilities. First, we review various positions on 
the role of logic in argumentation and proof; we then discuss them from an educa-
tional perspective; and fi nally, we offer suggestions that emerged from the contribu-
tions of the members of our working group. 
 1  Positions on the Role of Logic in Argumentation and Proof 
 By logic, one may mean common sense, or the principles of predicate calculus, or a 
mathematical subject or a branch of philosophy. The literature in mathematics edu-
cation and other related fi elds (psychology, epistemology, linguistics) allows for 
several such broad defi nitions. In order to avoid potential misunderstanding, we 
defi ne logic as the discipline that deals with both the semantic and syntactic aspects 
of the organisation of mathematical discourse with the aim of deducing results that 
follow necessarily from a set of premises. When we refer to logic as a subject, we 
mainly restrict ourselves to the mathematical uses of the words  and ,  or ,  not , and 
 if-then (the basis for “propositional logic”), especially in statements that involve 
variables, as well as  for-all , and  there-exists (the extension to “predicate logic”). 
 1.1  Positions from Psychology 
 Much psychological research on human reasoning has primarily focused on the con-
tent-free logical structures of the propositional calculus. It has especially emphasised 
implication, which plays a crucial role in reasoning whatever the context, and cer-
tainly in mathematics. For example, a signifi cant portion of the literature concerns 
the famous Wason selection task (Wason  1966 ) , which tests the ability of adults to 
recognise the cases that falsify an implication. Its original formulation is as follows:
 Subjects are shown a set of four cards placed on a table, each of which has a number on one 
side and a letter on the other. The visible faces of the cards show 4, 7, A, and D. Subjects 
are asked to “decide which cards [you] would  need to turn over in order to determine 
whether the experimenter was lying in the following statement: If a card has a vowel on one 
side, then it has an even number on the other side” (Wason  1966 , p. 146). 
 If the statement is interpreted as a material conditional, then the correct answer 
is that it is necessary and suffi cient to turn over the cards showing the letter A and 
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the number 7. Fewer than 10% of the university student subjects answered correctly, 
which led Wason  ( 1977 ) to argue that propositional logic fails to explain aspects of 
human reasoning. More recently, Johnson-Laird  ( 1986 ) claimed that humans reason 
using non-logic-based mental models in which a semantic (content-dependent) 
point of view predominates. 1 These developments in cognitive psychology resulted 
in devaluing the role of abstract logic in understanding human reasoning. 
 Additional studies gave participants tasks logically identical to the Wason task 
but situated in a familiar setting that involved interpreting the implication as a per-
mission or a requirement. Students did much better on these tasks than on the Wason 
task. For instance, in one of the fi rst such experiments, Johnson-Laird et al.  ( 1972 ) 
gave participants both the original Wason task and a concrete variation in which 
they imagined they were postal workers examining envelopes on a conveyor belt. 
They were shown four envelopes: the back of a sealed envelope, the back of an 
unsealed envelope, the front of an envelope with a 5d stamp, and the front of an 
envelope with a 4d stamp. Their job was to indicate which envelopes they would 
need to turn over given the rule that a sealed envelope should have a 5d stamp. 
Despite the similar logic required to determine the answers in both situations, only 
seven of the 24 participants determined the correct answer in the abstract Wason 
situation, whereas 22 out of the 24 answered correctly in the concrete situation. 
Results similar to this have been replicated in many subsequent experiments. A pos-
sible reason for the increase in success may be that subjects’ previous experience 
has familiarised them with the fact that, in situations involving permissions and 
requirements,  p →  q and not- q implies not- p and  p →  q and not- q does not necessar-
ily imply  p . 
 In a  1986 paper, Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver described one experiment 
that used pre- and post-tests in two separate introductory logic classes at the 
University of Michigan and seemed to show that having taken a logic course had 
little effect on students’ ability to succeed with variations of the Wason selection 
task, but another experiment described in the same paper “indicated that training in 
standard logic, when coupled with training on examples of selection problems, 
leads to improved performance on subsequent selection problems.” In addition, the 
reports of Stenning, Cox, and Oberlander  ( 1995 ) and van der Pal and and Eysink 
 ( 1999 ) actually show signifi cant improvement in logical reasoning skill amongst 
students who used the Barwise & Etchemendy Tarski’s World materials. 
 According to Stenning and Van Lambalgen  ( 2008 ) , “results such as those of the 
selection task, purportedly showing the irrelevance of formal logic to actual human 
reasoning, have been widely misinterpreted, mainly because the picture of logic 
current in psychology and cognitive science is completely mistaken.” (p. xiii) They 
aimed to more accurately depict mathematical logic and show that logic is still a 
helpful concept in cognitive science. In particular, they considered semantics inter-
pretation as underlying two key processes in deductive reasoning: “interpretation 
 1  Ufer et al.  ( 2009 ) propose a cognitive model based on mental models. 
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processes of reasoning to an interpretation  and derivational processes of reasoning 
from the interpretation imposed” (ibid, p. 197). Lee and Smith  ( 2009 ) also consid-
ered this distinction relevant for mathematics education. Thus, a strictly syntactic 
view of logic only inadequately explains human reasoning, which essentially 
involves an ongoing interaction between syntax and the interpretive role played by 
semantics. 
 1.2  Positions from Mathematics Educators 
 Several mathematics educators’ positions on the role of logic in mathematics educa-
tion seem to have been infl uenced by the psychological research cited above and by 
mathematicians’ personal accounts of their own work. For example, Hanna  ( 2000 ) 
described how Simpson  ( 1995 ) “differentiates between ‘proof through logic,’ which 
emphasises the formal, and ‘proof through reasoning,’ which involves investiga-
tions. The former is ‘alien’ to students, in his view, since it has no connection with 
their existing mental structure, and so can be mastered only by a minority” (p. 5). 
Simpson’s view replicates the researchers’ statements about the difference in results 
between the classical Wason test and the versions dependent on familiarity with 
certain kinds of contexts (e.g. permission or requirements). 
 The literature contains relatively few references to the work of logicians, despite 
the fact that logic seems relevant to an epistemology for mathematical proof (e.g., 
Sinaceur  2001 ) . Mariotti  ( 2006 ) , writing about the research and debate on proof and 
proving in mathematics education, stated, “From both an epistemological and a 
cognitive point of view, it seems impossible to make a clear separation between the 
semantic and the theoretical level, as required by a purely formal perspective.” (p. 5). 
This statement by Mariotti was an answer to Duval’s  ( 1991 ) assertion that proof 
consists of a logical sequence of implications from which one derives the theoretical 
validity of a statement and the organisation of which relies only on the theoretical 
status of the propositions involved, independently of their content. Notably, Duval’s 
position is based on a purely syntactic view of propositional calculus. Thus, unless 
one considers logic as restricted to the syntax of propositional calculus, arguing 
against Duval is not the same as arguing against the role of logic. Indeed, Tarski 
 ( 1944 ) assumed that the use of predicate logic involves a dialectic between seman-
tics and syntax, through the two crucial notions of truth in an interpretation and 
validity in a theory (Durand-Guerrier  2008 ) . Barrier et al.  ( 2009 ) , referring to 
Hintikka  ( 1996 ) , claimed that a model that would articulate syntactic and semantic 
analysis with game-theoretical tools could contribute to the understanding of the 
process of proof and shed light on the dialectical nature of proof construction. This 
last point, also supported by Mamona-Downs and Downs  ( 2009 ) , agrees with 
Mariotti’s  ( 2006 ) statement, “Proof clearly has the purpose of validation—confi rming 
the truth of an assertion by checking the logical correctness of mathematical 
arguments—however, at the same time, proof has to contribute more widely to 
knowledge construction” (p. 24). 
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 Beyond the debate about logic’s role in argumentation and proof, questions arise 
about the possibility of teaching logic in a way that would foster competence in 
activities of proving. In France, for example, the only rule of inference explicitly 
taught now is  modus ponens ( A and “If  A , then  B ”; hence  B ) in grade 8 (ages 13–14); 
in high school, students have few opportunities to encounter challenging activities 
that would call their modes of reasoning into question and offer occasions to develop 
their logical skills. Similar curricula could, at least partly, explain why students 
arriving at university both in France and elsewhere have severe problems with the 
logic needed for learning more advanced mathematics, especially the logic that 
involves quantifi cation (Blossier et al.  2009 ; Epp  2009 ; Roh  2009 ; Selden and 
Selden  1995 ) . 
 2  Logical Perspectives on Argumentation and Proof 
 2.1  The Role of Logic in Learning and Teaching 
Mathematical Proof 
 As teachers ourselves, we can attest to the considerable diffi culties students face in 
dealing with the logical issues that arise when they attempt to learn about the pro-
cess of proof in mathematics (e.g., Epp  2003 ) . It is not easy to determine what kind 
of work with students will help them overcome these diffi culties. In this section, we 
aim to clarify the role that logic may play in the learning and teaching of proof, tak-
ing into consideration different aspects of various proving activities and their depen-
dence on the mathematical topics in question. 
 The exploratory and constructive phases of reasoning involve frequent back-and-forth 
movement between examining individual objects, properties and relationships and 
referring to relevant conjectures, defi nitions, theorems and axioms. Such movement 
necessitates an intensive use of inference rules. This use may occur subconsciously, 
but it must be done correctly in order to be developed into an actual proof. In the 
mathematics curriculum, geometry and number theory provide opportunities for 
using inference rules from the logic of propositions, such as  modus ponens , 2  modus 
tollens , 3 hypothetical syllogism, 4 disjunctive syllogism, 5 the contradiction rule, 6 and 
so forth. They also give students occasion to explore problems by using particular 
cases; formulating a general conjecture; coming back to specifi c objects in order to 
support, reject or refi ne it; and when they believe it to be true, looking for reasons 
that enable confi dence in that belief. 
 2  A ; and “If  A , then  B ”; hence  B. 
 3  Not  B ; and “If  A , then  B ”; hence not  A. 
 4  If  A then  B ; If  B then  C ; hence If  A then  C . 
 5  A or  B ; not  B ; hence  A. 
 6  If not  A , then both  B and not  B ; hence  A . 
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 In discussing the exploratory stages of problem solving, Pólya  ( 1954 ) pointed out 
the crucial importance of both inductive (“if regularity appears, then it could be because 
of a general result”) and abductive (“given that this phenomenon has appeared, then it 
could be a consequence of this other phenomenon”) heuristic reasoning, despite the 
fact that neither produce necessary deductions from the point of view of logic. When 
one reasons with conditional statements that are not equivalences, only two valid infer-
ence rules are available ( modus ponens and  modus tollens ); one can deduce no necessary 
conclusions from a conditional statement when one only knows that the antecedent is 
false or that the consequent is true. This principle forms the very core of the notion of 
implication and its distinction from equivalence (Durand-Guerrier  2003 ) . 
 Four additional inference rules from predicate logic also have crucial importance 
in mathematical reasoning.
 1.  Given that a result is known to be true for all objects of a certain kind,  universal 
instantiation allows us to conclude that the result is true for any particular object 
of that kind. This rule is used constantly in the manipulation of algebraic expres-
sions and in providing reasons for most steps in a proof. 
 2.  When an object of a certain type is known to exist,  existential instantiation allows 
one to give it a name. This rule is used every time one introduces a letter into 
a mathematical explanation. Learning how to use such symbols correctly is a 
signifi cant challenge for most students. 
 3.  When one knows or hypothesises that a particular object of a certain type exists, 
 existential generalisation allows one to say that there exists an object of that 
type. Along with the ability to formulate negations of statements, this rule is used 
every time one produces a counterexample to a general statement. It is also part 
of the basis for the logic of solving equations. 
 4.  If one can show that a certain property holds true for a particular but arbitrarily 
chosen object of a certain type,  universal generalisation allows us to conclude 
that the property holds true for all objects of that type. This rule is the basis for 
almost all mathematical proofs. 
 Having some level of understanding of the fundamental rules of predicate logic 
helps students check mathematical statements that are in doubt, avoid invalid deduc-
tions, and comprehend the basic structures of both mathematical proof (direct and 
indirect) and disproof by counterexample. Here an educational question arises: at 
which level, in which contexts, and to what extent the rules of predicate logic should 
be taught explicitly. Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  ( 2005 ) reported a case in which 
teachers 7 examining a student’s proof immediately recognised that the proof was 
invalid because they knew that the statement was false. 8 The teachers’ knowledge of 
the subject made it unnecessary for them to use reasoning to determine that the 
 7  In the academic year 1998–1999, 22 mathematics teachers from various French scientifi c univer-
sities were asked to comment on an invalid proof written by an undergraduate (see Durand-Guerrier 
and Arsac  2005 , pp.159–163). 
 8  Mathematicians with broad knowledge of mathematical subjects can similarly recall mathemati-
cal facts without having to re-derive them, which could be one of the reasons they may underrate 
the extent to which logic plays a role in their work. 
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student had made a mistake. However, students learning a new mathematical subject 
lack their teachers’ rich knowledge base. So, to provide additional help for evaluating 
mathematical statements, at the same time that they give students experience with 
examples and counterexample, teachers also need to help students develop their 
deductive reasoning abilities. Indeed, in order to solve mathematical problems that 
involve deduction, students must be able both to derive statements from other state-
ments through logical rules (the syntactic aspects of proof), to consider counterex-
amples, to explore supportive examples, to work with a generic example, and so on 
(the semantic aspects of proof; cf. Barrier et al.  2009 ) . 
 Knowledge of the principles of logical reasoning becomes most important when 
familiarity with the mathematical subject matter does not suffi ce by itself to ascer-
tain truth or falsity in a given situation. Drawing on their research and teaching 
experiences, Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  ( 2009 ) and Epp  ( 2009 ) support the claim 
that teaching students the basic principles of predicate logic (e.g., Copi  1954 ; 
Gentzen  1934 ) provides them with a relevant tool for successful mathematical activ-
ity. Knowledge of these principles makes it possible for students to answer the ques-
tions: “What would it mean for such-and-such to be true? What would I have to do 
to show that it is true? What would I have to do to show that it is false?” The answers 
to these questions depend entirely on inference rules from predicate logic and the 
syntactic structure of the defi nitions involved. Knowing how to answer them gives 
students a means for focusing on the mathematical subject matter in question. Thus, 
including instruction in logical principles as one part of mathematics education pro-
vides a balance between two extreme positions: that checking the validity of a proof 
requires that it be completely formalised; and that success in proving requires no 
explicit knowledge of logical principles. 
 2.2  Logic and Language: The Role of Context 
 R. Thom  ( 1974 ) criticised instruction in logical principles where students are 
primarily asked to work on sentences such as “A New Yorker is bald or tall” or “If 
a New Yorker has blue eyes, then he is a taxi-driver”. However, Epp  ( 2003 ) has sug-
gested that using examples in which the ordinary interpretation of a statement in 
natural language is identical to its interpretation in logic can improve students’ rea-
soning skills. The latter approach conforms to that of logicians and philosophers 
who, since Aristotle, have developed formal systems that avoid ambiguities inherent 
in natural language and enable determination of the soundness of deductive conclu-
sions, “remaining close both to natural reasoning and to mathematical reasoning 
and proof ” (Durand-Guerrier  2008 , p. 382). 
 The problem of the relationship between natural and mathematical language is 
crucial in mathematics education, in particular because it is a matter of fact that 
natural language is commonly used in mathematics classes, both orally, in writing, 
as well as in textbooks. Nevertheless, the language of everyday conversation differs 
signifi cantly from that of mathematical discourse. Some of these differences  concern 
the meanings of the words used to defi ne mathematical objects. For example, a 
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“ring,” refers to a circular object in the real world but to a certain kind of abstract 
mathematical structure in the fi eld of abstract algebra. Other differences concern the 
meanings of terms that convey the logical structure of statements (e.g., Boero et al. 
 2008 ) . For instance, in everyday language “It is necessary to do  A to get  B ” is most 
commonly interpreted to mean “If I don’t do  A then I won’t get  B ” and “If I do  A 
then I will get  B ,” whereas in mathematics it means only the former and not the lat-
ter. On the other hand, there are situations in ordinary life where the phrase has 
exactly the same meaning as in mathematics, for example “It is necessary for France 
to win the semi-fi nals in order to win the World Cup.” 
 With just a few exceptions, one can fi nd examples in everyday language where 
words important for determining a sentence’s logic have the same meaning as in 
mathematics. Recognising this allows one to emphasise those cases where the math-
ematical interpretation of a statement genuinely differs from its interpretation in 
ordinary language. For instance, “There is a lid for every pot” is typically under-
stood to mean the same as “For every pot, there is a lid;” that is, different pots typi-
cally have different lids. In everyday language, statements where the words “there 
is” precede the words “for every” are almost always interpreted as if the words “for 
every” preceded the words “there is.” In mathematics, however, the phrases “there 
is” and “for every” are interpreted from left to right. Thus, “For every positive real 
number  x , there is a positive real number  y such that  y <  x ” is true, whereas “There 
is a positive real number  y such that for every positive real number  x ,  y <  x ” is false. 
Because of their experience with ordinary language, many students do not see a dif-
ference between these two statements. 9 
 Several researchers have studied the diffi culties experienced by university stu-
dents in dealing with the relationship between natural language and mathematical 
language (e.g., Blossier et al.  2009 ; Boero et al.  2008 ; Chellougui  2009 ; Dubinsky 
and Yiparaki  2000 ; Epp  2009 ; Selden and Selden  1995 ) . In the United States, many 
colleges and universities offer “transition-to-higher-mathematics courses” to help 
students communicate effectively in the language of mathematics in order to move 
from calculation-based courses to proof-based ones. According to Moore  ( 1994 ) , 
linguistic problems are one of the main diffi culties students face in such courses. 
 In ordinary classroom settings, except when they are themselves writing careful 
mathematical proofs, teachers often use natural language that typically contains 
implicit assumptions, hidden quantifi cation, and unstated reasoning rules rather 
than explicit references to logical principles (Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  2005 ) . 
This lack of rigour in teachers’ discourse may impede students’ ability to write 
 9   In addition, the logical analysis of statements may vary from one natural language to another. For 
example, in French statements of the form “tous les  A ne sont pas  B ” (“All  A are not  B ”) are 
ambiguous. Depending on the context, they may mean either “There is an  A that is not- B ” (existen-
tial statement) or “For all  A ,  A is non- B ” (universal statement). In written Arabic, however, this 
ambiguity does not exist (Durand-Guerrier and Ben Kilani  2004 ) . Such issues were discussed in a 
paper presented at  ICMI Study 21: Mathematics Education and Language Diversity , São Paolo, 
Brazil, September 16–21, 2011. 
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precise proofs, and in some cases, there is also a lack of rigour in textbooks 
(e.g. Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  2005 ) . For example, in one instance, in a French 
textbook for fi rst year university students, the author used an invalid inference rule 
(Houzel  1996 , p. 27). In the given mathematical context, one could deduce the con-
clusion from the premises, but only by referring to an extraneous mathematical 
property (Durand-Guerrier  2008 ) . This situation replicates the unequal positions of 
teachers (who can bring in additional, unstated knowledge when needed) and stu-
dents (whose knowledge base is limited). 
 2.3  Implicit Versus Explicit Assumptions About Logic 
 Proof and argumentation take place within social and organisational contexts that 
contain specifi c implicit assumptions about the appropriateness of various forms of 
reasoning. However, in making these assumptions, students may depend on naïve 
thinking processes and/or previous everyday and school experiences, 10 whereas 
teachers can draw on extensive mathematical experience and knowledge. For 
instance, students entering secondary school geometry may be disconcerted by 
teachers’ requirements for deductive reasoning because teachers in previous grades 
considered activities involving visualisation and/or measurement suffi cient to estab-
lish the truth of a statement. More generally, ordinary language and informal math-
ematical usage often hide the logical structures of sentences, such as the scope of 
quantifi cation, the interrelations between connectors and quantifi cation, the hierar-
chy of connectors, etc. At the university level, recognising the logical structure of 
mathematical statements is necessary for success in proving, but students have dif-
fi culty “unpacking” their logic (Durand-Guerrier  2003 ; Epp  2003 ; Selden and 
Selden  1995 ) . 
 Teaching should aim to make explicit the assumptions about the uses of logic, in 
terms of both reasoning and language, that students have not yet learned. Douek 
 ( 2003 ) proposed framing, clarifying and implementing this position by combining 
the work of Vergnaud  ( 1990 ) and Vygotsky  ( 1986 ) . This synthesis examines how 
teachers can manage and develop the dialectic between everyday concepts and sci-
entifi c concepts in order to promote students’ conceptualisations of logical princi-
ples by placing logical “theorems-in-action” 11 (with their respective domains of 
validity) in the foreground and by clarifying linguistic representations. 
 In this connection, deciding on priorities becomes a delicate issue of which the-
orems-in-action to make explicit and at which grade level. The answer depends on 
 10  This will be discussed in Sect.  3.4. 
 11  A theorem-in-action is a mathematical property that a person may not be consciously aware of 
but may use in certain situations, such as to fi nd an answer to a mathematical question. However, 
because the property may not apply to all the situations in which the person might try to use it, it 
could lead to an invalid deduction. 
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the needs of the specifi c mathematical topics addressed in each grade and the extent 
to which they involve making inferences. As Quine wrote, “The most conspicuous 
purpose of logic, in its applications to science and everyday discourse, is the justifi -
cation and criticism of inference” (Quine  1982 , p. 45). However, at any grade level, 
teachers cannot effectively guide their students’ reasoning activities if they them-
selves are not explicitly aware of the basic principles of logical reasoning. 
 2.4  Syntactic and Semantic Forms of Reasoning 
 At fi rst glance, one might consider logic as merely relevant to  s yntactic aspects of 
proof: for example, how to correctly use inference rules, and how to correctly sym-
bolise quantifi cation or negation and their relations. However, diffi culties with logic, 
whether from a didactic or a psychological perspective, are also linked with seman-
tics and with the interplay between everyday and mathematical language. 
 The semantic perspective in logic appeared with Aristotle and was signifi cantly 
further developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by Frege 
 ( 1882 ) , Wittgenstein  ( 1921 ) , Tarski  ( 1983 , 1944), Quine ( 1982 ), and others. In 
particular, Tarski  ( 1944 ) provided a semantic defi nition of truth that is formally 
correct and materially adequate, through the crucial notion of satisfying an open 
sentence with an object. He thus developed a model theoretic point of view, with 
semantics at its core, which elucidates the relation between truth in an interpreta-
tion and validity in a theory (cf. Durand-Guerrier  2008 ) . According to Sinaceur 
 ( 2001 , p. 52), Tarski showed that “semantic analysis is  furthered , and not super-
seded, by syntactic analysis.” 
 Many logicians nowadays share a belief in the importance of semantics. For 
example, Da Costa  ( 1997 ) has claimed that, in order to correctly understand a math-
ematical fi eld, one needs to take into account semantics (the relation between signs 
and objects), syntax (the rules of integration of signs in a given system), and pragmatics 
(the relationship between subjects and signs). And Hintikka  ( 1996 ) introduced a 
distinction between “indoor” and “outdoor” games that can be used to model the 
back-and-forth process in proof development. 
 Barrier et al.  ( 2009 ) provided some evidence that the two kinds of games play an 
important role in proof and proving, because the emergence of a proof often rests 
upon a back-and-forth process between actions on objects (semantics) and explora-
tion in a theory (syntax). They illustrate this with an example from Barallobres 
 ( 2007 , pp. 42–43). During a classroom session, 13–14 year-old students, who were 
beginning the study of algebra, were placed by their teacher in teams which com-
peted to fi nd the sum of 10 consecutive numbers in the quickest possible way, given 
an initial number. Then they were asked to describe their strategy in terms of the 
initial number. During the classroom debate different algebraic expressions and 
methods emerged. Asked to explain why two different formulations gave the same 
solution, the students combined both “indoor” syntactic and “outdoor” semantic 
points of view. For example, one response was, “When you multiply by 10, you’ve 
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got a zero at the end, and so, adding 45 is the same as adding 4 to the digit in the tens 
column and then putting a 5 in the ones column,” which led students to propose the 
equivalence “10 n + 45 = 10 n + 40 + 5”. Kieran and Drijvers  ( 2006 ) described a similar 
interplay between syntactic work on algebraic expressions and semantic work in the 
numerical domain through evaluation, and its role in fostering students’ understanding 
of the notion of equivalence in algebra. 
 3  Contexts in Mathematics Education That Foster 
Understanding of Logic 
 3.1  Addressing Known and Common Misconceptions 
 The mathematics education literature provides several examples of how students’ 
mathematical reasoning leads them to false conclusions because of misunderstand-
ings about the ways words such as  if-then ,  and ,  or ,  not ,  all , and  some are used in 
mathematics and about what it means for statements involving these words to be 
false (e.g., Epp  2003,  2009 ) . Including such examples in mathematics education 
programmes helps teachers both to better understand their students’ work and to 
improve their own understanding of important aspects of mathematical reasoning. 
 Take for example the relationship between implication and equivalence. For 
every  real number  x ,  x > 1 implies  x 2 >  x ; whilst there exists  x such that,  x 2 >  x and 
 x  1 (e.g., [−2] 2 > −2, and −2 < 1). If, however, the inequalities are viewed over the 
set of  natural numbers, then “for every x,  x 2 >  x implies  x > 1”. Interviews with fi rst-
year university students in Genoa about these inequalities have revealed a tendency 
to generalise incorrectly from a few examples, to confuse real with natural numbers, 
and to confl ate implication with conjunction. 
 Although logic is only part of students’ diffi culties with such questions, asking 
them to check whether such implications are equivalences over different sets of 
numbers can serve several purposes. It can help them understand what it means 
for a quantifi ed if-then statement to be false and thereby introduce them to the 
idea of counterexample; it can sensitise them to the domain over which variables 
are defi ned; it can reveal a misunderstanding on their part that implication and 
equivalence are the same; and it can increase their store of concrete examples for 
future reference. 
 As another example, in Euclidean geometry, Varignon’s theorems state (1) In any 
quadrilateral the midpoints of the sides are the vertices of a parallelogram; and 
(2) If the quadrilateral is convex, then the area of the parallelogram is one half the 
area of the quadrilateral. Theorem (1) is often “proved” by considering only the case 
of a convex quadrilateral and examining the pairs of opposite triangles formed by 
each of its diagonals. However, that “proof” does not work if the quadrilateral is not 
convex or is crossed, although theorem (1)  is true in both these cases. On the other 
hand, convexity is necessary for theorem (2). 
380 V. Durand-Guerrier et al.
 Varignon’s theorems illustrate the importance of precise defi nition in  mathematics: 
in this case, quadrilaterals can take three different forms; a statement that is true for 
one form may not be true for the others. In addition, this example addresses the 
common incorrect belief that to prove a theorem in Euclidean geometry one only 
needs to draw a single “suitable” representative of a class of fi gures that fi ts the 
conditions of the defi nitions and hypotheses in the theorem, whilst excluding any 
fi gure that satisfi es additional, specifi c conditions. A related mistaken belief is that 
a single counterexample suffi ces to show the necessity of a particular condition in a 
theorem. For Varignon’s theorems, no single  suitable generic example can be found 
to prove theorem (1) because the proofs are different for each type of quadrilateral. 
Moreover, two different counterexamples must be found to show that convexity is 
needed for theorem (2). Thus the theorems provide a situation, relevant to secondary 
school and teacher education, in which a given defi nition must be explored in order 
to identify the entire range of objects that satisfy it (for other examples, see Deloustal-
Jorrand  2004 ) . 
 Mathematics students at the tertiary level have problems working with defi ni-
tions, such as the defi nition of limit, which involve chains of quantifi ers. Even a 
defi nition involving only two quantifi ers (e.g., the defi nition of a surjective function, 
which is important at the secondary level in many countries) creates diffi culties for 
many students. Working with such defi nitions offers opportunities for addressing 
misconceptions about connectors, quantifi ers, and their mutual relationships, whilst 
dealing with important mathematical subject matter, particularly in linear algebra, 
advanced calculus, and real analysis. 
 Instructors can use defi nitions as a basis for class discussions that explore stu-
dents’ misunderstandings about important logical principles. For example, all of the 
following misunderstandings (amongst others) are typically revealed in students’ 
work: that the negation of an  and statement is an  and statement; that the negation of 
an  if-then statement is an  if-then statement; that negating only the fi rst quantifi er 
suffi ces to negate a multiply-quantifi ed statement; and that a statement of the form 
“there exists  A for all  B ” means the same as “for all  A there exists  B .” Many stu-
dents, even those in advanced courses at universities, continue to hold such miscon-
ceptions, even though these may have been hidden when the students were working 
on standard tasks in less advanced mathematical areas (e.g. Chellougui  2009 ; 
Dubinsky and Yparaki  2000 ; Epp  2003 ; Selden and Selden  1995 ) . 
 3.2  Familiar Contexts That can Foster Understanding of Logic 
 This section includes a few illustrations of how logical concepts can be developed 
through activities in contexts familiar enough that students’ reasoning depends only 
on “mature knowledge”; that is, their previous experiences combined with knowl-
edge of relevant language and symbolism. 
 Bartolini Bussi et al.  ( 1999 ) claimed that, given a suitable sequence of tasks and 
proper guidance from a teacher, Fourth-Graders can produce experience-based 
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 generalisations, which they can express as conditional statements and for which 
they can construct proof-like justifi cations. For example, in a long teaching experi-
ment in Italy, one class of 17 9 and 10 year-old students had been studying about 
gears since Grade 2. In Grade 4, they began to view the operation of the gears in 
terms of mathematical objects; drawings of toothed wheels became circles, a point-
ing fi nger became a symbolic arrow, and so on. The students’ reasoning basis shifted 
from observation and experimentation to exploration of the mathematical objects’ 
organisation and references to shared knowledge. 
 After observing and describing the functioning of two wheels in gear through 
observation, the students were asked to conjecture the movement of three hypotheti-
cal wheels in gear and to justify their conjecture. They did so verbally, through 
drawings, and through gestures. Then, the teacher asked them to express a general 
law governing the movement of any number of gears. To do so, they had to formu-
late conditional statements. Most students solved the problem on a theoretical level; 
offering general conclusions based on generally valid arguments belonging to “sure 
knowledge” that they had established through previous problem solving. For 
instance, Elisabeta expressed her reasoning as follows, using the shared knowledge 
that two wheels in gear move in opposite directions:  “The wheels, two by two, if 
[they are] odd [in number] are in gear but they block [each other’s movement] and 
if they are even [in number], they are in gear and do not block [each other] ....  I 
have done a drawing to make sure ….”. This task was followed by a collective dis-
cussion using a document supplied by the teacher, which compared excerpts of 
Heron’s kinematic on toothed wheels with excerpts of the students’ texts. Students 
compared their proofs to Heron’s, gave the status of key statements from Heron’s 
model, showed how these could lead to a proof, and so forth. They could identify 
key aspects of their reasoning using Heron’s words, such as “we postulate” or “we 
prove”. The process offered a genuine opportunity to develop a sense of the mean-
ing and value of proof, to distinguish experimental from theoretical proof, and to 
express relationships between logical structure and the contents of their own 
proofs. 
 Another example that uses a familiar context is the “maze task” discussed by 
Durand-Guerrier  ( 2003 , pp. 7–9). A drawing shows a maze consisting of 20 rooms 
labelled from  A to  T , some of which connect with others through open doors 
(Fig.  16.1 ). A person named  X is said to have passed through the maze, never going 
through any door twice. 
 Durand-Guerrier and Epp have presented this task hundreds of times in France 
and the United States, and there has always been disagreement about the statement, 
“If  X passed through  L , then  X passed through  K .” Some have responded that they 
“can’t tell” whether it is true or false, whereas others say it is false; the drawing 
actually shows that someone who passed through  L could have also passed through  K , 
but could also have passed through  L without passing through  K . Because the 
context of the question is easily understood, discussion can focus on the interpreta-
tion of the conditional, whether as a generalised (universally quantifi ed) statement 
or as a material conditional statement whose truth value depends only on the truth-
value of the two components, and on the logical status of the letter  X as referring to 
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a particular individual or a “generic person.” Thus, teachers can use this task to 
explore the difference between universal and material conditional statements and to 
alert students to the fact that universal quantifi cation is often implicit. 
 Relatively familiar mathematical contexts also allow examples that can help stu-
dents develop their logical skills. For instance, the question of how the sum of  p 
consecutive integers depends on the value of  p offers an opportunity for lower-secondary 
students to compare generalisation through particular examples with generalisation 
by a “generic” example. It can also give them experience with thinking about coun-
terexamples and determining the set of objects for which a general statement is true. 
At the upper-secondary-school and university levels, number theory and discrete 
mathematics provide opportunities to make explicit and formalise various modes of 
reasoning such as  reductio ad absurdum , proof by division into cases, proof by 
contraposition, and recursive reasoning (cf. Battie  2009 ; Epp  2003 ; Grenier and 
Payan  1998 ) . 
 3.3  Contexts That May Require Understanding Logic 
on a Syntactic Level 
 If work on logical concepts done within familiar contexts appears to be relevant for 
young students, one may ask what logical skills are needed in more advanced 
mathematical studies. Expert mathematicians, such as Thurston  ( 1994 ) and Thom 
 ( 1974 ) , claim that their natural and intuitive approach to logic, whilst necessary, is 
suffi cient for them to succeed in their work. In fact, Thom  ( 1974 ) wrote that over-
emphasising the formal aspects of mathematics may interfere with a mathemati-
cian’s work, in the same way that individuals may hesitate in “speaking a [foreign] 
 Fig. 16.1  The drawing 
of the maze 
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language because they know the grammar too well and are afraid of making 
 mistakes” (p. 45, our translation). 
 On the other hand, examination of mathematicians’ published work reveals a 
very considerable command of the principles of logical reasoning. It is possible that, 
through innate ability or unconscious absorption during their school years, many 
mathematicians reached this level of competence without formal training, but, as 
indicated previously, large numbers of mathematics students have not attained it by 
the time they reach the university. Moreover, even prominent mathematicians have 
been misled because of weak syntactic and formal control over the concepts with 
which they were dealing. For instance, Hitt  ( 2006 ) described the efforts of Leibniz, 
Wolf, d’Alembert and others who tried to solve problems of infi nite sums, limits, 
convergence and divergence at a time when the appropriate mathematical defi ni-
tions had not yet been formulated. Formal defi nitions of infi nite sum, limit, conver-
gence, divergence and continuity, which relied heavily on quantifi cation, were 
developed in the early to middle years of the nineteenth century. Cauchy and Abel 
were amongst the mathematicians who contributed to clarifying and formalising 
these concepts, and yet their work contains several faulty statements and incorrect 
proofs. These errors mainly resulted from incorrect management of stacked quanti-
fi ers. 12 Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  ( 2005 ) analysed, from this point of view, 
Cauchy’s proof of the incorrect statement that a limit of a (pointwise) convergent 
sequence of continuous functions is continuous (e.g., Lakatos  1976 ) , and pointed 
out that Abel recognised the available counterexamples to Cauchy’s proof, but did 
not identify the mistake. Moreover, he made a similar error in two of his own proofs. 
(Durand-Guerrier and Arsac  2005 , pp. 155–156) The identifi cation of that error 
ultimately led to the notion of uniform convergence. Analyses like these authors’ 
support the hypothesis that the diffi culties faced by these mathematicians involved 
closely interrelated mathematical and logical matters. 
 From an educational perspective, these examples suggest that syntactic control 
is not only particularly important for novices but is also necessary for more 
advanced students facing concepts about which their semantic control is still shaky. 
This necessity for syntactic control calls for attention from educators, teachers and 
textbook writers (cf. Dreyfus  1999 ) . In such contexts, a lessening of rigour, consid-
ered by experts as an innocuous shortcut, can result in serious misunderstandings 
by students. 
 3.4  Logic and Cultural Contexts: An Insight 
 We hypothesise the relevance of predicate logic throughout the curriculum on the 
basis of both epistemological and didactic considerations, as well as on research 
 12  These stacked quantifi ers may also be described as instances of the  dependence rule for vari-
ables : in a statement of the form “For all  x , there exists  y such that  F ( x ,  y ),”  y is dependent on  x . 
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with secondary and undergraduate students. However, the teaching and practice of 
logic as defi ned at the beginning of Sect.  1 takes place in cultural contexts where 
students and teachers may be exposed in other parts of their lives to different ways 
of organising and communicating reasoning. In their recent work, Boero and col-
leagues (Boero et al.  2010 ; Morselli and Boero  2009 ) have proposed adapting 
Habermas’s  ( 2003 ) theory of rational behaviour into a framework for situating and 
comparing different ways of interpreting and communicating logical requirements. 
According to Habermas, rational behaviour in discourse consists of three interre-
lated components: epistemic rationality (conscious checking of statements’ and 
inferences’ validity within a given culture); teleological rationality (conscious 
choice and use of tools to achieve the discursive aim); and communicational ratio-
nality (conscious choice of means to communicate reasoning according to the given 
community’s rules). All three components of rational behaviour may be related to a 
cultural context. 
 For an example concerning teleological and epistemic rationality consider the 
study by Luria  ( 1976 ) about Uzbek peasants living in Central Asia country villages 
of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, who would accept a syllogism only if they knew 
its major premise was true. (For a summary of that study and of more recent ones in 
several different cultures and social environments, see Norenzayan et al.  2007 ) . In 
such a context, argument by contradiction is impossible. On the other hand, there 
have been psychological studies showing that some children are able to apply modus 
tollens (e.g. Noveck et al.  1991 ) , and modus tollens was one of the fi ve inference 
rules explicitly used by the Stoics (Blanché  1970 ) . These results could be relevant 
to mathematics education because of the cultural diversity amongst students in 
many countries. 
 A second example illustrates the fact that, even in a given cultural context, com-
municational rules, and hence the required degree of explicitness in reasoning, 
depends on the domain. As an example, the need to stress a statement’s content is 
experienced in several familiar domains such as songs, poetry, and religious texts as 
well as in ordinary interpersonal communication, and this may affect some students’ 
mathematical writing. For instance, during a teaching experiment reported in Boero 
et al.  ( 1995 ) , students in a grade six Italian classroom had to justify the fact that the 
only common divisor of two consecutive numbers is 1. The students had been given 
no model of mathematical proof before this task, except for a discussion about how 
general reasoning can avoid the need to check the truth of a statement by examining 
every case. Lucia, a brilliant student with a powerful mathematical intuition, wrote a 
correct justifi cation, but as a series of statements without logical connectives.
 The difference between two consecutive numbers is 1. 
 The difference between two consecutive multiples of a number is that number. 
 Two consecutive numbers are multiple of 1. 
 No other number can divide them. 
 From the interview it was clear that her choice of statements was based on a 
conscious logical thread, but she did not use connectives because, as she put it, she 
wanted to “communicate the facts, the true things.” 
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 These two examples are intended to suggest the desirability of refl ecting with 
teachers and students on the fact that modes of reasoning, including what is regarded 
as acceptable mathematical argumentation, are a culturally and historically situated 
component of our scientifi c rationality. 
 4  Conclusion 
 We have tried in this chapter to provide evidence for the value of integrating 
 instruction in the principles of logic into instruction in mathematical argumentation 
and proof. Not all mathematics educators share this view, but there is little disagree-
ment that most students, even many in relatively advanced university courses, have 
serious diffi culties with the logical reasoning required to determine the truth or fal-
sity of mathematical statements. In addition, teaching logic as an isolated subject 
generally appears to be ineffi cient in developing reasoning abilities. 
 Initially, we discussed the positions of cognitive psychologists and mathematics 
educators about the role of logic in argumentation and proof. This brief review rein-
forced our position that it is important to view logic as dealing with both the syntac-
tic and semantic aspects of the organisation of mathematical discourse. In the second 
section, after reviewing the role of logic in mathematical argumentation and proof, 
we concluded that familiarity with logical principles and their application is most 
useful when students’ mathematical knowledge is not suffi cient, by itself, to evalu-
ate the truth of a mathematical statement. In order to enable students to check the 
validity of a proof or disproof, or to deal with potential ambiguities in the language 
used in the mathematical classroom, instructors should render explicit the logical 
aspects of mathematical activity in the classroom, taking into account issues both of 
context and of language. In the third section, we gave some examples of potentially 
rich contexts for fostering students’ understanding of logical concepts and for 
addressing and discussing common misconceptions. Familiar contexts can be used 
to focus on the logical aspects of mathematical activity; unfamiliar contexts could 
reveal the necessity of an interplay between semantic and syntactic perspectives. 
We also explored examples showing the sensitivity of logic to cultural contexts. 
A challenge for the future is to develop and implement these suggestions in research 
programmes. 
 It would be worthwhile to develop a framework for the comprehensive study of 
the complexity of the proving process as a whole and to provide the educational 
groundwork for fostering student competence in argumentation and proof, includ-
ing issues that concern logic and language – key aspects of proof and proving in 
mathematics education. 
 Such a framework should take into account the systemic aspects of proof and 
proving as related to a given theory, proof and proving within a given theory, and 
proof and proving in the construction/expansion of a theory. From this perspective, 
it is desirable to investigate the relationships and tensions between the problem-
solving aspect of the proving process and its logical and communicative aspects. 
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 In order to be able to provide teachers with concrete suggestions and solid 
 proposals, it is necessary to research further the variety of logical activities related 
to proof to help students better produce, organise, and understand arguments and 
assess their validity. Such research will enable educators to enhance the various 
means on which teachers may rely for developing students’ competence in argu-
mentation and proof: the design of activities, responses to student work, cultural 
mediation, and so forth. 
 Here, we have considered detailed questions of when and how only lightly and 
non-systematically, but the most important step is in “educating awareness,” as 
Mason  ( 2010 ) has put it, about the issues linked to logic in the teaching and learning 
of proof. This is the outcome to which we hope this chapter has contributed. 
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 There are many changes in the didactic contract (Brousseau  1997 ) when students 
move from secondary school to undergraduate study in mathematics or from under-
graduate to graduate study in mathematics. Beginning university students often face 
“a diffi cult transition, from a position where concepts have an intuitive basis founded 
on experience, to one where they [the concepts] are specifi ed by formal defi nitions 
and their properties reconstructed through logical deductions” (Tall  1992 , p. 495). 
 The problem of the passage from secondary to tertiary mathematics is not new. 
In the fi rst volume of the UNESCO series,  New Trends in Mathematics Teaching 
(ICMI  1966 ) , there is a conference report devoted to this issue. In addition, a spe-
cifi c section of the ICMI Study volume,  The Teaching and Learning of Mathematics 
at University Level (Holton  2001 ) discusses the secondary-tertiary interface (Wood 
 2001 ) . Also, a special issue of the  International Journal of Mathematical Education 
in Science and Technology (Zazkis and Holton  2005 ) was devoted to this issue. 
Further, a substantial amount has been written about the various mathematical, 
social, and cultural diffi culties involved in this transition (Clark and Lovric  2009 ; 
Gueudet  2008 ; Guzman et al.  1998 ; Hourigan and O’Donoghue  2007 ; Kajander and 
Lovric  2005 ) . In particular, it has been noted that in many countries, upon entry to 
the university, the emphasis changes from a more computational, problem-solving 
approach to a more proof-based approach to mathematics. 
 By “tertiary level”, we refer to undergraduate students majoring in mathematics 
or mathematics education, as well as undergraduate students majoring in other 
subjects, such as engineering or computer science, who take courses containing 
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proofs. We will also consider  inservice secondary teachers, and other professionals 
such as engineers, who take additional mathematics courses that include proof and 
proving. Finally, we include Masters and Ph.D. students in mathematics and math-
ematics education. 
 In Sect.  1 , after discussing how proof at the tertiary level is different from proof 
at the school level, we discuss transitions from secondary to undergraduate level 
and from undergraduate level to graduate. In Sect.  2 , we present research on how 
tertiary students deal with various aspects of proof and proving including logical 
reasoning, understanding and using defi nitions and theorems, selecting examples 
and helpful representations, and knowing how to read and check proofs. In Sect.  3 , 
we provide information, research, and resources on the teaching of proof and prov-
ing at tertiary level. In Sect.  4 , we summarise the preceding sections and pose 
questions for future research. 
 1  The Character of Proof and Proving at Tertiary Level 
 1.1  Proofs at the Tertiary Level 
 The nature of proofs and proving at tertiary level, with its increased demand for 
rigour, constitutes a major hurdle for many beginning university students. At this 
level, constructing proofs involves understanding and using both formal defi nitions 
and previously established theorems, as well as considerable creativity and insight. 
Understanding and constructing such proofs entails a major transition for students 
but one that is often supported by relatively little explicit instruction. These changes 
can be seen as a shift from elementary to advanced mathematical thinking (Selden 
and Selden,  2005 ; Tall  1991 ) , and as going “from describing to defi ning, from con-
vincing to proving in a logical manner based on defi nitions” (Tall  1991 , p. 20). Here 
Tall is apparently referring to the systematisation function of proof. In addition, the 
verifi cation, explanation, discovery, and communication functions (de Villiers  1990 ) 
of proof are all important at tertiary level. 
 Proofs that tertiary students are expected to study, and to construct, are more 
formal than those expected of students at primary or secondary level. In general, 
mathematicians and aspiring mathematicians, such as university mathematics 
majors, prove theorems, whereas children or novices tend to justify through less 
formal forms of argumentation. Tertiary level students may still use informal argu-
ments, examples and intuitive reasoning to think things through initially, but eventually 
such reasoning must be made more formal for communication purposes (Hanna et al. 
 2009 ) , whether for assessments, theses, dissertations, or publications. 
 In addition, proofs at tertiary level generally tend to be longer and more complex 
than those expected of students at primary or secondary level. If one compares typi-
cal secondary-school geometry proofs with proofs in real analysis, linear algebra, 
abstract algebra, or topology, one sees that the objects in geometry are idealisations 
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of real things (points, lines, planes), whereas the objects in real analysis, linear 
 algebra, abstract algebra, or topology (functions, vector spaces, groups, topological 
spaces) are abstract reifi cations. 
 Furthermore, proofs at tertiary level require a larger knowledge base. For example, 
real analysis proofs require a much deeper knowledge of the real number system 
than do secondary-school algebra or geometry proofs. In addition, tertiary profes-
sors increasingly use students’ original proof constructions, not just the reproduc-
tion of textbook or lecture proofs as a means of assessing their students’ content 
understanding. They also place more emphasis on fostering and assessing students’ 
creativity within mathematics, especially at the Masters and Ph.D. levels where 
professors expect students to conjecture interesting new results and to prove and 
publish them. 
 1.2  The Secondary-Tertiary Transition 
 1.2.1  Looking at the Transition from an Anthropological Point of View 
 Clark and Lovric  ( 2008,  2009 ) regard the secondary-tertiary transition as a “modern-
day rite of passage”. They have considered the role of the university mathematical 
community in this transition, the change in the didactic contract with its new 
expectations of student autonomy, the introduction of more abstract concepts, the 
students’ strong emotional reactions to these changes and expectations, the long 
time such transitions take, and the new responsibilities assumed of students and 
their teachers. This transition represents a signifi cant stage in the students’ encul-
turation into the practices of mathematicians (Nickerson and Rasmussen  2009 ; 
Perry et al.  2009a ) . 
 In regard to proof and proving, Clark and Lovric  ( 2008 , pp. 763–764) noted that 
there is a change in the nature of the mathematical objects considered at university, 
a change in the kinds of reasoning done about those objects, and a shift from informal 
to formal language. Students must learn to reason from formal defi nitions, under-
stand what theorems say, apply theorems correctly, and make connections between 
concepts – all of which cause them diffi culties. However, professors unfamiliar with 
secondary school curricula often mistakenly assume that secondary-school students 
are already familiar with elements of logic and can work with implications and 
quantifi ers. To help ease the transition, Lovric  ( 2005 ) has suggested using slightly 
older peer tutors who can empathise with entering university students’ experiences 
and can act as undergraduate teaching assistants. 
 1.2.2  Specifi c Examples of the Secondary-Tertiary Transition 
 Gueudet  ( 2008 ) in her survey article discussed many aspects of the secondary-
tertiary transition. She noted that studies from many different countries “have shown 
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that only a minority of students are able to build consistent proofs at the end of high 
school” (Gueudet  2008 , p. 243). At university, in addition to expecting the produc-
tion of rigorous proofs, professors expect students to use symbols, especially quan-
tifi ers, properly and to exhibit autonomy and fl exibility of thinking. There are also 
new expectations about what requires justifi cation and what does not. For example, 
in French secondary school, when students are asked to show a family of vectors 
forms an orthonormal basis, they need only compute the scalar product for each pair 
of non-identical vectors. However, in a university linear algebra course, students are 
expected to justify this by referring to the theorem establishing that orthonormal 
vectors are independent (Gueudet  2008 , p. 246). Such expectations, often not explicitly 
addressed by professors, constitute a vast change in the didactic contract. 
 In 1998, elementary number theory was introduced into the French secondary-
school curriculum to promote students’ mathematical reasoning in an area in addi-
tion to geometry. Topics included divisibility, Euclid’s algorithm, relatively prime 
numbers, prime factorisation, least common multiples, Bézout’s identity, and Gauss’ 
theorem. Whilst investigating the secondary-tertiary transition within number the-
ory in France, Battie  ( 2009 ) proposed two complementary, and closely intertwined, 
epistemological dimensions. The  organising dimension includes selecting the 
global, logical structure of a proof and associated techniques, such as contradiction, 
induction, or reduction to a fi nite number of cases. The  operative dimension includes 
working effectively with specifi c techniques in the implementation of those global 
choices. This means performing actions, such as using key theorems and properties 
or selecting appropriate symbolic representations and algebraic transformations. 
Battie  ( 2010 ) found that, due to traditional teaching, French secondary students are 
given autonomy mainly in the operative dimension, whereas fi rst-year university 
students are also expected to be responsible for the organising dimension of proofs 
and to be fl uent in both dimensions, and that this was one source of their diffi culties 
with proving. 
 According to Praslon  ( 1999 ) , who also researched the secondary-tertiary transition 
in France, proofs at university play a new role. Some results establish methods or 
provide useful tools, whilst others serve as intermediate steps on a path towards an 
important theorem. Studying tasks related to the derivative in secondary and univer-
sity textbooks, Praslon observed that secondary-school tasks were split into simpler 
subtasks; the derivative was a tool for studying function behaviour rather than itself 
being an object of study; and there was no need for students to develop any real 
mathematical autonomy. In contrast, at university, student autonomy and fl exibility 
between mathematical registers (e.g., algebraic, graphical, and natural language) 
were required. 
 Also in France, according to Castela  ( 2009 ) , when transitioning from Grades 6–9 
in Collège (lower secondary school) to Grades 10 and 11 in Lycée (upper secondary 
school), students are required to show an increasing autonomy as problem solvers 
and mathematics learners. Castela analysed this not in terms of transitioning to 
advanced mathematical thinking, but rather in terms of Chevallard’s  ( 1999 ) anthro-
pological theory of didactics, which considers the constraints of the institutional 
setting in which the mathematical activity takes place. 
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 Similarly in Spain, Bosch, Fonseca, and Gascon (cited in Gueudet  2008 , pp. 
246–247) found that novice university students knew only a single technique for 
a given task and, after applying it, could not interpret the result. The authors 
found this corresponded to Spanish secondary-school textbooks where a single 
technique is proposed, interpreting the result is (mostly) not required, and working 
with mathematical models is rare. In the examined secondary-school textbooks 
the focus was on narrow tasks with rigid solution methods; topics were also 
poorly connected. 
 Knuth  ( 2002 ) interviewed 16 U.S. secondary-school mathematics teachers, 
with from 3–20 years’ teaching experience, some with master’s degrees, partici-
pating in a professional development programme. Knuth asked about their con-
ceptions of proof and its place in secondary-school mathematics. All professed 
the view that a proof establishes the truth of a conclusion, but several also thought 
it might be possible to fi nd some contradictory evidence to refute a proof. In the 
context of secondary school, the teachers distinguished formal proofs, less formal 
proofs, and informal proofs. For some, two-column geometry proofs were the 
epitome of formal proofs. All considered proof as appropriate only for those stu-
dents in advanced mathematics classes and those intending to pursue mathematics-
related majors at university. 
 A case study of two typical Irish senior secondary-school mathematics classes 
(Hourigan and O’Donoghue  2007 ) found that the (implicit) didactic contract 
included the following: The terminal exam should be the central aim of the class; 
the teacher should not depart from the set lesson routine of going over homework 
quickly, introducing a new topic through a few worked examples, and having 
students practise similar exercises; the teacher should not ask pupils complicated 
questions; the teacher should provide pupils a step-by-step breakdown of prob-
lem-solving techniques; pupils should not interrupt the lesson unnecessarily; the 
teacher should not ask questions that require thought and refl ection (pp. 471–472). 
Whilst the authors concentrated on problem solving, and did not specifically 
mention proof and proving, they concluded that “mathematics-intensive 
courses at tertiary level need independent learners possessing [the] conceptual 
and transferable skills required to solve unfamiliar problems [but] the devel-
opment of these essential skills is not fostered within the [secondary] class-
rooms studied” (p. 473). 
 Lithner  ( 2004 ) stated that in Sweden the beginning undergraduate learning envi-
ronment is dominated largely by textbooks, teaching and exams. He investigated the 
reasoning required by the exercises in one calculus textbook and personally worked 
through, and classifi ed, the solution strategies required by 598 single-variable cal-
culus exercises. He found that 85% were solvable by identifi cation of similarities 
(essentially mimicking), 8% by local plausible reasoning, and 7% by global plau-
sible reasoning. He concluded that “it is possible in about 70% of the exercises to 
base the solution not only on searching for similar situations, but on searching only 
the solved examples” (p. 422) and suggested that “a larger proportion of not so very 
diffi cult GPR [global plausible reasoning] exercises should be included in text-
books” (p. 426). 
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 1.2.3  Epistemological and Cognitive Diffi culties 
of the Secondary-Tertiary Transition 
 Guzman et al.  ( 1998 ) pointed out, that secondary-school students can (almost) 
always take it for granted that a given problem has a solution. In considering some 
epistemological and cognitive diffi culties of the secondary-tertiary transition, the 
authors noted that “existence proofs are notoriously diffi cult for students” and “it is 
not easy for them [the students] to recognize their need, as this type of situation is 
rarely raised in secondary mathematics” (p. 753). Proofs of suffi ciency are especially 
diffi cult. “Sometimes, a proof requires not only to apply directly a theorem in a 
particular case, but also to adapt or even to transform a theorem before recognizing 
and/or using it” (p. 753). Guzman et al. suggested that tertiary students need to learn 
to distinguish between mathematical knowledge and meta-mathematical knowledge 
of the correctness, relevance and elegance of proof and take responsibility for their 
own mathematical learning. 
 In addition, some concepts learned at secondary school need to be reconstructed 
at tertiary level; these, too, constitute part of the transition’s epistemological and 
cognitive diffi culties. For example, in secondary-school geometry, a tangent is 
defi ned globally as the unique line that touches a circle at exactly one point and is 
perpendicular to the radius. However, in calculus, the tangent to a function at a point 
is defi ned locally as the limit of approximating secant lines and, somewhat later, as 
the line whose slope is given by the value of the derivative at that point (Biza et al. 
 2008 ; Biza and Zachariades  2010 ) . This change from a global to a local view of 
tangents can be diffi cult for students. For example, even after having studied analy-
sis (i.e., calculus) from the beginning of senior secondary school, French fi nal-year 
secondary students still had great diffi culty determining from a graph whether a 
given line was tangent to a particular function at an infl ection point or a cusp 
(Castela, cited in Artigue  1992 , pp. 209–210). 
 The treatment of equality in analysis is another instance of a concept that needs to 
be reconstructed. In secondary-school algebra and trigonometry, students grow used 
to proving that two expressions are equal by transforming one into the other using 
known equivalences. However, in analysis one can prove two numbers  a and  b are 
equal by showing that for every  0e >  , one has  | |a b e- <  . That this idea is not easy 
to grasp is indicated by a French study in which more than 40% of entering university 
students thought that if two numbers  a and  b are less than 1/ N for every positive 
integer  N , then they are not equal, only infi nitely close (Artigue  1999 , p. 1379). 
 1.3  The Transition from Undergraduate to Graduate Study 
in Mathematics 
 There are also transitions from undergraduate to Masters and Ph.D. level study, 
where one eventually has to fi nd and prove some previously unknown theorems of 
interest to the mathematical community (Duffi n and Simpson  2002,  2006 ; Geraniou 
 2010 ; Herzig  2002 ) . 
39717 Transitions and Proof and Proving at Tertiary Level
 1.3.1  The Transition to a Research Degree in the U.K 
 Geraniou  ( 2010 ) noted that, in the U.K., “the transition from a taught degree to 
a research degree involves signifi cant changes in the way students deal with the 
subject” (p. 282). Persistence, interest, confi dence, and problem-solving skills, 
as well as the guidance of the thesis/dissertation supervisor, are often cited as 
crucial for the successful transition to graduate studies. Geraniou  ( 2010 ) 
described Ph.D. students as going through three motivational transition stages. 
The fi rst, in the fi rst year, is the  adjustment stage, during which a student comes 
to terms with what a pure research Ph.D. degree is and develops survival strate-
gies. The second, beginning in the fi rst half of the second year and continuing 
until a student’s research is complete, is the  expertise stage. The student must 
research an unsolved problem, but fi rst may have to develop the appropriate 
research and problem-solving skills (which may be lacking due to dependence 
on memorisation for undergraduate success). The fi nal stage is the  articulation 
stage, during which time the student actually writes the Ph.D. dissertation in 
fi nal form. 
 Duffi n and Simpson  ( 2006 ) noted that U.K. undergraduates usually experience 
lecture classes of 100 or more where syllabuses are clearly defi ned, the pace of new 
material is set, and the majority of the given problems have predetermined solu-
tions. However, when students reach graduate school:
 there is no formal requirement to attend or pass taught courses during the period of doctoral 
study and almost all of a student’s three years of study is spent in independent research 
towards the production of a single, substantial dissertation … [which is] required to be the 
result of original research, to show an awareness of the relationship of the research to a 
wider fi eld of knowledge and, potentially, to be publishable. (p. 236) 
 In a small study of the entire population of 13 Ph.D. students at one medium size 
U.K. university, Duffi n and Simpson  ( 2002,  2006 ) uncovered three distinct learning 
styles. There were  natural learners whose tendency for independent thinking, rather 
than memorisation, no longer proved a hindrance as it had when they were under-
graduates and who found the movement to graduate study smooth. There were  alien 
learners who had succeeded in the past by reproducing proofs, learning procedural 
techniques and accepting new ideas without being overly concerned about their 
meanings; they found the transition to graduate study far from smooth. Lastly, one 
student had a fl exible learning style, adjusting it according to what he wished to gain 
from the material. 
 1.3.2  The Transition to Graduate Study in the U.S 
 In the U.S., doctoral students spend the fi rst 3 years taking content courses and 
passing a set of comprehensive examinations. Only after that, do they begin their 
research. Even so, many students still feel unprepared. Herzig  ( 2002 ) found in one 
large U.S. Ph.D-granting university that students were discouraged from fi lling in 
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gaps by taking Masters level courses, felt they could not ask questions of their 
professors, and wanted more feedback in their courses.
 Rather than the coursework building on students’ enthusiasm for mathematics and  involving 
them in authentic mathematical work, coursework distanced students from mathematics 
making it more diffi cult for them to learn what they needed to learn to participate effectively 
in mathematical practice. (Herzig  2002 , p. 192) 
 Even after students had “proved themselves” by passing their comprehensive 
examinations, they felt they wanted more interaction with professors. 
 Doctoral content courses require students to construct original proofs; later for 
the dissertation, they need to conjecture and prove interesting, new results. However, 
many entering U.S. mathematics graduate students have a limited ability to con-
struct proofs -- a major stumbling block to success in their doctoral content courses. 
To alleviate this problem, Selden and Selden  ( 2009b ) designed a one-semester 
beginning graduate course in which students construct a variety of different kinds of 
proofs, present them at the blackboard, and receive extensive criticism and advice. 
The Seldens divide proofs into their  formal-rhetorical parts and their  problem-
centred parts, which they see as somewhat like Battie’s  ( 2009 ) organising and oper-
ative dimensions, respectively (cf. Sect.  1.2.2 ). The Seldens aim to have students 
automate the formal-rhetorical parts of proofs so they can devote scarce working 
memory to the problem-centred parts (Selden et al.  2010 ) . 
 2  How Tertiary Students Deal with Various Aspects 
of Proof and Proving 
 Both tertiary students’ learning to understand and construct proofs and professors’ 
teaching tertiary students about proof and proving are daunting tasks, not easily 
approached by lecture alone. The following subsections provide information on ter-
tiary students’ documented proving diffi culties, along with some suggestions from 
the literature on helping students avoid or overcome them. 
 2.1  Language and Reasoning 
 It is important that students know the difference between the pragmatic everyday use 
of logical terms and their mathematical use. Some university students fi nd it chal-
lenging to keep the everyday and the mathematics registers separate (Lee and Smith 
 2009 ) . For example, students sometimes confuse “limit” with its everyday meaning 
of a bound as in “speed limit” (Cornu  1991 ) . Even students for whom such confu-
sions are not a problem, can have other diffi culties with mathematical language. 
 Rather than presenting students with truth tables or having them formally construct 
valid arguments, Epp  ( 2003 ) has suggested stressing the difference between everyday 
and mathematical language and emphasising “exercises where students apply logical 
principles to a mix of carefully chosen natural language and  mathematical statements” 
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because “simply memorizing abstract, logical formulas and learning to apply them 
mechanically has little impact on students’ broader  reasoning powers” (p. 894). 
 2.1.1  Quantifi ers 
 Students have diffi culties understanding the importance of, and implications of, the 
order of existential and universal quantifi ers, as well as knowing their often implied 
scope (Dubinsky and Yiparaki  2000 ; Epp  2009 ) . For example, in a study 61 U.S. 
undergraduate mathematics students, many in their third or fourth year, it was found 
that they could unpack the logical structure of informally worded statements correctly 
just 8.5% of the time (Selden and Selden  1995 ) . In addition, undergraduate students 
often consider the effect of an interchange of existential and universal quantifi ers as a 
mere rewording (David and Movshovitz-Hadar  1998 ; Dubinsky and Yiparaki  2000 ) . 
 Roh  ( 2009 ) gave U.S. undergraduate introductory real analysis students two 
arguments, one to show that the sequence {1/ n } converges to 0, the other to show 
that it did not converge to 0. No student noticed that both arguments were falla-
cious, because ε  was chosen to depend on the positive integer  N . In general, stu-
dents have diffi culty with proving universally quantifi ed statements, in which one 
customarily considers an arbitrary, but fi xed element, as in e d-  real analysis 
proofs. They often wonder why the result has been proved for all elements, rather 
than only for the specifi c arbitrary, but fi xed element selected (Selden et al.  2010 ) . 
 2.1.2  Proof by Contradiction and Its Link with Negation 
 Students sometimes fi nd proofs by contradiction diffi cult to understand and construct 
(Epp  2003 ; Reid and Dobbin  1998 ) . One reason may be the diffi culties students have 
with the formulation of negations in mathematics. Antonini  ( 2001 ) , studying Italian 
fi rst-year calculus students, found they had three ways, or schemes, for dealing with 
negation, often taken over from natural language. The fi rst scheme was that of the 
opposite. For example, the negation of “ f is increasing” was seen as “ f is decreasing”. 
 The second more prevalent scheme was that of considering possibilities. For 
example, the students saw the negation of “ g is strictly decreasing” as having sev-
eral possibilities, namely,  g can be increasing, constant, or decreasing but not strictly 
decreasing. Antonini  ( 2001 ) conjectured that one reason for the strength of stu-
dents’ scheme of possibilities is that in natural language one can often only express 
the negation of  p as “not  p ”. Consequently Antonini  ( 2003 ) later suggested that the 
tendency to express negation in terms of possibilities may require specifi c peda-
gogical attention. The third scheme, that of properties, is the one used in mathemati-
cal reasoning. For example, to deny that “f is increasing” one says “there exist  x and 
 y such that  x <  y and  ( ) ( )f x f y³  ” which expresses the negation in a positive way 
using a property common to all non-increasing functions. Doing so allows one to 
proceed with a proof by contradiction. 
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 2.2  Students’ Initial Nonstandard Views of Proof 
 Harel and Sowder  ( 1998 ) investigated U.S. undergraduate students’ views of proof. 
They defi ned a person’s  proof scheme to be that which “constitutes ascertaining and 
persuading for that person” (p. 244). They categorised the proof schemes they found 
as:  external conviction ,  empirical , and  analytical . The fi rst two are somewhat idio-
syncratic and nonstandard; the latter are like proofs that mathematicians would 
accept. In an earlier study, Martin and Harel  ( 1989 ) asked 101 preservice elemen-
tary teachers to judge verifi cations of a familiar result,  if the sum of the digits of a 
whole number is divisible by 3, then the number is divisible by 3 , and an unfamiliar 
result,  if a divides b and b divides c, then a divides c . Both inductive and deductive 
arguments were acceptable to these students with fewer than 10% consistently 
rejecting inductive arguments. 
 Tertiary students sometimes mistakenly think proofs are constructed in a linear 
fashion from the “top down” because this is the way they have seen them pre-
sented in lecture. Selden and Selden  ( 2009a ) report a mathematics education 
graduate student who thought this based on her undergraduate experience in a real 
analysis course and was very surprised to learn this was not so. Such ideas may 
also be a result, at least in the U.S., of being required to construct two-column 
geometry proofs in a linear way from the “top down” in secondary school. The 
normative way to construct proofs, as seen by U.S. secondary-school geometry 
teachers, is to always give a reason for each statement in a two-column proof 
before continuing, that is, immediately after the statement has been made (Weiss 
et al.  2009 ) . Further, they view it as unnatural to let a student make an assumption 
in the middle of constructing a proof in order to investigate whether the proof 
might be completed that way, and then come back later to reconsider the assump-
tion (Nachlieli and Herbst  2009 ) . Perhaps employing a less rigid style of proving 
at secondary school and university would help alleviate such linear “top down” 
views of constructing proofs. 
 Another suggestion is to have students fi rst write the  formal-rhetorical part 
of a proof, that is, the hypotheses and the conclusion and then unpack and exam-
ine the conclusion in order to structure the proof. Doing so “exposes the real 
problem” to be solved and allows one to concentrate on the  problem-centred 
parts of a proof (Selden and Selden  2009a ) . For further information, see 
Sect.  1.3.2 above. 
 2.3  Knowing, Using, and Understanding Other Constituents 
of Proofs and Proving 
 Although proofs at tertiary level are rigorous deductive arguments which require 
reasoning with correct logic, students need to learn more than logic in order to 
become successful provers. 
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 2.3.1  Understanding Formal Defi nitions and Using Them in Proving 
 Too often tertiary mathematics students can recite defi nitions yet fail to use them 
when asked to solve problems or prove theorems. For example, Alcock and Simpson 
 ( 2004 ) reported on 18 British fi rst-year real analysis students, a number of whom 
argued using prototypical examples of convergent sequences rather than the formal 
defi nition of convergence. Defi nitions need to become  operable for an individual. 
Bills and Tall  ( 1998 ) consider a defi nition to be  formally operable for a student if 
that student “is able to use it in creating or (meaningfully) reproducing a formal 
argument [proof]” (p. 104). 
 In addition, as Edwards and Ward  ( 2004 ) pointed out, instructors need to make 
clear the distinction between mathematical defi nitions ( stipulated or  analytic defi -
nitions) and many everyday or dictionary defi nitions ( descriptive ,  extracted , or 
 synthetic defi nitions) of which students may not be aware. One could help them 
become aware of this distinction by discussing it with them and by engaging them 
in the act of defi ning. For example, in a university geometry course, Edwards and 
Ward suggest beginning with the usual defi nition of triangle, which is initially use-
ful in all three of the Euclidean plane, the sphere, and the hyperbolic plane; but 
eventually students will notice that that certain theorems are not true for all trian-
gles on the sphere, a problem which requires a refi ned defi nition which they can 
participate in developing. 
 Furthermore, Lakatos  ( 1961 ) suggested that there can be a dialectical interplay 
between concept formation, defi nition construction, and proof. He also developed 
the ideas of  zero-defi nitions (initial tentative or “working defi nitions”) and  proof-
generated defi nitions (analytic defi nitions related to proof). To bring this interplay 
to students’ awareness, one needs to design problems whose resolution requires 
defi nition construction. 
 Following Lakatos, Ouvrier-Buffet  ( 2002,  2004,  2006 ) sought to engage entering 
French university students in zero-defi nition construction. She selected the mathe-
matical concept of  tree (giving it a neutral name); in France formal defi nitions of 
tree are not presented in secondary school. She fi rst gave the students four examples 
and two non-examples of trees, asking them to infer a zero-defi nition. This was 
followed by a task requiring them to prove that a  given connected graph contained 
 a tree. Ouvrier-Buffet reported that students attempting this proof sometimes, but 
not always, revised their initial defi nitions. 
 2.3.2  Understanding the Statement of a Theorem to Be Proved 
 At tertiary level, the pace of lecture courses like abstract algebra or real analysis is 
often very fast. Formal defi nitions are introduced one after another, followed by 
theorems proved by the professor or the textbook. Subsequent assignments often 
consist of requests to prove (moderately) original theorems using the newly intro-
duced defi nitions and theorems. Upon being given a statement to prove, a student’s 
fi rst job is to understand both the statement’s structure and its content. 
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 If a theorem is stated informally, then the students must fi rst ascertain which 
are the hypotheses and which is the conclusion. For example, they need to know that 
the word “whenever” is usually a synonym for “if” and hence introduces one of the 
hypotheses. Whilst one can attempt to teach such linguistic variations, it would 
probably be easier if professors, at least initially, stated theorems using the familiar 
 if-then and  if-and-only-if forms. 
 The student’s next job is to unpack the conclusion in order to understand it. This 
can entail looking up and unpacking the defi nitions of unfamiliar terms. Carefully 
unpacking these defi nitions can inform students where to begin a proof. However, 
instead of unpacking the conclusion, students will often initially focus on the hypoth-
eses, deduce just anything and never arrive at the conclusion (Selden et al.  2010 ) . 
 2.3.3  Interpreting and Using Previous Theorems and Defi nitions 
in Proving 
 Undergraduate students sometimes fail to use or interpret relevant theorems correctly 
or fail to verify that the conditions of the hypotheses of a theorem are satisfi ed. 
 For example, the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, guaranteeing a unique 
prime decomposition of integers, forms part of the core mathematics curriculum for 
preservice elementary teachers. However, in one Canadian study, 8 of 21 preservice 
teachers appeared to deny the uniqueness. For example, instead of applying this 
Theorem when asked whether 17 3 was a square number, these students took out 
their calculators to extract the square root. In addition, many of these students 
believed that prime decomposition means decomposition into  small primes (Zazkis 
and Campbell  1996 ; Zazkis and Liljedahl  2004 ) . 
 Undergraduate students often ignore relevant hypotheses or apply the converse 
of a theorem when it does not hold. In addition they sometimes use theorems, espe-
cially named theorems as vague “slogans” that can be easily remembered as pat 
“solutions” to answer questions to which the theorems apparently apply, whether 
they do or not (e.g., Hazzan and Leron  1996 ) . 
 Finally, students sometimes have diffi culty with substitution into a defi nition or 
into the statement of a theorem to be used or proved. This problem occurs more often 
when the substitution involves a compound variable (e.g., Selden et al.  2010 , p. 212). 
 2.3.4  Having a Repertoire of Examples and Using Them Appropriately 
 Constructing all but the most straightforward of proofs involves a good deal of per-
sistence and problem solving to put together relevant concepts. In order to use a 
concept fl exibly, it is important to have a rich  concept image. 1 
 1  The idea of concept image was introduced by Vinner and Hershkowitz  ( 1980 ) and elaborated by Tall 
and Vinner  ( 1981 ) . One’s concept image is the collection of examples, non-examples, facts, proper-
ties, relationships, diagrams, images, and visualisations, that one associates with that concept. 
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 In many upper-level undergraduate mathematics courses, students are given 
abstract defi nitions together with a few examples, after which they are expected to 
use these defi nitions reasonably fl exibly. To do so, they may need to fi nd additional 
examples or non-examples and to prove or disprove related conjectures, more or 
less without guidance. Such activities can help build students’ concept images, 
especially for newly introduced concepts. 
 Dahlberg and Housman  ( 1997 ) presented 11 third- and fourth-year U.S. under-
graduate mathematics students with an unfamiliar formal defi nition. They asked the 
students to study the defi nition, to generate examples and nonexamples, to determine 
which of several functions satisfi ed it, and to determine the truth of four conjectures 
involving it. They found that students used four basic learning strategies: example 
generation, reformulation, decomposition and synthesis, and memorisation. Students 
who used example generation (with refl ection), made the most progress in under-
standing the new concept. In contrast, those who employed memorisation or decom-
position and synthesis often misinterpreted the defi nition. 
 Thus, generating examples and counterexamples can help students enrich their 
concept images and enable them to judge the probable truth of conjectures. To dis-
prove a conjecture, it takes just one counterexample, so having a repertoire of exam-
ples is useful. In addition, examples are helpful in “making sense” of the statements 
in a proof. 
 However, students are often reluctant to generate examples. When Watson and 
Mason  ( 2002 ) asked U.K. graduate students for an example of a continuous func-
tion which is not everywhere differentiable, they all responded  | |x  . When asked for 
a second example, most suggested a translate of  | |x  . When asked for a third exam-
ple, they commented that one could generate a vast number of examples from  | |x  , 
but had trouble coming up with other different examples. Watson and Mason  ( 2005 ) 
have since examined using examples as a teaching and learning strategy. 
 Weber et al.  ( 2005 ) examined 11 U.S. transition-to-proof course students’ use of 
examples in proving. Some never used examples; those who did, tried to use them 
correctly to understand a statement, to evaluate whether an assertion was correct, or 
to construct a counterexample. However, their attempts were largely ineffective; 
only one in nine attempts produced a valid or mostly valid proof. Frequently, the 
students selected inappropriate examples and did not check to see whether these 
satisfi ed the relevant defi nitions or the conditions of the statement to be proved. 
 In sum, students can fi nd it useful to construct both examples and non-examples 
to clarify a new concept. In addition, “the ideal examples to use in teaching are 
those that are  only just examples, and the ideal non-examples are those that are  very 
nearly examples” (Askew and Wiliam  1995 , p. iii). 
 2.3.5  Selecting Helpful Representations When Proving 
 Another aspect of understanding and using a concept is knowing which symbolic 
representations are likely to be appropriate in certain situations. Concepts can have 
several (easily manipulated) symbolic representations or none at all. For example, 
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prime numbers have no such representation; they are sometimes defi ned as those 
positive integers having exactly two factors or being divisible only by 1 and themselves. 
Zazkis and Liljedahl  ( 2004 ) have argued that the lack of an (easily manipulated) 
symbolic representation makes understanding prime numbers especially diffi cult, in 
particular, for preservice teachers. 
 Some symbolic representations can make certain features  transparent and others 
 opaque . For example, representing 784 as 28 2 makes the property of being a perfect 
square transparent and the property of being divisible by 98 opaque. Likewise, certain 
results in linear algebra are more transparent and easier to prove if expressed as 
linear transformations than as matrices. Students often lack the experience to know 
when to use a given symbolic representation. 
 Moving fl exibly between representations (e.g., symbolic or graphic for functions) is 
an indication of the richness of one’s understanding of a concept (Even  1998 ) . However, 
conversion between representations can be both cognitively complex and asymmetric, 
that is, it can be easier to go from an algebraic to a graphic representation than vice 
versa; in linear algebra, such conversions are particularly diffi cult (Duval  2006 ) . 
 2.3.6  Knowing to Use Factual Knowledge 
 Two U. S. companion studies asked 19 fi rst-year university calculus students and 28 
second-year university differential equations students to solve fi ve moderately non-
routine calculus problems (problems slightly different from what they had been 
taught). Immediately afterwards, the students took a short routine test which showed 
they had the resources needed to solve the fi ve problems. However, they remained 
unaware of the resources’ relevance and unable to bring them to mind (Selden et al. 
 2000 ; Selden et al.  1994 ) . The researchers conjectured that, in studying and doing 
homework, the students had mainly mimicked worked examples from their text-
books; thus, they never needed to consider different ways to solve problems and had 
no experience at bringing their various resources to mind. 
 To date, mathematics education research has had little to say about how one 
brings an idea, formula, defi nition or theorem to mind when it would be particularly 
helpful; and probably, there are several ways. Carlson and Bloom  ( 2005 ) found that 
mathematicians solving problems frequently did not access the most useful infor-
mation at the right time, suggesting how diffi cult it is to draw appropriately from 
even a vast reservoir of facts, concepts, and heuristics. Instead, the authors found 
that the mathematicians’ progress depended on their approaches; that is, on such 
things as their ability to persist in making and testing various conjectures. 
 2.3.7  Knowing Which Theorems Are Important and Useful 
 Seeing the relevance and usefulness of one’s knowledge and bringing it to bear on a 
problem or a proof is not easy, but seems to become easier with experience and 
training. For example, Weber and Alcock  ( 2004 ) observed four U.S. undergraduates 
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and four U.S. doctoral students attempting to prove or disprove whether specifi c 
pairs of groups are isomorphic. The undergraduates fi rst looked to see if the groups 
had the same cardinality; then attempted unsuccessfully to construct an isomor-
phism between them. In contrast, the doctoral students examined properties pre-
served under isomorphism. In a somewhat similar study, in trying to prove 
propositions about groups, four U.S. doctoral students immediately recalled the 
First Isomorphism Theorem, whereas the four U.S. undergraduates did not. When 
asked why, the doctoral students typically said “Because this is such a fundamental 
and crucial fact that it’s one of the fi rst things you turn to” (Weber  2001 , p. 113). 
 In yet another U.S. study, four undergraduates who had completed an abstract 
algebra course and four professional algebraists were interviewed about the ways 
they think about and represent groups. The algebraists thought about groups in 
terms of multiplication tables, generators and relations, and could call on specifi c 
examples. In contrast, none of the undergraduates could provide a single intuitive 
description of a group; for them, it was a structure that satisfi es a list of axioms 
(Weber and Alcock  2004 ) . 
 Perhaps, undergraduates mainly study completed proofs and focus on their 
details, rather than noticing the importance of certain results and how they fi t 
together. Thus, they may not come to see other theorems as important or useful. The 
mathematics education literature contains few specifi c suggestions on how to teach 
students to know which theorems are likely to be important in various situations. 
 Knowing the most effective way to proceed in proving a theorem is important. 
Weber and Alcock  ( 2004 ) discussed two reasoning strategies: fi rst,  semantic rea-
soning, in which the prover uses examples to gain insight and translates that insight 
into an argument based on appropriate defi nitions and theorems; and second,  syn-
tactic reasoning, in which the prover uses the statement of the theorem to structure 
a proof and draws logical inferences from associated defi nitions and theorems. 
Alcock  ( 2009c ) described the contrasting perspectives of two professors who teach 
transition-to-proof courses in the U.S.; one used a semantic approach and empha-
sised meaning and the generation of examples; the other used a syntactic approach 
and emphasised precision in notation and structural thinking. Yet both were prepar-
ing students for similar proof-based courses. 
 Iannone  ( 2009 ) explored U.K. mathematicians’ views on this; her participants 
said that syntactic knowledge is effective or suitable for proofs about concepts not 
having an initial pictorial representation, such as showing a sequence does or does 
not converge. However, syntactic knowledge can be used only ineffectively or not at 
all if the proof requires very complex syntactic representations. The mathematicians 
considered knowing how to tackle a proof, whether syntactically or semantically, a 
meta-mathematical ability that students need to acquire. 
 2.3.8  Knowing How to Read and Check Proofs 
 An integral part of the proving process is the ability to tell whether one’s argument 
is correct and proves the theorem it was intended to prove. Selden and Selden  ( 2003 ) 
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conducted a study of how eight U.S. undergraduates from the beginning of a 
 transition-to-proof course validated proofs. When asked how they read proofs, the 
students said they checked carefully line-by-line to see whether each assertion fol-
lowed from previous statements, checked to make sure the steps were logical, and 
looked to see whether any computations were left out. The students evaluated and 
judged the correctness of four student-generated “proofs” of a very elementary 
number theory theorem. They made judgements regarding the correctness of each 
purported proof four times. The fi rst time, these judgements were just 46% correct, 
whereas the last time they were 81% correct, a difference due to the students’ hav-
ing reconsidered, and refl ected on, the purported proofs several times. 
 Several transition-to-proof textbooks include purported proofs to validate, but Selden 
and Selden’s  ( 2003 ) results suggest it would probably be helpful to have students vali-
date actual student-generated proofs. When mathematicians at one U.S. university 
implemented proof-validation group activities once a week in abstract algebra, they 
found those activities improved their students’ proof writing (Powers et al.  2010 ) . 
 Most secondary-school students have no experience with proof evaluation, because 
their teachers not only do not teach it but may not be expert at it either. For example, 
Knuth  ( 2002 ) gave 16 U.S. secondary-school teachers fi ve sets of statements with three–
fi ve arguments purporting to justify them; in all, 13 arguments were proofs and eight 
were not. In general, the teachers were successful in recognising proofs, with 93% of the 
proofs rated as such. However, a third of the nonproofs were also rated as proofs. 
 Having described a variety of diffi culties tertiary students have with constructing 
and comprehending proofs, we next consider various ways of helping students avoid 
or overcome these. 
 3  Teaching Proof and Proving at the Tertiary Level 
 Tertiary students learn about proof and proving in at least two different classroom 
contexts. First, in small classes, where in addition to or instead of hearing lectures, 
students may present their own proofs at the blackboard and receive critiques. They 
may work in small groups with the teacher acting as a resource/coach, or teachers 
and students may jointly work as a community of practice to develop the mathemat-
ics. Second, in large lecture classes, of 40 to 100 (or more), such individual attention 
is not possible. 
 3.1  Courses That Teach Proving 
 3.1.1  Transition-to-Proof Courses 
 In the U.S., undergraduate mathematics majors typically spend the fi rst 2 years in 
computationally taught courses like calculus, beginning differential equations, and 
elementary linear algebra before going on to proof-based courses, such as real 
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 analysis and abstract algebra. Consequently, many U.S. universities have instituted 
 transition-to-proof or  bridge courses (Moore  1994 ) ; others use linear algebra, 
number theory (Smith  2006 ) or a discrete mathematics course (Epp  2004 ) for this 
purpose. Mathematicians have written more than 25 transition-to-proof course 
textbooks: for example, Velleman  ( 1994 ) and Fendel and Resek  ( 1990 ) . Whilst 
their contents vary, such courses and books often begin with a decontextualised 
treatment of logic emphasising truth tables and valid arguments, followed by a 
discussion of direct and indirect proofs, sets, equivalence relations, functions, and 
mathematical induction. After that, the books diverge, selecting specifi c mathe-
matical areas, such as graph theory or number theory, in which students are to 
practise proving. 
 The courses are often relatively small, having perhaps 15–40 students; the 
teaching methods can vary widely: small group learning in class, student presenta-
tions at the blackboard, lectures, or a mix of all these. However, not many studies 
of the effectiveness of such courses have been conducted. Marty  ( 1991 ) examined 
the later success of all 120 students in his introductory proof courses (i.e., bridge 
courses) at one U.S. university over a 10 year period. He compared the students 
who received his instruction with 190 students taught in a traditional lecture for-
mat. He found his students two to three times more likely to pass their subsequent 
courses in real analysis and four times as likely to continue their studies of advanced 
mathematics. 
 A number of studies, other than for effectiveness, have been conducted on 
transition-to-proof courses. For example, Baker and Campbell  ( 2004 ) identifi ed 
problems transition-to-proof course students experience in proof writing. Weber 
et al.  ( 2005 ) examined how transition-to-proof course students use examples (see 
Sect.  2.3.4 ). 
 3.1.2  Proving in a Community of Practice 
 In a second university course in plane geometry for Colombian preservice secondary 
teachers, Perry et al.  ( 2008 ) developed a methodology based in part on a reconstruc-
tive approach (Human and Nel  1984 ) that harks back to Freudenthal’s  ( 1973 ) ideas. 
The content is not from a textbook nor is it presented by the teacher. Instead, the 
teacher and students as a community construct and develop a reduced Euclidean 
axiom system involving points, lines, planes, angles, triangles, and quadrilaterals. 
They jointly defi ne geometric objects, empirically explore problems, formulate and 
verify conjectures, and write deductive arguments. Consequently, the students par-
ticipate in axiomatisation and learn which basic elements they can use to justify 
statements. The teacher as expert orchestrates the process through a carefully devel-
oped set of questions and tasks  ( Perry et al.  2009b ) , the use of a dynamic geometry 
programme ( Cabri ) for developing conjectures, and careful management of the 
class. The approach provides the preservice teachers with experiences that they can 
use with their future pupils. 
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 3.1.3  Moore Method Courses 
 This distinctive method of teaching at tertiary level was developed by the 
 accomplished U.S. mathematician R. L. Moore (Parker  2005 ) ; it has been continued 
by his students and their mathematical descendants (Coppin et al.  2009 ; Mahavier 
 1999 ) . It has been remarkably successful in Ph.D. level courses, but has also been 
used at the undergraduate level in small classes of 15–30. Typically, the teacher 
provides students with a set of notes containing defi nitions and statements of theo-
rems or conjectures and asks the students to prove or provide counterexamples 
without help from anyone (except perhaps the teacher). The teacher structures the 
material and critiques the students’ efforts. Students just begin. However, once hav-
ing proved the fi rst small theorem, a student can often progress very rapidly. Though 
interesting, Moore Method courses have been only a little researched (Smith  2006 ) . 
However, the  Journal of Inquiry-Based Learning in Mathematics publishes univer-
sity-level courses notes and practical advice for such courses. 
 3.1.4  Co-construction of Proofs 
 McKee et al.  ( 2010 ) implemented a modifi ed Moore Method in a small (at most 10 
students) supplementary, voluntary, proving class, for undergraduate real analysis 
students who felt unsure how to construct proofs. The supplement instructor wrote 
a theorem entirely new to the students, but similar to one they were to prove for 
homework, on the board. Then the students, or the supplement instructor if need be, 
suggested what to do next. For each suggested action, such as writing an appropriate 
defi nition, drawing a sketch, or introducing cases, one student was asked to carry 
out the action at the blackboard. This process aimed to get students to refl ect on 
what had occurred and later perform the same or similar actions autonomously on 
the assigned homework. All students were encouraged to participate in co-con-
structing the proof. 
 The entire co-construction process, with accompanying discussions, was slow – 
so slow that only one theorem was proved and discussed in detail in each 75-minute 
supplement period. However, the students reported that they enjoyed this method 
of learning and the real analysis teacher reported improvements in the students’ 
proof writing. 
 3.1.5  The Method of Scientifi c Debate 
 Daniel Alibert and colleagues at the University of Grenoble in France designed the 
 method of scientifi c debate in which fi rst-year university students are encouraged to 
become part of a classroom mathematical community. In one implementation 
(Alibert and Thomas  1991 ) , the class consisted of about 100 students. First, the 
teacher got the students to make conjectures which were written on the blackboard 
without an immediate evaluation. Then the students discussed these, supporting 
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their views by various arguments – a proof, a refutation or a counterexample. The 
conjectures that were proved became theorems. There rest became “false-statements” 
with a corresponding counterexample. The method has been systematically imple-
mented for many years. 
 For the method of scientifi c debate to be successful, it is necessary to renegotiate 
the didactic contract (Brousseau  1997 ) so that students come to understand and 
accept their responsibilities. In addition, the teacher needs to refrain from revealing 
opinions, allow time for students to develop their arguments, and encourage 
maximum student participation (for details see Legrand  2001 ) . 
 3.2  Alternative Ways of Presenting Proofs 
 Whilst a traditional defi nition-theorem-proof style of lecture presentation may 
 convey the content in the most effi cient way, there are other ways of presenting 
proofs that may enable students to gain more insight. 
 3.2.1  Generic Proofs 
 For certain theorems, a teacher can go through a (suitable) proof using a generic 
example (particular case) that is neither too trivial nor too complicated. Gauss’ 
proof that the sum of the fi rst  n integers is  n ( n + 1)/2, done for  n = 100 is one such 
generic proof. Done with care, going over a generic proof interactively with stu-
dents can enable them to “see” for themselves the general argument embedded in 
the particular case. There is one caveat; there is some danger that students will not 
understand the generic character of the proof. In an attempt to avoid this, one can 
subsequently have them write out the general proof (Rowland  2002 ) . 
 In an intensive study with 10 fi rst-year Israeli linear algebra students, Malek and 
Movshovitz-Hadar  ( 2011 ) investigated the use of generic proofs, which they have 
called “transparent pseudo-proofs”(Movshovitz-Hadar  1988 ). Their students bene-
fi ted by acquiring “transferable cognitive structures related to proof and proving” 
(Malek and Movshovitz-Hadar  2009 , p. 71). Further, Leron and Zaslavsky  ( 2009 ) 
stated that the advantage of generic proofs is that “they enable students to engage 
with the main ideas of the complete proof in an intuitive and familiar context, tem-
porarily suspending the formidable issues of full generality, formalism, and symbol-
ism”, making them more accessible to students (p. 56). 
 3.2.2  Structuring Mathematical Proofs 
 Instead of presenting a generic proof and letting students write out the general proof, 
one might try presenting a proof differently. Proofs are normally presented in 
lectures or advanced textbooks in a step-by-step linear fashion, which is well suited 
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for checking the proof’s validity but is perhaps not as good for communicating its 
main ideas. 
 Leron  ( 1983 ) has suggested that one might arrange and present a proof in levels, 
proceeding from the top down, where the top level gives the proof’s main ideas in 
general, but precise, terms. The second level elaborates on the top level ideas, sup-
plying both proofs for as yet unsubstantiated statements and more details, including 
the construction of objects whose existence had merely been asserted before. If the 
second level is complicated, one may give only a brief description there, and push 
the details down to lower levels. The top level is normally short and free of technical 
details, whilst the bottom level is quite detailed, resembling a standard linear proof. 
Leron  ( 1983 ) gave three sample structured proofs: one from number theory, one 
from calculus, and one from linear algebra. 
 An instructor might use structured proofs in several ways: (a) to present the 
higher levels of the proof and let the students complete the lower levels; (b) to have 
students take a standard textbook proof and fi nd its structure; (c) to give students 
two similar theorems and have them determine to what level the similarity extends, 
counting from the top down. However, no empirical studies have yet substantiated 
that structured proof presentations are easier for students to comprehend (Mejia-
Ramos et al.  2011 ) . 
 3.3  Making Expectations Clear When Students Are Asked 
to Construct Their own Proofs 
 Sometimes students do not know what they should produce when asked to “explain”, 
“demonstrate”, “show”, “justify” or “prove”. Teachers and textbooks may not make 
this clear and may use different modes of argumentation (visual, intuitive, etc.) at 
different times, leaving students confused about which behaviour to imitate. 
However, sometimes the students just don’t have facility with mathematical lan-
guage. Dreyfus  ( 1999 , p. 88) gives the example of a fi rst-year linear algebra student 
who was asked to determine whether the following statement was true or false and 
explain.  If {v 
 1 
 , v 
 2 
 , v 
 3 
 , v 
 4 
 } is a linearly independent set, then {v 
 1 
 , v 
 2 
 , v 
 3 
 } is also a lin-
early independent set. The student’s answer was “True because taking down a vec-
tor does not help linear dependence”. Possibly, the student understood, but the use 
of “taking down” and “help” points to a lack of linguistic capability and left the 
teacher to speculate on the extent of that student’s understanding. On the other hand, 
sometimes students give a step-by-step account, somewhat like a travelogue, of how 
a problem was solved or a proof generated, which is not what most teachers want. 
Students also give redundant explanations. 
 Mejia-Ramos and Inglis  ( 2011 ) , in a study of 220 U.S. undergraduate mathemat-
ics students who were given arguments to evaluate, found that students responded 
differently to the noun “proof” than to the verb “prove”. The noun form elicited 
evaluations related to an argument’s validity, whereas the verb form elicited evalua-
tions related to how convincing the argument was. 
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 Duval (summarised in Dreyfus  1999 ) distinguished explanation, argumentation, 
and proof. The function of explanation is descriptive – to answer why something is 
so. Both arguments and proofs provide reasons that must be free of contradictions. 
However, in argumentation, the semantic content of the reasons is important. For 
proofs, the structure and the content determine the truth of the claim. Douek  ( 1999 ) , 
commenting on Duval’s distinction, added that argumentation allows for a wider 
range of reasoning than proof; not only deduction but also metaphor and analogy 
can be used. 
 Professors also need to be exemplary in their use of quantifi ers. Chellougui 
 ( 2004 ) , in a study involving 97 fi rst-year Tunisian mathematics and informatics 
university students, observed that many different formulations of quantifi cation 
were used in the same textbook or by the same teacher. Sometimes quantifi ers 
remained implicit; sometimes they were used very strictly; sometimes they were 
used incorrectly as shorthand, even by teachers who did not accept such usage from 
their students. 
 3.4  Alternative Methods of Assessing Students’ Comprehension 
of Proofs 
 3.4.1  Writing to Learn About Proofs and Proving 
 Writing to learn mathematics is not a new idea; Ganguli and Henry  ( 1994 ) produced 
an annotated bibliography on the topic. Kasman  ( 2006 ) uses the following tech-
nique in both modern algebra and introductory proofs courses. Students are given a 
fi ctitious scenario of two students discussing how they are going to construct a 
proof, along with their fi nal written proof. Students then write a short expository 
paper stating whether the fi ctional proof is valid, identifying any errors in it, com-
menting on whether the fi ctitious students had the right idea but were not expressing 
it well, deciding which fi ctional student had a better understanding, and justifying 
their own reactions. Kasman provided sample scenarios, advice for writing more 
scenarios, suggestions for specifi c directions to give to students in order to get 
thoughtful reactions, and suggestions for grading. 
 3.4.2  Testing Proof Comprehension via a Variety of Questions 
 Conradie and Frith  ( 2000 ) have pointed out that mid-term tests and fi nal examina-
tions given by the Mathematics Department of the University of Cape Town in 
South Africa have successfully used proof comprehension tests for at least 9 years. 
In such tasks, students are given a proof of a theorem that has already been proven 
in class. This is followed by questions like: What method of proof is used here? 
How are the terms and functions defi ned? What assumptions are justifi able? 
Variations include: having students fi ll in gaps in a proof or asking how the proof 
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would be affected if condition  X were replaced by condition  Y . The authors argued 
that such tests motivate students to understand the proofs presented in the course 
rather than just to memorise them; and give a clear evaluation of a student’s under-
standing. Furthermore, students can be prepared for such comprehension tests by 
giving them similar exercises as homework. Finally, the students preferred this type 
of test to the usual requests for the reproduction of proofs. 
 However, as reported by Mejia-Ramos and Inglis  ( 2009 ) , to date there has been 
little mathematics education research on the comprehension of proofs as compared 
with that on the construction and validation of proofs. 
 3.5  Videos About Proofs and Proving to Use with Students 
 Raman et al.  ( 2009 ) have produced videos of undergraduate students engaged in 
proving theorems that many students fi nd diffi cult, along with materials to help 
tertiary teachers use those videos with their own students. The intent is for students 
who view the videos to refl ect on their own thinking by discussing and refl ecting on 
the thinking of the students in the videos. These materials have been tested at four 
U.S. universities in transition-to-proof courses (see Sect.  3.1.1 ). In the process of 
creating these videos, Raman et al.  ( 2009 ) identifi ed three signifi cant “moments” in 
constructing a proof: getting a  key idea that gives one a sense of why the theorem 
might be true; discovering a  technical handle needed to translate that key idea into 
a written proof; and putting the proof in fi nal  standard form with an appropriate 
level of rigour. However, successfully negotiating one or two of these moments does 
not guarantee completing the other(s). 
 Such videos could be used in relatively small classes where discussion is possi-
ble, but not realistically in large classes. Alcock  ( 2009a ) , who routinely teaches real 
analysis to classes of over 100, has developed an alternate video technique, called 
 e-Proofs . Eight analysis theorems (also proved in lectures) were elucidated by vid-
eos with line-by-line explanations of the reasoning used and a breakdown into large-
scale structural sections. Students could replay particular sections as often as they 
wished. The aim was to improve students’ comprehension of theorems proved in 
class. Alcock and others are now working on an e-Proofs authoring tool called 
ExPOUND, a project of the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) part of 
the U.K. Higher Education Funding Council. 
 3.6  Resources About Proof and Proving for Mathematicians 
 3.6.1  A DVD of Students Constructing Proofs 
 Alcock  ( 2009b ) has a DVD, designed to provide mathematicians with an  opportunity 
to watch undergraduate mathematics students attempting to construct two proofs, 
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one on upper bounds of sets of real numbers, the other on increasing functions and 
maxima. The students’ proof attempts are broken up into excerpts, with prompts at 
the end of each excerpt designed to facilitate refl ection or group discussion. The 
DVD also contains additional material for those wishing to follow up on these ideas 
in the mathematics education research literature. 
 3.6.2  Two Booklets Incorporating Ideas from Mathematics 
Education Research 
 Nardi and Iannone  ( 2006 ) have a concise booklet designed for teachers of fi rst-year 
U.K. undergraduates. There are sections on conceptualising formal reasoning, 
“proof” by example, proof by counterexample, proof by mathematical induction, and 
proof by contradiction. Each section contains examples of actual students’ written 
responses, some relevant mathematics education research fi ndings, some suggested 
pedagogical practices, and references to the research literature. 
 Alcock and Simpson  ( 2009 ) produced a booklet containing chapters on the dis-
tinction between a student’s concept image and the formal concept defi nition; on the 
difference between thinking of a mathematical notion, as a process or as an object; 
and on the distinction between semantic and syntactic reasoning strategies in prov-
ing. Whilst both strategies are useful in proving, some students seem to prefer one 
over the other (see Sect.  2.3.7 ). 
 3.6.3  Other Resources 
 The Mathematical Association of America’s Special Interest Group on Research in 
Undergraduate Mathematics Education has produced a “research into practice” vol-
ume, in which researchers describe their research in an expository way for mathe-
maticians (Carlson and Rasmussen  2008 ) . The volume includes fi ve chapters on 
proving theorems (pp. 93–164). Also discussed in the volume are fi ndings regarding 
students’ learning of concepts, information on teacher knowledge, strategies for 
promoting student learning, and classroom and institutional norms and values. 
Other attempts to bring such information to mathematicians include sessions at pro-
fessional meetings, such as those of the American Mathematical Society and the 
Mathematical Association of America. 
 In addition, the International Commission on Mathematical Instruction has pro-
duced a study volume (Holton  2001 ) with sections on the secondary/tertiary inter-
face, teaching practices, uses of technology, project work, assessment, mathematics 
education research and proof. 
 The extent to which these resources have been consulted by, and are found to be 
useful by, those teaching proof and proving to tertiary students needs more 
investigation. 
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 4  Summary and Questions for Future Research 
 For a variety of reasons, students often fi nd the transition to tertiary level  mathematics 
study diffi cult. These reasons can include an expectation of greater student auton-
omy, a change in the nature of the objects studied, and the seeming unapproachability 
of professors. However, one of the major reasons for students’ diffi culties seems to 
be the requirement that they understand and construct proofs. A variety of diffi cult 
aspects confront tertiary students struggling with proof and proving: the proper use 
of logic; the necessity to employ formal defi nitions; the need for a repertoire of 
examples, counterexample, and nonexamples; the requirement for a deep under-
standing of concepts and theorems; the need for strategic knowledge of important 
theorems, and the important ability to validate one’s own and others’ proofs. 
 In addition, there are ways to teach proof other than by presenting proofs in a 
fi nished, linear top-down fashion. One can use generic proofs or employ structured 
proofs. There are a variety of courses and strategies that may help: transition-to-
proof courses, communities of practice, the Moore Method, the co-construction of 
proofs, and the method of scientifi c debate. There are also resources in the form of 
videos, DVDs, and books to help university teachers. 
 Despite this, many questions remain about how students at tertiary level come to 
understand and construct proofs and how university teachers might help them do so. 
Here are some issues that could be, but have not yet been, the object of much research.
 1.  How instructors’ expectations about tertiary students’ performance in proof-
based mathematics courses, such as real analysis or abstract algebra, differ from 
those in courses students have previously experienced. 
 2.  To what extent tertiary instructors use the ability to construct proofs as a measure 
of a student’s understanding. 
 3.  How effective tertiary instructors’ proof presentations are. 
 4.  Whether there are effective ways to use technology, such as clickers and comput-
ers, to help tertiary students learn to construct proofs. 
 5.  What amount and types of conceptual knowledge are directly useful in making 
proofs in subjects such as abstract algebra and real analysis. 
 6.  How tertiary students conceive of theorems, proofs, axioms, and defi nitions, and 
the relationships amongst them. 
 7.  Whether and how teaching proof to future mathematics teachers should differ 
from teaching proof to future mathematicians or students of other mathematics-
oriented disciplines. 
 8.  How secondary preservice teachers can acquire the abilities necessary to effec-
tively teach argumentation, proof, and proving to their future pupils. 
 9.  Which previous experiences have students had with argumentation and proof 
that tertiary teachers can and should take into consideration. 
 Acknowledgements  Thanks to Michèle Artigue, Michael de Villiers, and Tommy Dreyfus for 
their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft and to Kerry McKee for her input on two-column 
geometry proofs. 
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 Discussions amongst mathematics educators on how to teach proof touch on many 
issues of importance to those working on the history of mathematical proof in the 
ancient world: How does generality matter when carrying out a proof? What is 
transparency for a proof? What is the connection between solving a problem and 
proving? All these questions are relevant to discussions of ancient source materials 
and call for further exchanges between Mathematics Education and History of 
Mathematics. That the two disciplines share such common questions clearly indi-
cates why we may expect those exchanges to be fruitful. 
 As a historian of mathematics in ancient China, specifi cally interested in the 
subject of proof, I offer here some source material for further discussion between 
the two disciplines with at least two agenda in mind. One is to show that proofs 
existed in ancient China. It is quite important, in the world in which we now live, 
to convey to students that mathematical proof was not merely a Western product but 
has roots in many different parts of the planet. Second, I shall also suggest that 
mathematical source material from ancient China provides interesting ideas for 
teaching aspects of proof in the classroom, specifi cally algebraic proof. I shall focus 
on documents that, as far as I know, show types of proof specifi c to China, at least 
in early times, and represent an early history of algebraic proof, whose relation to 
later history awaits further research. These proofs are specifi c but have a universal 
dimension. 
 Let me outline some elements of context in order to introduce my sources. The 
earliest known Chinese mathematical book that was handed down through the 
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written tradition is  The Nine Chapters on Mathematical Procedures (henceforward, 
 The Nine Chapters ). Specialists still dispute the date of this book’s completion, but 
the book probably took the form in which we can read it at the latest in the fi rst 
century C.E.  The Nine Chapters is in the main composed of problems and general 
algorithms solving them. From early on, Chinese scholars considered the book a 
‘Classic.’ Some wrote commentaries on it. Liu Hui completed the earliest extant 
commentary in 263 C.E., the document in which we are interested here. No ancient 
edition of  The Nine Chapters has survived without Liu Hui’s commentary, indicat-
ing that the Classic was always read in relation to commentaries selected by the 
compilers to be handed down with it. 1 
 In contrast to  The Nine Chapters , Liu Hui’s commentary not only contains prob-
lems and algorithms but also includes refl ections on mathematics, philosophical 
developments and, more important, proofs that systematically establish that the 
algorithms given in the Classic are correct. This commentary is the earliest extant 
source material handed down from ancient China in which one fi nds explicit proofs. 
In contrast to, say, those in Euclid’s  Elements , these proofs are specifi c, in that they 
all prove the correctness of algorithms. This feature makes them interesting for the 
classroom, since today algorithms have become one of the subject matters with 
which mathematical teaching deals. 
 Proving the correctness of an algorithm means establishing that the algorithm 
yields the desired magnitude and an exact value for it (or an approximate value, in 
a sense that the proof must make clear — see below how Liu Hui handles the value 
for  p used in  The Nine Chapters ). We know that Liu Hui perceives part of his com-
mentary as proofs, because he regularly concludes them by recurring formulas such 
as “this is why one obtains the result [sought-for]”. Before I concentrate on one type 
of proof for which the commentary yields evidence, let me illustrate by example the 
kind of refl ections on mathematical objects introduced in  The Nine Chapters that 
the commentators develop. 
 Chapter  4 of  The Nine Chapters contains an algorithm to compute square roots. 
This algorithm relies on a decimal place-value system and yields the digits of the 
root one by one, starting from the one corresponding to the highest power of 10. 
At the end of this algorithm, however, we fi nd an interesting assertion: “If, by 
extraction, the [number] is not exhausted, that means that one cannot extract the [its] 
root, hence, one must name it [i.e., the number] with ‘side’.” Several historians 
independently established that the meaning of the latter clause amounts to suggesting 
that, in such cases, the result be given as “square root of” the number whose root is 
sought for. The argument relies on Liu Hui’s commentary on the sentence quoted 
 1  Chemla and Guo Shuchun  ( 2004 ) present a critical edition and a French translation of  The Nine 
Chapters and the two ancient commentaries with which it was handed down. The book also con-
tains a complete bibliography and discussion of all statements made here about  The Nine Chapters 
and the commentaries, except those incorporating results published after the book’s publication. 
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above. More important, Liu Hui comments on why  The Nine Chapters ought to 
yield the result in such cases in the form of quadratic irrationals. 
 To introduce this refl ection, Liu Hui fi rst considers a way of giving the result of 
root extraction as a quantity of the type of an integer increased by a fraction, but 
then discards this possibility. He asserts: “One cannot determine its value [i.e., the 
value of the root].  Therefore, it is only when “one names it [i.e., the number  N ]  with 
‘side’” that one does not make any mistake [or,  that there is no error ]” (my empha-
ses). This assertion leads him to make explicit the constraints that, he thinks, the 
result of the root extraction should satisfy and thus the reason why  The Nine 
Chapters gives the result as the book does. He writes:  “ Every time one extracts the 
root of a number-product [a number that has been produced by a multiplication]  to 
make the side of a square, the multiplication of this side by itself must in return 
 restore [this number-product]” (my emphasis). 
 Thus Liu Hui sees a relationship between the way in which the result should be 
given and a property that operations must have. The result to be used is the one that 
guarantees a property for a sequence of reverse operations. In fact, he establishes 
here a link between the kinds of numbers to be used as results and the possibility of 
transforming a sequence of two reverse operations. For him, the exactness of the 
result of the square root extraction ensures the fact that the sequence of two reverse 
operations annihilates their effects and restores the original data; this sequence can 
thereby be deleted. 
 Having emphasised the importance of this connection, Liu Hui goes on to stress 
that the same link between one’s achieving exact results and reverse operations 
cancelling each other holds true in other cases. He writes: “ This is analogous to  the 
fact, when one divides  10 by 3, to take its rest as being 1/3 , one is hence again able 
to restore [ fu ] its value” (my emphases). This statement also shows the perspective 
from which Liu Hui fi nds a similarity between quadratic irrationals and integers 
with fractions, despite his understanding, made explicit in other parts of his com-
mentary, that, as kinds of numbers, they differ. He compares the fact of yielding the 
result of a root extraction as a quadratic irrational and that of giving the result of 
division with fractions. It is, he stresses, also when the result of divisions are given 
as exact, in the form of integers increased by a fraction, that the reverse operation of 
multiplication restores the number originally divided. Such are the kind of refl ec-
tions the commentators made on mathematics and on  The Nine Chapters . Note how 
different Liu Hui’s perspective on quadratic irrationals is from the one expressed in 
Greek texts, whether Plato’s  Theaetetus or Book 10 of Euclid’s  Elements. 
 The property of reverse operations that Liu Hui stressed in his commentary 
brings us back to the issue of proof, and precisely to the type of proof on which I 
concentrate here. This appears clearly, when one looks for places in the commentar-
ies where that property is put into play. One fi nds that the property – the operation 
inverse to a square root extraction or a division  restores ( fu ) the original number and 
the meaning of the magnitude to which the extraction or the division was applied – 
is mentioned  only in relation to these proofs which I have designated “algebraic 
proof in an algorithmic context.” 
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 Let me clarify what I mean by that expression. 2 Problem 5.28 in  The Nine 
Chapters gives the values of the volume ( V ) of a circular cylinder and its height 
( h ), asking one to determine the value of the circumference of its basis ( C ). The 
algorithm formulated after the problem asserts that the following list of operations 
yields the result 3 : 
 2  For more extensive argumentation and a discussion of other cases, see Chemla  ( in press ) . 
 3  I represent the algorithm as follows: On the left of an arrow, appear the data entered in an opera-
tion and, under the arrow, the operation applied. Two successive arrows indicate that the results 
yielded by the left operation are entered as terms in the right operation. 
 4  It is only when one uses this value for  p that one can explain why the factor appearing in the 
algorithm is 12. The key point is that the area of a circle, whose circumference is  C , is equal to 
 C 2 /4 p .  The Nine Chapters uses this value of  p throughout the book. 
 In his commentary, Liu Hui establishes that this algorithm correctly yields 
the result, that is to say, he makes clear why this list of operations yields the 
correct result. He does so, within the framework of the hypothesis that the authors 
of  The Nine Chapters used a value for  p equal to 3. 4 The reasoning he unfolds is 
essential to argue the above thesis. He starts from an algorithm that he had 
proved correct earlier in his commentary. This algorithm computes the volume 
of a cylinder, when one has the values of the circumference of its base and its 
height. It reads as follows: 
 In order to prove that the initial algorithm given after problem 5.28 is correct, Liu 
Hui must establish that it yields the circumference  C . In other terms, the question is 
to determine the meaning of the following sequence of operations applied to  V : 
 Liu Hui approaches the problem by making clear which magnitude and which 
value each of the operations of the algorithm to be proved correct yields; in his own 
terms, he determines in turn the “intention,” the “meaning” (in Chinese,  yi) of each 
operation. He does so by relying on the analysis of  V provided by the algorithm 
whose correctness he has already established. 
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 The meaning of the result of the fi rst two steps can be determined as follows: 
then 
 In this reasoning, Liu Hui successively applies the operation inverse to the last 
operation which produced the result for each in a sequence of algorithms. Doing so, 
he states, restores the meaning and value of the last intermediary step. This state-
ment is correct, because, in Liu Hui’s terms, in the examples above multiplying by 12 
 restores that to which the division by 12 had been applied. Thereafter, dividing 
by  h restores that to which multiplying by  h had been applied. The property that the 
operations cancel each other is put into play in the reasoning. This property allows 
Liu Hui to formulate the meaning and value of each of the successive operations. 
 Now, again, because of the property of square root discussed, we have: 
 At this point, the meaning of the result of the following algorithm is 
established: 
 This is how the correctness of the algorithm is established. In the case of prob-
lem 5.28, the inverse operations successively applied are a multiplication, a division 
and a squaring. At each step, Lui Hui stresses that “restoring” was achieved. The 
“restoring” occurs correctly, because of the fact that exact results were secured for 
each operation. 
 This example illustrates the relationship between the property of numbers which 
permits restoration and the conduct of a kind of argumentation that relies on lists of 
operations and transforms them into other lists of operations in order to establish the 
correctness of an algorithm. The argument goes as follows: 
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 Therefore:
  
212V .C h=    
 Thus:
  
2 12 /C V h=   





 These transformations are correct for exactly the same reasons as those Lui 
Hui made explicit. This fact explains why there is a correlation between this 
property shared by various kinds of numbers and the conduct of such types of 
proof. The kind of argument developed by Liu Hui in such cases, within an algo-
rithmic context, corresponds to an algebraic proof. Further, Liu Hui accounts 
for the correctness of the steps of this proof – the transformations of lists of 
operations – through his commentary on the necessary exactness of the results of 
the operations involved. This is how he can establish the meaning ( yi ) of the 
result of a list of operations. 
 One can derive several conclusions from the outline above. First, what was pre-
sented suggests questions about the history of mathematical proof. The argument 
above, amongst others (see Chemla and Guo Shuchun,  2004 ; Chemla  in press ) 
raises the issue of the part played in the history of mathematical proof by the activ-
ity of proving the correctness of algorithms. Research on this question has just 
begun; one hopes to have clearer answers to the question in the near future. In the 
example here, we have seen how proof and algorithm interacted. The proof is con-
stituted by an algorithm and by transformations of this algorithm as well as by the 
interpretation of the successive results that the algorithms allow. The algorithms 
entering into the proof and the algorithm to be proved have interesting relationships 
that provoke further thought. 
 Second, to come back to the introduction to this note, these algorithmic ver-
sions of algebraic proofs appear as potentially fruitful tools to help students 
work with, or even think about, algebraic proof. The practice of keeping track 
of the meaning of operations along an algorithm, of pondering transformations 
of algorithms  qua algorithms of the type encountered above, of bringing to light 
the relationship between the set of numbers with which one operates and the 
correctness of transformations applied to lists of operations: all these proce-
42918 Using Documents from Ancient China to Teach Mathematical Proof
dures for which the Chinese sources provide evidence offer ideas for teaching 
algebraic proofs. 
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 There is something about mathematics that is universal, irrespective of race, culture or 
social context. For instance, no mathematician will accept the following “proof”, offered 
as a “joke-proof” by Oscar Perron (1880–1975) but not without pedagogical purpose:
 “Theorem”: 1 is the largest natural number. 
 “Proof”: Suppose N is the largest natural number, then  N  2 cannot exceed  N , so 
 2N(N 1) N N- = -  is not positive. This means that  N 1-  is not positive, or that N 
cannot exceed 1. But  N is at least 1. Hence,  N 1=  . Q.E.D. 
 Likewise, well-known paradoxes on argumentation exist in both the Western and 
the Eastern world. The famous Liar Paradox, embodied in the terse but intriguing 
remark “I am a liar”, is ascribed to the fourth century B.C.E. Greek philosopher 
Eubulides of Miletus. A similar fl avour is conveyed in the famous shield-and-halberd 
story told by the Chinese philosopher Hon Fei Zi (Book 15, Section XXXVI, 
 Hon Fei Zi , c. third Century B.C.E.):
 “My shields are so solid that nothing can penetrate them.  My halberds are so sharp that they 
can penetrate anything.” 
 “How about using your halberds to pierce through your shields?” 
 In the Chinese language the term “ mao dun ”, literally “halberd and shield”, is 
used to mean “contradiction”. Indeed, Hon Fei Zi used this story as an analogy to 
prove that the Confucianist School was inadequate while the Legalist School was 
effective and hence superior. 1 His proof is by  reductio ad absurdum . 
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special ability and high virtue of the ruler who set an exemplar to infl uence the people. In particular, 
the story of shields and halberds was employed to stress that the two legendary leaders, Yao and 
Shun, whom the Confucianist School extolled as sage-kings, could not be both held in high regard. 
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 In his book  A Mathematician’s Apology , English mathematician Godfrey Harold 
Hardy (1877–1947) said that “ reductio ad absurdum , which Euclid loved so much, 
is one of a mathematician’s fi nest weapons” (Hardy  1940/1967 , p. 94). Many people 
are led by this remark to see the technique of proof by contradiction as a Western 
practice, even to the extent that they wonder whether the technique is closely related 
to Greek, and hence Western, culture. I was once asked whether Chinese students 
would have inherent diffi culty in learning proof by contradiction, because such 
argumentation was absent from traditional Chinese mathematics. My immediate 
response was that this learning diffi culty shows up in a majority of students, Chinese 
or non-Chinese, and does not seem to be related to a student’s cultural background. 
Nonetheless, this query urged me to look for examples of proof by contradiction in 
traditional Chinese thinking. Since then, I have gathered some examples, many of 
which are in a non-mathematical context. One mathematical presentation that 
approaches a proof by contradiction is Liu Hui’s (c. third century C.E.) argument in 
his commentary on Chapter 1 of  Jiu Zhang Suan Shu ( Nine Chapters on the 
Mathematical Art ) explaining why the ancients were wrong in taking 3 to be the 
ratio of the perimeter of a circle to its diameter (Siu  1993 , p. 348). Still, I have not 
yet found a written proof in an ancient Chinese text that recognisably follows prom-
inently and distinctly the Greek fashion of  reductio ad absurdum . 
 However, the notion of a proof is not so clear-cut when it comes to different 
cultures as well as different historical epochs. Mathematics practised in different 
cultures and in different historical epochs may have its respective different styles 
and emphases. For the sake of learning and teaching it will be helpful to study such 
differences. 
 Unfortunately, many Western mathematicians have come to regard Eastern math-
ematical traditions as not ‘real’ mathematics. For example, take Hardy’s assessment:
 The Greeks were the fi rst mathematicians who are still ‘real’ to us to-day. Oriental mathe-
matics may be an interesting curiosity, but Greek mathematics is the real thing. The Greeks 
fi rst spoke a language which modern mathematicians can understand; as Littlewood said to 
me once, they are not clever schoolboys or ‘scholarship candidates’, but ‘Fellows of another 
college’. (Hardy  1940/1967 , pp. 80–81) 
 However, proper study of the different traditions leads one to disagree with 
Hardy’s assessment. 
 A typical example of the cross-cultural difference in style and emphasis is the age-old 
result known in the Western world as Pythagoras’ Theorem. Compare the proof given in 
Proposition 47, Book I of Euclid’s  Elements (c. third century B.C.E.) (Fig.  19.1 ) and that 
given by the Indian mathematician Bhaskara in the twelfth century C.E. (Fig.  19.2 ). The 
former is a deductive argument with justifi cation provided at every step. The latter is a 
visually clear dissect-and-reassemble procedure, so clear that Bhaskara found it ade-
quate to simply qualify the argument by a single word, “Behold!” 
 The notion of proof permeates other human endeavour in the Western world. 
Indeed, one fi nds the following passage in Book1.10 in  Institutio Oratoria by 
Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (First century C.E.):
 Geometry [Mathematics] is divided into two parts, one dealing with Number, the other with 
Form. Knowledge of numbers is essential not only to the orator, but to anyone who has had 
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 Fig. 19.1  Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’ theorem 
 Fig. 19.2  Bhaskara’s proof 
of Pythagoras’ theorem 
even a basic education. (…) In the fi rst place, order is a necessary element in geometry; is 
it not also in eloquence? Geometry proves subsequent propositions from preceding ones, 
the uncertain from the certain: do we not do the same in speaking? Again: does not the solu-
tion of the problems rest almost wholly on Syllogisms? (…) Finally, the most powerful 
proofs are commonly called “linear demonstrations”. And what is the aim of oratory if not 
proof? Geometry also uses reasoning to detect falsehoods which appear like truths. (…) So, 
if (as the next book will prove) an orator has to speak on all subjects, he cannot be an orator 




 Stephen Toulmin, in examining “how far logic  can hope to be a formal science, 
and yet retain the possibility of being applied in the critical assessment of actual 
arguments” (Toulmin  1958 , p.3), opines that one source from which the notion of 
proof arose is argument on legal matters. He propounds a need for a rapprochement 
between logic and epistemology, for a re-introduction of historical, empirical and 
even anthropological considerations into the subject which philosophers have prided 
themselves on purifying:
 The patterns of argument in geometrical optics, for instance (…) are distinct from the pat-
terns to be found in other fi elds: e.g. in a piece of historical speculation, a proof in the infi ni-
tesimal calculus, or the case for the plaintiff in a civil suit alleging negligence. Broad 
similarities there may be between arguments in different fi elds, (…) it is our business, how-
ever, not to insist on fi nding such resemblances at all costs but to keep an eye open quite as 
much for possible differences. (Toulmin  1958 , p. 256) 
 This year (2009) is the 200th anniversary of the birth of the great English naturalist 
Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and the 150th anniversary of the publication of  On the 
Origin of Species (1859). Not many may have noted what Darwin once said in his 
autobiography about mathematics:
 I attempted mathematics, and even went during the summer of 1828 with a private tutor 
(a very dull man) to Barmouth, but I got on very slowly. This work is repugnant to me, 
chiefl y from my not being able to see any meaning in the early steps in algebra. This impa-
tience was very foolish, and in after years I have deeply regretted that I did not proceed far 
enough at least to understand something of the great leading principles of mathematics, for 
men thus endowed seem to have an extra sense. (Darwin  1887 , Chapter II, Volume I, p. 46) 
 This kind of  extra sense shows up in another important historical fi gure, the 
American polymath Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790). He thought in a precise, 
rational way even about seemingly non-mathematical issues and used mathematical 
argument for a social debate (Pasles  2008 , Chapter 1, Chapter 4). 
 The same use of mathematical argument in other contexts also happens in the 
Eastern world. For example, the Indian-British scholar and recipient of the 1998 
Nobel Prize in Economics, Amartya Sen, presents an interesting discussion of the 
case in India in his book  The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, 
History and Identity (2005). 
 Next, I draw your attention to two styles in doing mathematics, using terms bor-
rowed from Peter Henrici (Henrici  1974 ) , who labels the two styles as “dialectic” and 
“algorithmic”. Broadly speaking, dialectic mathematics is a rigorously logical sci-
ence, in which “statements are either true or false and objects with specifi ed proper-
ties either do or do not exist.” (Henrici  1974 , p.80) On the other hand, algorithmic 
mathematics is a tool for solving problems, in which “we are concerned not only with 
the existence of a mathematical object but also with the credentials of its existence” 
(Henrici  1974 , p. 80). In a lecture (July, 2002), I attempted to synthesise the two 
aspects from a pedagogical viewpoint with examples from historical mathematical 
developments in Western and Eastern cultures. In this 19th ICMI Study Conference, 
I reiterated this theme, focusing on proof, and discussed how the two aspects comple-
ment and supplement each other in proof activity (Siu  2009b ) . A procedural (algo-
rithmic) approach helps to prepare more solid ground on which to build up conceptual 
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understanding; conversely, better conceptual (dialectical) understanding enables one 
to handle algorithms with more facility, or even to devise improved or new algo-
rithms. Like  yin and  yang in Chinese philosophy, these two aspects complement and 
supplement each other, each containing some part of the other. 
 Several main issues in mathematics education are rooted in understanding these 
two complementary aspects, “dialectic mathematics” and “algorithmic mathematics”. 
Those issues include: (1) procedural versus conceptual knowledge; (2) process ver-
sus object in learning theory; (3) computer versus computerless learning environ-
ments; (4) “symbolic” versus “geometric” emphasis in learning and teaching; and 
(5) “Eastern” versus “Western” learners/teachers. In a seminal paper, Anna Sfard 
explicates this duality and develops it into a deeper model of concept formation 
through interplay of the “operational” and “structural” phases (Sfard  1991 ) . 
 Tradition holds that Western mathematics, developed from that of the ancient 
Greeks, is dialectic, while Eastern mathematics, developed from that of the ancient 
Egyptians, Babylonians, Chinese and Indians, is algorithmic. Even if it holds an 
element of truth as a broad statement, under more refi ned examination this thesis is 
an over-simplifi cation. Karine Chemla has explained this point in detail (Chemla 
 1996 ) . I will discuss the issue with examples from Euclid’s  Elements . 
 Saul Stahl has summarised the ancient Greek’s contribution to mathematics:
 Geometry in the sense of mensuration of fi gures was spontaneously developed by many 
cultures and dates to several millennia B.C. The science of geometry as we know it, namely, 
a collection of abstract statements regarding ideal fi gures, the verifi cation of whose validity 
requires only pure reason, was created by the Greeks.  (Stahl  1993 , p. 1) 
 A systematic and organised presentation of this body of knowledge is found in 
Euclid’s  Elements . 
 Throughout history, many famed Western scholars have recounted the benefi t 
they received from learning geometry through reading Euclid’s  Elements or some 
variation thereof. For example, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) wrote in his 
autobiography:
 At the age of eleven, I began Euclid, with my brother as tutor. This was one of the great 
events of my life, as dazzling as fi rst love. (…) I had been told that Euclid proved things, 
and was much disappointed that he started with axioms. At fi rst, I refused to accept them 
unless my brother could offer me some reason for doing so, but he said, ‘If you don’t accept 
them, we cannot go on’, and as I wished to go on, I reluctantly admitted them  pro temp . 
(Russell  1967 , p. 36) 
 Another example, Albert Einstein (1879–1955), wrote in his autobiography:
 At the age of twelve I experienced a second wonder of a totally different nature: in a little 
book dealing with Euclidean plane geometry, which came into my hands at the beginning 
of a school year. (…) The lucidity and certainty made an indescribable impression upon me. 
(…) it is marvelous enough that man is capable at all to reach such a degree of certainty and 
purity in pure thinking as the Greeks showed us for the fi rst time to be possible in geometry. 
(Schilepp  1949 , pp. 9, 11) 
 That axiomatic and logical aspect of Euclid’s  Elements has long been stressed. 
However, reasoning put forth by S.D. Agashe  ( 1989 ) leads one to look at an 
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 alternative feature of the  Elements ; namely, right from the start metric geometry 
plays a key role, not just in the exposition but even in the motivation of the book’s 
design. In addition, there is a procedural fl avour to the reasoning. 
 For example, Proposition 14 of  Elements ,  Book II proposes, “To construct a 
square equal to a given rectilineal fi gure.” The problem of interest is to compare two 
polygons. To achieve the one-dimensional analogue, comparing two straight line 
segments, is easy; one simply overlays one segment on the other and checks whether 
one segment lies completely inside the other or whether the two are equal. This is in 
fact what Proposition 3 of  Book I attempts: “Given two unequal straight lines, to cut 
off from the greater a straight line equal to the less.” To justify the result, one relies 
on Postulates 1, 2 and 3. The two-dimensional problem is not so straightforward, 
except for the special case when both polygons are squares; in this case, one can 
compare their areas through a comparison of their sides, by placing the smaller 
square at the lower left corner of the larger square. Incidentally, here one needs to 
invoke Postulate 4. What Proposition 14 of  Book II sets out to do is to reduce the 
comparison of two polygons to that of two squares (Fig.  19.3 ). 
 The proof of Proposition 14 of  Book II can be divided into two steps: (1) con-
struct a rectangle equal (in area) to a given polygon (Fig.  19.4 ); (2) construct a 
square equal (in area) to a given rectangle (Fig.  19.5 ). Note that (1) is already 
explained through Propositions 42, 44 and 45 of  Book I , by triangulating the given 
polygon then converting each triangle into a rectangle of equal area. Incidentally, 
one has to rely on the famous (notorious?) Postulate 5 on (non-)parallelism to 
prove those results. To achieve the solution in (2), one makes the preliminary step 
of  converting the given rectangle into an L-shaped gnomon of equal area. This is 
 Fig. 19.3  Proposition 
14 of  Elements Book II 
 
43719 Proof in the Western and Eastern Traditions…
 Fig. 19.4  Construction 
of a rectangle equal (in area) 
to a given polygon 





illustrated in Proposition 5 of  Book II , “If a straight line be cut into equal and 
unequal segments, the rectangle contained by the unequal segment of the whole 
together with the square on the straight line between the points of section is equal 
to the square on the half.” 
 Proposition 5 of  Book II asserts that a certain rectangle is equal (in area) to a 
certain gnomon which is a square ( 2c  ) minus another square ( 2b  ). To fi nalise step 
(2), one must construct a square ( 2a  ) equal to the difference between two squares 
( 2 2c b-  ); or equivalently, the square ( 2c  ) is a sum of the two squares ( 2 2a b+  ). 
This leads naturally to Pythagoras’ Theorem, Proposition 47 of  Book I , which epito-
mises the interdependence between shape and number, between geometry and alge-
bra. (For an enlightening exposition of Pythagoras’ Theorem in Clairaut’s  Eléments 
de géométrie [1741, 1753], see (Siu  2009a , pp. 106–107)). In studying this problem 
to compare two polygons we see how algorithmic mathematics blends in with dia-
lectic mathematics in Book I and Book II of  Elements . 
 However, despite such evidence of parallels between the Western and Eastern 
mathematical traditions, some teachers hesitate to integrate history of mathematics 
with the learning and teaching of mathematics in the classroom. They cite their 
concern that students lack enough knowledge on culture in general to appreciate 
history of mathematics in particular. This is probably true, but one can look at the 
problem from the reverse, seeing the integration of history of mathematics into the 
day-to-day mathematics classes as an opportunity to let students know more about 
other cultures in general and other mathematical traditions in particular. They can 
thus come into contact with other variations in the development of proof and prov-
ing. Proof is such an important ingredient in a proper education in mathematics that 
we can ill afford to miss such an opportunity. 
 Earlier, I suggested (Siu  2008 ) four examples that might be used in such teach-
ing. The fi rst examines how the exploratory, venturesome spirit of the ‘era of 
exploration’ in the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries C.E. centuries infl uenced the 
development of mathematical practice in Europe. It resulted in a broad change of 
mentality in mathematical pursuit, not just affecting its presentation but, more 
important, bringing in an exploratory spirit. The second example deals with a 
similar happening in the Orient, though with more emphasis on the aspect of argu-
mentation. It describes the infl uence of the intellectual milieu in the period of the 
Three Kingdoms and the Wei-Jin Dynasties from the third to the sixth centuries 
C.E. in China on mathematical practice as exemplifi ed in the work of Liu Hui. 
The third example, the infl uence of Daoism on mathematics in ancient China, 
particularly astronomical measurement and surveying from a distance, examines 
the role religious, philosophical (or even mystical) teachings may play in mathe-
matical pursuit. The fourth example, the infl uence of Euclid’s  Elements in Western 
culture compared to that in China after the fi rst Chinese translation by the Ming 
Dynasty scholar-minister Xu Guang Qi (1562–1633) and the Italian Jesuit Matteo 
Ricci (1552–1610) in 1607 points out a kind of ‘reverse’ infl uence; namely, how 
the mathematical thinking may stimulate thinking in other areas of human endea-
vour. As a ‘bonus’, these examples sometimes suggest ways to enhance under-
standing of specifi c topics in the classroom. 
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 Finally, one benefi t of learning proof and proving is important but seldom 
 emphasised in Western education, namely, its value in character building. This point 
had been emphasised in the Eastern world rather early, perhaps as a result of the 
infl uence of the Confucian philosophical heritage. 
 In an essay on the Chinese translation of the  Elements , the co-translator Xu 
wrote:
 The benefi t derived from studying this book [the  Elements ] is many. It can dispel shallow-
ness of those who learn the theory and make them think deep. It can supply facility for those 
who learn the method and make them think elegantly. Hence everyone in this world should 
study the book. (…) Five categories of personality will not learn from this book: those who 
are impetuous, those who are thoughtless, those who are complacent, those who are envi-
ous, those who are arrogant. Thus to learn from this book one not only strengthens one’s 
intellectual capacity but also builds a moral base. (cited in Siu  ( 2009a , p. 110)) 
 Such emphasis on proof for a moral reason still sometimes echoes in modern 
times. As the late Russian mathematics educator Igor Fedorovich Sharygin (1937–2004) 
once put it, “Learning mathematics builds up our virtues, sharpens our sense of 
justice and our dignity, and strengthens our innate honesty and our principles. The 
life of mathematical society is based on the idea of proof, one of the most highly 
moral ideas in the world.” (cited in (Siu  2009a , p. 110)). 
 Acknowledgement  I wish to thank Gila Hanna, John Holt and Sarah-Jane Patterson for the careful 
editing of my contribution. 
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 Rationale 
 Mathematics educators face a signifi cant task in getting students to understand the 
roles of reasoning and proving in mathematics. This challenge has now gained 
even greater importance as proof has been assigned a more prominent place in the 
mathematics curriculum at all levels. The recent National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics  ( NCTM) Principles and Standards document and several other math-
ematics curricular documents have elevated the status of proof in school mathe-
matics in several educational jurisdictions around the world. 
 This renewed curricular emphasis on proof has provoked an upsurge in research 
papers on the teaching and learning of proof at all grade levels. This re-examination 
of the role of proof in the curriculum and of its relation to other forms of explana-
tion, illustration and justifi cation (including dynamic graphic software) has 
already produced several theoretical frameworks, giving rise to many discussions 
and even heated debates. An ICMI Study on this topic would thus be both useful 
and timely.
 An ICMI Study on proof and proving in mathematics education would necessarily 
discuss the different meanings of the term proof and bring together a variety of 
viewpoints. Proof has played a major role in the development of mathematics, from 
the Euclidean geometry of the Greeks, through various forms of proofs in different 
cultures, to twentieth-century formal mathematics based on set-theory and logical 
deduction. In professional mathematics today, proof has a range of subtly different 
meanings: for example, giving an axiomatic formal presentation; using physical 
conceptions, as in a proof that there are only fi ve Platonic solids; deducing conclusions 
from a model by using symbolic calculations; or using computers in experimental 
mathematics. For mathematicians, proof varies according to the discipline involved, 
although one essential principle underlies all its varieties: 
 To specify clearly the assumptions made and to provide an appropriate argument supported 
by valid reasoning so as to draw necessary conclusions. 
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 This major principle at the heart of proof extends to a wide range of situations 
outside mathematics and provides a foundation for human reasoning. Its simplicity, 
however, is disguised in the subtlety of the deep and complex phrases “to specify 
the assumptions clearly”, “an appropriate argument” and “valid reasoning”.
 The study will consider the role of proof and proving in mathematics education, 
in part as a precursor for disciplinary proof (in its various forms) as used by mathe-
maticians but mainly in terms of developmental proof, which grows in sophistication 
as the learner matures towards coherent conceptions. Sometimes the development 
involves building on the learners’ perceptions and actions in order to increase their 
sophistication. Sometimes it builds on the learners’ use of arithmetic or algebraic 
symbols to calculate and manipulate symbolism in order to deduce consequences. 
To formulate and communicate these ideas require a simultaneous development of 
sophistication in action, perception and language. 
 The study’s conception of “developmental proof” has three major features: 
 1.  Proof and proving in school curricula have the potential to provide a long-term 
link with the discipline of proof shared by mathematicians. 
 2.  Proof and proving can provide a way of thinking that deepens mathematical 
understanding and the broader nature of human reasoning. 
 3.  Proof and proving are at once foundational and complex, and should be gradually 
developed starting in the early grades. 
 A major classroom role for proof is essential to maintaining the connection 
between school mathematics and mathematics as a discipline. Although proof has 
not enjoyed the same degree of prominence in mathematical practice in all periods 
and contexts, and although standards of rigour have changed over time, proof 
undoubtedly lies at the heart of mathematics. 
 Similarly proof and proving are most properly used in the classroom to promote 
understanding, which in no way contradicts their role in mathematics. Mathematical 
proof consists, of course, of explicit chains of inference following agreed rules of 
deduction, and is often characterised by the use of formal notation, syntax and 
rules of manipulation. Yet clearly, for mathematicians proof is much more than a 
sequence of correct steps; it is also and, perhaps most importantly, a sequence of 
ideas and insights with the goal of mathematical understanding – specifi cally, 
understanding why a claim is true. Thus, the challenge for educators is to foster the 
use of mathematical proof as a method to certify not only that something is true but 
also why it is true. 
 Finally, the learning of proof and proving in school mathematics should be 
developmental and should start in the early grades. The success of this process 
would clearly depend on teachers’ views about the essence and forms of proofs, on 
what teachers do with their students in classrooms, on how teachers interpret and 
implement curricular tasks that have the potential to offer students opportunities 
to engage in proving, and on how they diagnose students’ diffi culties in proving 
and design instructional interventions to help overcome these diffi culties. 
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 Themes of the Study 
 The ICMI Study will be organised around themes that provide a broad range of 
points of view on the teaching and learning of proof in various contexts, whether 
symbolic, verbal, visual, technological or social. Within each of the themes, the fol-
lowing issues are of utmost importance:
 1.  Teachers’ views and beliefs 
 2.  Teachers’ preparation and professional development 
 3.  Curriculum materials and their role in supporting instruction 
 Below, we describe some of the themes and suggest a number of related research 
questions. Contributions on each theme should address these specifi c questions but 
need not be limited to them, so long as any additional questions raised are relevant 
to that theme. 
 Cognitive Aspects 
 Cognitive aspects of proof cover the entire development of proof and proving, from 
the young child to the research mathematician. They range from the manner in which 
the growing person develops a proving attitude to convince the self and others, 
through the initial use of specifi c examples, through prototypical numerical and 
visual examples representing broader classes of instances, to formal axiomatic proofs 
widely acceptable to the mathematical community. While proofs are considered 
either valid or invalid, the development of proof, both in the growing child and in the 
research of mathematicians, involves arguments that carry various levels of convic-
tion that are not absolute. For example, Tall’s framework of worlds – of conceptual 
embodiment, proceptual symbolism and axiomatic formalism – suggests a dynamic 
development of proof through embodiment and symbolism to formalism. For 
instance, the formula for the sum of the fi rst  n whole numbers can be proved from a 
specifi c or generic picture, from a specifi c, generic or algebraic sum, from a practical 
potentially infi nite form of induction, from a fi nite axiomatic form of induction from 
the Peano postulates, or even from a highly plausible visual demonstration. This part 
of the study will consider various theories of cognitive aspects of proof. 
 Possible questions about cognitive aspects: 
 1.  Is it possible/preferable to classify forms of proof in terms of  cognitive develop-
ment , rather than just in terms of  type of proof (e.g., by exhaustion, contradiction, 
induction)? 
 2.  When we classify proof cognitively, can we look from the learners’ viewpoint as 
they grow from the elementary grades to university, rather than just from the 
expert’s viewpoint, and appropriately value their current ways of proving? 
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 3.  How do we encompass empirical classifi cations of proof processes within a 
coherent cognitive development (which may differ for different individuals)? 
 4.  How can teachers and mathematics educators use our knowledge about learners’ 
cognitive development to develop ways of teaching proof that take account of 
each learner’s growing ways of proving? 
 5.  What are learners’ and teachers’ beliefs about proof, and how do they affect the 
teaching and learning of proof? 
 6.  What theoretical frameworks and methodologies are helpful in understanding 
the development of proof from primary to tertiary education, and how are these 
frameworks useful in teaching? 
 Argumentation and Proof 
 Understanding the relationship between argumentation (a reasoned discourse that is 
not necessarily deductive but uses arguments of plausibility) and mathematical 
proof (a chain of well-organized deductive inferences that uses arguments of neces-
sity) may be essential for designing learning tasks and curricula that aim at teaching 
proof and proving. Some researchers see mathematical proof as distinct from argu-
mentation, whereas others see argumentation and proof as parts of a continuum 
rather than as a dichotomy. Their different viewpoints have important didactical 
implications. The fi rst group would focus mainly on the logical organization of 
statements in a proof and would aim to teach a conceptual framework that builds 
proof independent of problem solving. On the other hand, the second group would 
focus primarily on the production of arguments in the context of problem solving, 
experimentation and exploration, but would expect these arguments to later be orga-
nized logically so as to form a valid mathematical proof. 
 From a very young age, students show high degrees of ability in reasoning and in 
justifying their arguments in social situations; however, they do not naturally grasp 
the concept of mathematical proof and deductive reasoning. Therefore, educators 
must help students to reason deductively and to recognize the value of the concept 
of mathematical proof. Some educators hold the traditional assumption that teach-
ing students elements of formal logic, such as fi rst-order logic with quantifi ers, 
would easily translate into helping them to understand the deductive structure of 
mathematics and to write proofs. However, research has shown that this transfer 
doesn’t happen automatically. It remains unclear what benefi t comes from teaching 
formal logic to students or to prospective teachers, particularly because mathemati-
cians have readily admitted that they seldom use formal logic in their research. 
Hence, we need more research to support or disconfi rm the notion that teaching 
students formal logic increases their ability to prove or to understand proofs. 
 Possible questions about argumentation and proof: 
  1.  How can we describe the argumentative discourses developed in mathematics 
teaching? What is the role of argumentation and proof in the conceptualization 
process in mathematics and in mathematics education? 
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  2.  Within the context of argumentation and proof, how should mathematics 
 education treat the distinction that logicians and philosophers make between 
truth and validity? 
  3.  To what extent could focussing on the mathematical concept of implication in 
both argumentation and proof contribute to students’ better grasp of various 
kinds of reasoning? 
  4.  How can educators make explicit the different kinds of reasoning used in math-
ematical proof and in argumentative discourse (e.g.,  Modus Ponens , exhaustion, 
disjunction of cases,  Modus Tollens , indirect reasoning etc.)? 
  5.  Quantifi cation, important in reasoning as well as in mathematics, often remains 
implicit. To what extent does this lead to misconceptions and to lack of 
understanding? 
  6.  How can teachers deal with the back-and-forth between conjectures and objects 
or between properties and relations involved in the exploration of mathematical 
objects? To what extent does this exploration help students understand the 
necessity of mathematical proof rather than just argumentation? 
  7.  Are we justifi ed in concluding that logic is useless in teaching and learning 
proof just because many mathematicians claim that they do not use logic in 
their research? What kind of research program could be developed to answer 
this question? 
  8.  What are the relationships between studies on argumentation and proof by 
researchers from other disciplines, e.g., logicians, philosophers, epistemolo-
gists, linguists, psychologists and historians, and research in mathematics 
education? 
  9.  What conditions and constraints affect the development of appropriate situa-
tions for the construction of argumentation and proof in the mathematics 
classroom? 
 10.  Which learning environments and activities help to improve students’ ability in 
argumentation and proof? 
 Types of Proof 
 Some aspects of the study might deal with types of proof characterized by their 
mathematical or logical properties, such as specifi c proof techniques, (e.g., proof 
by exhaustion, proof by mathematical induction, proof by contradiction) or proofs 
of specifi c types of claims (e.g., existence proofs, both constructive and non-
constructive). 
 These different types of proof (or techniques of proving) may have many diverse 
pedagogical properties and didactic functions in mathematics education. A case in 
point is inductive proof (proof by example), which is frequently the only type of 
proof comprehensible to beginners; it may be mathematically valid (e.g., for estab-
lishing existence or for refutation by counterexample) or invalid (e.g., supportive 
examples for a universal statement). Another type, generic (or transparent) proof, is 
infrequently used but may have high didactic potential. 
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 The various ways of proving, such as verbal, visual or formal, may be a factor in 
understanding proofs and in learning about proving in general. Specifi c proofs may 
lend themselves particularly well to specifi c ways of proving. 
 Possible questions about types of proof: 
 1.  To what extent, and at which levels of schooling, is it appropriate to introduce 
specifi c proof techniques? What are the particular cognitive diffi culties associ-
ated with each type of proof? 
 2.  Is it important to introduce proof in a diversity of mathematical domains and 
which proofs are more appropriate in which domains? 
 3.  At which level and in which curricula is it relevant to introduce the notion of 
refutation? In particular, when should one raise the question of what is needed to 
prove or refute an existential claim as opposed to a universal one? 
 4.  How and at which stage should teachers facilitate the transition from inductive 
proof (proof by example) to more elaborate forms of proof? 
 5.  What status should be given to generic proof? How can the properties of generic 
proofs be used to support students’ transition from inductive to deductive proof? 
 6.  At which level, and in which situations, should the issue of the mathematical 
validity or lack of validity of inductive proofs be discussed, and how? 
 7.  To what extent and how is the presentation of a proof (verbal, visual, formal etc.) 
relevant in understanding it and in learning about the notion of proof generally? 
 8.  To what extent is the presentation of a proof (in)dependent of the nature of the 
proof? Do some proofs lend themselves particularly well to specifi c presenta-
tions? For example, can visual theorems have non-visual proofs? 
 9.  Do students perceive different types of proofs as more or less explanatory or 
convincing? 
 Dynamic Geometry Software and Transition to Proof 
 Both philosophers and psychologists have investigated the connection between 
deductive reasoning and argumentation. However, there is still no consensus on the 
exact nature of this connection. Meanwhile some researchers have looked for pos-
sible mediators between plausible argumentation and mathematical proof. The 
main didactical problem is that at fi rst glance there seems to be no natural mediator 
between argumentation and proof. Hence, the problem of continuity or of discon-
tinuity between argumentation and proof is relevant for research and for teaching 
of proof. 
 Dynamic Geometry Software (DGS) fundamentally changes the idea of what a 
geometric object is. DGS can serve as a context for making conjectures about geo-
metric objects and thus lead to proof-generating situations. Specifi cally, it can play 
the role of mediator in the transition between argumentation and proof through its 
‘dragging function’, thanks to its instant feedback and to the fi gures created on the 
screen as a result of the dragging movements. The dragging function opens up new 
routes to theoretical knowledge within a concrete environment that is meaningful to 
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students. For example, it can introduce seemingly infi nite examples to support a 
conjecture or it can help in showing students degenerate examples or singular coun-
terexamples to a statement (e.g., when a given construction that works for building 
a fi gure degenerates into singular cases, producing a different fi gure). Moreover, 
while dragging, pupils often switch back and forth from fi gures to concepts and 
from abductive to deductive modalities, which helps them progress from the empiri-
cal to the theoretical level. The different modalities of dragging can be seen as a 
perceptual counterpart to logical and algebraic relationships. In fact, dragging makes 
the relationships between geometric objects accessible at several levels: perceptual, 
logical and algebraic. 
 Possible questions about DGS environments: 
 1.  To what extent can explorations within DGS foster a transition to the formal 
aspects of proof? What kinds of didactical engineering can trigger and enhance 
such support? What specifi c actions by students could support this transition? 
 2.  How could the issues of continuity/discontinuity among the different phases and 
aspects of the proving processes (exploring, conjecturing, arguing, proving etc.) 
be addressed in DGS environments? 
 3.  To what extent can activities within DGS environments inhibit or even counter 
the transition to formal aspects of proof? 
 4.  What are the major differences between proving within DGS environments and 
proving with paper and pencil? 
 5.  How can the teacher handle the different modalities of proving (induction, abduc-
tion, deduction etc.) that explorations in DGS environments may generate? 
 6.  How can DGS help in dealing with proofs by contradiction or proofs by example, 
given that through dragging one could get ‘infi nite examples’, degenerate exam-
ples or the singular counterexamples to a statement? 
 7.  How can DGS environments be used for approaching proofs not only in geom-
etry but also in other subjects, such as algebra and elementary calculus? 
 8.  What are the signifi cant differences among different DGSs used in teaching 
proof? 
 9.  What are the main differences between DGS environments and other techno-
logical environments (software other than DGS, concrete materials, mathemati-
cal machines, symbolic computation systems etc.) in tackling the issue of proof 
in the classroom? Can a multiple approach, which suitably integrates different 
environments, be useful for approaching proof? 
 The Role of Proof and Experimentation 
 The traditional view of proof has ignored the role of experimentation in mathemat-
ics and has perceived the verifi cation of mathematical statements as the only func-
tion of proof. However, in recent years several authors have emphasized the 
intimate relationship between proof and experimentation, as well as the many other 
important functions of proof within mathematics besides verifi cation: explanation, 
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discovery, intellectual challenge, systematization etc. Moreover, research in 
dynamic geometry has shown that, despite obtaining a very high level of convic-
tion by dragging, students in some contexts still display a strong cognitive need for 
an explanation of a result; that is, why it is true. Such a need gives a good reason 
for the introduction of proof as a means of explaining why a result is true. 
 However, not all new results in mathematics are discovered through experimenta-
tion. Deductive reasoning from certain givens can often directly lead to new conclu-
sions and to new discoveries through generalization or specialization. In this context, 
proof takes on a systematizing role, linking defi nitions, axioms and theorems in a 
deductive chain. Likewise, experimentation in mathematics includes some important 
functions relevant to proof: conjecturing, verifi cation, refutation, understanding, 
graphing to expose mathematical facts, gaining insights etc. For example, mathema-
ticians can formulate and evaluate concept defi nitions on the basis of experimenta-
tion and/or formal proof, as well as comparing and selecting suitable defi nitions on 
the basis of criteria such as economy, elegance, convenience, clarity etc. Suitable 
defi nitions and axioms are necessary for deductive proof in order to avoid circular 
arguments and infi nite regression. Thus, the establishment of a mathematical theo-
rem often involves some dynamic interplay between experimentation and proof. 
 The relationship between proof and experimentation poses a general didactical 
and educational research question: How can we design learning activities in which 
students can experience and develop appreciation for these multi-faceted, inter-
related roles of proof and experimentation? This in turn comprises several addi-
tional questions. 
 Possible questions about proof and experimentation: 
 1.  How can teachers effectively use the explanatory function of proof to make proof 
a meaningful activity, particularly in situations where students have no need for 
further conviction? 
 2.  How can students’ abilities to make their own conjectures, critically evaluate 
their validity through proof and experimentation, and produce counter-examples 
if necessary be stimulated and developed over time? 
 3.  How can teachers and mathematics educators develop effective strategies to help 
students see and appreciate the discovery function of proof – for example, deriv-
ing results deductively rather than experimentally or from deriving further unan-
ticipated results and subsequent refl ections on those proofs? 
 4.  What are students’ natural cognitive needs for conviction and verifi cation in dif-
ferent mathematical contexts, with different results and at different levels? How 
can these needs be utilized, changed and developed through directed instruc-
tional activities so that students appreciate the verifi cation function of proof in 
different contexts? 
 5.  What arguments can teachers use in school and university to foster students’ 
appreciation of the meaning of proof and to motivate students to prove 
theorems? 
 6.  What type of ‘guidance’ is needed to help students eventually produce their own 
independent proofs in different contexts? 
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 7.  Rather than just providing them with pre-fabricated mathematics, how do we 
involve students in the deductive systematization of some parts of mathematics, 
both in defi ning specifi c concepts and in axiomatizing a piece of mathematics? 
How able are students to identify circular arguments or invalid assumptions in 
proofs and how do we develop these critical skills? 
 Proof and the Empirical Sciences 
 Frequently, students do not see a connection between argumentation in empirical 
situations and mathematical proof. They consider proof a mathematical ritual that 
does not have any relevance to giving reasons and arguments in other circumstances 
or disciplines. However, mathematical proof is not only important in mathematics 
itself but also plays a considerable role in the empirical sciences that make use of 
mathematics. 
 Empirical scientists put up hypotheses about certain phenomena, say falling bod-
ies, draw consequences from these hypotheses via mathematical proof and investi-
gate whether the hypotheses fi t the data. If they do, we accept the hypotheses; 
otherwise we reject them. Thus, in the establishment of a new empirical theory the 
fl ow of truth provided by a mathematical proof goes from the consequences to the 
assumptions; the function of a proof is to test the hypotheses. Only at a later stage, 
after a theory has been accepted, does the fl ow of truth go from the assumptions to 
the consequences as it usually does in mathematics. These considerations suggest a 
series of questions for investigation. 
 Possible questions about proof and the empirical sciences: 
 1.  To what extent should mathematical proofs in the empirical sciences, such as 
physics, fi gure as a theme in mathematics teaching so as to provide students with 
an adequate and authentic picture of the role of mathematics in the world? 
 2.  Would insights about the role of proof in the empirical sciences be helpful in the 
teaching of geometry, given that geometry deals with empirical statements about 
the surrounding space as well as with a theoretical system about space? 
 3.  Could insights about the complex role of proof in the empirical sciences be 
helpful in bridging students’ perceptual gap between proof and proving in math-
ematics and argumentation in everyday life? 
 4.  To what extent and how should philosophers of mathematics, mathematics edu-
cators and teachers develop a unifi ed picture of proving and modelling, which 
are usually considered completely separate topics in mathematics? 
 5.  Could a stronger emphasis on the process of establishing hypotheses (in the 
empirical sciences) help students better understand the structure of a proof that 
proceeds from assumptions to consequences and thus the meaning of axiomatics 
in general? 
 6.  To what extent does a broader conception of proof require the collaboration of 
mathematics and science teachers? 
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 Proof at the Tertiary Level 
 At the tertiary level, proofs involve considerable creativity and insight as well as 
both understanding and using formal defi nitions and previously established theo-
rems. Proofs tend to be longer, more complex and more rigorous than those at ear-
lier educational levels. To understand and construct such proofs involves a major 
transition for students but one that is sometimes supported by relatively little explicit 
instruction. Teachers increasingly use students’ original proof constructions as a 
means of assessing their understanding. However, many questions remain about 
how students at the tertiary level come to understand and construct proofs. Here we 
lay some of the questions out clearly, proposing to examine them in the light of both 
successful teaching practices and current research. 
 Possible questions about proof at the tertiary level: 
 1.  How are instructors’ expectations about students’ performance in proof-based 
mathematics courses different from those in courses students experienced 
previously? 
 2.  Is learning to prove partly or even mainly a matter of enculturation into the 
practices of mathematicians? 
 3.  How do the students conceive theorems, proofs, axioms, defi nitions and the 
relationships among them? What are the students’ views of proof and how are 
their views infl uenced by their experiences with proving? 
 4.  What are the roles of problem solving, heuristics, intuition, visualization, proce-
dural and conceptual knowledge, logic and validation? 
 5.  What previous experiences have students had with proof that teachers can take 
into consideration? 
 6.  How can we design opportunities for student teachers to acquire the knowledge 
(skills, understandings and dispositions) necessary to provide effective instruc-
tion about proof and proving? 
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